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More Historical Evidence Showing that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment Does Not Allow Takings that Transfer Property to Private Parties
Harvard law Prof. Maureen Brady uncovers relevant evidence from late-nineteenth century state constitutional conventions.

The Supreme Court's controversial 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), held that private "economic development" is enough to satisfy the Fifth Amendment requirement that the government can only condemn property for a "public use." In so doing, it rekindled a longstanding debate over whether takings that transfer property to private parties violate the public use requirement. Harvard law Professor Maureen "Molly" Brady - one of the nation's leading property and takings scholars - has uncovered additional new evidence on this topic. And it counts against the decision reached in Kelo.
In an insightful post at the Brennan Center State Court Report, and an article for the recent Yale Journal on Regulation symposium on the 20th anniversary of Kelo (which I co-edited), Brady assesses debates over public use in late-nineteenth century state constitutional conventions, mostly in western states. She finds that several western states included specific provisions in their new state constitutions authorizing the use of eminent domain for some private purposes, such as drainage and mining. But, importantly, they did so explicitly, specifically outlining these categories as exceptions to the general requirement that takings must be for a "public use."
While Brady does not quite fully draw the connection, the fact that these private-use takings had to be explicitly authorized indicates that most delegates to these state constitutional conventions did not believe that a standard authorization of takings for "public use" was sufficient to allow condemnations for transfer to private parties, so long as the latter might benefit the public in some way (the interpretation eventually adopted by the federal Supreme Court in its terribly reasoned decision in Berman v. Parker (1954) and reiterated in Kelo). Rather, they assumed that "public use" only allowed condemnation for publicly owned projects, with the possible exception of private owners who have a legal duty to serve the entire public (such as public utilities).
This evidence is relevant to the interpretation of the federal Public Use Clause because many originalists argue that the relevant period for understanding the original meaning of the Bill of Rights as applied to state and local governments, is that around 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, thereby "incorporating" the Bill of Rights against the states. The state constitutional conventions Brady analyzes mostly occurred within a few years of 1868, and therefore illuminate understandings of the meaning of "public use" during this period.
One might wonder why state constitutional framers enacted provisions allowing for takings that were banned by the federal Fifth Amendment. One likely reason is that, during this period, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that the Fifth Amendment (or the rest of the Bill of Rights) had indeed been incorporated against the states. It did not do so until well into the twentieth century, a history discussed in Chapter 2 of my book The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain,
In The Grasping Hand, I also cover a wide range of other evidence of the meaning of public use in 1868, including state court decisions, legal treatises, and more. This evidence, too, largely supports the narrow definition of "public use" over the broad one adopted in Berman and Kelo. The same is true of the admittedly more limited evidence on the understanding of "public use" in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights were initially ratified. This evidence, too, is covered in my book.
Brady argues that the nineteenth century state conventions also highlight the importance of the "necessity" requirement as a constraint on eminent. Necessity - a doctrine adopted in many states' eminent domain jurisprudence - requires proof that condemnation is needed in order to achieve the public use supposedly justifying the taking. While federal courts would do well to give greater consideration to necessity, it is not a substitute for restoring the correct meaning of "public use." A condemnation that is "necessary" for a private use is still unconstitutional.
In the aftermath of Kelo, many states enacted reforms constraining eminent domain abuse. But abusive takings still continue in many parts of the country, and state action is not a sufficient substitute for systematic nationwide enforcement of the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
I hope the Supreme Court eventually reconsiders its badly flawed "public use" jurisprudence, and reverses Kelo and Berman. Molly Brady's excellent work provides additional reasons for moving in this direction.
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I'm not going to claim to be an expert in US (constitutional) history, but I am an expert in the early development of the railways, which happened a few decades later. Across Western Europe and North America it was common for things like turnpikes, canals, and later railways to be built by private companies. It strikes me as prima facie implausible that it would not have been permissible to use eminent domain powers to assist such companies. (Which, almost unavoidably, would have meant taking some land and transferrinig it to a private party, or at least granting them a very long-term lease for it.)
"with the possible exception of private owners who have a legal duty to serve the entire public (such as public utilities)."
There's a clear line of development when you trace the history of the case law:
It started with actual public ownership
Then it was private ownership but access to the public as a common carrier
Then it was private ownership with no access to the public, but it was in support of a private entity that was a common carrier and gave public access elsewhere.
Then it was zoning regulations, condemnations, etc. where the property would go to private owners.
Then it was taking property that wasn't blighted because property near it was blighted.
Then it was literally giving Hawaiian land from one private owner to another
Then it was regulations for a zoned piece of land that included pieces given from one private owner to another.
The original common carriers, IIRC, were actually quasi-governmental organizations that were allowed to exercise governmental powers like condemnation, but in return had to serve all comers on an equal basis. Port authorities, public ferries, and the like. The case for treating them as public use was pretty strong.
The problem here is that the government finds private property rights VERY inconvenient, and once you allow them to be violated in one case, the violations do tend to grow over time.
