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John Roberts Serves A Blue Plate Special, And The Progressives Forget All Of Their Complaints About The Shadow Docket
Trump v. Illinois is Robertsian faux minimalism at its worst.
Trump v. Illinois is the kind of Supreme Court opinion written for the headlines. For example, the New York Times blared "Supreme Court Refuses to Allow National Guard Deployment in Chicago." Most people reading that headline might think that the Supreme Court struck down President Trump's exercise of executive power, or determined that there was no actual need to deploy the national guard. But none of that happened.
The actual basis of the decision has nothing to do with the President's Article II powers, or whether Trump properly found there was a valid basis to deploy the guard. The short per curiam ruling is at once narrow, yet extremely consequential. Indeed, the statutory argument the Court adopted was not advanced in the lower court by Illinois, but was raised in an eleventh hour amicus brief by Professor Marty Lederman.
In short, federal law empowers the President to federalize members of the National Guard if he is "unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States." The Court finds that "regular forces" "likely refers to the regular forces of the United States military." The President did not point to any "source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois." Because the President has not done so, the President cannot show that those regular forces (the military) would be unable to execute the laws of the United States. QED.
If you just read the majority opinion quickly, everything seems to line up so easily and neatly. But once you peel back the shiny veneer, you realize that we have just been served another John Roberts Blue Plate Special. The Court purports to engage in minimalism: rather than deciding the difficult Article II issues, and determining how much deference the executive is owed, the Court resolves the matter on seemingly narrow statutory grounds. But any minimalism here is fake. The Court effectively neutered this statute. Because there will be very few cases where the President can use the military "regular forces" in domestic matters, it will be even rarer for the President to meet the predicate to federalize members of the National Guard. Perversely, as Justice Kavanaugh notes in his concurrence, "One apparent ramification of the Court's opinion is that it could cause the President to use the U.S. military more than the National Guard to protect federal personnel and property in the United States."
I can criticize Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett with my eyes closed. (I admit I have a propensity for calling on people named Roberts to resign.) But the other three members who joined the majority in full have some chutzpah. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson simply ignored all of their complaints about the shadow docket. They decided a significant issue affecting presidential power on the emergency docket with scant briefing and no oral argument.
Let's break it down.
First, this issue has been percolating for some time. There have been many decisions issued by District Courts in Illinois, California, Oregon, followed by appeals to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit. The emergency application was filed back on October 17. Circuit Justice Barrett called for a response three days later on October 20. The reply brief was filed in October 21, the same day as Professor Lederman's amicus brief. Then, on October 29, the Court requested supplemental briefing on "[w]hether the term 'regular forces' refers to the regular forces of the United States military." But this briefing schedule was a bit more relaxed. Opening briefs were due on November 10, and reply briefs were due on November 17. The Court no longer seemed to be in a hurry, and had likely already concluded that the stay would be denied. Given that the initial reply on all issues was due within three days, the Court was really pumping the breaks here for a fairly discrete issue. Those briefs were filed on November 17. Then silence for more than a month. Again, the silence can be explained with the benefit of hindsight, as the stay was ultimately denied.
On December 23, late in the afternoon the Court issues its decision. The majority opinion was about three pages long. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a four page concurrence in judgment. Justice Alito wrote a sixteen page dissent. And Justice Gorsuch wrote a two-page dissent. Did the opinions just take this long to put out? Or did the Court hold the opinion till the last minute for a slow news cycle? 'Twas the night before Christmas, when all through One First, Not a justice was stirring, they were all dispersed.
Second, given that the Justices took nearly two months to decide this case, there was more than enough time to schedule an emergency oral argument. The need for oral argument was especially acute since this case implicated core presidential powers, and there were very few precedents. It is telling the majority opinion only cites a single case from 2019 about statutory silence. Moreover, oral arguments seem especially appropriate since the Justices were poised to rule on an issue based on argument that the Plaintiffs did not advance below. Justice Kavanaugh made this point in his concurrence.
Third, in many cases, Justice Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson have complained that the Court decided important issues on the emergency docket. For example, in Dep't of State v. Aids Vaccine Advoc. Coal., Justice Kagan lamented that the Court decided the case "with scant briefing, no oral argument, and no opportunity to deliberate in conference." In the national guard case, there was no oral argument. Was there an opportunity to deliberate at conference? The Court did not have a regularly scheduled conference between the Lederman brief on October 21 and the request for briefing on October 28. Was the briefing here "scant"? Well, there was a call for supplemental briefing, so maybe not?
I think it is somewhat poetic that Justice Alito's dissent uses almost the same phrasing as Justice Kagan used:
To make matters worse, the Court reaches out and expresses tentative views on other highly important issues on which there is no relevant judicial precedent and on which we have received scant briefing and no oral argument.
Alito has been guilty of deciding major cases without oral argument, but Kagan and company have some explaining to do.
Perhaps the best response is here the Court denied relief, and Justice Kagan's admonition only applies when the Court grants relief. I'm not sure that argument works. An injunction and a stay are two sides of the same coin. If the district court enters an injunction, and that grant is in error, then the proper remedy is an emergency stay. If the district court declines to enter an injunction, and that denial is in error, then the proper remedy is an emergency injunction. During the past nine months (yes it has only been that long), virtually every emergency docket case that has come to the Supreme Court has been from a liberal lower court.
