We Are the Deadbeat Nation. Join Us.

There is an important movement forming with the goal of making most or all real estate foreclosures go away over the issue of securitization. Securitization entails bundling of your mortgage with other mortgages, slicing and tranching that bundle, and selling it as a bond or bonds. A mortgage servicer then takes over receiving and processing your checks, and in turn makes sure those further up the pipeline get paid.

For mortgage bailout advocates, securitization has become a phrase like "cloning" or "warlords" or "health care reform." It is valuable because it is drained of meaning, and thus seems to offer an easy pro/con choice on ideas that are nebulous and often unrelated. Activists have picked up the idea that the securitization process means your mortgage either doesn't exist or is being manipulated against you.

On the doesn't exist side are Landmark National Bank vs. Kesler buffs. This Kansas Supreme Court case ruled that a second lienholder, which had not filed paperwork on time, did not have standing to collect when the primary mortgager foreclosed on a property. Because in this case the second lienholder was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, a clearinghouse established by large lenders for electronic trading and tracking of mortgages, advocates of affordable fair housing for fair housing affordability have decided that the ruling will make it impossible to foreclose on 60 million mortgages.

In fact, it's a long-established principle that passing along a debt -- by either securitizing it or just getting bought by a bigger bank -- does not make the debt go away. The changeover of mortgage servicers imposes no burden on the borrower, other than possibly having to mail checks to a new address. MERS may be an incompetent, evil, destructive system -- a list of the company's shareholders strongly suggests it is. But there's nothing hard to understand about its role. You agreed to pay a debt; MERS is collecting it and administering your account on behalf of the current debt holders.

On the being manipulated against you side are groups like National Consumer Law Center, which publishes this report [pdf], purporting to explain the "perverse incentives" that cause servicers to foreclose when they should be providing the bad borrower with an expensive and risky loan modification.

You may think it's not always clear what the legitimate holder of a loan should do when faced with a non-paying debtor, but the report throws out that nicety in its title: "Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify..." Here's one of the perverse incentives:

Fees that servicers charge borrowers in default reward servicers for getting and keeping a borrower in default. As they grow, these fees make a modification less and less feasible. The servicer may have to waive them to make a loan modification feasible but is almost always assured of collecting them if a foreclosure goes through.

HuffPost's Shahien Nasiripour says this proves* that foreclosures are more "profitable" for servicers than loan modifications. It's not clear what "profit" means when you're talking about minimizing your loss on a loan gone bad. But foreclosure is the best option for the servicer for the same reason it's the best option for everybody else involved. As Hit & Run visitors have heard, time and time again, modified loans are so likely to end up defaulting again that there is essentially no argument for encouraging this procedure. Nor is there any mystery about why loan modification was so rare before the government spent $75 billion to subsidize it. Loans that go bad stay bad. The NCLC report is fairly reluctant to talk about redefault rates (who isn't, these days?), but does say second-strike defaulters just need one more slowball right over the plate. Or maybe five more:

Some servicers provide modifications upon redefault as part of their loss mitigation programs. This approach should be standard and mandated, and should include continued eligibility for Making Home Affordable modifications rather than only specific servicer or investor programs.

It's true, if you want to spend the money, and then spend it again in the future, you can eventually reduce the principal on every bad loan to the point that everybody can afford to pay it. You could even pay off every loan in its entirety if you really wanted to. It will cost a lot more than $75 billion, but isn't it worth it to keep people in their homes?

* Shahien Nasiripour sends in the following:

I never said any such thing. The NCLC may make that claim, but I don't (nor would I, for the record). I simply reported on the findings and recommendations in the group's report.

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  • Warty||

    We Are the Deadbeat Nation. Join Us.

    ...gooble gobble one of us one of us..

  • Br'er Rabbit||

    I thought it was "gabba gabba"?

  • matt||

    It may indeed be

    a long-established principle that passing along a debt -- by either securitizing it or just getting bought by a bigger bank -- does not make the debt go away"

    But if these banks haven't been dotting their i's and crossing their t's properly then they should get the same treatment as any small businessman or private citizen who fails like that.

    If some "deadbeats" get their debts erased because of it, then so be it, I say.

  • ||

    I sympathize with your position. If the banks had been allowed to fail, then all those mortgages would have been sold off at a fraction of the value. The MBS holders might still get something, but at a much reduced value. That is, actually, WHY the market value of MBSes collapsed - investors realizes that they weren't worth the face value because the mortgages had to be forclosed on. (In general you recover less than the principle when that happens, so if ALL [or a great majority] of the mortgages in the bundle backing your MBS were foreclosed on, then your bond wasn't even going to be worth the face value.)

