Anthony Randazzo | December 17, 2008
Killing zombies isn't typically the responsibility of America's president or treasury secretary. But if the country is going to get through the current financial crisis, President-elect Barack Obama and his economic team better get out their shotguns and aim for the head.
Today, our economy is plagued by struggling markets, liquidity concerns, and frozen credit. Twenty years ago, Japan faced nearly the exact same problems. Then they fell prey to the zombies.
After Japan's asset bubble burst in the late 1980s, their economy took a sharp downturn, prompting government officials to try bailing out banks and investing in infrastructure, much like the activity and proposals floating around America today. The results were terrible.
With the government propping up poor business models rather than allowing further job losses, firms wound up operating over the long-term without making a profit or adding any value to society. Their utter lack of vitality earned these perpetual money-leaching entities the moniker "zombie businesses." And unless American policymakers understand the failures of the Japanese response, we will suffer the same zombie fate.
Remember that the Japanese asset bubble and the American housing bubble have eerily similar origins. Both were driven by aggressive behavior in financial institutions. Wall Street, which sought new ways to get quality returns on investments, turned to securitizing everything it could and issuing unwise subprime mortgages—all highly valued by the rating agencies, and all highly misunderstood. The Japanese aggressively pursued real property assets to the point where the inflated values were unsustainable.
In both cases, the rapid rise in rates of return led to over confidence. In Japan, it is said that the market experienced a sense of euphoria, and poor investments were driven by excessively optimistic expectations of future economic development.
The Nikkei, Japan's stock index, rose from 18,000 in 1986 to an intraday high of 38,975 by the end of 1989. Similarly in the U.S., the Dow Jones went from 7,591 in July 2002 to an intraday high of 14,115 five years later.
These large growth trends led to inadequate risk management, over-leveraged investments, and depleted capital reserves. In both bubbles, loans were given out like candy, often times to people that the banks knew were high risk.
Government practices during both bubbles share many unfortunate similarities as well. In Japan, increased capital requirements caused many firms to struggle when their assets started to depreciate. Similarly, the inflexible mark-to-market regulations in America forced firms to raise capital quickly, sometimes driving them towards bankruptcy.
In America, Federal Housing Administration policies encouraged the expansion of subprime mortgages, particularly through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The idea was to expand homeownership for low-income families, though the increased demand drove housing up until the market was eventually oversaturated. Japanese regulatory policies and tax codes also caused land prices to unnaturally rise until they ultimately burst.
Given these similarities, U.S. officials should take a careful look at how Japan's response to the crisis lead to the more than ten years of recession and stagnation known as "the lost decade." We do not want to duplicate Japan's mistakes.
First mistake. The Bank of Japan tried to ease economic pains during their downturn through the 1990s by loaning large amounts of money to businesses. However, such attempts to recapitalize the market were counteracted by underlying management problems endemic to the dying firms.
According to Shigenori Shiratsuka, Deputy Director and Senior Economist at the Bank of Japan, even though firms became unprofitable, the government still encouraged lending to them to prevent losses from materializing. There were heavy concerns about a failing firm increasing unemployment.
The intense lobbying from special interest groups representing various sectors of the Japanese economy further perpetuated these ill-fated loans, funneling additional funds to zombie businesses. As Shiratsuka notes, "under such circumstances, loans to unprofitable firms become fixed and funds are not channeled to growing firms, holding down economic activity."
Unfortunately, we're seeing a disturbingly similar trend in America today, as the cost of bailing out AIG continues to rise and Congress moves forward with a bailout for the auto industry. The $8.4 trillion (and growing) cost of "saving" firms deemed too big to fail completely ignores the inefficiency and poor quality of the very businesses the government is trying to save.
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I heard something interesting along these lines on NPR.
Supposedly, Bernake is an expert on the Great Depression and on
Japan's decade+ recession. What he allegedly has learned from these
events, particularly from the latter, is that the bailouts and
other interventions need to be really big at the outset, not just
done bits at a time.
Naturally, I think that's nonsense, but that's what I heard.
Great article. I can see there being some argument to keeping banks alive, and also some argument to letting businesses die gracefully, but still die. There is no reason to keep any non-bank company alive for any reason. And there is especially no reason trying to invest gung-ho in infastructure, most of which is not needed. The market will only dip so far before it begins to rebound again, and there are things we can do to help that rebounding by freeing it up.
I can see there being some argument to keeping banks
alive
There are arguments for it, but they're wrong. When the government
keeps zombie banks around, they're preventing the market from
figuring out who's solvent and who's not.