However, during the prior four years, most of the Supreme Court's emergency docket cases came from my beloved Fifth Circuit. In several cases, the lower courts did not grant the progressive's favored ruling, and the Biden Administration took an emergency appeal. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, for example, Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Jackson, and complained that the motion to vacate the stays was made "without ordinary merits briefing and without oral argument." There are more such cases, all resolved without oral argument: Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 (granting stay), NetChoice v. Paxton (vacating stay), United States v. Texas (granting stay), FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (granting stay), Danco Laboratories v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (granting stay), and Garland v. Vanderstok (granting stay).
I don't recall complaints in these cases. It's as if the Court's progressives suddenly forgot their primary objections to the shadow docket. It's good to have five, or even six votes. Speaking of six votes, let's talk about Justice Kavanaugh.
Fourth, Justice Kavanaugh styled the opinion as concurring only in the judgment. Is that right? He actually agreed with the part of the majority's analysis that "the statutory term 'regular forces' likely refers to the U. S. military, not to federal civilian law enforcement officers." But Justice Kavanaugh does not agree with the majority's "complicated and debatable statutory analysis." That doesn't seem like a concurrence in judgment. That seems like concurring in part and dissenting in part. If this was a merits docket case, the majority opinion would be divided into several roman numerals, and the Justice would join Parts I (meaning of regular forces), but not Part II (statutory analysis). Since there were no roman numerals, it was not possible to indicate which parts he agreed and disagreed with.
In recent years, Justices have played a bit fast-and-loose about how they style their opinions. For example, Justice Barrett labeled her dissent in San Francisco v. EPA as "dissenting in part," but it seemed she was really dissenting straight up. Did Justice Kavanaugh not list his opinion as concurring in part and dissenting part to avoid confusing the bottom line vote count? Did he think something labelled as a dissent-in-part was less likely to be cited? There is some obfuscation going on here.
Fifth, given Justice Kavanaugh's desire to "not decide more," he sure does raise a lot of issue in footnotes. Footnote 1 reminds us that the President can "federalize the National Guard if there is an 'invasion' or 'rebellion.'" The issue of "invasion" is still very live before the courts. Stay tuned for the Fifth Circuit en banc oral argument next month.
Footnote 2 discusses the Insurrection Act and the "President's long-asserted Article II authority." Here, Justice Kavanaugh does not cite any court decisions, but instead invokes William Rehnquist's OLC Opinion from 1971. Curious that the majority opinion cites the Rehnquist opinion, but doesn't name him. I really get the sense that Chief Justice Roberts had a strange relationship with his former boss. During the tariff argument, Roberts quickly shot down the relevance of Dames & Moore, saying that the Court "went out of its way to say that it was issuing a very narrow decision that it pretty much expected to apply only in this case." Kavanaugh also cites Jack Goldsmith's new Substack. Then, Kavanaugh reaches out, and draws a significant inference: "One apparent ramification of the Court's opinion is that it could cause the President to use the U. S. military more than the National Guard to protect federal personnel and property in the United States." This sentence will likely be quoted in generations of OLC opinions.
In Footnote 3, Justice Kavanaugh repeats his understanding that this is just the interim ruling that will govern the matter until the merits case returns to the Court. (I suspect this case will be over soon.) But he leaves open the possibility that "the Court could reconsider its view of the law or the Government might seek to advance new or different arguments." But what new argument could there be? The meaning of "regular forces" is now settled? Or is Kavanaugh hinting that there might be some way for Trump to invoke the potential use of the military here as a defense? I don't quite get the point, but there is something.
Footnote 4 takes a detour to the Fourth Amendment. That seems far afield from the statutory issue. Dan Epps notes at the Interim Orders Blog that Kavanaugh was trying to "walk back his opinion" in Perdomo. Epps adds, "Justice Kavanaugh seems more interested than other justices in using his opinions to speak to potential critics (which I actually find admirable) and that impulse may be playing a role here." Well, I sure don't find that trait admirable, but I'm not sure if that is what is going on. Really, this entire concurrence seems a bit off. Usually Kavanaugh is very focused and on point. Here, he is all over the map. He takes pains to distance himself from the majority, even though the delta is quite small. And he takes pains to say the Court should not decide extra issues, even as he engages in extreme frolics and detours into presidential powers. If I had to guess, Justice Kavanaugh was the person holding this opinion up, and not the dissenters. It took him some time to figure this concurrence out. The Chief Justice likely wrote the majority opinion before lunch. Justice Alito probably banged out his dissent in a few days. Now, onto the dissent. It is a doozy.
Sixth, Justice Alito is livid the Court decides the case on grounds that the plaintiffs did not advance in the lower court. Just last month, the Court summarily reversed the Fourth Circuit in Clark v. Sweeney for departing from the principle of party presentation. This principle was firmly established in United States v. Sineneng-Smith (2020). And remember who wrote the panel opinion in that case? It was Judge Reinhardt. Well sort of. He was on the panel when it was argued, but died before it was decided. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "the Ninth Circuit's radical transformation of this case goes well beyond the pale."
