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Professor Greg Sisk on the Trump Administration's Failure to Transfer Federal Grant Litigation to the Court of Claims
Professor Sisk suggests that in jurisdictional disputes in litigation against the Trump Administration, an earlier answer would be better.
Federal grant recipients and beneficiaries have filed multiple suits in federal district court challenging the Trump Administration's grant cancellations. Insofar as these suits seek the disbursement or payment of promised funds, it would seem jurisdiction lies in the Court of Federal Claims. Yet the Trump Administration has not (as yet) sought to transfer any of these cases. Why not?
Professor Greg Sisk is one of the nation's foremost authorities on civil litigation with the federal government. Indeed, he wrote the hornbook on the subject. He is also the Associate Dean for Research and Pio Cardinal Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.
Below is a guest post by Professor Sisk exploring this question.
* * *
Given my study of civil litigation with the federal government, the current bevy of lawsuits challenging various Trump Administration initiatives falls right into my scholarly wheelhouse. From mass firings (reductions in force) of federal employees to immigration battles and beyond to spending disputes, nearly every day brings me something new to watch with interest. At the still early stage for most of these lawsuits, the focus has been on procedural and jurisdictional questions, which are grist for my litigation-with-the-federal-government mill.
Take, for example, the proliferation of lawsuits in federal district courts around the country provoked by the Trump Administration's cancellation of thousands of federal government grants amounting to billions of dollars. In addition to other defenses, the Department of Justice regularly asserts that (1) grants are simply contracts and (2) contract disputes involving the federal government fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
The Supreme Court has weighed in on this jurisdictional choice, at least preliminarily on the so-called shadow docket and at least with respect a lawsuit where the plaintiffs are disappointed grant recipients. Granting the government a stay of a district court injunction to resume payments on certain grants, the Supreme Court ruled in Department of Education v. California that the government was likely to prevail on its subject matter jurisdiction argument. The Supreme Court majority viewed the grant claims in that case as grounded in contract and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Why then has the Department of Justice repeatedly failed to act in the multitude of grant dispute lawsuits filed in multiple district courts by simply moving to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims?
Few have written more scholarly works on the Tucker Act and the Court of Federal Claims than have I (e.g., here and here). And yet I confess that I am perplexed by the government's failure to initiate a special statutory process tailored to resolve this very kind of jurisdictional puzzle.
In 1988, Congress adopted a particular procedural mechanism to achieve a prompt resolution of this category of jurisdictional questions. Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(d)(4), if the federal government moves in district court to transfer a case to the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, that motion stays further proceedings in the district court until 60 days after the judge rules on the transfer motion (admittedly with a key exception I'll note below). Further, if the district court denies the motion to transfer, the government then may file an immediate interlocutory appeal on the jurisdictional question — and that appeal bypasses the regional circuit and goes directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Now there is an exception in this jurisdictional statute that allows the district court during that stay period to grant preliminary relief when expedition is necessary. That of course means that the government couldn't avoid the possible issuance of temporary injunctive relief in these grant cancellation cases. But it would prevent the district court from proceeding to the merits, presumably halting discovery, and again would provide for an immediate appeal for expeditious resolution of the jurisdictional question in the Federal Circuit.
The United States has used this interlocutory appeal provision repeatedly over the past three decades, turning to the Federal Circuit with its nationwide jurisdiction to solidify the authority of the Court of Federal Claims over claims that are in essence attempts to obtain money from the federal government. This jurisdictional issue is hardly new — it is the longstanding question of whether a case involves a "disguised" Tucker Act claim that has been wrongly brought in district court. The Federal Circuit has issued several key jurisdictional precedents in these interlocutory appeals.
As shameless self-promotion, I am especially familiar with this appellate jurisdiction statute because I wrote Subsection 1292(d)(4) when I served in the Department of Justice. I convinced my DOJ superiors to promote my draft to the House Judiciary Committee where it was eventually adopted in judicial reform legislation in 1988. As I say in a footnote in my hornbook on this statutory subsection, my colleagues for a time honored/teased me by referring to these interlocutory appeals as "Sisk Appeals."
Anyway, so why is the government repeatedly failing to take the step of moving in the district court to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims, which then triggers a stay from moving to the merits and allows an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit if the motion is denied?
