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Ninth Circuit Upholds Nationwide Injunction in State Suit Against Birthright Citizenship Order
Judge Bumatay objects on standing grounds, arguing that courts should not seek to offset narrowing one form of relief by expanding another: "That would be like squeezing one end of a balloon—it just pushes all the air to the other end."
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court's nationwide injunction against enforcement of President Trump's birthright citizenship Executive Order, concluding that the E.O. is likely unlawful and that a nationwide injunction is necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff states. [As I said in today's Civitas Outlook column: "universal injunctions are dead, long live nationwide relief."]
Judge Gould wrote for the panel in Washington v. Trump, joined by Judge Hawkins. Here is how he summarizes the opinion:
Washington, Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon ("States") and individual expectant mothers ("Individual Plaintiffs") challenge as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 14160 ("Executive Order"), which purports to deny citizenship to the children born in United States territory of parents temporarily or unlawfully present in the United States. See Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship, Exec. Order No. 14,160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20, 2025). The district court entered a universal preliminary injunction which bars implementation of the Executive Order. Defendants appeal, contending that the States lack standing to challenge the Executive Order, that it was error to issue a preliminary injunction, and that the scope of the injunction is overbroad.
We address whether the Executive Order is constitutional and valid. We conclude that the Executive Order is invalid because it contradicts the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of citizenship to "all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Because the Individual Plaintiffs are covered by a certified class action in another federal court, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over their claims and dismiss them. But because State Plaintiffs have standing and are likely to succeed in demonstrating that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, we affirm the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction and its determination that a universal preliminary injunction is necessary to give the States complete relief on their claims.
Judge Bumatay dissented in part on standing grounds. He argues that the Court is, in effect, making up for the loss of universal injunctions by making it easier for states to establish standing and demand broad relief. His dissent begins:
For good reason, this case elicits strong reactions from all sides. Fewer questions could be more important than deciding who is entitled to American citizenship. And this is understandably so—citizenship in our country is worth fighting for. And it's also worth ensuring that it is only conferred on those legally eligible to receive it. Despite, or perhaps because of, this, courts must be vigilant in enforcing the limits of our jurisdiction and our power to order relief. Otherwise, we risk entangling ourselves in contentious issues not properly before us and overstepping our bounds. No matter how significant the question or how high the stakes of the case—at all times, we must adhere to the confines of "the judicial Power." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Exceeding those limits—even to settle a divisive issue—violates the Constitution.
Among the most profound innovations of our Constitution is our system of separated powers—one that grants each branch of our government only limited authority. The Founding generation understood this division was necessary to preserve liberty and prevent tyranny. With their personal experience at the hands of the British government—with its Star Chamber, arbitrary pronouncements, and other abuses—they knew that concentrating too much authority in only a few hands corrupts and threatens our freedoms. As a result, they established strict constitutional guardrails to keep each branch in its lane.
A vital separation-of-powers limit on the judiciary is that we may only grant party-specific relief. Under the constraints placed on lower courts by Congress, we may order only the "sorts of equitable remedies traditionally accorded by courts of equity at our country's inception." Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 2540, 2551 (2025) (simplified). For too long, this limit was ignored. All too often, district courts have issued universal injunctions—mandating relief to both injured plaintiffs and non-parties alike—as a matter of course. But, simply put, universal injunctions "lack a historical pedigree" and "fall outside the bounds of a federal court's equitable authority under the Judiciary Act." Id. at 2554. Indeed, runaway universal injunctions conflict with the judicial role—encouraging federal courts to "act more like a legislature by decreeing the rights and duties of people nationwide." United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 703 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). So the Supreme Court has put an end to that practice.