Justice Alito explains the issue plainly:
If a party passes up what seems to us a promising argument, we do not assume the role of advocate. Instead, we normally decide the questions that the parties choose to present. In this case, the Court has unnecessarily and unwisely departed from standard practice. It raised an argument that respondents waived below, and it now rules in respondents' favor on that ground.
But that John Roberts blue plate special is too appetizing, especially when so many other case went Trump's way. Justice Barrett couldn't resist.
I do not have the time now to comment on all of the merits discussions in Justice Alito's dissent. Indeed, I'm not sure it matters, since the Court has settled the issue. It is unlikely this case returns on the merits docket, so this might be the whole ball game.
Seventh, and finally, we have Justice Gorsuch. He did not join Justice Alito's dissent. Rather, he wrote a short separate dissent. Justice Gorsuch expressed a lot of hesitation and caution, finding this case to be very difficult. He raises a host of questions involving the Article I militia clause and the Article IV Guarantee Clause:
And if, as all parties seem to assume, today's Guard is the successor to the militia of the founding era, how far can this inherent Presidential authority extend before it intrudes on Congress's prerogative to decide when the militia may be used to execute the laws? See Art. I, §8, cl. 15. If all those questions were not fraught enough, an even graver one lurks here too:When, if ever, may the federal government deploy the professional military for domestic law enforcement purposes consistent with the Constitution? See, e.g., Art. IV, §4; Amdt. 14, §5.
Here, I would cite an essay on the Militia Clause by Professor Robert Leider from a certain Guide to the Constitution, the name of which is not terribly important now.
To avoid those questions, Justice Gorsuch would resolve the case solely on the basis of the party presentation principle.
That's it for now. Have a blessed Christmas everyone. I hope 2026 brings blessings to all of our readers (even those who hijacked the Google document I inadvertently linked to).
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Without backup, ICE will get trigger happy.
They are going to shoot their way out of a riot, which isn't good.
Dr. Ed predicts yet another civil war! What a shock.
Once again, Professor Blackman, who purports to be "a constitutional law professor" and who purports to support our Constitution by practicing "originalism" obsesses over petty, irrelevant issues instead of seeking to enlighten anyone with the truth about our Constitution and its purpose.
James Madison, himself, in Federalist No. 46, addressed issues that are relevant to the Court's conduct here (and relevant to the Second Amendment). Madison viewed the individual right to keep and bear arms as a sort of sword of Damocles dangling over the head of federal officials. He saw the individual right to keep and bear arms as essential to the moral courage and efficacy of our public servants in state governments in helping secure our rights against federal officials.
Highly relevant to the case before the Court, Madison emphasized that the standing army envisioned was "an army of [no] more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men" who would be backed up by "militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands."
From Federalist 46:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. . . . Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people.
Ya...that did not happen as he predicted. Kinda the opposite.
Note that the excerpt partially reminds us that the institution of the militia is involved, a governmental body, as is the jury, also seen as an important palladium of liberty.
"the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of"
etc.
This has nothing to do with the case, so Professor Blackman is right and you are entirely off the wall, as is usual with commenters on his posts.
"Because there will be very few cases where the President can use the military 'regular forces' in domestic matters, it will be even rarer for the President to meet the predicate to federalize members of the National Guard."
That's not a bug; it's a feature!
I was going to say the same. We don't want the President using the military to police US cities. We're supposed to think it's bad that he's unable to bypass this rule by federalizing the national guard instead?
Yes because the national guard is better equipped, and if he can't use the regular forces (actually federal law enforcement not just the military), then he needs to use the NG.
Or we can just let federal officials be hurt and murdered because our feelings are hurt.
Or we can just let federal officials be hurt and murdered because our feelings are hurt.
WTF are you talking about? Are you high?
He is. He's high on fascism.
The pitch "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" is reasonable, but at some point you need to actually specify what you think is good for whoever you're talking about.
I think most people take a position that's something like "Emergency decisions are generally bad, but I'm less unhappy about them when I win because procedural deficiency, while bad, is less bad than a bad outcome."
I take it you disagree, so it is incumbent to you to answer whether the court decide issues of substance in emergency posture. If your answer is yes, then I'm very sorry you lost in this very important case, and I hope that the love of your family carries you through this trying time. If your answer is no, then maybe shut the fuck up every once in a while?
The Court should not decide novel issues of law on the shadow docket, as it did here in construing what the term “regular forces” means.
It should only do so after oral argument.
Well, they did use "likely" and "procedural posture" a lot. Kinda like when someone repeatedly says, "allegedly."
In an ideal world, they'd just deny most of these requests for stays from the Administration without much comment. And if they did comment, they certainly shouldn't be scolding the lower courts for doing their job and not following the "binding" shadow docket (except when they shouldn't, like ... all of past history).
But maybe using a lot of the magic words ("likely") and Kavanaugh's walkback is an indication that they are starting to re-think this brave new approach; certainly, the lower courts aren't particularly happy with the "you should read our minds, not what the law has always been" approach they've been taking.
As Blackman noted, Kavanaugh's supposed walkback was full of footnotes expressing his opinion which seems to be a dissent on that part of the opinion of whether the military could be used.
