Boo on That Mortgage Bailout!
Nick Gillespie | April 9, 2008, 8:13pm
Over at Rough Cut, the video blog of reason.tv, check out Mike Flynn saying to mortgage bailouts on CNBC's Task Force. Flynn is director of government affairs at Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes the print and online editions of reason.
Click on the image below to hear a rollicking good argument against government intervention in the economy—for strapped homeowners and investment banks alot.

MK2 | April 9, 2008, 9:33pm | #
Here's a bit of heresy for the catechism class:
Writing in today’s Financial Times, billionaire and philanthropist George Soros calls out Hank Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary for not doing enough heavy lifting to improve regulation of financial institutions. He calls for new thinking not reshuffling of regulatory agencies.
Importantly, he not only questions but denies altogether the idea that markets are self-correcting.
For the past 25 years or so the financial authorities and institutions they regulate have been guided by market fundamentalism: the belief that markets tend towards equilibrium and that deviations from it occur in a random manner.
Authorities, caught unawares, responded to each new disruption only after it occurred. They lacked the ability to foresee them because they were in the thrall of the market fundamentalist fallacy. They need a new paradigm. Market participants cannot base their decisions on knowledge, or what economists call rational expectations. There is a two-way, reflexive interaction between the participants’ biased views and misconceptions and the real state of affairs. Instead of random deviations, reflexivity may give rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating boom-bust sequences or bubbles.
Soros’s credentials as a market theorist are bolstered, of course, by his record as a market practitioner. The man made a fortune, unlike the editorialists and columnists who still have to work for a living.
He is making a splash in the media today as he releases his latest book, “The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008,” as an ebook, which expands on the ideas in his opinion piece in the FT and explains why he thinks we are in the worst financial crisis since 1930.
CJR
MK2 | April 10, 2008, 9:37am | #
You can't prove that God doesn't exist or that The Market isn't perfect, but here's another wicked infidel who tries. Plug your ears! Cover your eyes!
The Dilbert strategy
By Paul Krugman
Monday, March 31, 2008
PRINCETON, New Jersey: Anyone who has worked in a large organization -
or, for that matter, reads the comic strip "Dilbert" - is familiar
with the "org chart" strategy. To hide their lack of any actual ideas
about what to do, managers sometimes make a big show of rearranging
the boxes and lines that say who reports to whom.
You now understand the principle behind the Bush administration's new
proposal for financial reform: It's all about creating the appearance
of responding to the current crisis, without actually doing anything
substantive.
The financial events of the last seven months, and especially the past
few weeks, have convinced all but a few diehards that the U.S.
financial system needs major reform. Otherwise, we Americans will
lurch from crisis to crisis - and the crises will get bigger and
bigger.
The rescue of Bear Stearns, in particular, was a paradigm-changing
event.
Traditional, deposit-taking banks have been regulated since the 1930s,
because the experience of the Great Depression showed how bank
failures can threaten the whole economy. Supposedly, however, "non-
depository" institutions like Bear didn't have to be regulated,
because "market discipline" would ensure that they were run
responsibly.
When push came to shove, however, the Federal Reserve didn't dare let
market discipline run its course. Instead, it rushed to Bear's rescue,
risking billions of taxpayer dollars, because it feared that the
collapse of a major financial institution would endanger the financial
system as a whole.
And if financial players like Bear are going to receive the kind of
rescue previously limited to deposit-taking banks, the implication
seems obvious: They should be regulated like banks, too.
The Bush administration, however, has spent the last seven years
trying to do away with government oversight of the financial industry.
In fact, the new plan was originally conceived of as "promoting a
competitive financial services sector leading the world and supporting
continued economic innovation." That's banker-speak for getting rid of
regulations that annoy big financial operators.
To reverse course now, and seek expanded regulation, the
administration would have to back down on its free-market ideology -
and it would also have to face up to the fact that it was wrong. And
this administration never, ever, admits that it made a mistake.
Thus, in a draft of a speech to be delivered Monday, Henry Paulson,
the Treasury secretary, declares, "I do not believe it is fair or
accurate to blame our regulatory structure for the current turmoil."
And sure enough, according to the executive summary of the new
administration plan, regulation will be limited to institutions that
receive explicit federal guarantees - that is, institutions that are
already regulated, and have not been the source of today's problems.
As for the rest, it blithely declares that "market discipline is the
most effective tool to limit systemic risk."
The administration, then, has learned nothing from the current crisis.
Yet it needs, as a political matter, to pretend to be doing something.
So the Treasury has, with great fanfare, announced - you know what's
coming - its support for a rearrangement of the boxes on the org
chart. OCC, OTS, and CFTC are out; PFRA and CBRA are in. Whatever.
Will rearranging these boxes make any difference? I've been
disappointed to see some news outlets report as fact the
administration's cover story - the claim that lack of coordination
among regulatory agencies was an important factor in our current
problems.
The truth is that that's not at all what happened. The various
regulators actually did quite well at acting in a coordinated fashion.
Unfortunately, they coordinated in the wrong direction.
For example, there was a 2003 photo-op in which officials from
multiple agencies used pruning shears and chainsaws to chop up stacks
of banking regulations. The occasion symbolized the shared
determination of Bush appointees to suspend adult supervision just as
the financial industry was starting to run wild.
Oh, and the Bush administration actively blocked state governments
when they tried to protect families against predatory lending.
So, will the administration's plan succeed? I'm not asking whether it
will succeed in preventing future financial crises - that's not its
purpose. The question, instead, is whether it will succeed in
confusing the issue sufficiently to stand in the way of real reform.
Let's hope not. As I said, America's financial crises have been
getting bigger. A decade ago, the market disruption that followed the
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management was considered a major, scary
event; but compared with the current earthquake, the LTCM crisis was a
minor tremor.
If we don't reform the system this time, the next crisis could well be
even bigger. And I, for one, really don't want to live through a
replay of the 1930s.