    But if the original bank failed, whatever bank bought up the junk would be buying it cheap, and thus would probably find it easier to reduce the principle. Or you mgiht see a market in banks buying up your mortgage for 1/3 of the value and then selling it to you for 1/2. (I.e. you take out a new loan for half the original amount, simultaneously clearing the old debt.)

    The loser is the holder of the original debt - likely ... oh Fannie Mea, Freddie Mac, and a host of people holding MBSes.

    Thus, you can see the bank bailout fucks you on both ends - you pay taxes to keep these shitheads afloat, and you are denied the opporunity to profit from their collapse by cancelling a mountain of debt.

  • Invisible Finger||

    Not that easy. Even if the bank wants to reduce principle, the amount reduced is taxable income to the borrower. Law has to be changed in order for it to happen, the only way to reduce principle WAS bankruptcy protection/cramdown but that is no longer legal and one would have to ask the Democrat majority in Congress why they don't make it legal again.

    You could drop the interest rate to zero and lots of people STILL couldn't pay the principal down over 30 years - they simply paid for more than their income. A fool and his credit are soon parted.

  • ||

    Yeah, that is pretty fucked up. A debt gets cancelled and it counts as income? WTF?

    I can see how it could be abused to avoid laws on taxing large gifts to avoid (say) estate taxes. Have them loan the money from you, then cancel the debt. But then that speaks more to the problem of estate taxes, and the government's need to create more laws to recify the perverse effects of other laws.

  • Dorothy||

    if MERS has no standing to foreclose, then nobody has standing to foreclose – on 60 million mortgages

    Wow, instant homeownership! Guess we're still in Kansas, Toto!

  • Tim Cavanaugh||

    If some "deadbeats" get their debts erased because of it, then so be it, I say.

    There is zero chance any deadbeat will make a foreclosure go away because of MERS paperwork. This is not a question of confused title, but of MERS' poorly defined role in the contract. (That is, poorly defined in a legal sense, not in common sense.) Even if that tendril were enough to cause a serious existential question about the loan, just follow that link to MERS' shareholders. There's no way a general ablation of MERS mortgages would ever be allowed to stand.

  • C-Dog||

    No mention of the perverse incentives to let dead beats stay in their houses for 6 months, for up to a year, so the banks don't have to write down the loss of foreclosing the home at its current market value?

    My sister was renting a home, when the owners bailed, she lived in it for eighteen months, rent free. The bank was reluctant to foreclose, postponing court dates time and time again. This is not an uncommon story.

  • Tim Cavanaugh||

    You know, whenever I publish a post I realize the point I originally wanted to make I forgot to make: The real scandal is that millions of people are getting taxpayer-funded bailouts for houses they never intended to pay for. I mean, it's bad enough when smart people get away with ripping us off. But when idiots can do it, we're out there with the animals.

  • Br'er Rabbit||

    I mean, it's bad enough when smart people get away with ripping us off. But when idiots can do it, we're out there with the animals.

    Not bad for an Obama voter Tim.I must commend you for recognizing that,while we are indisputably animals,they are supposed to be of a different category.

  • Mango Punch||

    perverse incentives to let dead beats stay in their houses for 6 months, for up to a year, so the banks don't have to write down the loss of foreclosing the home at its current market value

    And the majority of the MBS market is serviced by a relatively small number of players/banks who know that flooding the market will drive prices down reducing recovery. Once a loan enters foreclosure the bank is required to sell it in "an efficient" manner, this means they don't have the option of waiting around and shopping it.

  • hmm||

    Holy crap people are stupid. This is the inverse of one of the problems that created the mess to begin with.

    Make mortgage, sell mortgage to A, A bundles mortgages into MBS, S&P&M rate A's MBS into tranches by risk (we will ignore the law of large numbers fiasco), A sells the lowest BBB tranches to C, C collects a whole bunch of lower level tranches from several other people like A and bundles them into a CDO, C has S&P&M rate C's CDO into tranches by risk (top level paid first least risk), C sells AAA tranches of his CDO that is entirely made up of BBB tranches from MBS.