More bad law from the Roberts Court. It has happened before on quite consequential matters. Here we have a strained statutory interpretation on an argument waived below (sound familiar?) that shows zero deference to the President as required by precedent. The dissenters are right:
“The District Court also erred in refusing to afford any deference to the President’s determination that calling up the National Guard was needed to execute federal law. The most directly relevant Supreme Court precedent suggests that such a determination must be accepted by the courts. In Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 28 (1827), a militia member argued, among other things, that the standard for calling up the militia under the law in force at the time had not been met. See Act of Feb. 28, 1795, 1 Stat. 424. Section 1 of that law governed use of the militia when the country is invaded or threatened with invasion, and §2, much like §12406(3), authorized use of the militia when ‘the execution’ of federal law is obstructed. Addressing the §1 standard, Justice Story’s opinion for the unanimous Court held that ‘the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen . . . belongs exclusively to the President.’ “
How was there no factual deference? The Court here never so much as questioned the President’s view of the facts. When it summarized the facts of the case at the beeginnijg, it gave the President’s view of them. That’s complete deference.
On the law, didn’t you get the message that Chevron was overruled? The Court owes the administration no deference on questions of law.
This issue here is not some overreach of an administrative agency. Not only does the President have inherent constitutional authority to protect federal personnel and property, but the question of whether the exigency exists to require use of the National Guard under the statute has been confided in the President. " '[H]is decision,' the [Martin] Court held, 'is conclusive,' and therefore, application of the statute depends only on 'his own judgment of the facts,' not the predilections of some judges playacting as the Commander in Chief.
Article II Constitution gives the President commander-in-chief power over the militia only “when called into the actual Service of the United States.” But Article I of the Constitution gives the power to decide whether to call the militia into the service of the United States to Congress, and only Congress. As the Court explained, Congress, in the Posse Comitatus Act, declined to delegate its power to call out the militia to enforce federal law to the President. Accordingly, the President cannot do so absent specific Congressional authorization.
As the Court further explained, this statute provides no such authorization. The statute only authorizes calling out the militia as a backup to the regular forces in the event the regular forces prove inadequate. The President neither attempted to call out the regular forces nor made any finding that they would be inadequate. There was no factual finding on this issue to defer to.
If the President think’s it’s a good idea, he can recommend to Congress that it pass either a special law calling out the militia itself in this one instance, or a general law giving President power and whatever discretion it wants to give him to do so. But unless and until Congress chooses to authorize calling out the militia into “the actual Service of the United States,” the President is per the constitution not only NOT its commander-in-chief, he has no Article II powers over it at all.
And, as I’ve explained the Court comically misinterpreted a statute to decide an issue no party had raised, compounded its error by disregarding key precedent, and ended up grossly interfering with executive branch prerogatives.
I see you’ve changed your argument to a purely legal one. You pad your comment with insults. Insists (“comical” etc.) show that you think the opinion wrong, but not why anyone else should.
But at rate, no deference issue after all.
"Not only does the President have inherent constitutional authority to protect federal personnel and property"
This is another presidential authority that is made up. It has no textual basis.
Is there anything that nonexistent words in the constitution can't do?
The issue here is your favorite separation of powers — the same thing at issue in Loper Bright.
Also, the Martin court was wrong. It assumed a president acting in good faith.
No, it is not Loper Bright. This case concerns a statute confirming authority on the president himself in matters of national security. Moreover, matters in which he already has inherent power. And, just a clue for you, the judiciary is the branch overstepping its grounds here.
The judiciary is interpreting the law passed by Congress, which is the judiciary's role.
So much for your understanding of the separation of powers.
So much for your understanding of what presidential powers are.
Not only does the statute not “confirm” any authority of the president - the president has no inherent authority over the matter, Congress does - it doesn’t confer any authority either.
Your whining about the court’s decision shows only that you are a whiner. The fact that you are a whiner is no reason to think the court wrong. Not only do you offer no principled reason why anyone should disagree with it, your resorting to insults, invective, and general whining strongly suggests that you can’t.
The President may have inherent constitutional authority to protect federal personnel and property, but he doesn't have inherent authority to use the militia to that purpose. He doesn't have it over the National Guard even assuming it is not part of the militia (which Congress says it is), but rather a separate military force.
Congress set out the criteria under which he may use the National Guard, and what the criteria are a matter of law. The President's discretion does not extend to deciding what those criteria are.
This interpretation means that to call the Guard into
active federal service under §12406(3), the President must
be “unable” with the regular military “to execute the laws of
the United States.” Because the statute requires an assess-
ment of the military’s ability to execute the laws, it likely
applies only where the military could legally execute the
laws.
This, from the unsigned "we" produced an involuntary "WTF ?" from your correspondent. That's a terrible read from purported textualists (though perfectly normal for purposive weavers.)
The statute requires an assessment of the military's ability to execute the laws and so if the military is not legally permitted to act then .... the military is indeed unable to act, without any need for further enquiry.
The unsigned "we" flip this logic on its head, and suggest that we read in a phantom proviso that if the reason the military is unable to act is a legal one, that counts as a case of the military .... not being unable to act ! As I said - WTF ?!
I see that Justice Alito had the same reaction. There's no conceivable way to arrive at "we" 's answer by construing the text that is there, nor do "we" mention any context which would support the 180. It's pure invention to serve an imagined policy purpose, and a particularly egregious example as it flips the switch directly opposite to the clear meaning of the text.