To adhere to the separation of powers, then, federal courts must not grant an injunction "broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue." CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2562–63. No longer can a single district court judge casually enjoin the actions of the political branches everywhere against everyone all at once. Now, plaintiffs must establish that a sweeping injunction is truly necessary for "complete relief." And that inquiry must be searching—requiring the closest scrutiny to the plaintiff's claimed injury. "[T]he broader and deeper the remedy the plaintiff wants, the stronger the plaintiff's story needs to be." Id. at 2558 (quoting S. Bray & P. Miller, Getting into Equity, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1763, 1797 (2022)). True, sometimes complete relief may incidentally benefit non-parties, as in a public nuisance. See id. at 2557. But the key is that sweeping relief of that sort is "by far the exception," justified only when "it would be all but impossible to devise relief that reaches only the plaintiffs." Id. at 2565 (Thomas, J., concurring) (simplified). Thus, we should approach any request for universal relief with goodfaith skepticism, mindful that the invocation of "complete relief" isn't a backdoor to universal injunctions. Otherwise, CASA would be a mere drafting exercise rather than a binding precedent. And finally, it's worth remembering that "complete relief" functions not as a floor but as a ceiling—it's not a "guarantee" but the "maximum a court can provide." Id. at 2558 (majority opinion). Equity sometimes demands that courts grant less than complete relief.
Standing is another separation-of-powers mechanism to guard against judicial overreach. Standing keeps courts in their place: deciding only concrete disputes between an injured plaintiff and a defendant according to the law. Requiring an injury in fact before exercising jurisdiction "prevent[s] the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). Courts, then, can't be used to strike down disfavored laws on a whim. Instead, to invoke the judicial power, plaintiffs must establish actual harm traceable to the law. Otherwise, we risk transforming the judiciary into the "roving commission," United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 786 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (simplified), for the "free-floating review" of executive and congressional action expressly rejected by the Founders, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 761 (2024) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Founders left nonparticularized challenges to disfavored policy to the ballot box—not the courts.
And these two guardrails—party-specific relief and standing—must work in tandem. We can't tighten one but loosen the other. That would be like squeezing one end of a balloon—it just pushes all the air to the other end. The net result is the same—inflated power for the judiciary. So with our authority to issue universal injunctions sharply curtailed, we must resist the temptation to expand our authority by reflexively granting third-party standing, indulging speculative harms, or allowing other jurisdictional end-runs. That concern is particularly acute in our dealings with States because they are often "not directly subject to the challenged policy" yet may seek wider-ranging redress than individual plaintiffs for "at most, collateral injuries." See CASA, 145 S. Ct. at 2566 (Alito, J., concurring). As Justice Alito warned, lower courts must remain "conscientious[]" in applying thirdparty standing doctrine, "including against state plaintiffs." Id. Otherwise, we grant States the power to "create a potentially significant loophole" evading the limits on universal injunctions by artful pleading. Id. That's why we must be "rigorous" in our state-standing analysis if reaching the merits of the dispute would "force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional." Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997). In these cases, courts should not intervene "unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919)). The separation of powers demands no less.
With these principles in mind, I return to this case. On January 20, 2025, the President issued an Executive Order directing the federal government to no longer recognize the U.S. citizenship of children born in the United States to parents on a temporary visa or unlawfully present in the country. See Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship, Exec. Order No. 14,160, 90 Fed. Reg. 8449. (Jan. 20, 2025). The States of Washington, Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon ("State Plaintiffs") immediately challenged the Executive Order. Cherly Norales Castillo and Alicia Chavarria Lopez ("Individual Plaintiffs") also sued on behalf of their then-unborn children, who wouldn't receive U.S. citizenship under the Executive Order. On February 6, 2025, the district court enjoined the enforcement and implementation of the Executive Order on a universal basis. The United States appealed.
I join Section III.B of the majority opinion in declining to reach the Individual Plaintiffs' claims. As the majority observes, it appears that both Individual Plaintiffs have given birth, meaning their children are United States citizens—raising mootness concerns. It's also a good call to avoid potential conflict with the overlapping class action pending in the District of New Hampshire. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979). But in rigorously applying our standing doctrine, I conclude that State Plaintiffs have no standing at this time. Absent a party with Article III standing, it's premature to address the merits of the citizenship question or the scope of the injunction.
I respectfully dissent in part.
