Iraq's Scrap of Paper
In Slate, Fred Kaplan has written another critical piece on the Iraqi constitution, urging that it be rejected by voters in an October 15 referendum. There is much I agree with in what Kaplan says, particularly that the constitution is likely to fuel more Sunni violence, because the community will clearly be much the poorer relative in a new Iraqi federal arrangement.
Where I believe Kaplan errs is that at this stage it may already be too late to prevent a breakup of the unitary Iraqi state–in essence a Kurdish north and a Shiite south that will be virtually autonomous politically and economically. Constitution or no constitution, Iraq's future seems beyond a written document. Kaplan writes:
The Iraqi insurgency–the main impediment to social, economic, and political order–is principally a Sunni insurgency. Any constitution worth its name would have to lure or co-opt the Sunnis, to give them an incentive to join the new political order. The actual proposed constitution, on the other hand, formally confirms and reinforces the Sunnis' sense of disenfranchisement.
True, and in many ways the greatest American mistake in Iraq was to misunderstand the pull of minority anxieties, so that relatively quickly Sunnis felt that the United States was easing Iraq's transfer to majority Shiite power. That was perhaps inevitable, inasmuch as any dismantling of Saddam Hussein's regime was bound to hit the Sunnis hardest. However, in the eyes of many Sunnis it's the defenders of Iraq's "unity"–themselves, but also such Shiite politicians as Muqtada al-Sadr–who the U.S. seems to have targeted as its worst enemies.
Whether these perceptions are justified is a different matter. However Kaplan (or the International Crisis Group, which he cites) rightly believes the unfair constitution will only make matters worse (mainly because Sunnis are unlikely to get much oil). Yet the logical conclusion of that argument is that, whether or not the constitution is rejected on October 15, sectarian and ethnic relations in Iraq will worsen anyway, making it highly improbable that Kurds and Shiites will go back on what they consider today their nonnegotiable demands of autonomy; both already manage their geographic regions areas independently, and whatever happens to the constitution, they are not likely to cede any of that leeway (particularly on oil revenues) to Sunnis.
My very unsophisticated fear is that what we may eventually have is a struggle for control in mixed Arab Sunni-Kurd and Arab Sunni-Shiite areas–something similar to what occurred in Bosnia. The gun will do the talking, as well as the vested interests of surrounding states (Iran in particular is keen to see a broken Iraq, which removes its main regional rival). Where the Bosnia comparison may not hold, however, is in the continued presence of American forces. The U.S. will still be able to prevent all-out war by remaining (and we should understand that we are not halfway there yet); and even if American forces were to leave, would Washington be able to keep them away for long if Iraq turned into a regional free-for-all?
I doubt it.
