Why Conservative Reformers, and the Rest of the Right, Should Adopt a Foreign Policy of Caution
Teeing off of the recent back and forth between Rand Paul and Rick Perry on foreign policy, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat responds to accusations that reform conservatives—the label adopted by a group family-friendly right-leaning domestic policy reformers, including Douthat—are too close with Bush-era neoconservatives on foreign policy. The gist of Douthat's response, to the extent that it can be summarized, is that reformers may be guilty of association, but not necessarily of unified endorsement. Reform conservatism has always focused more on domestic policy and domestic politics, and it is loosely attached to politicians with a variety of foreign policy impulses, so its philosophy when it comes to interacting with the rest of the world remains largely unsettled. Indeed, Douthat isn't even sure what it should be.
One thing that Douthat gets at in his post is how unsettled foreign policy thinking is across the entire right side of the aisle. It is not just the reform conservatives who do not have a definitive foreign policy vision, it is the entire Republican party, and the conservative movement that makes it its core. Part of that is due to the considerable influence of Rand Paul, who has invigorated the right's long-dormant non-interventionist tendency; part of it is a result of the right's fracturing and subsequent loss of identity in the Obama era; and part of it is a result of the difficult-to-deny failures of the Iraq war—arguably the single biggest cause for Republicans in the Bush era, and just as arguably the GOP's single biggest failure. These strains have combined to shake loose the right from the relatively unified hawkish neoconservatism that defined it throughout the 00s.
So it's not exactly surprising that reform conservatism, a relatively new strain of thinking on the right built largely out of domestic policy concerns, has yet to construct a fully-realized foreign policy ideology. Indeed, it would be surprising if reform conservatism, a cautious movement championed by cautious individuals who favor cautious policies, was charging forth in such a fraught and contested space.
And yet I think that caution, which Douthat admirably reflects in his own uncertainty about what reform conservatives specifically and the right more broadly should preach when it comes to international affairs, actually provides the seed of a foreign policy stance that would fit nicely with the reform movement's broader way of thinking, appeal to many on the right (reformers and Republicans, libertarian populists and skeptics of government power across the spectrum), and inject a much-needed voice into the nation's foreign policy.
Too much of our foreign policy conversation, on both sides of the aisle, is conducted with a kind of chest-thumping certainty about what we can know, what we should do, and what the results will be if we follow through. That attitude is perhaps understandable, given the context of war and international power, but it's also frequently frustrating and unhelpful, especially given how difficult it can be to establish even the most basic facts on the ground when it comes to the particulars of many foreign policy conflicts and disputes.
A foreign policy of caution and humility, of uncertainty and wariness, might help help turn down the heat on foreign policy debates, by focusing on the limitations of America's power and—even more—its ability to determine foreign policy outcomes, and by talking as much about what we don't know as what we do.
It's not so hard to imagine this sort of caution appealing to many of the same middle and working class families that reformers and libertarian populists want to serve, partly because many of them have grown more skeptical of foreign interventions post-Iraq, and partly because it offers an approach that prioritizes prudence and common sense.
It would, necessarily, lean toward the non-interventionist side of the spectrum, stressing caution about when and whether to act, but would not be as easy to label an abdication of America's role in the world, because it would not take any course of action or inaction as a must. It would recognize America's greatness as an institution, a people, and a world power, but be humble about what the actual humans charged with making decisions with limited time and resources can know and do. It would start from the certainty that there is a lot that is unknown, and a lot that can go wrong, especially with big ideas and bold plans, and then work slowly and carefully from there.
In some sense it would take some of Rand Paul's influence, some of the pragmatism that's driving certain factions on the right, and some of the lessons of Iraq, and combine them into something that draws from all of them—a foreign policy that remains confident in America, but practical and cautious about what it can and should do around the world.