Three possible reasons occur to me, but none are satisfying.
First, perhaps the Department of Justice has been so emptied of experienced civil litigators that the few remaining lawyers are too overwhelmed to initiate this procedural step or insufficiently versed in statutory procedures to be aware of it. Reports are that the Federal Programs Branch in DOJ's Civil Division, which ordinarily would handle this class of lawsuits, has lost about 70 percent of its lawyers.
Second, perhaps the Trump DOJ is wary of the Federal Circuit for some reason and wishes to avoid an interlocutory appeal going there, thus being willing to wait for the case to move through to the regional circuit to decide the jurisdictional question. But at the end of the day, this strategy would work only to delay and not to change the path of the litigation. If the government is right in its objection to jurisdiction in the district courts, then the longstanding remedy (even if neither party asks) is to transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. And since all appeals from the Court of Federal Claims go to the Federal Circuit, then that appellate destiny cannot be avoided.
Third, perhaps the DOJ is less confident in its jurisdictional position than it pretends to be and so is willing to simply drag things out. This last strikes me as the least plausible explanation, since the government has not hesitated to go to the Supreme Court and seek a stay based, in part, on this jurisdictional argument.
Whatever the reason for the government's failure to invoke the jurisdictional resolution statute, I cannot think of what would measure up as a good reason.
As Justice Scalia once wrote, in a dissent endorsing the jurisdictional control of the Court of Federal Claims over past-due money claims, "[n]othing is more wasteful than litigation about where to litigate, particularly when the options are all courts within the same legal system that will apply the same law." For that reason, swifter resolution of such jurisdictional disputes is always preferable.
The federal courts rightly expect the highest in ethical behavior from federal government lawyers. The Department of Justice should be facilitating prompt resolution of the jurisdictional dispute. Section 1292(d)(4) is waiting to make that happen.
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I think your first explanation is the simplest and likely the most accurate.
When you fire a lot of attorneys, and a lot of the other good attorneys leave, and you fill the positions with bad attorneys whose only qualifications are their craven loyalty to Trump ... you're not going to get good lawyerin'.
Like a lot of things in the administration, never attribute to 4D chess what is more easily explainable by incompetence.
See my comment below. This is not due to bad lawyering.
Someone send the DOJ $20 for a ChatGPT subscription. I said grantee did not get money from federal government.
When the recipient (or receiver) of a federal grant wishes to sue because the federal government has stopped or terminated the funding, the appropriate forum depends on who the defendant is and the legal theory being used. Here’s a breakdown:
Primary Jurisdiction: U.S. Court of Federal Claims
If the plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the United States for breach of a grant agreement (viewed as a contract), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is usually the proper forum.
This is based on the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491), which allows suits against the federal government for:
Breach of contract
Illegal exaction
Claims founded on the Constitution, federal statute, or regulation
Example: If a university had a grant terminated prematurely and claims a breach of agreement, it would sue in the Court of Federal Claims.
Alternative Jurisdictions
Depending on the facts, other courts may be proper:
1. Federal District Court
If the plaintiff is not seeking monetary damages, but rather:
Injunctive relief (e.g., to reinstate the grant)
Declaratory judgment
Review of an agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Then suit should be brought in a U.S. District Court under:
5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (APA)
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction)
Example: If NIH cancels a grant for a non-monetary reason (like alleged ethics violation), and the plaintiff claims the cancellation was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, the proper forum is a U.S. District Court.
2. Court of Appeals (in very limited review contexts)
If the grant program has a specific statute requiring administrative appeal first, and then review in an appellate court (e.g., under the Higher Education Act), that route must be followed.
It got this wrong.
Gregory C. Sisk is a law professor known for federal courts and litigation procedure scholarship. However, he is not known to have a namesake procedural motion.
Are they barred from now seeking to move to the Court of Federal Claims?
If it's a matter of subject matter jurisdiction -- which it apparently is -- then the answer is a definite NO. That is the one thing that is never waived, and can be raised even for the first time on appeal.
When I was a young associate, a partner asked me to prepare materials for a talk she was giving on recent decisions in employment law. I found a Third Circuit case that had come out recently, that held, after five years of litigation including a trial, that there was no subject matter jurisdiction. Judgment vacated, case dismissed, go to state court and start all over again.
