The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
What Does It Mean To "Regulate Importation"?
It's the central question in the tariff cases, and one exchange during oral argument caught my ear
An interesting exchange occurred during last Wednesday's oral argument in the tariff cases [transcript available here] that caused me to scratch my head a little.
Background: As I'm sure most of you know, the relevant statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), provides that if the President "declares a national emergency with respect to … any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States," the President may "regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, . . . or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest."
The bold-faced language is where all the action is – at least, that's pretty much all the Court wanted to talk about during oral argument: Is the imposition of a tariff included within the power to "regulate importation"?[1] The Administration says it has long been so understood; indeed, at one point the Solicitor General said that "the power to impose tariffs is a core application of the power to regulate foreign commerce, which is what the phrase 'regulate importation' in IEEPA naturally evokes." The challengers, on the other hand, pointed out that Congress has never – not once – used the phrase "regulate" to "impose taxes or for revenue-raising."
At one point, Justice Alito posed the following question to Neal Katyal, one of the lawyers for the challengers:
JUSTICE ALITO: [L]et's just start with the bare statutory language: regulate importation. If we disregard all of the rest, would you dispute that that would include the imposition of a fee?
KATYAL: So if it's revenue, yeah, we do dispute that. Absolutely.
JUSTICE ALITO: [S]uppose that there's a particular national park that's very crowded, and Congress passes a statute that says the National Park Service may regulate admission to the park. Would you say, well, that does not allow them to impose a fee?
KATYAL: So, you know, Your Honor, sometimes we think of fees as not revenue-raising but rather capturing the cost of government services in your example, the going to the park. That may -- you know, those kinds of cases, which I think some people struggle with --
JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose it goes beyond the cost of running the park. Congress just wants to control admission to the park, regulate admission. Wouldn't that include the imposition of a fee?
KATYAL: So if -- if it doesn't raise revenue, then -- and it's not about that, then I think that's fine. If it does --
JUSTICE ALITO: It raises revenue. That's the hypothetical. That wouldn't apply?
KATYAL: So I think -- I think in that circumstance that it wouldn't be a regulation in context. It wouldn't be permitted.
Katyal – who did, I thought, an admirable job overall responding to the Court's questions yesterday – seemed thrown off-guard by this question, and it's not difficult to see why.
On the one hand, it seems clear to me that a statute that says 'The National Park Service may regulate admission to Yellowstone National Park' does authorize NPS to impose entrance fees. In ordinary usage, the imposition of entrance fees is one of the more obvious ways – along with shutting down the Park at certain hours, or on certain days, or closing down certain Park entrances - to "regulate admission" to a park.
I can certainly understand why Katyal was reluctant to come out and say that. Had he done so, presumably Justice Alito would have pounced: If you concede that charging fees for admission is one way to "regulate" admission, doesn't it follow that charging fees for imports (i.e., imposing a tariff) is one way to "regulate" importation?
It struck me, at the time, as it appears to have struck Katyal[2]: as a tough question. Doesn't it follow?
The answer is: No, it doesn't follow. Context matters – indeed, it is dispositive. To regulate "Commerce with foreign Nations" – a power that Article I of the Constitution gives to Congress - clearly means something different, and encompasses different actions and activities, than the power to regulate "the Value [of] Money" (also given to Congress in Art. I), or to regulate "admission to the National Parks," or, for that matter, to regulate the "temperature in the Senate chamber" or the "bloodflow through the aorta." Different contexts, very different meanings.
And importantly: The question in this case isn't "what meaning might conceivably be given to the phrase 'regulate importation'?" The question is: What meaning did Congress give it in IEEPA? When Congress used the phrase "regulate importation," what actions and activities did it envision being encompassed within that capacious phrase?
And on this one, the challengers have the better of the argument – by far. Congress has used the verb "regulate" hundreds – perhaps thousands – of times in its statutes, but never once to mean "impose taxes/tariffs." Not to mention that if the power to "regulate" foreign commerce includes the power to impose tariffs, why did the Constitution have to specify that Congress has both the power to "regulate" foreign commerce and the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" in Article 1?
[1] One important threshold question that was barely touched upon during the 2.5 hours of argument: do we face an "unusual and extraordinary threat" in connection with either our trade deficits or the Fentanyl crisis, warranting the designation of a "national emergency" sufficient to justify the President's invocation of the powers granted to him in IEEPA? And relatedly: is the President's decision to declare an IEEPA "emergency" subject to any judicial review at all, or is that an unreviewable decision committed to his sole discretion?
The absence of any serious examination of these questions during oral argument makes me think that the Court is going to ignore these questions – i.e., assume them away – when it issues its final judgment, and focus exclusively on the question: Assuming arguendo that the IEEPA was properly invoked here, does that statute give the President the power to impose tariffs?
Notice, incidentally, that the Court can ignore the question of whether the "emergency" powers were properly invoked only if the President loses. That is, for the President to prevail in the suit, he has to prevail on two issues: the Court has to find both that (a) IEEPA was properly invoked, and (b) it gives him the tariff-determining powers he has been exercising. The challengers, of course, need only prevail on either of the two, viz., "Assuming arguendo that the statute was properly invoked, it doesn't grant the power to impose tariffs" or "Assuming arguendo that the statute grants the power to impose tariffs, it wasn't properly invoked here."
And this leads to the possibility that this case could produce a "voting paradox" (a subject I've been interested in for a long time – see here, here, here and elsewhere). Suppose the individual Justices (labelled "A" through "I" just to avoid any implication that I'm actually predicting any actual Justice's vote here – just speaking hypothetically!) view the matter as follows:
Was IEEPA properly invoked here? Does IEEPA grant tariff-setting power?
Justice A Yes Yes
Justice B Yes Yes
Justice C Yes Yes
Justice D Yes Yes
Justice E Yes No
Justice F No No
Justice G No No
Justice H No No
Justice I No Yes
Notice: In this hypothetical lineup, the Court (5-4) is of the view that IEEPA was properly invoked, and also of the view (5-4) that IEEPA does encompass the tariff-setting power. So the President should win. But 5 Justices (E,F,G,H,I) cast their vote for the challengers – Justice E because while the statute was properly invoked, it does not include the tariff-setting power, and Justice I because he/she believes that the statute was not properly invoked here (although if it were properly invoked, it does include the tariff-setting power.
So the challengers win, 5-4.
Again, I'm not saying this is going to happen! But it's a definite possibility, and it would leave the law in a very messy state, for reasons I've discussed elsewhere.