    Shazam you just made a BBB rated security into a AAA. No risk really. Jesus christ when will people realize risk doesn't go away if you cover it up with shit. It just stinks more and adheres to everything. People are advocating (or forcing if you are government) basically CDOing (modifying) loans on a personal level.

    You can't move risk down the line and not expect it to fuck you in the long run. Even if some retard says we are all dead in the long run. (had to get that dig in)

    There is so much hate to go around in this mess that I have a hard time not saying fuck everyone involved let their dumb ass burn. Then again I might have actually said that once or twice.

  • Mango Punch||

    I don't think I've ever heard of the equity tranches of a CDO being rebundled and sold as a second securitization. With Re-REMICs they actually break the pool.

  • hmm||

    You've never heard of a CDO squared, CDO cubed, or CDO nth?

  • Mango Punch||

    I thought those were mostly synthetic and so just derivatives on MBS pools.

  • hmm||

    They are derivatives on MBS pools, the problem is they are the nth iteration of a derivative on a derivative. The synthetic CDOs are based on something other than the cash asset, like CDS, and are an even more fucked way to hide risk.

  • ||

    Holy crap, how many securitization lawyers do we have here?

    Glad I got outta that crap a couple years ago - right as it was tanking.

    Stop with the jargon; you're giving me nasty flashbacks.

  • Caption for the Picture:||

    "One more payment, and it's ours!"

  • ||

    If the banks had been allowed to go belly up last fall, a lot of these people may have been able to buy their own mortgages dirt cheap. Thereby making their own "loan modifications". The kind where the principle is reduced, every progressive's dream.

    See the thing is there are a lot of people whose paper wealth depends on the value of those banks stocks, or bond, or other financial products. If they died, the mortgage holders would win.

    How do you prevent that while pretending to help out the mortgage holder? Well, you string out the mortgage, keeping a trickle of interest payments coming to the poor slump who is now bound and chained to that mortgage for the rest of his living year. That preserves the paper value of the mortgage, so the banks can continue pretending that they will someday recover the principle, so anyone holding their paper can continue pretending that their paper wealth exists - at least until they can sell it to some other idiot.

  • ||

    Er if the BANKS died.

  • Mango Punch||

    Well, you string out the mortgage, keeping a trickle of interest payments coming

    Servicers want to do this but can't. Most securitization contracts restrict servicers from modifying a loan so that its term extends beyond the life of the pool. Since most securitizations are made with same durration MBS originated in the same year, the most servicers can often extend a loan is by one year or less. Most people think extending loans durration (for borrowers who aren't underwater) would have a significant impact, but it can't and isn't happening. Average loan extension [for loans extended] this year is 1 year.

  • Invisible Finger||

    With the Fed buying so much MBS, changing the contract legally so that the term can be extended isn't an insurmountable problem.

  • Mango Punch||

    there's $14-$15 T of mortgage debt outstanding in the US with about $9 T in securitizations... I don't know the % the fed owns off the top of my head, but I doubt it's more than 1/3 of the securitized market.

  • ||

    I dunno, the Feds ordered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to start buying up the toxic assets in 2007 or so, to try to get them off the bank's balance sheets. That's what drove them into collapse and receiver ship. Now, I belief it's the Federal Reserve which has been buying the assets from them, so they could absorb more of the crap.
    This is part of the behind-the-scenes multi-trillion dollar bailout that consists mainly of the Fed printing money.

  • ||

    Ignoring of course, Uncle Sam's role (via the Community Reinvestment Act) in creating the whole mess to begin with.

  • anonymous||

    The article doesn't make it clear -- does MERS not have standing to collect because it was a secondary lienholder, or because it didn't get its paperwork in on time, or a combination of both?

  • Invisible Finger||

    Second lien-holers are the last-in-line legally, last ones allowed to go to the feed bag and it's always empty when their turn comes up. HELOCs are all second-liens, so none of them were securitized. That is why WaMu died.

  • Ebeneezer Scrooge||

    Bring out your dead.