As I often say, there are two phrases that are guaranteed to make any judge pay attention: "there is no subject matter jurisdiction" and "we want to settle."
It seems so obvious I don’t understand how Professor Adler could fail to see it. Why should anybody expect this administration to do its the enemies the favor of directing them to the right court when it can simply get them tossed out of the wrong one and let them figure out what to do next themselves? It’s a good bet some percentage of the plaintiffs will simply give up and go away and not file in the Court of Claims. Every single one who does is a win for the administration. Why would this administration voluntarily give up a chance at winning? Doing so would be stupid strategically. It would be as stupid as giving your opponent directions to the courthouse (correct ones anyway) when if he doesn’t show up on time, he loses and you win.
This is not an administration of boy scouts here to do the right thing. This administration uses courts as weapons of combat. It is here to womp its enemies.
The idea that government lawyers in this administration would voluntarily help their opponents file in the right court is as totally disconnected from reality as the idea that gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail was in the realm of international relations a century ago.
Expecting this administration to any interest in getting “the right decision” “efficiently” is as absurd as expecting a mafia don to do hits by the Marquis of Queensberry’s rules. They are not here to “save the taxpayers money,” and to think they are is insanity. They are here to weaken their enemies by keeping government money out of their enemies’ hands. Stalling is a perfectly effective way of doing that. It is far preferable to swifter resolution if swifter resolution would risk letting their enemies get their hands on it. After all, if they can stall long enough, some of their enemies might go bankrupt and go away. Swiftness is the absolutely last thing they want. Racking up legal fees and increasing the pain and cost of litigation for their enemies is far, far preferable.
If they could put the money in a bonfire and just let it go up in smoke to keep it out of their enemies’ hands, they would gladly do it; it would be the most efficient possible approach. Spending it on legal bills for stalling tactics is, from this point of view, a less efficient way of keeping it out of their wnemies’ hands. But it is still effective.
But to actually help their enemies get the money faster? Are you bonkers? Are you stark raving mad? Why would they want to do that?
It's a guest post from Prof. Greg Sisk (U. St. Thomas). You still may be right about potential reason #4.
'This administration uses courts as weapons of combat. It is here to womp its enemies."
That is ironic, after 91 criminal charges that would not have been filed if Trump were not running. This is ironic after the valuation of Mar-a-Lago at $18 million, when a nearby 2 acre empty lot is valued at $250 million. All those prosecuting Trump, including all colluding judges, should be arrested for criminal perjury, since their legal utterances were sworn statements. Try them. Put them in gen pop.
Yeah, I had a different reason #4, but I agree "Why should this administration do its enemies the favor of directing them to the right court " is a far better explanation. They can drag out the litigation for a very long time and then make the plaintiffs re-file in the claims court.
Quite right. Let the plaintiffs manage their own damn litigation. If they f up, it’s on them.
Professor Adler didn't write the post.
And not only did you not read the part of the post where he explained he didn't write it, but you didn't read the part of the post explaining why your guess is wrong:
Emphasis added.
That paragraph doesnt explain why the guess is wrong. The government has infinite resources. They can wait for the judge and plaintiff to figure in out while the plaintiff burns cash on legal fees.
I think that is a pretty good summary of this DOJ. Those nerd doctor/professors doing cancer research at [pick whatever university you want] are the enemy! Kick them when they are down.
Years later: why is the US falling behind in cancer research? Such a mystery.
Because giving grant money to perform trans plays in South America is just like cancer research.
I had a similar thought (with less partisan diatribe) that was summed up by the quote (or maybe paraphrase) from Napoleon - never interrupt an enemy when he's making a mistake.
The one from Truman is a bit different -
“Never murder your enemy while he’s committing suicide.”
I tend to agree with ReaderY that the answer is closer to option 2. If the goal is to cause FUD due to stopped grants, and you know that you are going to lose on the merits, why wouldn't you just let the litigants battle it out through 2 steps of appeals only to get dinged on subject matter jurisdiction? The feds don't want a ruling, they want the status quo. It's just like the dissent arguments in the birthright case - if you make everyone sue, the administration will never appeal its losses. It will instead just make everyone play whack-a-mole.
The bigger question is this: why aren't these litigants moving to transfer (or dismissing and refiling) in Federal Claims - especially after the Supreme Court stayed the first order? It's like tilting at windmills.
