Tim Cavanaugh | September 16, 2009
Need evidence for the economic recovery that your betters keep telling you about but that you don't actually see? Here are some indirect observations made by the Hubble Telescope but still not visible to the naked eye:
The consumer price index increased 0.4 percent in August.
The producer price index for finished goods increased 1.7 percent in August.
Industrial output increased 0.8 percent.
Retail sales have increased 2.7 percent, mostly on the strength of auto sales.
Gold rises, suggesting aggressive inflationary policy is finally succeeding.
Credit card company write-offs rise again, after briefly trending down. Some would say that's bad news, because it's more lost money for Citibank (though as Kramer knew, those big companies write everything off). I consider it good news because it continues the trend of brute-force deleveraging -- which is the only kind of deleveraging we're likely to see.
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Other than Gold, which has gone crazy and truly scares me, all
of the others are indeed good indicators to me (assuming you feel
the same).
Now I'll retire to go through my wife's jewelry buffet.
Retail sales have increased 2.7 percent, mostly on the
strength of auto sales.
Yessir, that's growth for the longview. There certainly wasn't any
sort of one-shot deals there. America is buying cars, and its going
to keep buying cars. To infinity and beyond!
Inventory restocking & contrived demand does not mean a
sustainable recovery is in place.
Regards,
TDL
The other shoe is going to drop soon. This is a sucker's
rally ala 1930.
Am I allowed to call a thread winner yet?
Tim, Sorry you have insomnia like me.
I still expect a post from you by 9 am.
Here's a direct observation made by me, the person, I, myself, who that I am: these Hubble observed phenomenon do not factor in either the weed killer or the pre-emerge that Obama is doing his very best to spread all over the lawn.
The link within the link, that maybe would have explained to a
non-economist like me what "brute-force deleveraging" is, has
expired.
So could someone please tell me?
We pumped trillions of dollars into the economy through
bailouts. We'd BETTER see some economic improvement for all that
loot...
But, it doesn't matter how much the economy does or does not
recover, a system based on fiat money has only one logical end.
This is a sucker's rally ala 1930
Market "timers" are the suckers.
Sucker or not most of the indicators and actions are there to give
us a long, slow, painful next 10 years. There really is no reason
for the market to be at 9700. Right now people are selling like a
hooker selling ass on nickle night. Even options down to a month
are selling, people are expecting either the top to come quickly or
the fall to come quickly.
I see a slow bleed on the horizon as long as CMBS and commercial
property doesn't tank, which means government forced restructuring
of loans. Lets just hope the opportunity cost of C4C and other
programs aren't just moving revenue into near periods and raping
later periods.
You forgot about debt/ebitda & interest coverage ratios
strengthening
A massive CMBS rally yesterday (which could smooth losses by
allowing restructurings [although cumulative losses shouldn't
change much])
A strong VC mkt prospects (2Q was ahead of expectations and while
3Q is generally slowest 4Q is projected to be strong)
Corp. defaults coming in slower than expected prompting Moody's,
S&P and JPM to lower peak default estimates...
... There is definitely still pain ahead and certian sectors
probably rallied more than they should have, but others remain
under-valued (my $0.02)...
"I see a slow bleed on the horizon as long as CMBS and commercial
property doesn't tank, which means government forced restructuring
of loans"
hmm... this is asinine, are speaking of "tank" as in asset prices
selling off or as in comulative losses coming in? In the first case
the tank has already come and asset prices are now being supported
in senior tranches by PPIP and TALF, in the second case losses and
delinquencies haven't even hit yet in CMBS and wont for some time,
people understand this and it's priced into the mkt with 7-15% cum
losses (even post yesterday's short covering)... CMBS losses are
going to be painful and lumpy w/o restructuring vs smooth with (I
don't know of a gov't program to force restructuring and given how
much more diverse CMBS mkts are and how there is no political
capital in helping 'fat cats' I don't think there will be)... on
the other hand, the recent rally in CMBS might help servicers
restructure allowing losses to come sooner and be more
smooth...
The link within the link, that maybe would have explained to
a non-economist like me what "brute-force deleveraging" is, has
expired.
So could someone please tell me?
Nope.
What I think TC is refering to with "brute deleveraging" can be
explained as follows:
In most environments, companies can deleverage through out-earning
their interest and slowly pay down debt (possibly refinancing),
hence reducing debt/equity, interest/EBITDA (or cash earnings) etc.
In some cases when a company or individual is underwater (either
debt>assets or interest>EBITDA) they will enter bankruptcy
and change of control will occur (debt holders become the equity
holders and equity goes to 0).
