The Volokh Conspiracy
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Fourth Circuit Panel Splits Three Ways on Kalshi Preemption
Three judges produce four opinions on one of the more consequential preemption questions in the lower courts.
Yesterday, in KalshiEX LLC v Martin, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit split three ways on whether sporting event contracts offered by Kalshi are "swaps" (as opposed to sports gambling), and whether state regulation of such contracts is preempted by federal law. The court's ultimate opinion was a one sentence per curiam affirming the district court, with two concurrences and a dissent.
In the end, two judges (Gregory and Thacker) concluded state regulation of these contracts is not preempted, but split over whether the contracts at issue are "swaps." A third judge (Benjamin) concluded that Kalshi's sporting event contracts are swaps and are preempted. So that's two votes for the contracts being swaps and two votes against preemption, but also two votes that the answer to the first question should control the answer to the second.
Judge Gregory began his concurrence as follows:
KalshiEX, LLC ("Kalshi") brings this appeal, which presents a narrow question of federal preemption. The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA" or "the Act") grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") exclusive jurisdiction over transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market ("DCM"). 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). But Congress also enacted a separate provision elsewhere in the same Act providing separate treatment for certain event contracts specifically involving gaming, among other things, and providing that certain such contracts may not be listed or traded on a DCM. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). The question here is whether, when read together, those provisions clearly establish that the CFTC's authority over the sports event contracts at issue excludes Maryland's traditionally recognized authority to enforce its gaming laws.
I do not decide whether Kalshi's sports event contracts are "swaps" within the meaning of the CEA. That is because, even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the CFTC's implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a DCM free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps bears on the scope of the CFTC's regulatory authority; it does not alone answer whether that authority is exclusive to the CFTC and displaces Maryland's concurrent authority to regulate gambling. Rather than providing a settled answer, the statutory and regulatory framework leaves unresolved the relationship between the CEA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction and Congress's treatment of gaming contracts.
Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police power, I would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland's concurrent authority absent a clear expression of its intent to do so. Nor has Kalshi shown that complying with both the CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible or stand as an obstacle to Congress's objective to create a centralized federal regulatory framework for trading derivative contracts. I therefore conclude that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA preempts Maryland's sports wagering laws and concur in the judgment affirming the district court.
Judge Thacker concurred separately, as he saw the issues differently, only he reached the same bottom-line result. His opinion begins:
Although I ultimately concur in the bottom line opinion, that is, affirmance of the district court, I get there via a different route than does my concurring colleague. KalshiEX, LLC ("Appellant") operates a prediction market. On that market, users enter into contracts with one another in which they try to predict whether or not a given event will occur. This appeal focuses on Appellant's sporting event based contracts. For instance, a user can predict whether a given NASCAR driver will win Talladega, or whether a college basketball team will win or lose a particular game. If the prediction is correct, the user gets paid. If not, they lose money.
In this appeal, we are asked whether Appellant's sporting event based contracts are "swaps" as defined by the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"). In my view, Appellant's sporting event based contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA. See also, KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, No. 25-7516, 2026 WL 2543846 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). As a result, I would hold that Appellant's contracts lie beyond the exclusive regulatory authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Therefore, Maryland officials can co-regulate these contracts.
And Judge Benjamin, dissenting, began her opinion this way.
This case concerns whether the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") preempts Maryland's application of its gambling laws to KalshiEX's ("Kalshi") sports related event contracts traded on a federally regulated exchange. Kalshi argues that because it operates as a designated contract market ("DCM") under the CEA, its contracts fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Maryland argues that Kalshi's contracts are functionally indistinguishable from sports betting and thus remain subject to traditional state authority over gambling.
This appeal turns on two issues: (1) whether Kalshi's sporting event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA and, if so, (2) whether the CEA preempts otherwise applicable state law. Because I think Kalshi's sports-related event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA, and because Congress has granted "exclusive jurisdiction" over such swaps to the CFTC, I would vacate the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.
This question is certainly headed to the Supreme Court, whether in this case or one of the others. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a split decision, found preemption was likely (in reviewing a preliminary injunction), whereas the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits found Kalshi's arguments for preemption unpersuasive. I am personally skeptical of preemption here, but we will see whether that is ultimately the view held at One First Street.