[2] Katyal went off on something of a tangent regard "revenue-raising" tariffs versus "regulatory" tariffs. Not a good idea, in my opinion. The Administration, and Solicitor General Sauer in his responses to the Justices; questions, tried to make much of the distinction between "regulatory tariffs" (which, in their view, are encompassed with the IEEPA) and "revenue-raising tariffs," which they concede are not. It's an unreasonable and totally unworkable distinction. All tariffs raise money, and all tariffs affect behavior. Trying to figure out whether a tariff is "revenue-raising" or "regulatory" is the very definition of a fool's errand. They are, always, both. I think it was a mistake for Katyal to try to steer the discussion in this direction in response to Justice Alito's questions.
Note that my suggestion that Katyal had a much better retort to Justice Alito's question is not intended as criticism; I have had several days to ponder the Justice's question, while Katyal had about 3.5 seconds.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please to post comments
David.
Read more is a thing.
Mr Bumble: I've got a "Read More" tag in there, but for some reason it's not working ...
DGP
Seems to have been fixed.
The Supreme Court did not agree to decide whether the Act was properly invoked. The question presented is whether IEEPA authorizes tariffs, including the nondelegation sub-question.
The Supreme Court did not agree to decide whether the Act was properly invoked.
Which is mysterious to me. Since the invocation is based on patent falsehoods, maybe they didn't want to embarrass Trump by pointing that out, or themselves by swallowing them.
Trump would have comically got his ass handed to him if they were debating if it was properly invoked.
Not mysterious. Because it's a can of worms, as I've been noting in every comment about this. Responding to people who are incredibly sure that Trump has to lose, because it's both not an emergency and the statute never says tariffs.
Alas, because the administrative state is founded on such broad delegations and arbitrary presidential declarations, it is no simple matter to cleave out an exception here. Since some were outraged, outraged about the one-off of Bush v Gore, I reject any special pleading here because anyone thinks Trump is an authoritarian.
I would welcome Congress legislating here more precisely, about emergency declarations and excluding tariff implementation from any foreign trade regulation by the executive. What I don't welcome is people who otherwise favor broad delegations by Congress to the executive branch from being bothered when that goes against them. That's exactly why Congress shouldn't delegate like this. The best argument against the Patriot Act remains President Hillary Clinton.
(Or just rewrite the statutes to make presidential declarations expire, and not able to reissued, unless Congress passes a resolution of approval. Something workable to overcome the loss of the legislative veto, along the lines of the Congressional Review Act. I assume that hasn't happened because Democrats generally like the administrative state, with the CRA being a Republican instigated mechanism of review.)
Does the same voting paradox occur if we substitute "does not violate non-delegation" for "properly invoked"? 5 justices conclude non-delegation is not violated (*) and 5 justices conclude the statue authorize tariffs. And yet, there are 5 votes to strike down the tariffs.
(*) Or perhaps the lone justice who would conclude tariffs are authorized under normal circumstances will conclude tariffs are not authorized because of the major questions doctrine (I'm looking at you Neil).
Yes. There were two affiliated cases, but neither one's QP on which cert was granted was, "Is this actually an emergency?"
(SCOTUS is almost never going to grant cert on a QP like that, especially at a preliminary stage, because it's a fact intensive inquiry. At most, SCOTUS would address, "Is the question of whether it's an emergency justiciable, or is it a political question?)"
Post is right that context is everything, but I don’t think you need to dig deep. This didn’t carry the day in the predecessor statute litigation, but it seems plain to me that “Emergency” taxation makes no sense. I can conceive of no plausible circumstances in which its effects would be sufficiently rapid they could not be considered by the legislator. Not so with bans or binary conditions on import. Isn’t that full answer to Alito’s question? It would be perverse to describe a park admission fee as an “emergency” regulation, revenue or no. The invocation of “ Qui potest majus, potest et minus” is totally inapt.
A division like the one Prof. Post hypothesizes occurred in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, where a majority of the Justices agreed that nude dancing was expressive conduct, and a majority agreed that as expressive conduct it would be protected by the First Amendment -- but only four justices held both positions, leading to a state prohibition of nude dancing being upheld.
I was quite disappointed that they did not discuss the "unusual and extraordinary threat" angle. I really wanted to hear the government lawyer try to argue that Canada running an ad that annoyed Trump was a "national emergency". Or how the US was going to fix the trade deficit with an island of penguins.
And I wanted a pony. And the Court to overturn Lochner.
But alas, the Court did not agree to any of those things when it took this case. What you or I want it irrelevant.
I have had several days to ponder the Justice's question, while Katyal had about 3.5 seconds.
I hope not. Katyal should have been prepared for this question since its all over the cert briefs and merits briefs and internet blogs and SSRN papers. This was a 100% predictable hypothetical. So either Katyal was unprepared, or unwilling to concede a different answer.
The power to regulate certainly includes the power to establish quotas and rationing, and setting a fee/tax to reduce demand/supply is one quintessential economically efficient way to perform rationing.
I tend to think the court will give Trump an L. Gorsuch gave away the game when he said to Katyal that he needed nondelegation docrine to win. "I think you do, dont you."
But....every day the court allows the tarrifs to exist and be collected is a day I think I am wrong and the court will uphold them.
Trying to figure out whether a tariff is "revenue-raising" or "regulatory" is the very definition of a fool's errand.
Chief Justice "a tax is not a tax" Obamacare Roberts is exactly this kind of fool.
Roberts didn't a tax isn't a tax. He said a penalty is a tax. Then he said Congress could tax not doing something.
Point being: While gorsuch is a textualist, Roberts is a taxtualist; A mandate isnt a mandate and a penalty isnt a penalty and a tariff isnt a tax whenever he feels like reading the law that way.
That's exactly how the Court could uphold Trump's tariffs here. Just because Congress does not call it something, it doesn't mean that it can't be interpreted as something other than what the statute says.
Again, the real problem here is that precedent has allowed Congress to delegate tariff implementation to the executive. There was very little discussion during oral arguments about whether the lack of any explicit mention of tariff authority in the statute was problematic (because past foreign trade regulation authority used other magic words). I don't think Congress should be allowed to delegate such tariff authority without explicit wording with definitive guidelines. But again, prior precedent says otherwise. And I don't see how the Court (other than Thomas) could ignore that without also undermining the administrative state (which of course Thomas would embrace). It won't stop as limited "tariff" exception.
