Man of the Mountain

A Reason interview with Lebanon's Walid Jumblatt.

Iran weighs heavily on Walid Jumblatt's mind these days, as the paramount leader of Lebanon's Druze community answers questions in his mountain palace at Mukhtara, which he rarely leaves these days, fearing assassination by Syria. "In two weeks' time, [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is going to Damascus to sign a defense cooperation agreement," he told me. "Neocons are no longer in power in Washington, but you can find them in Tehran."

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Jumblatt has gone through several incarnations in recent months, as Lebanon seeks to break free from 29 years of hegemony imposed by Syria, following the Syrian military withdrawal from the country last April. He initially led opposition to the Syrians after the killing of Rafik Hariri on February 14, but Jumblatt was also instrumental in later cutting a deal with two pro-Syrian Shiite groups, Hezbollah and Amal, to protect their quota in parliamentary elections during the summer. This about-face earned him the hostility of many Christians, who felt the deal was directed against them. That is, until Jumblatt's latest turnaround, where he broke with Hezbollah, accusing it of supporting Syrian aims in Lebanon. This followed the assassination last month of journalist and parliamentarian Gebran Tueni, where it became clear to Jumblatt that no understanding was possible with the Syrian regime—though he might conceivably have considered a good one had it been offered.???????

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Jumblatt's binoculars perpetually sweep the region's political horizon to see what distant tremor might threaten his tiny 200,000-strong community—and his authority over it. This makes the Druze leader an insightful interpreter of the fluctuations in Middle Eastern politics—particularly issues of interest to the United States, such as Iranian-Syrian relations, Saudi-Egyptian maneuverings to save the Syrian regime, and the future of Hezbollah.

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Jumblatt's nightmare is that Syria will succeed in re-imposing its control over Lebanon, with Arab endorsement. Apart from what this would mean for Lebanon's newfound freedom, it would sound the death knell for Jumblatt. On the day we met, he was worried about a Saudi-Egyptian plan plainly designed to guarantee that the Hariri investigation would not undermine Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime. Why, I asked, had the Saudis altered course on Syria? After all, a week ago the former Syrian vice-president, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, appeared on the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya station lambasting Assad; a few days later, Saudi-owned media spiked several interviews with Khaddam, and Al-Arabiya cancelled a one-on-one with Jumblatt.

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"Bashar seems to have blackmailed the Saudis and Egyptians. He seems to have said 'It's either me or the Muslim Brotherhood' to the Egyptians; and he may have scared the Saudis by threatening them with Al-Qaeda, which he happens to be backing in Iraq."

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Were there other explanations for the sudden Saudi shift in direction? "There may be differences of opinion in the royal family," Jumblatt answered. He speculated that the foreign minister, Saud Al-Faysal, for decades the avatar of status-quo Arab politics, may be keener to sustain the Assad regime than another Saudi mediator with Damascus, Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the U.S. who now heads the kingdom's National Security Council.

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Jumblatt affirmed that the Saudi-Egyptian plan—which seeks to impose vaguely-defined "coordination" between Lebanon and Syria on a variety of bilateral issues, and to muzzle Lebanese media when it comes to matters Syrian—had "failed." For Jumblatt, "implementation of such a plan would take us back to where we were with the Syrians before they left."

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Why had the plan failed? "Because both [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice and [French President Jacques] Chirac have rejected any plan that might weaken Lebanon's sovereignty." Indeed, Rice released a statement on Wednesday saying: "The United States stands firmly with the people of Lebanon in rejecting any deals or compromises that would undermine the [Hariri] investigation, or relieve Syria of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions… As Resolution 1559 demands, Syria must once and for all end its interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon."

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Though Jumblatt helped torpedo the Saudi-Egyptian initiative, he seemed little reassured that the Arab states would not again seek to save Assad's bacon. For him, however, one way to undermine such efforts is to create an international tribunal "that alone would have the power to call in suspects involved in Hariri's assassination, like Bashar Assad." Jumblatt makes no bones about the fact that the Syrians ordered the murder. "The only problem with such a tribunal," he conceded, "is that it takes time." Plenty of time for assassinations in Lebanon to continue.