With this decision, it would seem the birthright citizenship Executive Order will return to the Supreme Court next term.
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"It appears that both Individual Plaintiffs have given birth, meaning their children are United States citizens"
Of course they are but not if the Supreme Court overturns the 14th Amendment.
That's what we need. We need the SCOTUS to actually rule that the citizenship clause doesn't mean what Democrats want it to mean, and find the law that grants it unconstitutional. That way the next Democrat president can't reverse the EO.
There is no "law that grants it." There is the citizenship clause itself, which can't be "unconstitutional" because it's part of the Constitution, and which grants citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, when it says that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."
8 USC 1401(a) grants citizenship to "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof". The Supreme Court might conclude that this grant of citizenship is broader than constitutionally required, overruling its precedents if necessary.
After Roe v. Wade some states codified a right to abortion. In Dobbs the Supreme Court decided it was mistaken. Those state laws did not disappear because they were enacted based on a misunderstanding of the Constitution.
So I would decide this case based on the statute. Stare decisis is stronger for statutes because they can be more easily changed to correct perceived problems. The statute means what people have long thought it means even if the Supreme Court reinterprets the Constitution.
Whoosh!
"At the time that this lawsuit was filed, the Individual Plaintiffs were a group of pregnant women who are noncitizens with pending applications for asylum, representing a putative class of pregnant persons and future children residing in Washington State."
The degree to which America is being exploited is off the charts-- economic migrants show up, wink, utter the word "asylum" and then have anchor babies while things are "pending." We have to either return them home immediately, stick with Remain in Mexico, or win on birthright citizenship. Anything else is just a recipe for the third world conquering America without firing a shot. By the way, all of their asylum applications should be denied on principle. "Mommy" can go home and hopefully take the child with her even if we're stuck with it as a citizen.
You need to change the law on asylum and the Constitution on birthright citizenship, not merely resort to executive fiat. Of course you prefer that both law and Constitution follow a Trump decree, not constrain it.
In another year we will have a Scotus decree, if that makes you feel better.
I feel fine, because I'm not motivated by hatred of "those people" and a belief in the fuhrerprinzip, unlike yourself.
The Constitution does mention "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and illegals are certainly not subject to the jurisdiction of a country they are not citizens of.
No more than I am subject to the jurisdiction of Mexico should I decide to go there on vacation.
Mexico can prosecute you for crimes you commit in Mexico, which is the (frankly rather silly, in this context) meaning of "jurisdiction" that some people assign in order to make US borders almost worthless.
You think the US border is almost worthless because of birthright citizenship?
That's been part of our exceptionalism since the 14A showed up! What kind of radically alternate history of America do you yearn for?!
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and illegals are certainly not subject to the jurisdiction of a country they are not citizens of.
We've gone through this countless times before, First, by being in the :US you're under its jurisdiction, legal or no - else the US could not punish crimes committed by illegals. Second, someone born in the US is not illegal. Duh.
fine, but giving birth here does not grant the parents citizenship nor should it permit them to stay illegally. is there any standard of proof a child was born here, the old if a tree falls in the woods.
"fine, but giving birth here does not grant the parents citizenship"
Who is claiming otherwise?
The problem with this view is that a person who is indisputably not a citizen if she gives birth here----a member of an invading army---would be under your test "subject to the jurisdiction" of our laws because we could punish her for crimes or war crimes committed while she is here.
An Indian in 1870 who went to town and committed murder could be punished under our laws despite the universal belief that he was not a citizen and not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or to the state in which he lived.
How does your side take these rather apparent examples and hold that simply because we have the de jure and de facto ability to punish someone for a crime, that he is "subject to the jurisdiction" when he is here?
The invading army exception derives from this statement in Wong Kim Ark:
These folks aren't subject to US jurisdiction because they are occupying forces that control how the law is enforced.
As to Indians, while it is true they can be held to account in US courts for conduct outside a reservation, they cannot for conduct on the reservation even though the reservation is part of the USA. If you cannot be held to account in US courts for your conduct while anywhere in the USA, you aren't subject to US jurisdiction.