As further noted in Alito’s dissent:
Under the Court’s interpretation, National Guard members could arrest and process aliens who are subject to deportation, but they would lack statutory authorization to perform purely protective functions.
Our country has traditionally been wary of using soldiers
as domestic police, but it has been comfortable with their use for purely protective purposes. The Court’s interpretation of §12406(3) assumes that Congress meant for that provision to turn this approach on its head.
* * *
In conclusion, the Court should have decided this appli-
cation based on the arguments the parties chose to present, and on that basis should have granted a stay. Injecting another issue into the matter was unwise, and suggesting views on a host of important questions without adequate briefing, consideration, or explanation is imprudent.
Whatever one may think about the current administra-
tion’s enforcement of the immigration laws or the way ICE has conducted its operations, the protection of federal officers from potentially lethal attacks should not be thwarted.
According to the Court, the statute says that the National Guard are not to be called as first responders. Rather, they are reserves who are only to be brought in when the regular forces are found insufficient. Here, the President went right to the backup without even attempting to call in the regular forces, let alone ever finding them insufficient. That he can’t do. It’s very straightforward.
I agree with Justice Kavanaugh that because the President never attempted to call in the regular forces, the Court should not have issued additional dicta about the Posse Comitatus Act. I think the Court should not even have decided the “regular foces” issue definitively without full briefing and oral argument.
But I agree with the Court’s view. The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits using the military, regular forces or reserves, to conduct federal law enforcement without a state’s consent. An exception to it has to exist for any military forces to be usable. And since this statute merely addresses the role of the National Guard as a reserve back-up for the regular military, it provides no independent authorization to deploy them that would create an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act’s prohibition.
This approach may not be good policy. If might be better policy to deploy the militia rather than the regular military first in domestic matters. But policy is a question for Congress, not the courts.
1. The Posse Comitatus Act is not a constitutional provision it is just a statute. It does not emit a purposive miasma overpowering later statutes.
2. Its only relevance to the interpretation of the later statute governing the deployment of the National Guard when the regular forces are “unable” to assist with law enforcement is that it creates circumstances of legal inability along with the physical inabilities that might obtain
3. I note that in your account “unable” has morphed into “insufficient” which is a different word carrying the quite different connotations that you prefer and which Prof Marty worked so hard to weave into his story.
4. There’s nothing at all in the actual provision the court was supposed to be applying that even hints that the regular forces must have been quite tried first and found wanting.
5. All that is necessary is that the regular forces are “unable” - if it is the Posse Comitatus Act that makes them unable as a matter of law, they’re unable. The court doesn’t get to feed in an extra clause about legal inability not counting.
6. I agree of course that Congress gets to determine what the militia can be used for and when. That’s the statute we are trying to construe.
7. All that has happened is that clever Prof Marty offered SCOTUS a silky way out which depended in pretending that regular forces should be tried and fail first when in reality the statute says no more than that they should be unable to enforce the law - which inability is supplied by the Posse Comitatus Act.
Suppose the President wants a political rival assassinated or a Democrat-controlled city blown up. Maybe he wants to rob a bank. Unfortunately, he is unable to send in regular forces to do it because the gosh-durned law prevent him from doing so. So this statute entitles him to simply send in the National Guard to do it, right? Anything that’s illegal to do, anything at all, whatever he wants done, he can just call in the National Guard to do it. Because whenever an action is illegal he always “unable” to send in regular forces to do it, the National Guard can always be used.
Correct?
Your hypo assumes, without evidence. that the task that the President is calling the National Guard to perform is itself unlawful. As explained to Mr Nieporent below, enforcing the laws by illegal actions is a contradiction in terms, and so a statute empowering the President to enforce the laws using the National Guard cannot empower him to rob banks using the National Guard. Robbing banks and enforcing laws are different, and indeed contradictory, sports.
Deleting your unsupported assumption that the task set for the National Guard is itself unlawful, the question is, does the President have the lawful authority to deploy them ? I agree that Congress sets the rules for such deployments and it has done so here, limiting it to cases where the regular forces are "unable" to perform the tasks in question. Does that condition apply ?
Well, if the whole of the regular forces were fully employed fighting the Japanese, they would be unable to perform the task. That is a practical inability. But - stipulating that the regular forces, today, have plenty of spare capacity for putting down riots and other criminal behavior in Chicago - then they are not physically unable to perform the task that the President has assigned to the National Guard. But there are other ways of being "unable." They could mutiny and refuse to answer the President's command. Or Congress could make it illegal for them to perform the task in question. In any of these situations, under the statute, the President can deploy the National Guard on the basis that the regular forces are "unable" to perform the task of law enforcement. There is no subclause, written in invisible ink, that says that the inability of the regular forces to perform the task by reason of a statutory prohibition on the use of regular forces for these purposes, doesn't count.
It is argued - and I hereby stipulate - that the Posse Comitatus Act makes it illegal for the regular forces to be deployed in support of law enforcement activities in Chicago. Thus the President is "unable" to deploy the regular forces, putting him slap bang into the necessary condition to deploy the National Guard.
If instead he chose to deploy them to rob a bank, this would be unlawful (a) because robbing banks is unlawful in itelf and (b) because this statute does not permit the National Guard to be deployed to assist in bank robbery - that is not one of the statutorily itemized goals that the President is authorized to pursue using the National Guard.