  • Tadit||

    While the tone seems reasonable you have skipped over several points. There has been several levels of fraud perpetrated in the securitization process as it has functioned so far. First, the contract was breached by violation of contract law by the securitization agents, second fraud was routinely committed by the ratings agencies and the securitizing agents in the ratings of and selling of the tranched mortgages, and thirdly in the process of deregulating the "commodities" market and applying unregulated "insurance" policies known as credit default swaps were used to create a massive piece of moral hazard in the burning down the entire economy and collecting on that bet (remember the AIG payoffs where AIG had to be bailed out?). Insurance is generally regulated so that that my neighbor cannot take out fire insurance on my house, because of the temptation to burn down my house. When this process is legally challenged the whole process will fall apart, imo. This only scratches the surface of the fraud that has been committed relative to the securitized mortgages arena. As to the supposed involvement of the Community Reinvestment Act try doing some research rather than parroting BS. The whole CDO and MBS process was created to soak up excess "liquidity" that was created by both the Japanese ZIRP process, the enormous US trade deficit, and the PONZI schemes being run on a global scale. And now a US ZIRP is supposed to fix the problem??? I think not. Likewise, the nominal value of property was driven way up by the same process, not to forget the effects of the commission and bonus scamming. On a practical basis most foreclosure hearings fail because the the filing of the alleged mortgage agent cannot even produce proof that they actually own the mortgage, ie they have no standing in the legal process under contract law. The total absence of depth in this nominal analysis seems to damn the whole related process rather than investigating what has been going on.

  • Mango Punch||

    You lost me at "While the"

    the contract was breached by violation of contract law by the securitization agents

    What contract was breached? Are you saying that it was illegal (persuant to the mtg contract) to seciritize said mtg? If that's what you are saying then I'm calling BS.

    thirdly in the process of deregulating the "commodities" market

    Not that regulated and never has been...

    unregulated "insurance" policies known as credit default swaps were used to create a massive piece of moral hazard

    ok, but NOT ON MBS! That is what we're talking about right?

    The whole CDO and MBS process was created to soak up excess "liquidity"

    What the fuck does that mean??

  • Mango Punch||

    I recind my "NOT ON MBS" statement, CDS was obviously written on MBS... my head was somewhere else

  • ||

    Couple errors. The ratings agencies didn't commit fraud. They were using a risk model that was flawed by the assumption that the housing market would never be nationally correlated. That is - they assumed that local markets moved indepedently, so there would be a low risk that an entire "basket" of mortgages would go bad simultaneously. It was a means of averaging out risk to make the securities safer. And would have worked fine if the housing bubble hadn't occured causing all the local markets to move in synch. Or if someone had been paying attention to the housing market and realized that there was something fucked up about the model.

    Second, CDOs and CDSes weren't a means of soaking up "liquitity" it was a means of soaking up risk. Basically these things worked like insurance. To cover the risk of an MBS going bad, you would make monthly payments to AIG, similar to premiums. If the security went bad, AIG would pay you the face value of it, and they would take the loss.

    What I find fucked up about this is that this process implicitly assumes that a MBS's face value is backed up by some kind of hard asset. But it isn't, It's backed up by something that has a subjective market price - houses. Effectively, what this means is that the value of the house was insured against a price drop at the top of the market. Once the market went south, Goldman Sach's and other CDO/CSD holders collected the inflated value that the bonds had been worth in the middle of the bubble. Which is coming directly from the US Treasury via AIG.

  • Mango Punch||

    What I find fucked up about this is that this process implicitly assumes that a MBS's face value is backed up by some kind of hard asset. But it isn't, It's backed up by something that has a subjective market price - houses. Effectively, what this means is that the value of the house was insured against a price drop at the top of the market.

    Well put.

  • ||

    Well, I should actually clarify that. A HOUSE is a hard asset, but the MBSes aren't "really" backed by houses. They are a contrivance that is based on a mortgage based on the market value of the house.

    That's a better way of putting it.

  • ||

    Also, even worse, are the people collecting on the "naked" CDSes - people who didn't even own the MBSes, but were just gambling that they would fail. Those people are collecting money from AIG - and by extension US taxpayers - as well.

  • Tadit||

    see also http://www.economics.arawakcity.org

    and thanks for all of the fish

  • bizarre||

    It's bizarre, but then it gets worse!

    http://ancaps.super-forum.net/.....t12120.htm

  • Mango Punch||

    Tim, I have a few issues with your post...

    But foreclosure is the best option for the servicer for the same reason it's the best option for everybody else involved.

    Foreclosure isn't the best option for everyone else involved. The servicer is should be relatively indifferent, it's generally good for senior paper holders, and terrible for the equity tranche holders of securitizations. There is a major and legitimate dillema in servicing MBS pools as to whose interest the servicer should be looking out for.

    As Hit & Run visitors have heard, time and time again, modified loans are so likely to end up defaulting again that there is essentially no argument for encouraging this procedure.