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Did Jumblatt believe the Americans were sincere in pushing for a thorough investigation of the Hariri murder and an end to bombings in Lebanon? "They keep telling us there is no deal [with Syria]. But Syria is not being put under serious pressure," he answered, insisting that the latest U.N. resolution on the Hariri investigation was not as strong as it should have been.

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The U.N. investigation is mandated by the Security Council. I asked Jumblatt, knowing his close ties with the former Soviet Union, whether he didn't fear a breakdown of the consensus in the council because of Russia's refusal, along with China's, to sanction Syria."Yes, there are those in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the army who defend Syria, and the Russians have received gas exploration contracts from Syria." Jumblatt also expressed skepticism that the investigating commission would soon ask the Syrian authorities to arrest Syrian suspects, as the former head of the commission, Detlev Mehlis, told me it would over a month ago: "I've heard this again and again; I will believe it when I see it," said Jumblatt, with a trace of exasperation.

The Iranian relationship with Hezbollah is also of great concern to Jumblatt, because Hezbollah is closely allied with Syria, is heavily armed, and because the Druze leader doesn't believe the Lebanese government can persuade the party to disarm. According to Resolution 1559—the September 2004 Security Council decision demanding a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon—Hezbollah and other militias in the country must surrender their weapons. However, Hezbollah's arms are there partly to help Iran. The group reportedly has thousands of rockets in southern Lebanon targeted at Israel, to deter an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. "According to what I have heard [from within the Shiite community], the Iranian side in Hezbollah has gained ascendancy over the Syrian side," Jumblatt said. An Iranian-Syrian defense treaty would only bolster the group, making it more intransigent.

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Jumblatt saw Iran as becoming much stronger in the Middle East, thanks in large part to the Bush administration's weakening of its historical geopolitical rival, Iraq. "Iran is going to have the bomb. And when they do, the Arab world is finished." The Iranians are unsettling, he warned, because "they're very patient. You know, those who weave carpets are very patient."

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Jumblatt was recently taken to task in Lebanon for telling David Ignatius of the Washington Post: "[The U.S.] came to Iraq in the name of majority rule. You can do the same thing in Syria." One prominent left-wing Lebanese journalist wrote that Jumblatt was endorsing an American invasion of Syria, where the majority is Sunni Muslim, unlike Iraq, with its Shiite majority. "Yes, I said it," Jumblatt admitted; "Why be hypocritical? The Shiites in Iraq expanded their power under the American occupation; but here in Lebanon Hezbollah continues to be opposed to the U.S."

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He went on to observe that in the back of the minds of some in Syria's ruling minority Alawite regime, the idea of an alliance between Alawites and Lebanese Shiites and Christians to confront the region's majority Sunnis was still alive. I asked, half seriously, why the Druze had been left out of the equation. "The poor Druze, the poor Druze," Jumblatt muttered.

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For Jumblatt, Hezbollah is, dangerously, a "state within a state." Where can its refusal to disarm lead? "Perhaps to the situation prevailing in the late 1960s when the Palestinians began creating an autonomous 'Fatah-land' in southern Lebanon, from where they attacked Israel." Left unmentioned was that this state of affairs was a catalyst for Lebanon's civil war in 1975; though apparently recalling that his father was a prime supporter of the Palestinians, Jumblatt added: "At the time, Lebanese society was divided."?

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Jumblatt's pervasive pessimism, or realism, is sometimes an act, since the nonstop burden of impending doom is too much even for a man who has transacted and interacted with death since his late 20s. As if to prove that buoyancy still had its place, hours after the interview ended I received an 11:00 pm call from Jumblatt. "Did you read what the Americans said?" he asked, in reference to Rice's statement on Syria; "Pretty strong." He seemed happy. From his redoubt, he could see that the planets had momentarily aligned themselves in his favor—until they shift again and anxiety returns.??