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Justice Sotomayor Authors First Opinion of Supreme Court's October 2025 Term
Contrary to widespread speculation, the Court's first opinion of an argued case concerned neither Trump's tariffs nor voting rights.
This morning the Supreme Court issued its first decision of the October 2025 term in an argued case. Contrary to widespread speculation, today's decision was was not in Learning Resources v. Trump (the challenge to the Trump Administration's tariffs) nor Louisiana v. Callais (a timely Voting Rights Act case). Instead, the Supreme Court decided Bowe v. United States (an AEDPA case) by a 5-4 vote.
When the Supreme Court announced that it would be issuing one or more opinions today, many leapt to the conclusion that it would be deciding a particularly time-sensitive case, perhaps on the assumption that it is unusual for the Court to issue opinions in early January. This assumption is unfounded, however. The Court routinely issues a handful of opinions in December or January, although usually in unanimous or relatively straight-forward cases. Bowe is thus unusual in that it split the Court 5-4, divided the conservative majority, and generated 60 pages of opinions.
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the Court in Bowe joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, and Justice Barrett in part. Justice Jackson also wrote a concurrence.
Here is the introduction to Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Court:
Congress has created a comprehensive scheme to address when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal courts. A state prisoner can file an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. A federal prisoner, by contrast, can file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under §2255. Each provision contains its own procedural and substantive requirements that an individual must satisfy.
This case concerns the more complicated situation when a prisoner returns to federal court after a prior attempt for relief has failed. In this situation, Congress has enlisted the courts of appeals to play a gatekeeping role in the consideration of second or successive filings brought by federal and state prisoners. Under this system, before a prisoner can bring such a filing in a district court, a court of appeals must certify that the filing meets certain threshold conditions. Section 2244 governs authorization requests made by state prisoners, and §2255(h), in turn, governs requests made by federal prisoners. The two have distinct requirements, but through a limited cross-reference in §2255(h) to §2244 for how a filing is "certified" by a "panel," Congress has borrowed certain of the procedures that apply to state prisoners and applies them to federal prisoners too.
This case presents two questions regarding which aspects of §2244 fall within the scope of §2255(h)'s cross-reference. The first is whether §2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the "denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application" from being the "subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari," bars this Court's review of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal prisoners. If it does, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this case. The Court holds that it does not. In the narrow cross-reference to the procedures in §2244, Congress has not clearly indicated that it intended to incorporate §2244(b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar.
The second question is whether §2244(b)(1), which directs courts to dismiss a claim "presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application," applies to motions filed by federal prisoners. It does not: Section 2244(b)(1), by its express terms, applies only to state prisoners' habeas applications under §2254, not to federal prisoners' motions under §2255.
Here is the introduction to Justice Gorsuch's dissent:
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), courts of appeals serve an important gatekeeping function. When a state prisoner seeks to challenge his conviction or sentence in federal court for the first time, he normally proceeds directly to district court under 28 U. S. C. §2254. But before a state prisoner may bring a second or successive attack in district court, AEDPA requires him to obtain a certificate from a panel of the relevant federal court of appeals. And under §2244, an appellate panel may certify a case to proceed only subject to certain demanding rules.
Two are relevant here. First, an appellate panel may not authorize do-over claims—claims the prisoner already "presented in a prior" federal challenge. §2244(b)(1). Second, neither a state prisoner nor state authorities may file a petition for rehearing or seek "a writ of certiorari" to contest an appellate panel's decision granting or denying certification. §2244(b)(3)(E).
AEDPA contains parallel directions for federal prisoners. When a federal prisoner seeks to challenge his conviction or sentence collaterally for the first time, he usually proceeds directly to district court under §2255. But before he can pursue a second or successive challenge, it "must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals." §2255(h). Through that crossreference, then, federal prisoners seeking to bring second or successive collateral attacks are generally subject to the same rules as their state counterparts.
That brings us to Michael Bowe. After shooting two guards while trying to rob an armored vehicle in 2008, he pleaded guilty to three federal crimes. Since then, he has pursued five nearly identical postconviction challenges. In each, Mr. Bowe has asserted that one of the statutes under which he was convicted, 18 U. S. C. §924(c), is unconstitutional under our void-for-vagueness doctrine. And in all but the first of his challenges, Mr. Bowe has centered his argument around the same case: United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019).
When Mr. Bowe sought permission to bring his latest collateral attack, the Eleventh Circuit demurred. Because he had pursued his Davis claim three times before, the court held that his latest filing represented an impermissible doover claim barred by §2244(b)(1). Now, Mr. Bowe asks us to reverse the Eleventh Circuit's decision. Yes, he concedes, AEDPA bars state prisoners from pursuing do-over claims. But, he insists, federal prisoners are different. They (and they alone) are free to bring the same claim in district court over and over again.
Before we can take up that question, however, we must answer another. Under §2244(b)(3)(E), Mr. Bowe acknowledges, this Court lacks certiorari jurisdiction to review an appellate panel's decision denying a state prisoner leave to file a second or successive collateral challenge. But here again, Mr. Bowe argues federal prisoners are different. He submits that they (and, once more, they alone) are free to challenge adverse certification decisions on writ of certiorari.
Because I do not believe that either of Mr. Bowe's pleas for federal-prisoner exceptionalism can be squared with AEDPA's text, I respectfully dissent.
The Court has not yet announced its next decision day.
UPDATE: The Court has announced it may release additional opinions on Wednesday.