-jcr
Thank you for an excellent article. The best thing to do, in my
opinion, is nothing. Let the creative destruction take place. What
is happening is a correction to excesses, bad decisions, government
involvement and other reasons you've listed. May be the financial
institutions that caused this should disappear so that their place
can be taken up buy better, smarter managers of money. Also, may be
housing market was overpriced by a great margin (fueled by
imprudent loans indirectly instigated by the government, and sooner
or later it needed to deflate, and not everyone needs to be a house
owner.
Just like forest fires sweep away old deadwood which makes it
possible for new growth to take place so is the economy. Instead,
massive government bailout of banks, auto industry (and who knows
what else is in line) is going to preserve everything as is.
Correction will be prevented from running its proper course. This
will result, I fear, in a long period of no innovation, low job
creation, high unemployment, and no new creation of wealth.
However, many see it differently.
Paul Crougman, for example, article after article, is advising
Obama not to listen to those who warn him not to do anything
drastic. To the contrary, he hopes that Obama's intervention will
be massive and transformational. He does not go into specifics of
what exactly should be done. He just says that it should be massive
and should transform society. I think that he, just like many of
his intellectual comrades, is salivating for the government take
over of the means of production. He is anxious to see another great
social experiment to take place.
Personally, I do not see anything appealing in this scenario. It
conjures up in my mind bleak landscapes of my birthplace - Soviet
Union with its empty shelves, product lines, absence of liberty and
absence of economic creativity. Its massive government bureaucratic
apparatus controlling all aspects of its citizen's lives is every
liberal's dream.
Well, I can see that the zombie companies have already eaten the
administration's brains.
(No wonder they are still hungry.)
I am glad to see that article. Over the past few weeks, I've been reading more and more about Japan's lost decade and have wondered why it happened. This has at least given me some clues. I agree with much of what is written too. Continuing to prop up dysfunctional businesses only harms the overall economy in the long run.
Is Ving Rahmes available to kick some zombie ass?
"You coming with us?
Nah, you're coming with me. I've done this before."
In a related
article on CNN Money, Toyota and other asian carmakers want a
bailout for the big 2.5. It seems counter-intuitive at first glance
but the primary reasons cited are:
1)Potential bankruptcies of parts suppliers. Since many auto parts
are made by only a few companies with no redundancy in the market
mean that any interruption in the supply chain hurts all auto
manufacturers equally. I fail to see how propping up 3 big
companies instead of 12 smaller ones is any different.
2)Failure of the big 3 would further weaken the US Economy and
reduce demand for all autos. I call bullshit on this one. It may
put all UAW workers out on the streets and while it may be a boon
to the repo-man for a year or so it won't really affect forward car
sales.
And lastly, buried at the end of the article, almost as an
afterthought:
3)"The failure of a U.S. automaker could open the door for a
Chinese or Indian automaker to buy up the assets of the failed
company and create a new low-cost competitor in the U.S." Yup, the
real reason that Toyota, Hyundai and Honda fear the 'Big 3' failing
is that Tata or Geely could get a huge jump on the US market. Damn
those Indians for wanting to sell $2000 cars to cash
strapped Americans and beating the Japanese and Koreans at the game
they have dominated for the last 20 years. In short, better to
waste American taxpayer money on businesses that are "too big to
fail" than give it back to taxpayers to spend on affordable
cars.
This "crisis" definitely makes for strange bedfellows.
Potential bankruptcies of parts suppliers.
I see this potential problem cited all the time, but I don't get
how it could happen. If Honda, Toyota, etc are dependent on these
companies, they must be buying parts from them; and if they're
still selling parts to Honda and Toyota after the Big 3 fail, how
are they going to go bankrupt?
I have a cunning plan. Rather than propping up these failing
companies, the government should use its billions to finish them
off. Brilliant!
Strange that no one else has suggested this.
Pro Lib,
As usual I have a good idea and you take it and mold it into a
great idea. Here I am talking about using Ving Rhames to blow CEO's
heads off(on the assumption they are zombies) and you take it to
new heights by suggesting an agency committed to destroying them.
Truly you are a genius.
cunnivore,
There are three ways I can see the part supply bankruptcy playing
out.
First, if the company was running so thin a margin that the lost
profit would kill them. I have serious doubts about this.
Second, if the manufacturing facilities cost so much to run/retool
that the options are full production or none at all. Again, I have
my doubts unless said suppliers partook of "easy money" to expand
business when they should have been holding steady.
Last, if the companies have no way to "downsize" appropriately.
What I mean is, if they are bound by legal/union regulations
regarding staffing. I don't know if this is at all the case but it
wouldn't surprise me given that most US parts manufacturers were
spin-offs from the Big 3 (ACDelco comes to mind).
