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The Defense Challenge to Alina Habba's Appointment is Weak
A defendant has challenged Acting New Jersey U.S. Attorney Alina Habba's appointment under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, but he has no real case under the statute's plain language.
Previously Steve Calabresi and I have blogged about how Alina Habba's appointment as Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Jersey is valid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). Calabresi's initial post argued that New Jersey judges lacked constitutional power to displace Habba by appointing an interim replacement. But while I disputed that constitutional conclusion, I ultimately reached the same position as Calabresi under the relevant statutes. I concluded that, under 28 U.S.C. § 546 and the FVRA, Habba was appropriately serving as the Acting U.S. Attorney. In my last post, I explained that the Justice Department had made a powerful defense of Habba's appointment under the FVRA. Earlier today, the defendant challenging Habba's appointment filed a reply brief. But that brief fails to engage on the main issues surrounding the FVRA. It appears that the defendant's position is weak and should be swiftly be rejected.
The timeline is important here. To recap the (essentially undisputed) facts, on March 27, 2025, the Attorney General appointed Ms. Habba interim United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey pursuant § 546. (To make his case seem stronger than it really is, the defendant's brief claims that the Ms. Habba was appointed three days earlier, on March 24—citing a CBS news article. But the Justice Department's brief includes as an exhibit the actual appointment order, which is dated March 27, 2025.) Section 546 explicitly limits such interim appointments to a maximum period of 120 days. 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1). Given an appointment of 120-days, Habba's interim appointment would have expired on on Saturday, July 26.
On June 30, 2025, President Trump formally nominated Ms. Habba for the permanent position of United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey and submitted her nomination to the Senate. On July 24, 2025, before the Senate had acted, the President withdrew Habba's nomination. That same day—July 24, two days before her interim appointment expired—Habba resigned her interim position as United States Attorney. The Attorney General then immediately appointed her as a Special Attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 515, which appointment Ms. Habba accepted. Exercising her authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515 and 542, among other provisions, the Attorney General also designated Ms. Habba as the First Assistant in New Jersey, effective upon her resignation as the interim United States Attorney. All of this occurred on Thursday, July 24, two days before the 120-day limit period in § 546(c)(2) expired at 12:00 a.m., Saturday, July 26. As a result of her holding the position of First Assistant U.S. Attorney position in New Jersey, by operation of law, Habba then became the Acting United States Attorney under the FVRA, 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1).
In addition, on Saturday, July 26, a senior Department of Justice official notified the former First Assistant that the President would have removed her from the position of United States Attorney if her judicial appointment to that office had somehow become effective. The notification indicated that, in taking that step, the President was exercising his authority under Article II of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 541(c). The former vests "the executive power in" the President; the latter provides that "each United States Attorney is subject to removal by the President."
Against this backdrop, it seems hard to see the argument that Habba is not currently and validly the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey. The defendant's argument turns on a single phrase in the FVRA, which he does not bother to quote in his brief. Instead, the defendant represents that the FVRA "explicitly prohibits individuals whose nominations have been submitted to the Senate from serving in an acting capacity for the same office, regardless of subsequent withdrawal of the nomination. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1)." But let's look at the text of the statute that the defendant fails to quote.
The statute provides that an otherwise-qualified individual cannot serve as an Acting U.S. under the FVRA if:
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person—
…
(ii) served in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer for less than 90 days; and
(B) the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office.
5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
To be sure, Habba had been the first assistant for less than 90 days. So her eligibility to serve devolves to the last phrase highlighted above, related to a Presidential nomination.
At the time Habba became the Acting U.S. Attorney, the President had previously withdrawn her nomination. So the statutory question becomes whether the highlighted phrase above should be read as creating a perpetual disability for a person whose nomination was submitted to the position from becoming Acting U.S. Attorney—i.e., should be read as if it were written "the President has submitted a nomination of such person …."—or read as creating a disability for a person whose nomination is pending at the time—i.e., should be read as if it were written "the President is currently submitting a nomination of such person …."
As between these two alternative readings, the later reading (which affirms Habba's appointment) seems like the obvious one. As I explained in my earlier post, the statute's plain language does not create a disability after the President "has submitted" a nomination in the past. Instead, the statute uses the present tense: a disability exists when the President "submits a nomination." Under standard, recommended principles of legislative drafting, the present tense is used "to express all facts and conditions required to be concurrent with the operation of the legal action," as Bryan Garner explains in his excellent treatise, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage 536 (3d edition 2011) (emphasis added). After the President withdrew Habba's nomination—i.e., was no longer submitting her nomination—the condition of her nomination being submitted to the Senate was no longer concurrent with her becoming the Acting U.S. Attorney.