The task is to read the words in the statute and work out what they mean. We are not tasked with reading in extra words that make us feel happier about the policy goals of the statute. There are no words in there about robbing banks - we should not read them in. But if they were there, in fact, then we should indeed allow the President to do what the statute expressly permits him to do. Absent such words it's easy to conclude that nothing in this statute empowers the President to use the National Guard for bank robbery.
Likewise there's nothing in the statute that limits the condition of the regular forces being "unable" to act, by excluding an inability imposed by law. Once again we should not read in such a limitation.
As I've been trying to drill into my kids for years, "can" and "may" are different things.
That the President is unable ( can not rather than may not) use illegal means to execute the laws is a tautology. Your children need not be woken up to discuss this.
A political rival is parking illegally. OK to call in the National Guard with orders to shoot him dead? Protesters are blocking traffic in a US highway in a Democrat-controlled city. OK to call in the national guard to machine-gun them down? Napalm the entire city and wipe out all its Democrat voters?
Any way of enforcing federal law that’s illegal, the National Guard can be called in to do it? No limits?
Any way of enforcing federal law that’s illegal, the National Guard can be called in to do it? No limits?
No, the National Guard can be called in to do anything that the regular forces could lawfully do by way of law enforcement, absent a provision - such as the Posse Comitatus Act - which makes it unlawful for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force or Space Force specifically to do that stuff. The PC Act is a bar on specific actors doing stuff that would, absent that bar, be legal for them to do. The unlawfulness established by the PC Act is to do with the "who" not the "what."
If the National Guard were included in that list of prohibited actors, they couldn't do the same stuff either. And if the Air Force had been left off the list, the Air Force could do what the National Guard is being tasked to do.
As predicted, the Court is avoiding confrontation with the Administration by deciding questions on legal grounds without having to say the Trump Administration’s factual claims are false. Politically, this may well be a wiser course because it avoids a direct conflict with the administration that could be construed as political.
But it has conssequences. As this case illustrates, it decides important and novel legal questions fraught with unforeseen consequences without the benefit of full briefing, oral argument, or deliberation. It reduces the risk that this Administration will take umbrage at being called liars and defy the judiciary. But it does so in a way that is not good for the health of the rule of law.
NAL, question:
If Trump is unable to utilize the ‘regular forces’, why wouldn’t that satisfy the requirement that Trump is unable to handle the problem with ‘regular forces’?
A (perhaps) poor analogy: if I can only use a vacuum cleaner if I’m unable to clean a particular mess with a broom, and I don’t have a broom, it sure seems to me that I’m unable to clean the mess with a broom.
Because the Constitution assigns decisions on these matters to Congress, not the President. Although Congress has historically delegated a lot of its power and gave the President great discretion on many matters, this simply isn’t one of them.
In the Posse Comitatus Act Congress explicitly withdrew previous delegations to the President. It reserved exclusively to itself the power to call out the armed forces to enforce ordinary federal law against the will of a state.
If the President thinks using the military, any part of it, is a good idea, he can come to Congress and recommend that they authorize him. The decision lies entirely with Congress. Under our Constitution, It’s none of the President’s business unless and until Congress makes it so.
I think it's disputed as to whether he is unable to utilize the 'regular forces,' or at least he didn't make that argument below. Kavanaugh's concurrence suggests that the President could use the military to protect federal personnel and property without need for the national guard.
As Lederman put it:
Congress designed the militia calling-forth authority to enable the President to use National Guard only in the same manner that he may make use of the regular military forces (and only if and when those regular forces are unable to ensure sufficient execution of federal laws)— not as a backdoor that would invite the militarization of law-execution in cases where Congress has foreclosed the use of the standing Armed Forces themselves.
That is, "unable" only refers to the military could not do the job when they were lawfully deployed. It does not include being barred by statute from using the military.
Note: Lederman urged SCOTUS not to deal with the above issue (nor whether the military could be lawfully deployed). It was sufficient that the administration assumed "regular forces" included ICE (civilian law enforcement) when it doesn't (SCOTUS did as Lederman suggested).
Oops. On further review, SCOTUS did address what "unable" meant:
I'm with loki (and Blackman to some extent). SCOTUS should not be answering such weighty questions on the shadow docket, and even could have denied relief without weighing in what "regular forces" are.
SCOTUS did not offer any reason for its conclusion that the President "likely must have statutory or constitutional authority to execute the laws with the regular military" - there's nothing in its opinion pointing to any authority deeper than ipse dixit.
Unless it is Marty dixit. Marty, likewise, offers no authority for his version of the alleged Congressional "design" :
Congress designed the militia calling-forth authority to enable the President to use National Guard only in the same manner that he may make use of the regular military forces (and only if and when those regular forces are unable to ensure sufficient execution of federal laws)— not as a backdoor that would invite the militarization of law-execution in cases where Congress has foreclosed the use of the standing Armed Forces themselves.
This is just assuming-the-conclusion, plucking a purpose from the air so as better to skip past the actual words of the statute, which say nothing about "in the same manner that he may make use of the regular military forces" - they just limit the National Guard deployment to cases where the regular forces are "unable" to help enforce the law. Being prohibited from doing so is as good a way as any.