Otherwise, I'd have to call bullshit on that theory. Even if a
couple of the weaker companies went down and the stronger ones took
three to six months to tool up for replacement, the Asian
manufacturers wouldn't have to worry about domestic competition for
that time.
Naga,
I see the Department of Killing Off Weak Businesses as an
alternative to socialism and increased regulation. Under this
scheme, everyone wins. The left gets to enjoy destroying businesses
on the brink of failure, while the right and the libertarians get
to keep their free market--at least for companies that are
self-sustaining.
I think I'll deem this Regulatory Darwinism. The government will
sit watching. Waiting. Judging. And if a company looks weak enough,
the government will send its agents to finish the job. Won't need
Chapter 11 any more, because once these guys are done with a dying
business, there won't be anything left to restructure.
If this works, then we can use the same system for individuals who
declare bankruptcy.
Hemiptera - Our economy has caught
The
Vapors:
No fun, no sin, no you, no wonder it's dark
Everyone around me is a total stranger
Everyone avoids me like a cyclone ranger
That's why I'm turning Japanese
I think I'm turning Japanese
A good article. I've been in Japan since 1994 and even spent a very enlightening year on a provincial capital's Chamber of Commerce seeing how things don't work, how every idea is thwarted by some existing regulation or worry (valid or not). The CoC was looking to revitalize the old shopping arcade, but effectively zero interest loans meant zombies wouldn't/couldn't be shut or demolished to make way (though a Daiei that folded did turn into a condo complex). The remaining businesses were in buildings long since paid off, dealing with a clientele of people 50+, all slowly dwindling but at a stable predictable rate. All the young people left for Osaka or Kobe where the jobs and other young people are. Nobody wanted to return to take over the family jewelry or men's fashion shop. The ongoing question was: Come the death of owner X, childless or whose children don't want to return, what happens? The trend then was chuushaka, "parking-lotiziation": turn vacant property into pay parking. I recall parking inside a buliding, one wall of which had simply been removed so 6-8 cars could park inside at an hourly rate.
It's odd to be where chanage doesn't happen. Bus and train
fares? Museum admissions? Various foodstuffs? Almost all still the
same prices they were in 1994, but go outside a metropolis and you
can see the decay of inertia in crimbling public buildings, roads,
etc.
NHK recently reported that some private room Internet cafes, where
increasing numbers of the poor live for $5/night with hi-speed net
access (to seek work, one interviewed guy said), have begun
allowing long-term customers to establish official addresses there
(it's a Japanese thing). Without an official address on file at the
local ward office, you're kinda resigned to day laborer work. Now
registered at room 123 of Net Cafe X, some 48-year-old guy was
finally able to secure a month-long contract at some factory. The
private sector filling a niche created by a traditional
regulation.
I don't understand why zombie banks have this problem. Their
business model still works; presumably they won't be investing in
what didn't work before, just like solvent banks. Make them solvent
and they're the same as solvent banks, albeit not great for their
current diluted shareholders.
Unlike buggy-whip companies, or any regular business in the wrong
line, which certainly ought to die.
"Killing zombies isn't typically the responsibility of America's
president or treasury secretary."
Maybe it should be... personally I feel that dispatching the undead
(zombie or otherwise) is a fine indicator of being able to handle
national crisis (who ever heard of a local zombie problem?)
President Abraham Lincoln for example is reported to have quelled
an entire uprising of zombie slave owners with just his bear hands
and particularly sharp pencil.
So the Big 2.5 Chapter 11s, and (some of) their parts supplies
Chapter 11.
They're still around, aren't they? Making cars and parts, only
downsizing/renegotiating?
Where's the catastrophe, again?
I am so tired of people blabbering on like bankruptcy means their
plants are levelled, their employees either executed or living out
of cardboard boxes, and all that's left of Michigan is a
radioactive wasteland with tumbleweeds blowing down Main
Street.
I'll play devil's advocate, and repeat the line that "no one
will buy a car from a bankrupt car company" since who knows whether
they'll still be in business when you need a new part.
And given the rep of GM, you WILL be needing a new part, probably a
few days after your warranty expires.
President Abraham Lincoln for example is reported to have
quelled an entire uprising of zombie slave owners with just his
bear hands and particularly sharp pencil.
Ha ha ha ha ha. No one will catch Time Lincoln!
Bear hands are much more powerful and deadly than human hands. Those long grizzly claws are excellent for beheading zombies.
"President-elect Barack Obama and his economic team better get
out their shotguns and aim for the head."
They can't do it... BO & his team are anti-gun. They'll need
the bitter gun owners to help out.