The Justice Department has made the same argument, as I recounted earlier. Here's the Department's argument:
The purpose of subsection (b)(1) is to prevent the President from circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination. See NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 295–96 (2017) (tracing history of provision). Accordingly, "if a first assistant is serving as an acting officer under [subsection (a)(1)], he must cease that service if the President nominates him to fill the vacant [Presidentially-appointed, Senate confirmed] office," or else withdraw from nomination. Id. at 301; see Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d 550, 558 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Subsection (b)(1) thus precludes someone from continuing to serve as an acting officer after being nominated to the permanent position, unless he or she had been the first assistant for ninety days of the prior year.").
Subsection (b)(1) therefore presupposes a current nomination to an office that is pending before the Senate. Nothing in the FVRA, however, suggests that the mere fact of a past nomination for an office—withdrawn by the President and never considered or acted upon by the Senate—forever bars an individual from serving in that capacity on an acting basis. The statute precludes a person from serving as an acting officer once "the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office," 5 U.S.C. 3345(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added); it does not say that the person is barred from such service if the President ever submitted a nomination in the past, or continues to be barred once a nomination is withdrawn. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003) (explaining that a statutory provision "expressed in the present tense" requires consideration of status at the time of the regulated action, not before); Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104, 110 (2016) (same). Indeed, a lifetime ban of that sort would have no logical relationship to the distinct separation-of-powers problem that Congress sought to address in subsection (b)(1): Congress's desire to protect its ability to consider and act upon a pending nomination for an office can hardly be served if no nomination is pending.
In my earlier post, I explained my view that the Department's argument was "powerful." So what does the defendant now say in reply to the Department? Nothing. The defendant's entire reply brief is devoted to teasing out the implications of what happens if Habba were to be in her position improperly. Indeed, nowhere in his reply does the defendant even quote the FVRA's "submits a nomination" language, much less explain why the Department's straightforward interpretation is somehow unreasonable.
Against this backdrop, I expect the defendant's argument will be swiftly rejected. Perhaps his motion has had its desired effect, of attracting headlines about how Habba's appointment has been challenged as unconstitutional and diverting attention attention away from whether the defendant is guilty of the drug dealing crime alleged against him. But the bottom line is that the defendant is asking a court to bar his prosecution under a statutory provision he does not even quote, much less plausibly interpret.
The defendant does refer back to the New Jersey's judges' effort to appoint a person besides Habba as the interim U.S. Attorney. But that argument founders on the fact that judicial authority to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney only exists after the expiration of the 120-day term. Indeed, the New Jersey's judge's order provided that it became effective "upon the expiration of 120 days after appointment by the Attorney General of the Interim U.S, Attorney, Alina Habba." As the chronology recounted above makes clear, there was no expiration of the 120 days. Habba resigned two days before. And even if the judges had somehow effected an appointment of a person besides Habba, the relevant statutes make clear that the President (acting through his Attorney General) can remove that person. Title 28 U.S.C. § 541 specifically provides that "[e]ach United States Attorney is subject to removal by the President." 28 U.S.C. § 541(c). Here again, the defendant does not even cite this provision, much less explain why the President is somehow unable to use it to effectuate his choice to be U.S. Attorney.
To be sure, one can debate whether Habba is well qualified to assume the important position of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Jersey. I take no position on the merits of that issue. And one can also find this entire appointment process to be arcane and hyper-technical--even a "loophole." Perhaps so. But the bottom line is that the President (acting through his Attorney General) has put in place (at least temporarily) an Acting U.S. Attorney that he has confidence in to execute his policies. That seems like the sensible outcome.
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Caligula had a solution for this
I am not 100% convinced by this argument. The problem, as I see it, is that the submitting of a nomination is a single one time act. The President does not keep on submitting a nomination as a continuous process the whole time a nomination is pending before the Senate. Prof Cassell's interpretation relying on the Bryan Garner theory smears this one time act into a continuous one.