"The power to regulate certainly includes the power to establish quotas and rationing, and setting a fee/tax to reduce demand/supply is one quintessential economically efficient way to perform rationing"
Two points: First, completely ignored here is Professor Post's point that "regulate" means different things in different context. The fact you manage to find a context where it means what you want doesn't necessarily translate to other contexts.
Second, I'm not sure Katyal is wrong. Are there examples of the executive imposing fees that go beyond cost recovery for such broad language? Certainly there's contexts where the government makes a profit: spectrum auctions are the obvious example that spring to mind. But in general, government fees seek to recover (some of) the cost of operations, not generate a surplus. Even then, most of the fees are explicitly authorized by Congress. I'm skeptical of Alito's hypothetical.
(But yes, Katyal probably should have been more prepared and actually known the answer versus me speculating.)
If the Nixon precedent hadn't happen, with similar language under a prior statute, plus other tariff/importation history, then maybe both this question never gets asked, and this case doesn't even exist.
The problem has been pretending Trump's actions are unprecedented, and the case against them is a slam dunk. Especially for someone like Katyal, who otherwise likes broad congressional delegations with vague language, this is a challenge of intellectual honesty and personal integrity. His hesitation highlights why fighting this case full bore is a threat to the administrative state.
I am having a hard time thinking of a situation where a national emergency would justify embargoing, regulating, or placing tariffs on goods that would otherwise be routinely imported.
Of course I think Trump's claims of emergency are utter nonsense. A Canadian politician citing Reagan (accurately, BTW, not that it matters) does not terrify or threaten me or, or any other American. But Trump's other arguments for tariffs are just as bad.
"I am having a hard time thinking of a situation where a national emergency would justify embargoing, regulating, or placing tariffs on goods that would otherwise be routinely imported."
Russian oil? A bad bad batch of Lipitor from Somewhereopia kills 500 people? Chinese phone routers are listening in and phoning home?
I agree with you, but those all seem like scenarios where the appropriate response is to ban importation (so satisfying bernard's "embargo") or maybe add rules as to which types of the items are allowed in.
On the other hand, imposing tariffs wouldn't solve any of those problems.
Disagree, because one could make the argument, that steep tariffs let the market decide what deserves to get through. If someone is willing to pay big bucks for it, it probably shouldn't be banned outright.
Not necessarily my argument, but I can imagine it being made.
Agreed; it's a false dichotomy, and also, the distinction appears — according to Sauer himself — to just turn on the subjective intent of the president.
But it's worth noting that Sauer unethically lied to the court about that issue; he claimed that these tariffs aren't about raising revenue even though Donald Trump has expressly and repeatedly said that they are.
The President most definitely has NOT "expressly and repeatedly" said that the sole purpose of tariffs was to raise revenue. He has repeatedly emphasized re-shoring manufacturing; restoring balance to trade relationships; and, most especially, protecting U.S. sovereignty and national security interests.
And that the decision to impose these tariffs turns upon the intent of the President is most definitely NOT a reason for the Court to second guess and invalidate that decision. Congress left the matter to the President's discretion, not to the discretion of the judiciary.
1) I didn't use the phrase "sole purpose." I know it's just one of three incompatible purposes that Trump has offered. But Sauer falsely claimed that revenue raising wasn't one of those purposes.
2) Congress did not leave the matter to the president's discretion, and if it had done so it would've been an unconstitutional delegation of Article I power. It's Sauer who contended that these were okay because they weren't intended to be revenue raising.
Revenues would inevitably be produced from most emergency actions the President would likely take in this context and cannot be a reason, in and of itself, to invalidate measures Congress specifically authorized the President to implement to address national security concerns. The President’s comments on monies merely relate one unsurprising effect of his authorized emergency actions.
And it is laughable absurd to contend that Congress lacks the ability to authorize the President, the head of the branch of government that deals most directly with national security emergencies, to employ these tools. That is further evidenced by past legislative practice.
"Revenues would inevitably be produced from most emergency actions the President would likely take in this context and cannot be a reason"
This is obviously wrong. The easiest way for Trump to accomplish all of his goals would be to just ban a lot of imports, which wouldn't raise any revenue at all.
More importantly, though: tariffs are a tax. The fact that, like all taxes, they also influence behavior doesn't mean that the President magically gets the power to tax when he's more focused on the side effects than the tax itself. As an example, the President couldn't unilaterally impose a cigarette tax just because too many people are dying from lung cancer. Cigarette taxes do discourage smoking, but that doesn't move them from Article I powers to Article II.
There’s an interesting word I employed in the text you quote, “most.” It’s pretty small so either you missed it or don’t know what it means.
And that’s your best argument? You concede that President Trump is properly authorized to ban all imports but the far lesser option of tariffs is unconstitutional? And of course let’s just skip over the small matter that the party authorized and institutionally competent to make the decision that there is an emergency requiring measures be employed is the President, not a panel of judges.
No, the argument is that imposing a tax on Americans is the far greater option than merely banning imports. Notwithstanding the economically illiterate Trump and his supporters, tariffs are domestic facing, while import bans are foreign facing.
And some economically illiterate folks think banning imports has no financial impact on any Americans.
Nobody thinks that banning imports wouldn't have a financial impact on any Americans. The test for whether something is a tax is not "has a financial impact." The test is whether it takes money out of people's pockets and deposits it in the treasury.
Tariff monies are deposited in the U.S. Treasury based on statutes enacted by Congress. Congress has authorized and requires this process. That monies are deposited into the treasury does not mean that tariffs, authorized by Congress via the statutory process followed by President Trump, are illegal or unconstitutional.
And the financial impact from a ban, which you seem to acknowledge is proper, would be far, far greater than any tariffs imposed so far.
Revenues would not actually be produced from the things actually authorized by the statute, like quotas or embargos. A tariff, on the other hand, is a tax on Americans, which — whether it produces net revenues or not — is explicitly an Article I power.
And this case has absolutely nothing to do with national security or emergencies. ("National security" is yet another phrase not found in Article II — or anywhere else in the Constitution.) As Justice Gorsuch pointed out in oral argument, this line of reasoning would allow Congress to delegate the power to declare war to the president. Sauer realized that that dog wouldn't hunt, but he was unable to give any coherent argument as to why it was different.
If Justice Gorsuch believes that Congress authorizing the President to exercise his discretion to employ necessary and limited measures to respond to national security emergencies is unconstitutional then he is, respectfully, as he has been before on Title VII, full of shit.