As I mentioned to Reader Y, the Posse Comitatus Act is just a statute, it's not a constitutional provision. If Congress chooses to bar the regular forces from doing stuff, and in a later statute chooses to allow the National Guard to do that same stuff that it previously barred the regular forces from doing, that's Congress's prerogative.
(Moreover, even if Congress didn't realize that that was what it was doing, that's irrelevant. The law is what they wrote. Laws often have consequences that Congress did not expect.)
Perhaps KSB just got tired of arguing against the shadow docket.
And it takes some nerve for Alito to complain that the court decided on the basis of issues not raised by Illinois. I understand the general idea but the SC is not merely there to judge arguments, as though it were the judge of a HS debating competition.
In an unrelated story, the 101st airborne has been placed on alert.
"Perhaps the best response is here the Court denied relief, and Justice Kagan's admonition only applies when the Court grants relief."
That is exactly it. The Shadow Docket is usually about EXTRAORDINARY relief. In other words, the reason it has become so controversial is because the Trump Administration has been using it as it's "we want SCOTUS to give us a break, right now, from following the law and the rulings of the rest of the judiciary." And SCOTUS usually obliges; this is quite a break from the past.
Denying a request for extraordinary relief is not, itself, extraordinary. It should be par for the course. The cases should continue to percolate in the lower courts, and the Supreme Court will benefit from more facts and legal analysis. The only issue I have is that SCOTUS is now writing its own "peaks" at the issues, and also admonishing lower courts that those peaks are binding.
This is a problem, because we have issues... like Kavanaugh riffing on 4th Amendment Stops, creating the "Kavanaugh Stop," seeing it unfold (which was entire predictable) ... and then having to walk it back in a footnote in this shadow docket.
Riffing and "oopsies" in footnotes is no way for the Supreme Court to operate, and it's why the shadow docket is not supposed to be precedential law outside of the case- and it's why you are seeing the issues arise when they start writing half-baked semi-opinions.
Finally, congratulations to Marty Lederman! The Lederman Amicus ... maybe that will catch on like the Brandeis Brief.
Lederman Amicus- An Amicus Brief that persuasively raises a dispositive issue that was hiding in plain sight from the parties and that the Court can't ignore.
I think it’s a real problem. The Court here decided difficult and important legal questions that it didn’t need to decide simply to deny preliminary relief. Its opinion will be binding precedent. I agree with Justice Kavanaugh that the decision involved is fraught with potential for unforeseen consequences that ought to be fleshed out in full briefs on the merits, oral argument, deliberation, and a well-researched and thorough opinion with well-researched and thorough concurrences and dissents. There was no need to definitively decide these issues simply to deny a stay.
As I understand it, the Court's refusal to grant the stay leaves in place the underlying decision which allowed federalization of the guard (which had already happened), but barred their deployment (which had not yet happened). This maintains an awkward status quo while the merits are resolved, but addresses Kavanaugh's concerns about whether the U.S. military could deploy quickly enough to stop mob action that overwhelmed federal and state police.
I assume Illinois will seek to defederalize the guard in light of the order's discussion of the legal authorities, though perhaps that factor may not be sufficient to change the nature of the last actionable status quo. Assuming it does, that would give Trump the opportunity to present "new and different arguments."
The court forgot to write "PER CURIAM".
Blackman is being disingenuous again. Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson did not do any such thing. What they — as well as the rest of the majority — did was deny a stay. Which is exactly what they've been contending should happen on the shadow docket. Denying a stay is not simply the flip side of granting an injunction, as Blackman claims; it is the neutral position. Once the court agreed to take up the government's application, the only choices were to grant the stay or deny it. There's no middle ground. (Refusing to vote at all has the same effect as denying the stay.)
Bullshit. A few cases going against Trump in no way changes the arguments against the shadow docket. This case should never have been sent to SCOTUS at this time.
Lawyers shouldn’t take courses of action that are open to them and will advance their clients’ interests?
One could argue about what the Supreme Court should have done, and what it should have said when doing it. But trying to get the Supreme Court to stay an injunction upheld by a Court of Appeals is a well-trod path. I don’t see how one could fault the lawyers for trying it.
It's the dissenters here who are being dishonest (though consistent). They seem to forget which side has the burden of proof when requesting an emergency stay of a lower court's decision. If the record is too scanty and/or the briefing is insufficient for SCOTUS to evaluate, then the administration, as the emergency applicant, is supposed to lose.
I agree the Administration should have lost. But the Court should have found a way to deny the stay without issuing an opinion covering complex and far-reaching legal issues that should have waited for full briefing and oral argument.
"I can criticize Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett with my eyes closed."
Easier to do a Blackman Special -- dubious analysis with a lot of bad (talk radio can be good) talk radio-level blather.
Josh Blackman originally (in 2016) opposed Donald Trump. He is now a big supporter. I have consistently opposed John Roberts.
But I will acknowledge the pearls mixed in the swine. Or whatever. Roberts minimalism is a trick. All the same, the two dissents are far from consistent either (except for their inconsistency).
They regularly are willing to go along on the shadow docket with broad results. Gorsuch is selectively concerned with federal power.
"Second, given that the Justices took nearly two months to decide this case, there was more than enough time to schedule an emergency oral argument."
