Signal Chat Controversy Is an Endorsement of Encryption Software
Popular encryption apps are probably secure if government officials rely on them.

The drama this week over the Trump administration Signal group chat about a strike on Houthis in Yemen in which The Atlantic Editor in Chief Jeffrey Goldberg was inadvertently included has been popcorn-worthy, if you're into that sort of thing. But beyond the resultant posturing between screw-up bureaucrats and pompous politicians, we learned something of value from the incident: Government officials use the popular encrypted messaging app because the intelligence community considers it secure. While the political class argues over the details, the rest of us should consider that an endorsement of this technology.
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Is It Snoop-Resistant?
Encryption software is widely used by businesspeople, journalists, and regular folks who don't want to share the details of their lives and their finances with the world. But there's always been speculation about how secure apps like Signal and Telegram are from government snoops who have the resources of surveillance agencies behind them. Are we just amusing the geeks at the NSA when we say nasty things about them to our colleagues via ProtonMail or WhatsApp?
One indication that private encryption software really is resistant to even sophisticated eavesdropping is the degree to which governments hate it. U.S. federal officials have long pushed for backdoor access to encrypted communications. Apple is currently battling British officials over that government's requirements that the company compromise the encryption offered to users so that law enforcement can paw through private data. The Signal Foundation—creator of the open-source software at the center of the current controversy—threatened to leave the U.K. in 2023 during an earlier anti-encryption frenzy while Germany-based Tutanota said it would refuse to comply.
But then we got news of a group chat on Signal including such officials as Vice President J.D. Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and, of course, Goldberg as a plus-one. If administration officials including several from the intelligence community are willing to hold a conversation on the app, that's important added testimony to the security of the software.
Endorsed by the CIA
Even more evidence came courtesy of the March 25 Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing on Worldwide Threats, during which attendees were understandably pressed to explain the incident and the use of Signal.
"One of the first things that happened when I was confirmed as CIA director was Signal was loaded onto my computer at the CIA, as it is for most CIA officers," Ratcliffe told Sen. Mark Warner (D–Va.). "One of the things that I was briefed on very early, Senator, was by the CIA records management folks about the use of Signal as a permissible work use. It is. That is a practice that preceded the current administration, to the Biden administration."
Later, in response to Sen. Martin Heinrich (D–N.M.), Ratcliffe added: "Signal is a permissible use, being used by the CIA. It has been approved by the White House for senior officials and recommended by CISA [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] for high level officials who would be targeted by foreign adversaries to use end-to-end encrypted apps whenever possible, like Signal."
Whether all popular encryption software is equally secure isn't clear. But Ratcliffe's mention that officials are encouraged to use apps "like Signal" suggests it's not the only one that's reliable.
Nothing Will Save You From Your Own Carelessness
Of course, Jeffrey Goldberg got access to the hush-hush meeting anyway, but that wasn't a failure of the software's encryption. Goldberg was apparently included in the chat accidentally, by the invitation of National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, according to his own embarrassed admission.
"A staffer wasn't responsible, and I take full responsibility," Waltz told Fox News's Laura Ingraham. "I built the group. My job is to make sure everything is coordinated."
Waltz claimed he had Goldberg's phone number in his contacts under the name of a government official who he intended to add to the meeting. Basically, the fault lies with Waltz' mastery of contact lists and how to make sure you share confidential info only with those you want to have it.
"There's no encryption software in the world that is going to prevent you from making a blunder if you directly send classified information to a journalist accidentally," Northeastern University professor Ryan Ellis, who researches cybersecurity among other topics, commented on the matter.
Ellis and his Northeastern colleagues emphasize that Signal and government-developed communications platforms don't differ regarding the security they offer for data but in "safeguards to prevent the sharing of information with individuals without the proper clearance." Presumably, government software doesn't draw on generic contact lists. That means there's less opportunity for officials to unintentionally share secrets—or dick pics—with journalists and foreign operatives.
Popular With Everybody (Just Watch That Contact List)
That said, commercial encryption software is as popular among government officials as it is with the public. "The AP found accounts for state, local and federal officials in nearly every state, including many legislators and their staff, but also staff for governors, state attorneys general, education departments and school board members," the news service reported last week in a piece that emphasized transparency concerns around the use of encryption by government officials. Like Ratcliffe, the A.P. noted that CISA "has recommended that 'highly valued targets'—senior officials who handle sensitive information—use encryption apps for confidential communications."