I'll hop on the "Reader Y stole my answer" train.
Why on earth would the administration help out the people suing it? If Democrat BigLaw wants to expend its time and resources in a hopeless endeavor in the wrong courts, why not let it?
I vote for answer 1. I almost never see a DOJ lawyer in this administration (starting at the top) who could even get an interview for a biglaw job.
And the conduct if the “biglaw” firms has been so exemplary as of late.
"Professor Sisk suggests that in jurisdictional disputes in litigation against the Trump Administration, an earlier answer would be better."
I suggest that our judicial system and the lawyers inhabiting it DO NOT WANT SPEED. One commenter here, several years ago, actually sneered that of course the system is slow and expensive, because that discourages people from bringing trivial cases to courts and encourages them to work it out themselves.
Prof. Volokh likes to say lawyers' true super power is turning every question into a question of procedure. I'm pretty certain he's one of the few good lawyers, and that he was half-joking, but too many of the lawyers commenting sure seem to be in love with ritual above justice.
"Section 1292(d)(4)(B) When a motion to transfer an action to the Court of Federal Claims is filed in a district court,"
well plaintiffs file your motion !
Yes, This article is asinine. Why should the administration help the plaintiffs. Should they draft an amended complaint for them?
The people saying making the jurisdictional argument helps the plaintiffs or that this is some masterful tactic are grasping.
This government does not have infinite time. And it knows it.
Slow-rolling while the injunctions go on does not comport with their behavior in every other case against their sweeping activities.
I don't know what's going on, but intentionally slowing things down isn't likely at all.
Trump was noted for these kinds of litigation tactics - litigation as a war of attrition, with defeat to the person whose resources run out first, and with the merits having nothing to do with it - as a private individual. He attempted to use a similar approach in litigation surrounding the 2020 election. That alone makes it plausible that he would favor, and appoint people willing to use, similar tactics.
Sure, when he was a private citizen and had all the time in the world. That doesn't apply here - he's got 1 term.
His litigators seem in quite a hurry in every other arena, from mass firings to foreign prisons, they're racing to the Supreme Court for emergency relief.
I agree with you, Sarcastr0.
Look, I get why ReaderY thinks that. Except for a few things.
First, as you point out, delay doesn't help the government here. It's just weird to think that in this one area, they would be allowing injunctions to dawdle along to stop 'em, while in every other area they are trying to steamroll ahead.
Second, I think ReaderY is falling into the "4D chess" trap. I have litigated against the government at all levels. Let me start by saying this- there are some truly amazing government attorneys in some areas... absolutely phenomenal. And others ... I wouldn't wish them on my worst enemies. Some long time ago, I had a massive case that involved, inter alia, the DOJ and the EEOC. Long story short- I ended up having respect for the DC DOJ attorneys- admittedly, one time we got into a shouting match (they were used to having their way), but they were always professional, civil, and knew the law and were candid to the tribunal and to everyone else. Good lawyers, good people.
...the EEOC? Oh boy .... as much as I enjoyed beating them like a rented drum, it's never fun when you can't trust a word out of opposing counsel's mouth, including "and" and "the."
Anyway, the point is this- the government has a mix of attorneys, some quite good, and some ... not so much. But this administration has purged a lot of attorneys ... a lot of the good attorneys, and a lot of the best attorneys have also "self-purged" (because they have ethics and refuse to make false representations or because they want to get out of this mess before it gets worse and/or their reputations are tarnished). The people coming in have little legal acumen in many cases- especially regarding some of the more technical issues.
Put more simply, I cannot attribute to malice or "4D Chess" what is easily explainable by incompetence, especially where there is no benefit to the administration in the incompetence.
Is this case (and the ones like it) the same legal issue as past cases involving Democrat administrations at odds with red states that have decided not to provide any support to federal law enforcement involving gun laws? I always love when the parties find themselves on the flip side of a legal issue and scream and holler one way and then four years later screaming and hollering the exact opposite position.
....okay, I'll bite. I know I am going to regret this ..,
How is what you are alleging possibly analogous to what is being described? I mean ... I know that people come here to try and say, "Look, a squirrel!" .... but I genuinely have no earthly idea what possible relevance whatever you are talking about has to this.