If we consider someone appointed on Monday, who is nominated on Wednesday, we can see that the person in question is disqualified on Wednesday. But what about Thursday ? There's no submission on Thursday, so in order for the disqualification to persist on Thursday we need to :
(a) smear "submits" over the whole period of the nomination being live, or
(b) accept "submits" as a one time act that is an on/off switch triggering a condition for disqualification of service at any time
Textually, I'm not sure (b) is a worse reading than (a). It may be a sillier answer (note that (b) would also seem to retrospectively disqualify the person for Monday and Tuesday as well) - but as the wise and fragrant ACB said - policy questions are not what judges should be deciding.
But as a non judge, I will merely offer that this provision could have been worded more felicitously.
En passant, I will ask Prof Cassell a question I raised before about the court's appointment of the deputy, which also hinges on a timing question. The law allowing the court to appoint an interim appears to me to carry a "condition precedent" - ie the court only gets the right to appoint someone if and when the 120 day period is up. But in fact their order was made before the 120 day period was up, in conditional and prospective form. This seems to me very doubtfully kosher. It seems to me that they jumped the gun. Are they allowed to ?
Many judges/justices announce that they will resign on some future date — or even some conditional future date, like "upon the confirmation of my replacement." And then someone is nominated, and his/her nomination is confirmed. But to what position is that person nominated/confirmed? There's no vacancy at the time! Yet nobody blinks an eye at this.
Not sure why you think this particular situation should be treated any differently.
Actually I have myself blinked an eye at this practice on this site, though without definitively calling it wrong.
In the first place the time at which there is a potential problem is when the appointment happens and there is no extant vacancy. Nominations and the process of Senate consent do not create a problem. The “upon the confirmation of my replacement” format implies the vacancy is created on Senate consent being given, ie pre appointment.
Secondly there may be bits of statute that permit this sort of thing. Thus for example judges take senior status while a new judge takes their official slot. I presume that there is some statute permitting this practice. Since Congress has the power to legislate the structure of the inferior courts then presumably it can create offices that can morph into senior offices.
If there’s no statutory basis for senior status judges then I’d sniff pretty hard at the practice. Likewise if there’s no statute permitting the President to appoint judges for prospective future vacancies I’d say that was dodgy too.
Else Obama could have appointed a replacement for RBG in 2014 even while she was refusing to retire. Ditto Trump for Clarence.
Lee, as I addressed in my reply to David, a profound and profoundly important functional difference exists between the normal nomination process and what Trump, Bondi and Habba are doing here.
I am actually discussing with Mr Nieporent the comparison between the court's appointment of not-Habba and the normal nomination process, which sometimes involves, sometimes, nomination before vacancy. Not the Habba appointment.
David, there is a clear functional difference between this situation and the normal nomination process.
Professor Cassell agreed with the DOJ brief that "[]the purpose of subsection (b)(1) is to prevent the President from circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination."
Trump and Bondi clearly and irrefutably are actively "circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination." Trump and Bondi have installed and re-installed Habba, and they clearly are "circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function."
The conduct of Trump, Bondi and Habba should be measured against their oaths of office. As Article VI emphasizes, the first, foremost and constant duty of every legislator and "all executive and judicial Officers" (state and federal) is "to support" our "Constitution" in everything they do. As Article II more particularly emphasizes, the president's first, foremost and constant duty is to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to "the best of" his "Ability." Trump, Bondi and Habba clearly and deliberately are violating their oaths. They are undermining the advice and consent function of Congress. They are doing everything they can to render that part of our Constitution superfluous regarding whether particular people are properly exercising the powers of their purported office.
Any public servant who knowingly violates his or her oath is guilty of “worse than solemn mockery.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). Any person “usurp[ing]” any power “not given” in the Constitution commits “treason to the Constitution.” United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, n.19 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
Habba especially clearly had no intention of honoring any oath of office she swore or affirmed (to support our Constitution) after her initial appointment as interim U.S. Attorney expired.
Yes, but that's a different issue than the one I was discussing. Lee raised the issue of whether the judges — and I broadened it to anyone — can make an appointment before a vacancy actually exists. Not whatever shenanigans Trump is engaged in.
I tend to agree. Submits is a one time event. The better language would be "has a pending submission."
That being said, it certainly could be clearer. It uses submits in the present tense rather than submitted. Also, the time restrictions aren't part of the requirements of B (suggesting any past tense submission would be a bar even if it wasn't within the past year). It seems obvious that they don't want the President to circumvent the advice and consent provision by only prohibiting rejected candidates (i.e., anything other than a yes is a no). It seems logical from that premise that Congress wouldn't want the President to withdraw someone from consideration if there's obviously no traction and then go this route instead. In other words, if this only prohibited people with pending applications, it would be a needless formality easily circumvented.