    Naive, the point is to get the most value out of the loan, not to keep people in their homes. Modifying loans does often increase value.

  • Invisible Finger||

    Why should the servicer be indifferent? A terminated loan means the termination of servicing fees on the loan.

  • Mango Punch||

    6th digit, It depends on the servicing agreement, some especially secondary servicing agreements have pool performance metrics versus similar pools, Ocwen for instance has this type of pay structure a lot.

  • ||

    The first principle of property law is that you want someone, anyone, to have clear title to the property. Property that is tied up in court or has unclear ownership can't be used very productively.

    In my short experience looking for a house, there seems to be a lot of foreclosure properties that can't sell because they either can't figure out who actually holds all the liens or the second lien holders won't release their lien and take their loss. For that reason I don't think that the Kansas decision is necesarily that bad. Screw the second lien holders. They made a bad bet. Let's get the bad loans cleared off, the people who can't afford the properties off of the properties and get the property into the hands of someone who can afford to pay for it and will use it prodcutively.

  • Mango Punch||

    I think the second lien issue is more so trying to modify loans, as the second mortgage holder has to agree to be re-subordinated to the new modified loan.

    Your other point is spot on too, an MA court recently ruled that lenders must have proof of ownership at the time of foreclosure.

    What was the Kansas decision?

  • ||

    "On the doesn't exist side are Landmark National Bank vs. Kesler buffs. This Kansas Supreme Court case ruled that a second lienholder, which had not filed paperwork on time, did not have standing to collect when the primary mortgager foreclosed on a property. Because in this case the second lienholder was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, a clearinghouse established by large lenders for electronic trading and tracking of mortgages, advocates of affordable fair housing for fair housing affordability have decided that the ruling will make it impossible to foreclose on 60 million mortgages."

    That case mentioned above is the Kansas case. That is an awful sentence so I am not entirely sure what the complaint is. But, I don't see the problem with the case. Rule number 1 of secured transactions is that you have to file your paperwork on time and give the world notice of your lien. If those dumb asses couldn't do that, then their lien is invalid. We are supposed to change the rules because some retarded MBA dreamed up some stupid system? The primary lien holder still got to foreclose. As for the secondary lien holder, too bad. Figure out how to file liens before you go into the mortgage business.

  • ||

    This Kansas Supreme Court case ruled that a second lienholder, which had not filed paperwork on time, did not have standing to collect when the primary mortgager foreclosed on a property.

    If MERS botched its filing, then it probably doesn't have standing to collect.

    Also, note that in this case the primary lienholder foreclosed.

    I have no idea what the priorities and flows of funds were supposed to be on this particular foreclosure, so its hard to say what really happened, but it looks like:

    (a) The house was foreclosed on.
    (b) The primary lienholder got whatever it was owed/was going to get.
    (c) MERS (and whoever MERS is fronting for) got nothing.

    I'm looking around for perverse incentives and injustice, and I'm not seeing them.

  • ||

    If you read the link and the comments, the guy says that the case also stood for the proposition that MERS didn't count as a "lien holder" under the law because it is just some lien holder's nominee. The author goes on to say in response to a commment

    "This is key because in a lot of these securitized deals the actual ostensible note-holder doesn’t show up in court to enforce the foreclosure and tries to do it through MERS (ie a case in California called Mers v. Vargas), the reason being that if the actual note-holders showed up in court with their crappy paperwork, the judges would usually throw them out of court."

    Basically these idiots split up these mortgages in such a sloppy and complicated way, that they made them unenforcable under the secured transaction laws. Now they are screaming bloody murder that the courts are enforcing the laws in the same way they have been for about the last 500 years in common law courts.

    I honestly can't see how anyone could have any sympathy for them. As I said above, if you want to go into the mortgage business, you better know how to enforce a lien.

  • Mango Punch||

    Thanks for the synopsis, if the securitization was invalid than wouldn't the originator still 'own' the loan? I'm having trouble seeing where/how the debt could just go away.

  • ||

    Someone has the loan. But without the ability to take the property it was supposed to be secured with, the loan isn't worth much.

  • Mango Punch||

    if that's the case then wouldn't that just delay the foreclosure process while they get the proper documentation together?

  • ||

    Because the guy is not paying hte loan and the only way to get your money is to forclose. If you can't foreclose you are out of luck.