The limitation to what you described was very briefly followed, if it was at all.
But it was contemporaneous with the drafting of the relevant constitutional language.
The lesson is that "public use" is hard to define/enforce. Therefore, the focus should switch to the "reasonable compensation" side. At the very least, eliminate some of the games that governments play wrt FMV. Or better, that it shouldn't be limited to theoretical FMV given the use of force.
Legislative charters commonly did grant eminent domain to the corporation. And -- contrary to the replies above -- they didn't just go to common carriers or pubic service corporations.
As I mention in my comment below, I've read several hundred pre-Dartmouth College charters. Anyone forming an originalist view of the Fifth Amendment should read them.
First, the linked piece notes that the Kelo plan was a bust. Okay. Property clearly taken for public use, even by the lights of critics, sometimes is bust.
For instance, a property might be taken for a courthouse. It's compensated (like here). The courthouse, for whatever reason, was never built. It is notable, but a bit of a red herring.
Second ...
But even before the Kelo backlash, some state constitutions seemingly departed from the federal takings clause.
So there was, like in various constitutional matters, a dispute among the states on the issue. It is questionable if we should nationalize one side of this debate, putting it beyond state discretion or the discretion of federal policy. By SCOTUS fiat.
Again, for property that is taken by the government with compensation for a public purpose and used by the public in promotion of said purpose. See the Kelo majority opinion.
The history is interesting, but like many "history and tradition" appeals, it does not settle the question.
In the Kelo case, the only 'public use' was that they expected property tax revenues, and the new private owners were part of the public, weren't they? In fact, the Court didn't even call it "public use".
" It is questionable if we should nationalize one side of this debate, putting it beyond state discretion or the discretion of federal policy."
That horse left the barn when we ratified the 14th amendment, specifically to require states to uniformly respect certain rights.
"Ecnomic development" i.e. pay more taxes.
In Detroit, the spent insane amounts taking Poletown for GM. They estimated it would take 30 years for the city to get it all back.
Which was up over a decade ago. Still waiting for some Detroit journalist to track it all down and see how well the high and mighty predictions from the powerful, all retired fancy, or dead by now, turned out.
The opinion explains more than paying more taxes is involved so you might want to replace "i.e." with "e.g."
I chose i.e. deliberately, as a re-interpretation of sophistry akin to "in other words", and not as a clarifying example among several possible.
This incident, btw, highlighted something interesting. As a proto-libertarian, my reaction was against it. A relative, well-steeped in Democrats, was full in favor of it.
Full in favor of taking hundreds of houses from a Polish working class neighborhood to give to a gigantic corporation? Whaaaaaat? The Republicans are in favor of business, big business, the rich, pick your rhetoric.
It took a while before I realized it was about insatiable need for money to spend to buy votes so personal wealth could skyrocket. You can't waggle finger in the coat rooms if you are not in the majority, much less office.
And the more you can take, the more you can spend to get re-elected.
See the related threads about the anniversary of relaxation of political spending limits. One of the best arguments to do so is incumbants get to spend, well, $14 trillion this two year cycle.
Divide that by Musk's $260 million, you hacks.
I don't think anyone really defends Kelo on originalist grounds. I think they do defend it as hard to distinguish from Berman v. Parker and Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff.
I think the slippery slope can be identified quite early. Certainly, by the time of railroads (not sure about canals), but it's really Berman that paved the way. To me, Kelo isn't worse than Berman, it's just more honest.
TheAmazingEmu 1 hour ago
"I don't think anyone really defends Kelo on originalist grounds. I think they do defend it as hard to distinguish from Berman v. Parker and Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff."
That Highlights the problem with relying on precedent over the constitution. Kelo is an excellent example of how precedent allows the morphing of a direct constitution prohibition into something constitutional . 2A was headed that way until Heller. Same with civil forfeiture, same with double jeopardy, ex post facto ban, etc.
Yeah, if you're not continually correcting doctrine to the original text, but instead your last take on it, you end up doing a drunkards walk away from the original meaning.
Well, sometimes it's more of a determined sprint, than a drunkard's walk.
Thomas makes the point quite frequently.
"The ever-leftward ratchet" works as well. I.E. The ever-more-intrusive, ever-bigger-government ratchet of the historical plague called politicians".
Until the enactment of general corporation laws, corporations were formed by legislative act. During the colonial, Confederation and early Constitutional era, the charter commonly gave the corporation the power of condemnation.
The original understanding? State governments didn't need to exercise eminent domain on behalf of private enterprise -- they explicitly granted the power to private enterprise.
But the point is that these early corporations WEREN'T private enterprise. They were quasi-governmental organizations, just a way for the government to get some of its own work done.
You are incorrect. I repeat: go read the charters.
When will the takings clause address the transfer of property in tax payer dollars to private party NGO's.
I can remember posting in the old Cyberia usenet group using Euclid against Ambler to justify restricting restrictions on betting as a public good. At the time Euclid was the canonical case defining government taking. How far have things come not just with taking but betting as well.