First, that language about conquest is extraordinarily outdated. I can't imagine any Supreme Court writing that opinion today. Second, it seems arbitrary. If the lines shifted and an invading female soldier was trapped behind our lines and gave birth, it would seem that her child would be a citizen. Is it really that silly?
Finally, we do regulate major crimes occurring on Indian reservations. We allow them to police minor crimes, but my whole point is that all of that is at our sufferance.
From the early 1800s through the early 1900s we invaded Indian territory and subjected them to our laws, sometimes in big chunks, sometimes in little chunks. Nobody ever suggested that made them or their children citizens even though at all times they were de facto subject to the jurisdiction of our laws.
And the particular level of conquest we achieved, unlike in your cite, was not determinative of child citizenship. I mean, if Custer took over a whole Indian village (and he actually left anyone alive) was an Indian child born the next day a U.S. citizen? Under your argument, the 14A would require that they be.
I would think the child in your war hypo is a 14A citizen at birth. I would also think if the USA took over a reservation such that all conduct on the reservation could now be held accountable in US courts, a child born there would be a 14A citizen at birth. But, there has always been large chunks of conduct on reservations for which accountability in US courts is not available.
So the test is that ALL conduct must be now punishable in our courts. What if Trump declared that misdemeanor federal crimes would not be enforced against women or their children found here illegally? Is the EO now constitutional?
The exemptions must come from treaties.
Um, you are, dumbass. Go commit a crime while you're there and see what happens.
Also, even if your wrong premise ("illegals are certainly not subject to the jurisdiction of a country they are not citizens of") were true, it's irrelevant because we're talking about the children, not the illegal aliens.
How about 18 U.S.C § 1119 which makes it illegal to murder a U.S. national anywhere in the entire world. Does that imply that the entire world is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?
What work is the "subject to the jurisdiction" language doing in the 14A? If we acknowledge that you are here and we can punish you and you claim that is enough, wouldn't the amendment be the same without the included language?
You might point out diplomats. But couldn't we pass a law tomorrow revoking diplomatic immunity? We wouldn't for various reasons, but if we did, who would stop us? Norway? Doesn't that make diplomats subject to our jurisdiction because we could pass a law that makes them responsible for crimes committed while here?
How is that any more tenuous than saying that murdering an American anywhere in the world allows us to exercise jurisdiction?
My point is not that Trump is right with his EO. In fact, I think he is probably wrong. But I don't think that this line of argument is sufficient to carry the day.
"Subject to the jurisdiction" means being held to account for your conduct while anywhere in the USA. That you might also be held to account for actions outside the USA is not material.
So yes, the entire world's population (*) is subject to the jurisdiction of the USA without considering 18 U.S.C § 1119. And if any of them give birth to someone here in the USA, that child is a US citizen at birth per the 14th Amendment.
(*) ... with the noted exceptions because they cannot be held to account in US courts for their conduct anywhere in the USA (if there weren't diplomatic immunity, that exception would likely no longer exist).
You've misread the statute; it only makes it illegal for a U.S. national to murder a U.S. national anywhere in the entire world. Second, you understand that the 14th has a two-part test, right? People must be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and born in the U.S.
Oh, come on. This has been answered oodles of times. It works to exclude a few extremely narrow categories.
Arguably not; diplomatic immunity was part of the basic law of nations, incorporated in our common law tradition, from before the U.S. even existed. The 14th was enacted against that backdrop. And certainly not retroactively. If we eliminated the concept entirely and ordered all diplomats to leave, I suppose any who stayed might from then on be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S., and their kids born thereafter in this country would be citizens. I don't understand the point of this hypothetical.
This line of argument is that the 14A should be interpreted how it has been since it was enacted, and consistent with U.S. common law and English common law going centuries before that. I'm not clear why that shouldn't be sufficient to carry the day.