I agree on this point. You could have a situation where, after the argument when Trump proposed a $2k "rebate" to each person from the tariffs if that would weaken Sauer's argument. Does such a proposition move the needle from "regulatory" to "revenue"?
I also think that Sauer gives away the game when it says that tariffs will work best if nobody ever has to pay them. That's not regulatory, it is a bargaining chip.
Agree strongly with this. It's subjective and impossible for any court to decide. I don't want judges making these kind of determinations. That should be up to Congress. If Congress had wanted to put a limit on allowable tariffs as a function of revenue, it could do that. It hasn't, so I see know point in arguing whether their intent to raise revenue.
If someone wants to make the argument that Congress can't delegate tariff authority without defining such limits, that's fine. But it also goes against prior precedent. Like I keep saying, I don't see anyone making a principled argument because of conflicting political interests. MAGA does not care about limiting government power, and neither do liberal/leftists, who are otherwise welcome such broad and vague grants of executive authority. I don't see them arguing in good faith for the need for limits, because the Court recognizing such a principle here will fence them in in other areas.
I agree with Post that the power "to regulate" does not necessarily encompass the power to tax, it may indeed in some cases, and context matters. And the proper context here is that the IEEPA is extremely broad. It delegates to the President the power to:
If the word "regulate" were removed from the statute, what would change? What hypothetical regulation would be permissible under this statute that would not be encompassed by the other words present?
In fact, in the 7-4 decision against the Trump administration by the Federal Circuit the Supreme Court is reviewing in this case, a majority of the judges conceded that the statute gave the President the power to impose tariffs, but that he had exceeded his authority in imposing these particular tariffs. Only the four concurring judges claimed the statute did not give any power to raise tariffs.
And on this one, the challengers have the better of the argument – by far. Congress has used the verb "regulate" hundreds – perhaps thousands – of times in its statutes, but never once to mean "impose taxes/tariffs."
Never once? Indeed? What if we included the noun "regulation"? (I put aside, for the moment, the issue of whether courts should interpret what Congress means or what Congress says in a statute.)
During the Civil War, Congress passed a law prohibiting commerce with the states in rebellion. The statute provided, however, that the President could grant exemptions through licenses, subject to "rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury." President Lincoln did so, prescribing a charge of four cents per pound of cotton transported from a rebellious district to the United States. This four-cent charge was challenged under the theory that the Taxation Power was reserved to Congress, and the surcharge was not a permissible "regulation". A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the surcharge. Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73 (1874).
Id. at 92-93.
Post is correct. Context is everything.
I'll note here the case of South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
Under the Sugar Act of 1948, sugar imports were limited and subject to a quota system under which 77% of sugar imports came from Cuba. In 1960, after Castro had taken over in Cuba, Congress amended the Sugar Act to allow (but not require) the President to reduce the Cuban quota. President Eisenhower used this authority to reduce the Cuban quota to zero. Additionally, should the President choose to reduce the Cuban quota (which he did), Congress allowed him to regulate the import of "replacement" sugar.
Eisenhower used this authority to impose an "entry fee" of two cents per pound on imports of sugar from the Dominican Republic. (The "entry fee" was essentially a license, functionally equivalent to a tariff. "Licenses" vs. "tariffs" elicited some discussion in the recent oral arguments in the Trump tariff case.) The instant case involved a sugar importer's attempt to recoup $6.9 million in "entry fees" it had paid.
The question before the court was whether the President had had the authority to impose the fee under the "terms and conditions" delegation from Congress. The Court of Claims, in a 4-1 decision, upheld the President's authority to impose the fee.
Id. at 633 (citations omitted).
"a majority of the judges conceded that the statute gave the President the power to impose tariffs"
Are you sure? It's been a while since I read the case but weren't there three factions?
The 'does not grant tariffs' faction who were part of the majority + wrote a concurrence, the 'may grant tariffs (we're not deciding that) but certainly not these tariffs' group and the 'yep tariffs and yep these tariffs' group. None had a majority, hence the 7-4 decision being formed from the 'does not grant tariffs' faction signing on to the 'may grant tariffs (we're not deciding that) but certainly not these tariffs' faction's majority.
So they didn't concede tariff authority The majority just dodged that question and ruled on more limited grounds.
You are correct. My choice of wording was poor. The per curiam opinion did say it was not deciding the question. My main point was that only four of the eleven judges said the IEEPA did not allow tariffs at all. And, even if the Supreme Court rules against the Trump administration, I would bet it does not hold the IEEPA altogether foreclose tariffs.
"transported from a rebellious district to the United States"
I don't think, "the Confederacy actually won the Civil War and is not part of the United States" is the winning argument you think it is.
Regulate Importation - Adjust costs to lessen imports as a counter balance to the current tariffs imposed on US exports in the hope of establishing lower or no tariffs on either party.
Everything government does is to regulate
I don't find David Post's argument very convincing. Taxation is a standard method of regulation the world over - see for example Philadelphia's beverage tax, which is intended to promote public health and to raise revenue. Even if it failed to raise revenue it would retain its public health intention. Tobacco and alcohol are frequently subjected to high excise taxes in the hope of reducing consumption. Ditto gas. And CO2.
Katyal's reluctance to concede that a tax intended to regulate that raises net revenue above covering government costs falls within the meaning of "regulation" was awkward, but for the obvious reason that he can't afford to concede it. David Post's super knockout answer amounts to no more than "this is different !"
I can certainly see there might be arguments about non-delegation, but if Congress can't delegate the power to tax, there's no good reason why it should have the power to delegate regulation, and there goes the administrative state. Which would be great, but they're not going there.
And there's arguments about the existence of an emergency - but "it can't be regulation if it raises money" is a no hoper. Though not quite so much of a no hoper as "taxation would be such a biggie as to constitutte a forbidden major question" .... in a list including "direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit."
The counterpoint is this. The IEEPA was in many ways an update of the Trading with the Enemies Act. Nixon used the TWEA to put a 10% tariff on all imports. The language in the text of the TWEA used to put those tariffs into place was imported into the IEEPA.
So, Congress knew the language could be used to put tariffs into place, and deliberately wrote a new law with the same language.
For this you might want to go look at the Federal Circuit opinion. It deals with the argument that Yoshida II was effectively incorporated by IEEPA.
The TLDR version: Yoshida II upheld only a limited tariff power while explicitly denying an unlimited one. The court then help that Trump's tariffs fell well outside the limited carve out established by Yoshida II. If Congress did incorporate Yoshida II (an open question) it must have also incorporate the limits.
