Anti-Doxing Injunction (as to Address and Phone Number) in N.Y. Trial Court

From the July 25 decision in Fuhr v. Smith by N.Y. trial court judge Gerald Lebovits:

This action arises from a dispute about who should house a dog and her litter of puppies. Plaintiffs, Kristopher Fuhr and Sara Obstarczyk, are foster parents for rescue pets in New York State. A Good Dog Rescue, a pet-adoption organization, and Lisa Smith, the president of A Good Dog Rescue, are the defendants….

On January 10, 2025, plaintiffs signed a foster agreement with defendants temporarily to foster Lily, an adult dog, and Lily's litter of eight puppies.  Plaintiffs allege that Smith was unable to foster Lily and the litter, because Smith's home had recently been contaminated with Parvovirus, a highly contagious canine virus that can be deadly to puppies/unvaccinated dogs.  Plaintiffs began fostering Lily and her puppies in their home on January 11, 2025.

On March 8, 2025, Smith texted plaintiffs that she would retrieve Lily and her puppies from plaintiffs' home on March 14, 2025. On March 13, 2025, plaintiffs responded that they would continue to foster Lily and her litter because they believe that Smith's home is still contaminated.

According to plaintiffs, over the next several weeks defendants posted on social media (mainly Facebook) that plaintiffs were housing Lily and Lily's puppies in breach of the foster contract. Defendants' posts contained personal information, including plaintiffs' address and phone numbers. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' social-media posts prompted third parties to send plaintiffs threatening voicemails and emails, which forced plaintiffs to flee their home. Plaintiffs are currently keeping Lily and her puppies at an undisclosed location.

Plaintiffs bring claims against defendants for defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, recission of the foster contract between defendants and plaintiffs, and declaratory judgment. Defendants counterclaim for replevin of Lily and her puppies….

Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction to (1) enjoin defendants from posting personal details about plaintiffs on defendants' social media accounts; (2) enjoin defendants from creating posts advocating harassment and violence against plaintiffs; and (3) require defendants permanently to remove all social-media posts containing personal details (e.g., plaintiffs' home address) about plaintiffs and permanently to remove social-media posts that advocate harassing and violence against plaintiffs….

The court concludes that plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their defamation per se claim. Defendants' social-media posts, which consist of defendants' asking their followers for help finding the dogs, are neither false nor harmful to plaintiffs and therefore not defamatory. Defendants' posts also state that plaintiffs breached their foster agreement—an assertion supported by the agreement itself, which provides that "Lily and her babies" belong to A Good Dog Rescue and that plaintiffs "agree to give Lily and her babies back anytime it is requested by A Good Dog Rescue."  Defendants made a truthful statement that does not support a defamation per se claim….

The branch of the plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the defendants from making social-media posts about plaintiffs is denied. The branch of the motion to require defendants to remove all social-media posts containing plaintiffs' home address(es) and telephone number(s) is granted, however, for the reasons the court stated on the TRO.

The TRO (entered April 28) "required defendants to remove posts from their social-media accounts (whether made by defendants or third parties) that include residential addresses at which plaintiffs are living or currently staying and plaintiffs' work or personal telephone numbers"; here is the rationale from that order:

Posting this information serves only to harass movants (and encourage their harassment). The Appellate Division has made clear that narrow, focused restraints on a defendant, aimed toward preventing harassment of plaintiff carried out through speech directed to third parties, are constitutionally permissible. (See Dennis v Napoli, 148 AD3d 446, 447 [1st Dept 2017].)

The court also ordered that the dogs be turned over to the defendant.