Honestly, there is a third viable reading not proposed above: it could cause someone to lose the position they are currently serving if the President submits their name to the Senate. This is actually the most grammatically straight-forward way of reading it. It just doesn't seem to effectuate any purpose of the statute. Read plainly, it would mean that, if a person is doing a great job and the President wants them to have the job permanently, the act of requesting the Senate to confirm them would divest them of the job.
But what if you really, really don't like her?
Would it help to add an additional really?
The plain and clear text of the law says that once she serves 120 days the court can appoint a USA, which they did. And one does not have to do multiple rounds of gymnastics to reach that conclusion.
The point of the law is to prevent exactly what Trump is doing, having an unconfirmed ASA in office fo an extended time.
Molly, you're right, and as I've addressed in comments above, the controlling standard is stated in our Constitution, not merely in the law at issue.
Clearly, Congress has the power and duty to "make all Laws" that are "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" absolutely "all" the "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof" (including the president and officers he appoints). But that is not the end of the relevance of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The necessary-and-proper standard governs the president, too. The president's power (like the power of judges), essentially, is to fill in the interstices that legislation leaves. As Article II emphasizes, the president's first, foremost and constant duty is to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to "the best of" his "Ability."
The foregoing duty is why, for example, President Thomas Jefferson and his officers had the power to negotiate the Louisiana Purchase without the approval of Congress. That's also why the president has (and that's also the standard that limits) the power to take military action without a declaration of war by Congress. The president has the power and the duty to fill in the interstices in legislation to the extent that such actions are necessary and proper to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to "the best of" the president's "Ability."
She didn't serve 120 days
Professor Cassell perhaps proves too much. He agreed with the DOJ brief that "[]the purpose of subsection (b)(1) is to prevent the President from circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination."
I think we all can agree that exactly what Trump and Bondi are doing is "circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination." Trump and Bondi have installed and re-installed Habba, and they clearly are "circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function."
The conduct of Trump and Bondi should be measured against their oaths of office. As Article VI emphasizes, the first, foremost and constant duty of every legislator and "all executive and judicial Officers" (state and federal) is "to support" our "Constitution" in everything they do. As Article II more particularly emphasizes, the president's first, foremost and constant duty is to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to "the best of" his "Ability." Trump and Bondi are clearly and actively violating their oaths. They are undermining the advice and consent function of Congress. They are doing everything they can to make that part of our Constitution superfluous.
I think we all can agree that exactly what Trump and Bondi are doing is "circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function by installing a pending nominee for an office on an acting basis before the Senate can act on the nomination."
I don't think we can, since Ms Habba is not a pending nominee. Her nomination was withdrawn before she was appointed under the FVRA. She's never going to get confirmed to the full time office, and her term as a temp will expire just like any other temp. The coffee machine is being used to make coffee, as the manufacturer designed it.
The FVRA is, moreover, a presumptively constitutional law passed by Congress to allow temporary appointments without Senate consent. So it's hardly a Presidential end run round Congress's consent function. If Cassell's analysis is correct, this is simply a case of the President and AG applying a law that Congress itself has constitutionally passed to dispense with Senate consent over the short term.
As noted above, I have my doubts that Cassell's interpretation is correct, but it is hardly egregiously wrong, even if it does turn out to be wrong.
All the machinations and arguments regarding Habba's status (e.g., that she's not a currently-pending nominee) and about the text of any particular statute are missing the forest for the trees. It's not legally possible to apply a law in a manner that violates our Constitution. Laws must be enacted, executed and construed "pursuant" to or "under" our Constitution.
The primary point of Marbury v. Madison was that even if every branch of government works together to violate our Constitution, they still did nothing more than violate our Constitution and all their actions still are void because they are unconstitutional. Everything every federal (or state) employee does must support our Constitution, not merely be consistent with legislation that Congress managed to enact.
Our Constitution requires the advice and consent of the Senate regarding the person who holds the US Attorney position, and Trump, Bondi and Habba are violating their oaths and undermining our Constitution by trying to make that language superfluous.
The analysis of James Madison and the Virginia Assembly in the Report of 1800 (opposing the enactment and implementation of Section 2 of the Sedition Act of 1798) is insightful and relevant here.