To quote that part properly...
The CCPA ultimately concluded that President Nixon’s tariff was authorized given its “[l]imited [n]ature” in time, scope, and amount, since it was a temporary measure, “limited to articles which had been the subject of prior tariff concessions, and, thus, to less than all United States imports,” and subject to a maximum rate that had been prescribed by Congress. Id. at 577–78. Thus, the CCPA held that “[f]ar from attempting . . . to tear down or supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress, the President imposed a limited surcharge, as a temporary measure . . . calculated to help meet a particular national emergency, which is quite different from imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.” Id. at 577–78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Government argues that because Yoshida II was existing precedent at the time IEEPA was enacted, Congress intended to ratify Yoshida II’s understanding of the
term “regulate . . . importation” as used in TWEA by using
the same language in IEEPA. Even if we assume, as the Government urges, that Congress intended to ratify Yoshida II when it enacted IEEPA, we still must consider what it is that Congress ratified. Yoshida II does not broadly conclude that “regulate . . . importation” must be read to include any type of tariff imposition. In fact, it held the opposite. The CCPA’s reasoning in Yoshida II was expressly premised on the limits of President Nixon’s Proclamation. The court noted that “[t]he Executive does not here seek, nor would it receive, judicial approval of a wholesale delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 583. And the CCPA agreed with the Customs Court that to sanction “the exercise of an unlimited power . . . would be to strike a blow to our Constitution.” Id. Thus, the CCPA explicitly contrasted presidential conduct it found permissible within the power granted by TWEA—“‘a temporary measure’ . . . calculated to help meet a particular national emergency” that is limited in scope and amount—with conduct it found impermissible under TWEA—“imposing whatever tariff rates [the President] deems desirable.” Id. at 578. The Government would have us define “regulate . . . importation” to include only the portion of Yoshida II authorizing tariffs and ignore the rest of its holding. But if the ratification doctrine is to apply, and we are to presume that Congress intended for the holding of Yoshida II to apply to the newly enacted IEEPA, then we must presume that it intended for the court’s entire holding to apply, not just the portion favorable to the Government. And because Yoshida II was explicit in its view that an unbounded tariff authority would not be permitted, that understanding must be attributed to Congress as well.
Accepting the Government’s argument as correct—that Congress ratified Yoshida II’s conclusion that “regulate . . . importation” could include the power to impose tariffs—we still must conclude that the Challenged Executive Orders in this case exceed the authority provided by that interpretation of IEEPA. Both the Trafficking Tariffs and the Reciprocal Tariffs are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration. These tariffs apply to nearly all articles imported into the United States (and, in the case of the Reciprocal Tariffs, apply to almost all countries), impose high rates which are ever-changing and exceed those set out in the HTSUS, and are not limited in duration. The Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs assert an expansive authority that is beyond the express limitations of Yoshida II’s holding and, thus, beyond the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA.
Point being, it's already been ruled that tariffs count as a type of regulation.
Only question after that is the level of tariffs that can be applied.
I didn't hear much interest in parsing such a distinction during oral arguments.
Maybe that's the different between SCOTUS and an intermediate court of appeal. The justices have the freedom to plow new ground in a way that lower courts do not, only looking to explicit precedent and not past political practices or textual history.
Even if you think Yoshida is on point (and I agree with Opinions vary that if you look at the actual opinion it's easy to see why it wouldn't apply to Trump's tariffs), it's hard to see how this delegation survives the Major Questions Doctrine, which hadn't yet been invented at the time of the Yoshida decision. The Court is now much more skeptical of Congress delegating away its powers without a very clear statement that that's what it intended to do, and the endless debate here at a minimum demonstrates the text isn't clear on this question.
Here's the text. "Thus, the CCPA held that “[f]ar from attempting . . . to tear down or supplant the entire tariff scheme of Congress, the President imposed a limited surcharge, as a temporary measure . . . calculated to help meet a particular national emergency"
That "limited surcharge" was a global 10% tariff.
Currently, the average effective global tariffs under Trump are 15% (up from ~2.5%). So, ~12.5% versus Nixon's 10%.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariffs_in_the_second_Trump_administration#/media/File:UStariffsJantoJune2025.png
Not a lot of difference honestly.
Are Trump's tariffs of limited duration? Narrowly tailored to address a specific emergency? Are they uniform?
Seems to me the answer to all 3 questions are "no." If you also throw in the question that seemed to be a focus of the justices: "Are the tariffs revenue generating?" And you got yourself a problem.
Sauer does this weird thing. He wants the justices to agree that Trump's intent is important "he wants to regulate imports and revenue is merely incidental" but also wants them to ignore Trump's own repeated statements that the tariffs are generating billions in revenue. Since its Presidential intent that is at issue (according to Sauer), why isn't the President's own public pronouncements evidence of that intent?
"Are Trump's tariffs of limited duration?"
Yes?....That chart I linked to is fascinating. You see the tariff levels go up and down. So, at least some are certainly limited in duration.
"Sauer does this weird thing. He wants the justices to agree..."
No weirder than Obama repeatedly claiming that the ACA mandate was not a tax and then having the SCOTUS declare it a tax.
I don't think they are of limited duration. If Trump says China gets a 90% tariff until they come to the negotiating table, then says China gets a 20% tariff going forward... the 20% is permanent. If a different country refuses to come to the table and negotiate a permanent tariff rate then we can assume the reciprocal tariff rate is the rate going forward.
The fact that Trump imposes tariffs and increases and decreases them at whim is not helpful when comparing them to Nixon's universal 10% tariff across the board. Saying the 'avg' tariff is merely 12.5% doesn't help either when some countries are 75%, others are 20% etc... because that is not evidence of uniformity.
Because even if the justices decide Trump can do what Nixon did; Trump isn't doing what Nixon did so at least some, if not majority, of the tariffs would have to go.
Or, more likely, Trump would have to rely on other statutes that deal specifically with tariffs but there he would run into limits on what he can actually do (or for how long). Which is why Trump declared all these emergencies and is using this statute instead of the one's he could have used that give him less power.
I stand to be corrected, but the Court is not considering that distinction, right?
The QP is whether the statute allows tariffs..full stop. If the answer is "yes" I don't see how a court could draw a principled line that X is okay but X+Y is not limited enough.
The QP is whether the statute allows tariffs..full stop.