This would be a sensible move, and doubtful the liberals would be against it if they had the votes. The opinion against the application for a stay did (in limited form, but long given recent practice), as they have said, was advisable, provided a real explanation. It was not merely a summarily few words and an order.
The liberals are consistent in refusing a stay. Kavanaugh and Barrett are, too, actually, since they in the past have noted that it is a matter of judgment. A somewhat arbitrary "when we think best" sort of thing. Roberts also has not been absolutist.
The opinion does have a "voice from God" feeling that is somewhat dubious. Yes, the refusal is not as "ho hum" as its tone implies. It would be somewhat more aboveboard to bluntly discuss what is happening. Why a request to "allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois" warrants special note.
But there is nothing too novel about that either at this point, though it has led to problems writ large that warrant some court reform. But then Josh Blackmun is against the sort of thing.
NYT has a good article on this. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/24/us/politics/georgetown-scholar-supreme-court.html?unlocked_article_code=1._E8.b-3E.8H1eYHV0A_QD&smid=url-share (gift link)
IANAL, but in sports both teams play by the same rules. A coach may think the designated hitter rule is bad for the game, but unless he succeeds in getting it changed, he's expected to take full advantage of it. The GOP justices have changed the rules and customs, the Dems get to play by the same rules without being called hypocrites.
Exactly. As usual, Blackman is FOS.
He doesn't like it when KSJ don't confine themselves to knives when getting into a gunfight.
[Shrug.]
As Kavanaugh sort-of gestures at in a footnote, if the President wanted to deploy the militia, the President should have issued a proclamation to disperse under 10 U.S. Code § 254, announcing that there was (per § 253, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/253 ) an "unlawful combination" to "oppose the execution of the laws of the United States" in Chicago. At which point he can use "the militia or the armed forces, or both" to "take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress" the combination.
As to the practical effects here, you' may well be right.
I am more exercised by SCOTUS making up imaginary words in a statute to arrive at their preferred result. In this case I doubt Roberts, Barrett and Kavanaugh care very much whether National Guard folk roam the streets of Chicago - what they really want is to avoid considering - never mind deciding - any factual issues in connection with exercises of Presidential discretion.
You expect motivated reasoning from lefty District and Appeal Court judges, but SCOTUS with a "conservative" majority are supposed to be the grown ups, calling balls and strikes without fear or favor. They whiffed.
But the task here “is itself unlawful.” That’s the central import of the Court’s decision.
Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the task the President is calling the National Guard in to perform “is itself unlawful.” Every bit as unlawful a task as assassinating a political opponent. The Posse Comitatus Act took calling in the military, any part of it, regulars or reserves, off the table of things the President can lawfully do.
The Posse Comitatus Act doesn’t say the military can’t be called in to rob banks. But it DOES say that it is unlawful to use United States military forces to execute the laws of the United States unless specifically authorized by Congress, providing for a criminal penalty for doing so. That makes it an unlawful task.
Robbing banks is always illegal, whoever does it. The task is per se unlawful. Enforcing the law is not per se illegal, the Posse Comitatus Act merely makes it illegal for particular organs of government to do it (in various circumstances.) The unlawfulness of using the military to enforce the laws is a who question not a what question. The unlawfulness of using the military, or anyone else, to rob banks is a what question not a who question.
Moving on, your summary of the Posse Comitatus Act not only begs the question, it begs a different question from the one SCOTUS answered. The actual Posse Comitatus law says :
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Neither reserves nor the National Guard are mentioned.
SCOTUS did not decide that the National Guard is part of the Army. If it had done so it would not have offered an opinion on the meaning of "regular forces" or "unable" in 10 U. S. C. §12406(3), which empowers the President "to federalize members of the Guard if he is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.”
Maybe at some point they will decide your question, but that was not the basis of their decision here. The basis of their decision has nothing to do with whether or not the National Guard is swept up in the Posse Comitatus Act - it was that for the purposes of §12406(3) the President is not “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States" if he is forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act from deploying regular forces to execute laws.
In other words being legally prohibited from deploying regular forces is not a case of being unable to deploy them.
I should add, for completeness, that stipulating that they had got the current question right - ie that for the purposes of §12406(3) the President IS “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States" if he is forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act from deploying regular forces to execute laws - the answer to your question becomes interesting.
Suppose that SCOTUS were to conclude that the National Guard IS part of the Army for Posse Comitatus purposes. How should we apply "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress" in the Posse Comitatus Act ?
For §12406 is itself a provision of an Act of Congress expressly authorizing cases and circumstances in which the National Guard can be deployed notwithstanding the - stipulated - inclusion of the National Guard within prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act.
So even if the National Guard is part of the Army and so within the §12406 prohibition, we still seem to have a circumstance in which the President is unable with the regular forces to enforce the laws (by reason of the PC prohibition.) And so the National Guard should still be deployable for law enforcement because the condition of express authorizing of cases and circumstances has been met by §12406.
Blackman has been cheering the shadow docket making sweeping decisions all year, but now he's upset because the Court doesn't rubberstamp fascism.
Typical MAGAt.
"Perhaps the best response is here the Court denied relief, and Justice Kagan's admonition only applies when the Court grants relief."
So then, by this logic, this also applies to Alitio.