After news of the administration group-chat breach broke, Frederick Scholl, a professor of cybersecurity at Quinnipiac University, discussed several apps that people can use to keep their communications secure "including Briar, Session, Signal, SimpleX, Telegram, Threema, Viber and Wire."
That's in addition to others including Meta's WhatsApp. And encrypted RCS is replacing old-school SMS for basic text messages, though the transition isn't complete. Even better, the new standard is supported by both Apple and Google so that encryption will work in conversations between Android and iPhone platforms.
Nothing is completely safe, of course. People developing security are in a constant race with those trying to compromise it. And, like Mike Waltz has discovered, nothing can save you from embarrassment if you invite the wrong person to the chat.
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If you are a civilian wanting privacy (from deep state pedo types), Signal might not be for you due to CIA’s involvement with the app.
Popular encryption apps are probably secure if government officials rely on them.
Trust big government's example is an odd take for a 'libertarian' magazine.
Yeah, this is the dumbest take, ever.
Signal (and others) replicate your messages across multiple devices. If China or Russia manage to replicate or spoof just one of the participants, they get a transcript of every chat that person receives.
The real lesson is that proper security is hard, and people are lazy. If you're going to use a mobile device for classified chats, it needs to be a dedicated device with no unauthorized contacts stored within it.
""If you're going to use a mobile device for classified chats, it needs to be a dedicated device with no unauthorized contacts stored within it.""
Totally agree. Administrations have been too loose with this since the internet.
I question the entire premise of this article. First off, I've seen varying comments on whether Signal is totally secure. Several say that many governments have a so-called "back door," which allows for access under certain circumstances. Also, all the participants (except Goldberg) of the Signal controversy are now supposed to use only the government-in-place system for classified discussions. No third-party apps allowed.
One thing that sets Signal apart is that it is Open Source. One ramification of this is that it can be confirmed to not have back doors. And the encryption can be confirmed to be robust.
I've seen some pretty good analysis regarding preventing what happened. Most obvious one is to make everyone use their real name on the chat. The transcript of that showed a fair number of initials or abbreviations, making it less obvious that JG was Goldberg rather than some other JG who was supposed to be in the chat.
1. How exactly do you enforce that? Someone may be known by initials (JD) to some people, by first name to others, by full name to yet others.
2. Regardless of what their name shows as, strangers in a group chat won't be known to some. This case, for instance; arguably, everyone else in the group chat should have noticed the unknown name and objected. Poor security by everyone involved.
Assuming Heresolong is correct, They may have expected a JG in the group. So it would not be an unknown name.
Not that excuse flies with me. Fire whomever added the wrong JG.
Fire the person who unnecessarily transmitted classified information across an unsecure channel. Hegseth. None of that was actionable by the people on the chat. All of it was actionable by a hostile actor.
Up until that point, it was just high level discussion.
Signal chat was deemed secure. That’s why government personnel uses it. The Biden admin used it, and the left didn’t say a word about it. They didn’t care we kept government info in cabinets inside a cave.
The problem is humans leaking sensitive info. It was problem all through trump’s first term and continued on with the Biden admin. No one knows who leaked Israeli satellite info, which is more than generic metadata discussed by hegseth.
The only difference is that now we have a president who can be trusted to address these issues. I wouldn’t be surprised if Mike waltz is fired. We wouldn’t have struck Houthis in the first place if Kamala was president.
It’s sad that this is what now passes as a Great Article here at Teen Reason. Coming on the heels of and compared to the absolute nadir by Sullum yesterday, it feels like Pulitzer material
"by the invitation of National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, according to his own embarrassed admission. A staffer wasn't responsible, and I take full responsibility," Waltz told Fox News's Laura Ingraham. "I built the group. My job is to make sure everything is coordinated."
This is correct but also out of context. The staffer did indeed add Goldberg, but Waltz took the responsibility.
Also, five articles at Reason on this non-scandal with no libertarian connection in the last couple of days, but how many did we get in the last two years about the massive, coordinated effort to censor everyone on social media by the Biden administration, the CIA and the FBI?
Oh, that's right... zero.
DEFLECT. DEFLECT. DEFLECT.
There's no libertarian connection to launching an attack on Yemen without congressional approval?
And Waltz has a staffer fat fingering his phone, under Waltz's name?
There is a libertarian connection to limited retaliatory strikes.
If someone punches you, you can punch back.
If someone punches you, you can punch back.
And you can also punch the 50 other people in the building he's in.
Were there 50 other people in the building he was in? It seems you're constructing a false scenario to me.