No, there's a second question presented: If the statute does allow them, is this an unconstitutional delegation of Article I power.
So, the court is considering that distinction, assuming I'm reading this thread correctly. (there are a host of other things that are beyond the scope of the QP, and maybe you are addressing one of them)
The Major Problem with the Major Questions doctrine in this particular case is that the Major Questions doctrine questions powers that are Major in relation to those actually mentioned in the provision. It is presumed that Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.
But in this case the elephant in question is tariffs hidden within the meaning of "regulate...." But this is in a provision which explicitly gives the President power to "direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit" imports. All of these powers are much more Major than tariffs. If tariffs are an elephant, the hole they are hiding in is enormous - big enough to contain Blue Whales and Sauropods.
Tariffs are "Major`' in the sense that a fine is Major in a list containing garroting, burning at the stake, imprisonment for life and hanging, drawing and quartering - ie ..... minor.
All of those powers are much more minor than tariffs. Taxes on Americans are qualitatively different and bigger than a mere import ban. There's a reason there was never a slogan, "No regulation without representation."
All of those powers are much more minor than tariffs. Taxes on Americans are qualitatively different and bigger than a mere import ban.
Bananas. Americans (or indeed foreigners) do not have to pay any taxes on imports if they do not import them. An import ban is necessarily a bigger deal than a tariff on imports, since the ban does not leave you any option to import and pay the tax. The effect of a tariff is necessarily either less than, or equal to, the effect of a ban. It cannot be greater.
You will recall, of course, that the British government's response to the Boston Tea Party included .... closing the Port of Boston. There is no hint that the residents of Massachussetts regarded that has a calming measure, less serious than the taxes on tea.
Yes, that seemed to be where some of the justices were probing. Precedent can only illuminate what was challenged in a legal dispute by opposing parties. Listening to ACB and others talk about licenses etc, it seems like much of 19th century foreign trade regulation delegated by Congress went unchallenged but has subsequently been abandoned or forgotten. Hand in hand with setting up the Treasury Department, Alexander Hamilton set up the customs regime and the predecessor to the Coast Guard, to make sure tariffs were collected.
I'm not saying that justifies Trump's actions. Only that exclusively modern knowledge may be insufficient here.
The Emergency provision can be argued fairly effectively as well.
Let's consider this. Foreign agents smuggle a chemical weapon into the United States. They release it, killing off the entire population of Springfield, OH....all 56,000 residents are dead.
Then next year, they smuggle a different chemical weapon into the United States. They release it in Grand Junction, CO, killing off the entire population of 65,000 residents.
Then the following year, another chemical weapon is smuggled in. This time it's released Utica, NY. Another 65,000 Americans dead.
Would anyone realistically contest that this represented an emergency? That these chemical weapons are being smuggled into the US and used to kill tens of thousands...hundreds of thousands...of US Citizens? And that it doesn't appear to be stopping?
And then someone from Canada pays for a Super Bowl ad that accurately quotes Ronald Reagan. 65,000 people do not die.
Oh, the huge manatee!
I’m sorry, but bombing and smuggling are totally different things. To give a real-life example very similar to your hypothetical, you can say if you want to that the United States merely smuggled some uranium into Hiroshima and some plutonium into Nagasaki. But nobody but you would consider what it did to have anything to do with smuggling.
I mean, you can say if you want to that Japan merely smuggled some TNT into Pearl Harbor. But nobody else would consider what it did to be smuggling.
Question isn't the "bombing or smuggling". The real question is the resulting deaths. To give a real life example, if the bomb that hit Hiroshima didn't go off...it would still be a bombing.
And whether the bomb was smuggled in or dropped, doesn't really matter. The real matter is the massive death total.
It’s not the real question. Thousands of people die in automobile accidents every year, but that doesn’t permit a President to claim automobile importation constitutes an emergency.
An emergency requires a sharp, sudden change from the past. Something new has to emerge. Pearl Harbor was an emergency. Drug smuggling is a chronic problem. It’s an old problem, not a new one.
That's bolstered by the fact that IEEPA doesn't even say that the president can take action in "emergencies"; it says that the president can declare an emergency in response to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." Chronic problems are, by definition, usual.
Automobile deaths per year are relatively constant.
Fentanyl OD deaths are...not. As recently as 2013, there were ~3,000 Fentanyl OD deaths in the US. Today, it's near 70,000. More than 20 fold increase in less than 15 years. That's a sharp, sudden change. Something new has emerged.
https://www.consumershield.com/articles/fentanyl-deaths-per-year
To put this in context, if Auto deaths went up by the same level Fentanyl OD deaths did, today we'd have more than 600,000 deaths every year due to automobile accidents.
So your theory is that in response to this emergency, the President should be allowed to put tariffs on chemical weapons so only the rich terrorists wipe out cities?
Try again.
As expected, people disagree with the example.
Let's give a different example. A group of foreign terrorists decide to destabilize the United States. Their method is to distribute counterfeit contaminated baby formula throughout the United States. They import the raw materials from China, including the fake packaging and lethal contaminant. They assemble the product in Mexico, then smuggle it across the border, distributing it to thousands of grocery stores. Tens of thousands of infants show up in ERs dying.
The President declares an emergency. In addition to much higher border security with Mexico, he demands China crack down on the raw materials that the terrorists are using, threatening massive tariffs if China doesn't cooperate.
Legitimate emergency? Or should a court strike this down as illegal?
My 2 cents: legitimate emergency ... for a couple weeks until congress acts.
Also, for a legit emergency, a president could just threaten - or impose - a complete embargo.
But a permanent 10% tariff is kind of hard to justify via an emergency.
"until congress acts."
And if Congress doesn't act? Just for the record, there are 48 current US emergencies. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_national_emergencies_in_the_United_States
" for a legit emergency, a president could just threaten - or impose - a complete embargo."
They could....but any threat needs to be believable and the President needs to be actually willing to carry out the threat. A complete embargo (as opposed to a modest tariff) is an extreme option that many would say the President wouldn't be willing to use, especially if it's a tool to attempt to get cooperation. The President could also threaten to nuke a capitol city...but it's too extreme.
"And if Congress doesn't act?"
Then in my perfect world, you don't have an emergency.
Alas, we don't live in your perfect world.
I can hope!
You think the Supreme Court will bring this about? They sort eventually got to it during the COVID "emergency" but that was mostly well after. Many people contemporaneously disputed that emergency and the legal means government employed.
"You think the Supreme Court will bring this about?"