"It's the same old theme since nineteen-thirteen."
Gold Bug - is this a 17th amendment reference? I am not sure that I
am hip enough to keep up with the comments section yet...
Gold Bug - is this a 17th amendment reference?
Nah - its a quote from the most excellent Cranberries song
"Zombie."
[off to iTunes for a download]
Oooh, yeah - but that was in reference the Easter Rising in
1916. I thought 1913 may have been an inserted reference to the
rise of statist government in the US with the passage of the 16th
(I said 17th) amendment.
&*%*... Now I'm going to have that song stuck in my head all
day.
Pretty much agree EXCEPT
"Similarly, the inflexible mark-to-market regulations in America
forced firms to raise capital quickly, sometimes driving them
towards bankruptcy."
Uh, its called reality. And when you borrow trillions, and your
return is 1% less than you expected, all of a sudden you have a
shortfall of billions and billions.
Is that mean of the bondholders not to wait till housing prices go
back up? Well, if you were owned 100 million a month, and someone
told you to wait till housing prices went back up, would you?
"I am so tired of people blabbering on like bankruptcy means
their plants are levelled, their employees either executed or
living out of cardboard boxes, and all that's left of Michigan is a
radioactive wasteland with tumbleweeds blowing down Main
Street."
Plz butt out of my escapist post apocalyptic fantasy. Thx.
So, in reading this article, what came to my mind is the
following:
1) How did folks in Japan get rich during the Zombie company
time?
2) What sectors within the Japanese economy could one invest in and
make bank?
3) Did one HAVE to look outside of Japan to get rich?
I ask, since, if the basic thesis of the article is right, then
perhaps those that got rich in Japan in the 90's could point the
way to get rich in America from 2009 on.
Neither Obama nor Congress has seriously considered cutting
business taxes, cutting capital gains taxes, or creating an
investment tax holiday. Any of these would encourage capital
investment and the growth of businesses, thereby spurring on an
economic recovery.
To paraphrase Jon Stewart:
Oh tax cuts, is there anything you can't do?
As I understand it the supplier problem is that the suppliers
are borrowing on their accounts receivables.
Most of their accounts receivables are owed to them by the
2.5.
The value of the receivables as collateral is largely due to the
customers ability to pay eventually so that the supplier can pay
off the loan.
Now, if the 2.5 go into Chapter 11 payments to the suppliers will
bereduced and/or deferred thus making the banks cut of the credit
line.
So the 2.5 need a bailout so they can pay their suppliers, so their
suppliers can stay in business.
My question is, how the 2.5 will pay their suppliers next time the
bills come due?
Maybe Uncle Sam should bailout the suppliers to give them some time
to find some customers that aren't such a bunch of fucking
deadbeats.
On June 4th, 1974 Hubbert testified before Representative Morris
K. Udall's Subcommittee on the Environment.3 In his 21 page written
statement he presented his familiar lecture on various growth
curves, their equations, curves of world and U.S. production of
fossil fuels as well as projections for the future. He next
discussed the cultural aspects of the growth problem. He states,
"during the last two centuries of unbroken industrial growth we
have evolved what amounts to an exponential-growth culture. Our
institutions, our legal system, our financial system, and our most
cherished folkways and beliefs are all based upon the premise of
continuing growth, Since physical and biological constraints make
it impossible to continue such rates of growth indefinitely, it is
inevitable that with the slowing down in the rates of physical
growth cultural adjustments must be made.
We will never again be able to get sufficient growth of the economy
to eliminate or even markedly reduced unemployment. NAFTA, GATT,
and Clinton's hope of growing the economy to solve unemployment is
doomed to failure.
The promise of competing in the global economy is a hoax
perpetrated upon the working and unemployed people of this country
because over time a nation needs to buy and sell overseas in
roughly equivalent amounts.
All attempts to reduce the deficit, balance the budget or pay off
the national debt are futile. The deficit and the national debt
represent the subsidy the government has paid in its attempt to
keep growth and unemployment at the level of social
tolerance.
The steady state economy into which we are being inexorably forced
implies an interest rate of zero.
An interest rate of zero (as Hubbert explains) means the end of the
money system. We are being forced to completely rethink our
cultural ideas about how to organize our economy and distribute
purchasing power.
Increasingly desperate means will be used by those who think we can
continue to have business as usual.
The proposals of Negative Population Growth should be implemented
immediately.
Americans are slow to understand world issues
that all the world in not classical economists
We are going to have a much worse time of it than Japan did, and their crisis lasted a decade. Japanese people save money (investement capital for banks) rather than piss it away on consumer goods.
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