Companies can also enter into technical default by violating terms
that they have on their debt. These are often fincancial covenants
such as debt/equity ratios, interest coverage ratios, but also
usually include terms such as fair disclosure and change of control
provisions. In normal environments breaching covenants usually
results in amending the debt (or refinancing) and paying some sort
of fee and increased interest, or often amortizing the debt (paying
principal down over time). However, in other environments, such as
when the lender is close to their covenants or regulatory
requirements (think bank and insurance companies)or when the lender
(often holders of corporate notes) are capitally constrained (think
hedge funds running into margins) the process might not go as
smoothly, and it is often in the lender's best interest to force
the borrower into default, and foreclose on assets (if secured)or
force the borrower into bankruptcy. In the previous sentances I was
refering to corporate debt, but similar principals hold for private
debt, mortgages etc.
I believe TC is referring to brute as the later process I
mentioned, where there is massive foreclosure, and assets are
shifted from borrower to lender. In principal, once the
deleveraging occcurs and they system is back to a sustainable debt
burden, we should return to a normalized scenario. Essentially
brute deleveraging would result (in theory) in a large temporary
disruption in exchange for a sooner return to equilibrium. The
alternative, where asset values are proped up (averting the
breaching of a lot of technical covenants) or where lenders are
backstopped (making it more profitable to unwind debt in an orderly
fashion) a return to equilibrium is slower but the shock is
lesser.
While I didn't read the actual link in the post, this is I believe
the general explanation given for brute deleveraging. It's a lot
like the theory of "shock" in macro-economics when a country goes
from a centralized to free market.
all of the others are indeed good indicators to
me
How the fuck can an increase in consumer prices be looked at as
"good" news, in light of the fact that wages are not increasing at
a same or better pace? You think losing purchasing power is good
news?
BO, I'd love to have a beer, as long I don't have to arrest Ben
first.
6th Digit:
Standard economic theory is that some inflation is good in that it
allows "sticky" prices or expenses to adjust down, the most common
example which is used is wages, (where people [and contracts] are
more likely to accept below inflation wage increases than they are
a wage cut)
In the current environment this extends to other "sticky" assets
such as housing prices, which many speculate are required to
stabilize before real economic recovery can take hold.
Generally deflation or 'too' high inflation is bad economically
while a little inflation is healthy. Some would argue that higher
than what is normally considered healthy inflation is in fact
healthy in the current environment.
Another effect of high inflation (be it fair or not) is that it
alleviates debt burdens (via reducing real interest and real debt
value) at the expense of lenders.
Why would I talk about realized asset losses and the future? It
would already be a part of any security. With default rates hitting
4% again and even with losses, supposedly, being priced into the
derivatives the market for commercial real estate's current
condition is dismal and not getting better. There are two basic
ways to go, defaults galore and the securities around them tanking,
or restructuring (government forced or otherwise) which will create
the same problem we had before with respect to derivatives backed
by assets that are inflated with little way to effectively measure
the default risk. Or a slow deleveraging of the assets and praying
the market doesn't spook and magically send a finite resource
backed assets to zero.
I don't see the difference from the short, acronym-less simple
statement that we are most likely going to bleed out the inflated
asset values over time due to restructuring and what you stated in
100 words or more.
This
looks a lot like a government program to restructure commercial
loans to me. Hence the rally yesterday since this was in the 16th
paper. Just because it didn't get a fancy name. They are
pushing restructuring which will keep the assets inflated and
complicate the evaluation of risk relative to the backing
asset.
hmm
What you wrote wasn't asinine, I miss-read you the first time and
thought you were saying there would be a 'crash', as if you were
saying a potential 'crash' would change your scenario... sorry
about that.
Caveats:
"government forced restructuring of loans" - false
"Lets just hope the opportunity cost of C4C and other programs
aren't just moving revenue into near periods and raping later
periods" - agree with this, but in the case of CMBS restructuring
it has the opposite impact, spreading losses to sooner periods.
How exactly is increase in CPI a good thing again?
And likewise, industrial output can be explained by the increase in
retail sales, which are explained by the time-preference change
caused by Cash for Clunkers.
If these are "Green Shoots", what are the fully sprouted money
trees supposed to look like?
And when the economy fizzles again after showing signs of life, it will still be that free market laissez-faire enthusiast Bush's fault.
@ Sean W. Malone
Think Bonsai! 1/100th the tree for 100x the required care :)
Cheers!
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