The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Judge Wilson Denies the Justice Department's Motion to Dismiss a Police Excessive Force Conviction
Judge Wilson from the Central District of California rejects the Department's breathtakingly sweeping position that "what the Government says is the public interest in this courtroom."
Last week I blogged about the Justice Department's effort to vacate a police officer's conviction for using excessive force. On behalf of the victim, co-counsel Caree Harper and I objected. And earlier today, the judge agreed with our arguments and denied the motion to dismiss. The found the proposed dismissal would be "contrary to the public interest" because it was designed to interfere with judicial sentencing authority. The ruling is an important step in protecting judicial review of the appropriateness of dismissals proposed by federal prosecutors.
I've previously described the facts of the case, involving a take-down by police of J.H. When she began recording the officer on her phone, he responded by slamming her to the ground and pepper spraying her. You can see for yourself: the relevant events were captured on video. The Justice Department filed a civil rights charge against the officer and, following a jury trial in February, he was convicted. But then the Department moved to reduce the charge down to a misdemeanor and asked the judge (Stephen Wilson, a Reagan appointee) for a sentence of probation. The judge reduced the charge to a misdemeanor, but rejected the Government's proposed probationary sentence as too lenient. The judge instead imposed a sentence of four-months in prison, in light of the officer's clear betrayal of the public trust. The Department then moved to dismiss the entire case, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). (I have discussed the history of Rule 48(a) at greater length in an earlier post in connection with the Eric Adams case.)
On behalf of the victim, Ms. Harper and I objected to the dismissal motion, urging the judge to reject it. Our argument was the Government was trying to control sentencing:
The Government's purported reasons for the dismissal are after-the-fact, pretextual, and unpersuasive. At bottom, the Government relies only on the fact that it is not inclined to defend the conviction on appeal. But it would be clearly contrary to the manifest public interest for the Court to dismiss this case on such flimsy grounds. Indeed, it appears that the Government's true basis for the dismissal motion is that it objects to the Court's prison sentence. The Court should not allow the Government to subvert a duly imposed sentence for a serious crime.
Today, Judge Wilson agreed with our position, denying the motion to dismiss. The judge concluded that "the record reflects that the Government's newest Rule 48(a) motion is motivated not by the discovery of new evidence or reconsideration of the case, but by disagreement with the Court's decision to sentence Defendant to four months in prison." The judge also noted that nothing had changed since the Government filed its earlier motion in the case asking for a sentence of probation—except that the court had sentenced the officer to a prison term.
Against this backdrop, Judge Wilson held that the Department's dismissal motion was contrary to the public's interest in protecting judicial sentencing authority:
The motion is a direct attempt to override the Court's decision to sentence Defendant to four months in prison. Indeed, after the Court rejected its request for probation and imposed a custodial sentence, the Government responded by seeking to dismiss all charges—ensuring Defendant serves no time at all. Put simply, the Government disagrees with the Court's sentencing decision and is using Rule 48(a) to erase it. It has even acknowledged that this is its reason for seeking dismissal.
Judge Wilson also rejected the Department's claim that it was entitled to determine by itself whether the court's sentence was fair:
The Government seems to argue that, regardless of its motives, its prosecutorial discretion alone is enough to justify granting a Rule 48(a) motion under any circumstances, especially if the Defendant consents. When pressed to reconcile that view with the appellate courts' requirement that Rule 48(a) dismissals not be contrary to the "public interest," the Government argued that the public interest is "what the government says is the public interest in this courtroom." The Government is wrong—at this stage, it does not have unbounded discretion to dismiss cases. The history of Rule 48(a) makes that clear (emphasis added).
Judge Wilson concluded that denial of the motion to dismiss was required to protect separation of powers principles:
In sum, even considering the significant discretion afforded to prosecutors to decide whether to bring or maintain a case, the Court may deny a Rule 48(a) motion when dismissal is clearly contrary to the public interest. This is such a case. The record shows that the Government filed this motion to overturn the Court's four-month prison sentence for Defendant. A post-sentence Rule 48(a) motion aimed at undermining the Judiciary's sentencing authority violates separation of powers principles, and, for that reason, is contrary to the public interest.
This case now moves to the Ninth Circuit, to which the defendant has already appealed. And I have already filed a motion there, asking for Ms. Harper and me to be appointed to defend the judgment below—i.e., to defend the conviction and four-month prison sentence in Judge Wilson's judgment. Such an appointment seems to be the standard practice of courts in considering appeals where the parties are no longer adversarial.
More broadly, Judge Wilson's ruling makes clear that courts possess authority to reject Rule 48(a) dismissal motions from federal prosecutors based on considerations of the public interest. And, contra to the Government's sweeping claim, the "public interest" does not automatically equate with the Government's interest. Judge Wilson's ruling could be persuasive to other judges who are considering similar questions about dismissal motions in other cases, such as my U.S. v. Boeing case where the Department has also filed a dubious motion to dismiss.