Also, you still haven't explained how this isn't retaliatory and isn't acceptable under the NAP.
I was confusing that one strike with the total casualty counts in reports of the series of strikes against the Houthis. My apologies. Reports stated that at least 53 people were killed in total in the strikes that occurred over the weekend of the 15th.
My point is in response to the general argument that this kind of military use of force is analogous to some kind of individual self defense situation. TrickyVic had said, "If someone punches you, you can punch them back."
First, in terms of legal justification for using force, you only get to "punch them back" if that is necessary to defend yourself from further attack in that moment. Retaliation is not a legal justification for the use of force in criminal law. Retaliation in a international law is different, and there are different standards for what level of response is justified.
That is why I framed it as I did. If someone punches you, even if you do need to punch them back to defend yourself in that moment, you don't have justification to harm innocent bystanders to do so. At least, not in a way that is grossly disproportional to the threat to you, and the justification would be a high bar to clear. (Here, the only easy to visualize scenario would be using a gun to defend yourself from someone else with a gun and how you could end up hitting bystanders with your shots. You'd have to really be able to convince a jury that you needed to risk other people's lives to defend yourself if you did shot an innocent person and were prosecuted for it.)
No Shrike, a reciprocal attack is not necessarily an act of war. Maybe if the Houthi's hadn't been attacking American ships first, but they did. But go on. Try to make a connection for us without lying or ignoring important facts.
I'm curious to see how you'll try to do it.
Deflect? No, we’re just playing by the rules of the left.
If a Secretary of State knowingly storing classified info on a private server isn’t deemed criminally negligent, then Hegseth’s job is safe. The Biden and Obama admin all discussed classified info on chat signal. It was never illegal to use that app. Hegseth never authorized Goldberg to be part of the chat.
Give me a freaking break. Lloyd Austin went awol twice. Biden telegraphed Israeli strike plans on Iran. He kept classified material in his garage. Chatgate doesn’t even come close to these sins. It’s not deflection to protest selective standards on accountability.
Like these?
https://reason.com/2024/08/27/mark-zuckerberg-blames-biden-for-government-pressure-to-censor-facebook/
https://reason.com/2024/07/29/judge-tosses-former-disinformation-chiefs-defamation-suit-says-she-really-was-a-censor/
There's more.
I'd like to see the others because both of those were about the knock on effects of the discovery rather than the actual coordinated effort to censor everyone on social media by the Biden administration, the CIA and the FBI itself.
Reason never reported on the Twitter Files directly or on the Facebook revelation itself. All related articles (and there aren't many) are about things arising from it. From a libertarian perspective it was the biggest violation of Americans rights as a whole outside of wartime, and they deliberately kept quite.
It's disgusting.
If you think the social media strong-arming was the biggest violation of Americans' rights outside of war time then you weren't paying attention to the lockdowns, business shut downs, mask mandates, and vaccine mandates of COVID.
Not true. There were a bunch of articles defending the censorship as the companies complied to public politicians demands.
Signal may be "secure" in some sense, but it's not authorized for transmission of classified information.
It has been deemed secure by the cia. The Biden admin used it. Can you link to me to source showing its forbidden to discuss classified material on encrypted app?
It was approved during Dementia Joe's administration, which probably should have been a warning.
I think there are questions here unasked by most around the implications of using Signal or other third-party messaging apps, around records retention requirements. Under federal regulations, digital communications including emails, texts, social media messages, and chats are official records if they are sent/received by government officials in their official capacities. While I've never used Signal, my understanding is that chats can be configured to auto-delete. So how can, for example, these types of messages be discoverable for FOIA requests, discovery in lawsuits against the federal government, etc. if high officials choose to auto-delete their messages?
It's bad enough that Hillary Clinton wasn't prosecuted for destroying her official emails from when she was Secretary of State, but now we're apparently making that practice the new standard. This is very bad for government accountability.
Feature, not a bug, as far as government hacks are concerned.
Wouldn't this entire chat be part of the Executive decision making and so not FOIA eligible? The actual commands, sure but not the decision making.
Executive privilege does not cover Cabinet departments or any actions involving Cabinet departments. Only Executive Office of the Presidency.
Of course it appears that we are avoiding FOIA now by simply using Israeli intelligence to put US military assets at war In this case to avoid decision making processes re civilian casualties.
I may be all wet here, but my understanding is that Signal was compromised over a year ago.
You are indeed uterly wet and a weed. Signal hasn't been compromised. However, phones can be hacked which is apparently why it is not advisable to use phones with Signal in insecure locations,