Alas, no.
To flesh this out: we have a divided government for a good reason - you assume the occasional bad apple will get elected. Requiring approval from multiple people/branches makes the system fault tolerant in that respect. It's like 'No Lone Zones' for nuclear weapons, or requiring two signatures for big checks, or similar precautions.
But, you will have genuine emergencies where you need immediate action. Curfews during a natural disaster are an example - it might be hard to assemble the city council during a hurricane or whatever. So you let the executive take extraordinary actions in extraordinary circumstances, but only until the other branches can agree those actions are justified. If they disagree that it is really an emergency it's no different than any other law that requires approval from all of the House, Senate, President, and the courts.
Otherwise you get the all too familiar pattern where El Supremo declares that some emergency means he needs to declare martial law and suspend elections and habeas corpus and etc. And those emergencies tend to never end.
Here's the thing. Congress can end emergencies anytime. It's in the text of the National Emergencies Act. It just...doesn't.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Emergencies_Act
Right. I would invert that - they end without approval, as opposed to continue without disapproval. Like the War Powers Act is supposed to work - the president can send in helicopters to evacuate an embassy, but can't just up and start a war w/o affirmative congressional buy in.
(I say 'supposed to work' because presidents get away with just ignoring it. Sigh.)
No, Congress cannot do so. As came up in the oral arguments with respect to this case, INS v. Chadha is the spanner in the works.
Yes, thank you. Without looking at that link, I was wondering what was being referenced.
Like I said elsewhere, I think these emergency statutes could be reworked to overcome INS. But as was explored during oral arguments, no president is likely to go along with that without being dragged kicking and screaming.
One would have thought that after the first 4 years of Trump, it would have been a Biden priority with a Democrat Congress to fix this tariff problem. Instead, Biden kept most of Trump 1.0 tariffs (admittedly, not implemented like these, to this extent). That's the other Democrat problem here: they really aren't opposed to them. Mostly it's a problem because Trump is doing them. Assuming some significant number of them survive under other statutes, I doubt very much the next Democrat administration will significantly repeal them. Both parties want to demagogue to working class voters about unfair foreign competition.
Congress absolutely can do so.
INS v Chadha was in regards to a pseudo one-house veto.
If Congress (IE, both the Senate and House) together do so, they can end an emergency with a resolution.
The court should strike this down as illegal. China is facilitating something that would constitute an actual terrorist attack on the U.S., and you think that threats of tariffs would be the appropriate response? "Millions of our babies are being killed, so we're going to make iPhones 20% more expensive"?!?!?
"Facilitating" is doing a lot of work there....
I would have thought that to be a fairly easy question, given that balance-of-payments authority was already addressed in the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132), which allows temporary import surcharges for serious external-payments deficits. It seems implausible that just three years later Congress would have implicitly delegated overlapping tariff power through IEEPA. If the bill had been intended to add tariff-setting authority, I’d have expected it to amend both Title 50 (for emergency powers) and Title 19 (for customs duties), not just the former. The committee reports on S. Rep. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977), as excerpted in CRS R45618 (2019) make clear that IEEPA was meant to confine the broad economic-controls power of the Trading with the Enemy Act, not expand the President’s trade toolbox.
Sorry, what's excerpted in CRS is of no relevance. It might have escaped your notice, but we're not doing legislative intent anymore, except to the extent it illuminates the public meaning of the statute. It's the text of the statute that matters. Anyone can find something in committee reports that justifies an argument.
Fair point. But I’m not invoking the committee report for “intent” — only to confirm the ordinary public meaning of the words Congress chose. Even on a purely textual reading, “regulate importation” has to be read in context with its companion verbs in IEEPA — block, prohibit, nullify, prevent. Those all describe transaction control, not revenue collection. The text itself limits the delegation. The report just mirrors what the statute’s own language already shows.
I would love to eliminate the administrative state which gives the President way too much power. What I'm not willing to do is eliminate it for Trump, and only for Trump.
Ding! Ding! Ding!
Same. And I never even voted for the guy, because he likes Big Government. Still, glad to see someone else saying that.
I did, grudgingly, in 2020 and 2024. I did not in 2016.
But the fact is, the executive is supposed to be "faithfully executing" Congress' laws. Not making new laws. It can be a blurry line sometimes, but what we've been doing for almost 100 years now is clearly on the wrong side of the line.
I think Justice Sotomeyor raised a strong textual argument. The text refers to regulating imports or exports. Normally a verb with two objects means the same for both. The constitution prohibits prohibits taxing exports, so regulating exports can’t include taxing them. Why should regulate get a different meaning for imports?
I agree that this was a very subtle, yet important point, that was lost in all the exchanges.
Again, I think that sometimes people overthink easy issues. To me, this is one of those. A tariff is a tax; always has been, always will be. And the Executive Branch does not have the power to unilaterally tax.
And no, the power to ban an import in an emergency is not, in fact, "greater" than the power to tax unilaterally. If you think about this ... you'll understand. It's why the taxing power was considered so very special and different in the Constitution.
According to Madison, tariffs could be regulatory—they could raise or diminish revenue depending on purpose. The Taxing and Commerce powers were broken out separately in Article I, but Madison noted that didn’t mean duties couldn’t be used to regulate trade as well as raise funds. Still, whenever tariff authority has been delegated, Congress has tightly circumscribed it—never left it open to broad interpretation.
In IEEPA, Congress delegated a very specific toolbox of regulatory powers: to investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit transactions involving foreign property or interests (50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)). Those are control powers, not revenue powers—they let the President block or license activity, not impose exactions. When Congress wanted to let a President use tariffs for economic stabilization, it said so outright—§ 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) authorizes temporary surcharges for balance-of-payments crises.
And if you think about the Origination Clause, that makes sense. Revenue bills have to start in the House—the body closest to the people. How could Congress hand over open-ended tariff authority to the executive without gutting that safeguard? I’m not a lawyer, but it seems to me that would collapse both the separation of powers and the very check the Framers built into the taxing power.
A tariff is a tax; always has been, always will be.
True
And the Executive Branch does not have the power to unilaterally tax.
True, but irrelevant to this case. The questions are whether Congress has delegated an element of its taxing power to the Executive, and, if so, whether it has the constitutional power to do so. The Executive in this case is not claiming the power to "unilaterally" tax - it is claiming to exercise a statutory power granted to it by Congress.
And no, the power to ban an import in an emergency is not, in fact, "greater" than the power to tax unilaterally. If you think about this ... you'll understand.
