Judicial Misconduct Complaint Against Judge Boasberg Dismissed

Judge Sutton concludes there was not much to the complaint submitted by the Department of Justice.

On July 29, the Department of Justice filed a complaint against district court Judge James Boasberg, alleging that the Judge's comments to the Judicial Conference suggesting he was concerned that the Trump Administration might disobey district court orders violated multiple Canons of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

To avoid potential conflicts within the federal courts in D.C. (where Boasberg sits), the complaint was transferred to the Judicial Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

In December, Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint, and the order of dismissal was released this week.

Judge Sutton's memorandum and order first outlines the potential bases for dismissal:

After conducting an initial review, the chief judge of a circuit may dismiss a complaint of judicial misconduct if he concludes: (A) that the claimed conduct, even if it occurred, "is not prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts"; (B) that the complaint "is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling"; (C) that the complaint is "frivolous" because the charges are wholly unsupported; or (D) that the complaint "lack[s] sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred." Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(A)–(D); see 28 U.S.C. § 352(a), (b).

This complaint warrants dismissal.

On the substance of the complaint, Chief Judge Sutton writes:

The primary theory of the complaint is that the judge made an improper statement at the Judicial Conference on March 11 about the risk that the Administration would not comply with federal judicial rulings. This claim fails to establish a cognizable basis of misconduct. First, it lacks "sufficient evidence" to support the allegations. Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D). Here is the key allegation in the complaint: "On March 11, 2025, at one of the Conference's semiannual meetings, Judge Boasberg disregarded its history, tradition, and purpose to push a wholly unsolicited discussion about 'concerns that the Administration would disregard rulings of federal courts, leading to a constitutional crisis.' By singling out a sitting President who was (and remains) a party to dozens of active cases, Judge Boasberg attempted to transform a routine housekeeping agenda into a forum to persuade the Chief Justice and other federal judges of his preconceived belief that the Trump Administration would violate court orders." Compl. at 4. The Department identified one source of evidence, Attachment A, for the judge's statement and for the setting in which it occurred. The complaint, however, did not include the attachment. The D.C. Circuit contacted the Department about the missing attachment and explained that, if it failed to submit the attachment, the circuit would consider the complaint as submitted. The Department did not supply the attachment.

In the absence of the attachment, the complaint offers no source for what, if anything, the subject judge said during the Conference, when he said it, whether he said it in response to a question, whether he said it during the Conference or at another meeting, and whether he expressed these concerns as his own or as those of other judges. Later in the complaint, to be sure, the Department refers to a Fox News clip discussing the same allegation. But it does not identify any source, contain any specifics, or answer any of the above questions. A recycling of unadorned allegations with no reference to a source does not corroborate them. And a repetition of uncorroborated statements rarely supplies a basis for a valid misconduct complaint. "[R]umor[s] and gossip that at most could [constitute] leads into possible misconduct" fail to carry a complaint. In re Complaint of Jud. Misconduct, 591 F.3d 638, 646 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2009).

Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that the subject judge made this statement at some point during the Judicial Conference or its related meetings, the statement was not "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(A). The subject judge attended the Conference as one of two representatives of the D.C. Circuit, and federal law required him to be there. 28 U.S.C. § 331. The Conference acts as the policymaking body for the judiciary and consists of a diverse body of federal judges, drawn from every geographic region of the country and appointed by several different presidents. The Conference sets policy and provides guidance with respect to all manner of issues facing the judiciary—from budgets and courthouse maintenance to workplace conduct and judicial security and independence. On top of that, the formal meeting of the Conference involves presentations from invited guests from the elective branches, including the Attorney General and congressional leaders, about issues that often require coordination between the branches. A key point of the Judicial Conference and the related meetings is to facilitate candid conversations about judicial administration among leaders of the federal judiciary about matters of common concern. In these settings, a judge's expression of anxiety about executive-branch compliance with judicial orders, whether rightly feared or not, is not so far afield from customary topics at these meetings—judicial independence, judicial security, and inter-branch relations—as to violate the Codes of Judicial Conduct. Confirming the point, the Chief Justice's 2024 year-end report raised general concerns about threats to judicial independence, security concerns for judges, and respect for court orders throughout American history. See 2024 Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary at 5, 7–8.

To the extent the Department claims that the judge's alleged March 11 remark amounts to a "public comment" with respect to "a matter pending or impending in any court" in violation of Canon 3(A)(6), that theory also falls short. The alleged comment does not refer to a case, and the J.G.G. action was not filed until four days later: March 15, 2025. Because the judge did not refer to a case, that all but guarantees that his comments did not "violate[] Canon 3A(6), Canon 2A, or the Judicial–Conduct Rules." In re Charges of Jud. Misconduct, 769 F.3d 762, 788 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The comment at any rate was not a "public" one, as it was made in a closed-door meeting in which the communications are off the record and confidential. The complaint, notably, does not claim that the judge made public what was said in private at the Conference or its related meetings.

Chief Judge Sutton writes further:

The second theory of misconduct is that the judge improperly exercised jurisdiction over a case in defiance of a Supreme Court order, mistreated the Department during the case, and made other errors in handling the case. These allegations, however, "directly relate[] to the merits of a decision" and thus do not constitute judicial misconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); see Judicial Conduct Rule 4(b)(1). The Judicial Council is not a court and has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a subject judge's rulings, to reverse a judge's ruling, or otherwise to grant merits-related relief with respect to an underlying lawsuit. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 858 F.2d 331, 331–32 (6th Cir. 1988).

This resolution of the complaint is not remotely surprising. Whatever one thinks of Judge Boasberg, or his handling of various cases involving the Trump Administration, there was not much substance to the initial complaint.

Addendum: For those curious, the reason the order of dismissal was just released is because the disposition of judicial conduct complaints are not released until the time for a potential appeal lapses, creating a gap between the date of the order and the date of its public release.