Have you ever read Wong Kim Ark? I mean, actually read it, not just the headnotes or various advocates' description of it, or a certain bot's lying about its text? It doesn't just announce an ipse dixit; it traces back the concept of birthright citizenship for hundreds of years, explaining its application and its narrow exceptions.
I have read Wong Kim Ark. I encourage everyone to read it. It is a well thought out case. I think the dissent (although again I would rule with the majority) has some excellent points as well.
Remember, though, that Wong Kim Ark's parents were here legally, worked here legally, and lived here legally. That is substantively different than being here by a subterfuge. A sovereign country really cannot control the members of its populace by enforcing limits on its border? An 8 1/2 month pregnant woman simply has to slide across the unguarded border in the desert to give birth and thereby unilaterally, by her sole decision, adds to our citizenship?
And we have no power to stop it? Must we have a sort of reverse Berlin Wall and shoot her if we want to stop it? We could take that extreme action but not a lesser one and deprive the child of citizenship? That seems to go against the basic law of sovereignty.
I don't see anything in Wong's reasoning that excludes the child born in your 8 1/2 month hypo from being a 14A citizen at birth.
We can amend the Constitution if we don't like that outcome.
And the law will never be changed, even though the people dislike the current situation, because the Democrats know that Consuelo's illegitimate crotch dropping will vote for them in 18 years.
And then you have traitors like the two I have muted screaming "Those babies are Americans like you and me! Why would you want to hurt your fellow countrymen!"
Only a sick, diseased society would make it such that the people have no control over whom joins them as citizens.
I didn't vote for you to become a citizen.
Funny, I don't FEEL exploited every time my lawn gets mowed, or I eat at a restaurant, or my car gets repaired, or my carpet gets cleaned, or ...
Thus you're not a Right-winger. The Victimhood Party™ is obsessed with the idea someone with black or brown skin is somewhere getting something that they should have, even if that something is the smallest of wages earned by backbreaking work.
They take Zero-Sum to a degree close to mental illness. You can bring out all the studies showing illegal immigrants are a plus to the economy but it never does any good. If the numbers conflict with their sordid pleasure wallowing in faux-victimhood, then the numbers must be ignored.
Once again: there's no such thing as an "anchor baby." It's a non-legal term made up by demagogic/ignorant (but I repeat myself) politicians. And you should probably leave "third world" out of your rant if you don't want to correctly be dismissed as a racist.
Just because a term is non-legal, doesn't mean there is no such thing.
If the notion is to limit court jurisdiction to delivering party-specific relief, then that ought to be accompanied by rejection of any judicial power to decide a case outcome without reaching and deciding it on the merits first. Pretty obviously, if a court decides to reject a party's case on a closely-contested question of standing, for instance, it denies party-specific relief on the merits without permitting them to be argued.
That opens the door to court-created procedural novelties, as a means to suppress hearing otherwise meritorious cases. This Supreme Court has fallen into a pattern to do that when a politically-motivated court majority wants not only to avoid the embarrassment to support a non-meritorious outcome, but also to consider a case to an extent sufficient to defeat it on other grounds.
To accomplish that, the Court simply invents a procedural novelty, such as those tailored to deliver a Trump victory in Trump v. United States, and the case goes away. But the procedural novelties hang around as precedents useful enough (or baleful enough) to kill similar future cases.
Thus, no case with a merits outcome depending on a witness to presidential criminal intent in the performance of official duties can any longer be heard, thanks to Trump v. United States. To permit that defeats altogether any need for the Court to consider some important cases which the national interest—and justice for the parties—demand get decided on their merits.
Thus, a new Supreme Court court policy ought to be instituted. Require a full consideration on the merits for every case the Court does not reject outright. On that basis, require a full argument and decision to decree which party wins on merits, before any procedural questions get consideration.
For the sake of legal efficiency, leave the old procedures in place for the lower appellate courts. In those, a new doctrine of no national injunctions will limit deleterious national effects.
Then, with a Supreme Court case proved important enough on its merits to justify national precedential status, go on to treat procedural questions as non-precedential prerequisites. Thus, decide last, not first, whether the party prevailing on the merits got procedural justice sufficient to deserve the benefits of the decision.