Congress (with the president's approval) enacted the Sedition Act of 1798 and then judges (including SCOTUS justice Samuel Chase) implemented it. They all violated our Constitution.
Here as there, the conduct of the president, his officers, judges and Congress was a "deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted" by our Constitution. Madison criticized their conduct for "mark[ing] a reproachful inconsistency, and criminal degeneracy." "It will be remembered that a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is solemnly enjoined by most of the state constitutions, and particularly by our own, as a necessary safeguard against the danger of degeneracy to which republics are liable."
Madison illustrated and emphasized how the legislative powers of Congress are subordinate to the legislative powers of the People, and the executive powers of the president (and the powers of all judges) are subordinate to both the foregoing legislative powers.
"The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in mind; and at no time perhaps more necessary than at the present."
In America, "[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less than the executive, is under limitations of power. . . . Hence in the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative, as well as against executive ambition. They are secured not [only] by laws paramount to prerogative [but also] by constitutions paramount to laws."
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Great article. It clarifies the exact strategy the administration is using.
The Justice Department stated “if a first assistant is serving as an acting officer under [subsection (a)(1)], he must cease that service if the President nominates him to fill the vacant [Presidentially-appointed, Senate confirmed] office, or else withdraw from nomination” (internal quotation omitted).
Is the Justice Department stating that Ms. Habba will cease serving as Acting U.S. Attorney if/when the President nominates her for the permanent position and sends the nomination to the Senate? If so, does this mean that the President can keep her in the acting position indefinitely by repeating the resignation-renomination process? If so, is this a strong argument that 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1) is unconstitutional since it provides for “circumventing the Senate's advice-and-consent function”?
Its either Habab or no one. The President will just serially remove each person appointed by the 15 Democrats and 2 Bush appointees on the NJ bench.
So they get to serve 1 day! Eventually no one will accept the judge's appointment.
It shouldn't be Habba. The District Court could and should disbar Habba. They obviously already determined that she lacks the requisite qualifications or competence.
For what misconduct exactly do you think the district court could and should disbar her?
Where did they announce such a determination that she lacks the requisite qualifications or competence? The only action about her I'm aware of that the district court did not appoint her as interim US attorney when here initial temporary one expired. You could speculate about why that is. Others have done so and suggested it was about politics.
See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 1.1: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
Comment 1 thereto: "In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question."
How would "politics" account for the fact that Republican Senators did not consent to her appointment or that her nomination was withdrawn by Trump?
Isn't it strange and erroneous to tag this article as pertaining only to separation of powers (between federal branches) but not federalism (powers of state and federal officials to check each other)? This issue seems to pertain even more fundamentally and importantly to federalism than to separation powers.
This is a vital aspect of our Constitution. Federalism and separation of powers were designed to interact to secure the rights of the people. As James Madison emphasized in The Federalist No. 51: "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments [state and national], and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments [legislative, executive and judicial]. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."
The majority opinion in Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706, 759 (1999) (by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ. and Rehnquist, C.J.) emphasized the same principle:
"Although the Constitution begins with the principle that sovereignty rests with the people, it does not follow that the National Government becomes the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the people's will. The States exist as a refutation of that concept. In choosing to ordain and establish the Constitution, the people insisted upon a federal structure for the very purpose of rejecting the idea that the will of the people in all instances is expressed by the central power, the one most remote from their control."
In United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995), Thomas, O'Connor and Scalia, JJ. and Rehnquist, C.J. emphasized a similar principle in their dissenting opinion:
"Our system of government rests on one overriding principle: All power stems from the consent of the people. To phrase the principle in this way, however, is to be imprecise about something important to the notion of 'reserved' powers. The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."
Madison also emphasized a similar respect in which federalism is relevant: regarding "a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, . . . the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or intentions of the Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it recd. all the authority which it possesses."
Originally, "two Senators from each State" were "chosen by the Legislature thereof." So regarding nominations of executive officers and judges, Senators especially clearly represented state governments as much as they represented their constituents. (Analogously, "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors" for electing the president and vice president.) Now, Senators are elected directly by voters, but they continue to represent the interests of state governments.
Moreover, Senators' "consent" function is a direct descendant of the "consent" that was crucial to the crucial second paragraph of our Declaration of Independence. "Governments are instituted" with only "just Powers" and only by "the Consent of the Governed." Under our Constitution, the governed include not only the people but also the states. Article IV requires [t]he United States" to "guarantee to every State" a "Republican Form of Government."