Very gnomic. Are you Sarcastro in disguise ? I've thought about it and I do not undertstand it. From the perspective of either importer or exporter, or final consumer, which is a greater interference with your liberty ?
(1) thou shalt not import oil from Russia, or
(2) if thou choosest to import oil from Russia, thou shalt pay a tax of $30 a barrel
Under (2) I always have the choice to avoid the tax by putting myself into (1). Under (1) I have no choice.
The taxing power is a very great power indeed. But it is a lesser power than the power to forbid, or compel, anything that might be taxed. It is regarded as a great power precisely because it can substitute for greater powers yet. Wanna ban guns ? Not permitted. Slap on a $5,000 tax on a box of ammo ? Gets you 90% of the way there.
The questions are whether Congress has delegated an element of its taxing power to the Executive without ever even saying the word tax. (Or any synonym thereof.)
Right—and in the modern U.S. Code, all tariff authority lives in Title 19. The name of the title itself is Customs Duties. Every time Congress has delegated that kind of power—whether under § 232 (national security), § 301 (retaliation), or § 122 (balance-of-payments)—it’s been right there, expressly and with limits. IEEPA, in contrast, sits in Title 50, where Congress placed its national-security control statutes, not its taxing ones. Reading that as a silent grant of tariff power would mean Congress tucked a taxing delegation inside the wrong title entirely.
Yes, Captain Obvious, that's why there's a question. If Congress had mentioned tariffs or tax explicitly, there wouldn't be a question.
A similar problem would arise if the President required some form filling on imports. Form filling isn't mentioned in the statute. Is a requirement to fill in a form a type of regulation. Or not ? Who can say ?
It could be argued that in the term "regulate" it is implied that it is done in a lawful manner. So while a regulation of exports could not include the power to tax them (because that is unconstitutional) the regulation of imports might include that power (because there is no constitutional prohibition on it).
The verb acts on both objects the same---the President may regulate them, but he has to regulate under the background assumptions of what are legal regulations of each.
Yes, I think that is the obvious answer. There are many statutes that delegate power to the President or a Cabinet secretary that say "under such regulations as he may deem appropriate" or some similar verbiage. "Legal regulations" would be implied.
Others have mentioned Roberts declaring the Obamacare mandate a tax. I don't think that was ever seriously discussed during oral arguments. It was his invention to justify his decision.
Yes, I could see something that didn't get much attention being the fulcrum of the final decision. Although I also think we may get a plurality (like also happened at the lower courts) where no single rationale gets a majority. Maybe this attracts several votes.
The language of this emergency powers act is too sweeping. That is the big problem that needs Congressional attention. Regardless of how this particular case is decided, Congress has all but guaranteed a repeat attempt by the Executive to assert too much control.
Bad laws make bad court cases.
These issues were not among the "Questions Presented" listed in the grant of cert by the court. So, it would seem to follow that the justices and the attorneys were not there to debate those points.
However, these issues were raised by the plaintiffs, and my understanding is that the court of international trade which heard the case used this as one of the bases of their ruling, and their ruling was upheld on appeal. Since the Supreme Court is not examining that part of the ruling, wouldn't that mean that part of the ruling stands? Or would it just be remanded?
IANAL, curious how this all works...
(My take is that we are not faced with an "...unusual and extraordinary threat" so IPEEA is not applicable. But I don't know that the court will agree to even entertain that argument, let alone agree with it. )
As I've pointed out before...the excessive overdose deaths due to fentanyl (which is basically all smuggled across the border for illegal use)...should well qualify as a national emergency.
70,000+ Americans die due to fentanyl that is illegally smuggled across the border. Annually. 70,000 due to an agent that can be considered a chemical weapon.
https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/CSWMD%20Proceedings%20Dec%202019.pdf
If more than 70,000 Americans being killed every year due a chemical weapon smuggled across the border by foreigners isn't an emergency, what is?
Well, I was kinda hoping someone with actual legal experience would answer, instead of just a bunch of irrelevant derp.
Where does the fentanyl come from? Not Canada, or ~100 other countries. And how, exactly, is a tariff supposed to stop smuggling? Or Ontario from making TV ads? As Pauli would put it, "It's not even wrong".
"And how, exactly, is a tariff supposed to stop smuggling?"
I doubt a tariff would stop drugs from being smuggled in from Mexico; it's not like the cartels are paying tariffs on smuggled drugs, and it's not like the nominal Mexican government can control what the cartels do.
But it seems likely that a properly incentivized Chinese government could stop the sale of precursors to Mexican cartels. The Chinese government isn't squeamish about capital punishment. Executing the top 50 precursor exporters would likely be effective, I'd think.
(which is not to say we'd end drug abuse if they did that; junkies will find a way. But they'd be using something other than fentanyl made from Chinese supplied precursors.)
"But it seems likely that a properly incentivized Chinese government could stop the sale of precursors to Mexican cartels"
Indeed. If China's making a buck on the side by selling chemicals to Mexico...that's one thing. If China is "incentivized" via tariffs to not sell those chemicals, that's something else.
Ok, so maybe there is some kind of reverse triple-bankshot mechanism that would somehow prevent China from selling precursors of fentanyl to Mexico. It's dubious, but let's stipulate for the sake of the argument that this is a way to address the "emergency".
What about the other ~98 countries affected?
Anyway, I'm more interested in hearing the legal basis for why answering this question is relevant or irrelevant, as opposed to arguing about the answer itself.
If you're asking why it's an emergency...the annual deaths of 70,000 Americans surely isn't "irrelevant. "
At the risk of relying on AI google searches, the hypothetical is counterfactual, because congress was very specific in its authorization of park fees, and highlights that if congress wanted to include tariffs in regulation, they would have included tariffs in the law:
The FLREA, which became law on December 8, 2004, allows the NPS and several other federal agencies (Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Forest Service) to collect and retain fee revenue to enhance the visitor experience.
Revenue Retention: At least 80% of the recreation fees collected at a specific park unit stays at that site to be used for improvements, such as facility maintenance, repair, and enhancement, as well as interpretation and visitor services.
Use of Funds: The revenue must be used for purposes that directly benefit visitors and enhance their experience, not for general operational costs.
Yes, I mentioned this above--I'm actually not aware of any fees that the federal government charges that aren't (a) authorized by Congress explicitly, or (b) only do some form of cost recovery rather than generating additional revenue. As you note with the NPS, it's usually (c) both of the above.