  • Mango Punch||

    yes but if as you said "someone has the loan" then they ultimately should be able to consolidate the paperwork and execute the lien. If they don't "have the loan" then what happened, did the contract become invalidated?

  • ||

    For the lien to be any good, you have to file it on time and you have to be the person who is entitled to the lien. What appears to have happened is that the mortgages were cut up into so many pieces that no one is sure who owns this loan and no one bothered to file the right paperwork at the right time to perfect the lien.

  • Mango Punch||

    So the loan and the debt exists but it's no longer secured? So it's basically paripassue with credit card debt?

  • ||

    Exactly.

  • ||

    Hahaha.

    How much do you want to bet that it is Fannie and Freddie holding the toxic asset that couldn't get their ass together fast enough to file the lein.

    Or, even better, how much to you want to bet that the Obama adminsitration ordered them not to, because they didn't want any more foreclosures?

    Heck, it doesn't even have to be Fannie and Freddie - wasn't the administration leaning on bailed out banks in other ways? It's certainly not beyond them to lean on lien holders to avoid filing their paperwork on a false promise that their interests would be protected.

  • ||

    Hola, maybe it's even the Fed holding the paper by now.

    In which case, the paperwork will probably never get filed. I suspect the Fed is just going to hold a bonfire (bondfire?) and burn up the toxic paper. I mean, nobody's going to buy it and the Fed certainly does not have the capacity to do anything with it.

    Ahhhh ... can this get to be a bigger clusterfuck?

    We would have been Soooooo much better off if the banks had failed.

  • ||

    Show me the note.

    That's four words that have been putting a halt to some forclosures. If the forclosing entity can't produce paperwork that proves they own the home, they shouldn't have standing in court.

  • Mango Punch||

    the Fed is just going to hold a bonfire (bondfire?) and burn up the toxic paper

    Puts a whole other meaning to brownshirts burning books.

  • ||

    There's some sweet karma in play here considering the list of MERS shareholders.

    Is anyone surprised that these assholes couldn't get their lien filings in on time? They couldn't organize a trip to the bathroom.

  • Invisible Finger||

    HuffPost's Shahien Nasiripour says this proves that foreclosures are more "profitable" for servicers than loan modifications.

    Nasiripiour is a complete idiot. If it was profitable, the banks would be pulling out all the stops to foreclose ASAP. Instead they're ass-dragging because they don't want to spend the money to foreclose and end up with a near-worthless asset. One only needs to have walked through a neighborhood with lots vacant SFR's to know this. But there's poor people in those neighborhoods and they scare the shit of these uplifters.

  • robc||

    You are correct, but it doesnt disporve Nasiripiour's point. Foreclosing MAY be more "profitable" (ie less losses) than modifications. Its just that delaying may be more profitable than either.

  • ||

    I wonder why anyone thinks that these loan modifications help the borrowers anyway.

    A) You aren't helping someone by keeping them chained to a debt burden they can't afford.

    B) This is about propping up the BANKS. Not even the local banks, but the banks at the top of the food chain that are holding those securities. They want to keep housing prices up and prevent forclosures to prop up the value of houses, and subsequently the bonds. It's ALL about preventing "To Big to Fail" banks from failing. The idea is to stabilize the housing market so that people will resume trading MBSes.

  • ||

    I think you are right. But that is a hopless task. Those banks are going down and housing prices with them. The longer we put that off, the worse things will be.

  • Mango Punch||

    Regardless of why the gov't is involved in incentifying mods (HAMP/HARP) or keeping home prices up (HPDP), accepting a mod is a free market transaction. The borrower isn't being "chained to a debt burden", they're choosing to accept the modified contract.

  • ||

    True, but most of these people are being encouraged to do so. They think they are being "helped".
    They have the entire dDemocratic party "for the poor" "affordable housing" shebang telling them that it's a good thing they are getting a loan modification.

  • ||

    Narcissists love the Blame Game, but lets get real, Bankers are Professional Loan Makers, it's their business, they do it all day every day and for them to make so many bad loans tells me it was not only intentional but planned! It tells me they knew they would package these BAD LOANS and SELL them to SUCKERS with AAA Rating from Moody's How Moody's sold its ratings - and sold out investors http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/77244.html
    what do you call it when Banks and Rating Agencies work togather to cheat millions of people? ... what's it called? We call that Conspiracy and Fraud

  • robc||

    clicked on the shareholders link and this came to mind:

    You will never find a more wretched hive of scum and villainy.

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