It remains important to decide case-by-case whether justice has been thwarted by inadequate procedural fairness. It should never be important to decide whether procedural inadequacies particular to one case become bars to hearing other cases which feature similar merits questions..
To do it that way would put a needful end to at least some of the presently out-of-control political policy meddling by the Court. And it would do it by a simple expedient to go back to the Constitutional jurisdictional mandate to consider cases and controversies, not policy and politics.
Once again, Lathrop plays lawyer while saying utterly nonsensical things. "Courts should decide cases they can't decide" is gibberish.
I'm on the "no standing" side. States don't get to choose their citizens. For individual plaintiffs, they should identify a better harm than "Trump said he would be mean to us." For example, a denied application for Social Security Number. Refusal to consider hardship to citizen children when removing noncitizen parents.
I'm all for narrowing state standing, but if states can challenge student loan relief, they can challenge this.
For somebody with standing, I would be inclined to rule on statutory grounds rather than constitutional grounds. Constitutional avoidance. If Congress amends the statute then courts must reach the constitutional question.
Suppose an individual born after the EO was issued is denied a SS# or some other benefit of citizenship. They then successfully sue the Feds. My understanding, possibly incorrect, is that they would not be entitled to attorney's fees. This seems utterly invidious.
I assume they would be so entitled under the EAJA, if not pursuant to any other provision of law.
Does the decision in Murthy v. Missouri specific to standing not apply here?
Murthy v. Missouri held that past harm on its own did not provide standing to seek injunctive relief. Plaintiffs had to show that defendants were likely to take actions in the future that would cause social media companies to censor them. Plaintiffs in the citizenship cases had suffered no harm when the cases were filed. The claimed future harm in the citizenship cases is both more likely and more clearly the responsibility of the federal government rather than third parties.
Thanks for an explanation.
From the opinion:
"Second, the Court did not hold or even hint that there was a requirement of “primary allegiance” or exclusive allegiance in either Elk or Wong Kim Ark. "
This is, of course, completely false.
From Elk v Wilkins:
"The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this Court, as to the citizenship of free negroes..., and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside."
There are of course many other flaws in the opinion, which generally comes across as setting out to advocate for a preexisting political opinion. This is just one example.
The opinion also entirely misapprehends the relevance of Indians to the citizenship clause issue, and uniformly mischaracterizes quotes from the ratification debates. For example, it quotes Trumbull:
"[Trumbull noted] that Indian tribes “are not subject to our jurisdiction in the sense of owing allegiance solely to the United States,” because“[i]t is only those persons who come completely within our jurisdiction, who are subject to our laws, that we think of making citizens.” Id. at 2893–94 (emphasis added). The Senators recognized that as “quasi foreign nations,” Indian tribes and tribal members were distinct from other noncitizens. . . . Senator Trumbull confirmed that the text covers all persons “who are subject to our laws.”"
No, Senator Trumbull did not confirm any such thing.
In the context of discussing quasi foreign Indian tribes, Trumbull referenced Indians that had become "subject to our laws." That was specifically referring to Indians that were NOT part of any quasi foreign tribe - those that did NOT have any separate territory or treaty status. The Indians that WERE part of a quasi foreign tribe, on the other hand, were NOT "subject to our laws," within their territories. (There is even a direct quote "within the territory" clarifying that point). Trumbull's point was that such quasi foreign Indians were not included in the citizenship clause. These quasi foreign Indians WOULD, however, be "subject to our laws" when outside of the territory. Say they took a visit to New York City for example. They would be subject to laws, just like any other visiting foreigner. But they would NOT be subject to full political jurisdiction - again, just like any other foreigner.
The whole point of the discussion was to illustrate that Indians belonging to a quasi foreign tribe were sufficiently like any other foreigners, who likewise are not "subject to our laws" within their foreign homelands (such Indians were explicitly compared to Mexicans in Mexico in the discussion), that they were not included in the citizenship clause. But, obviously, all of them are still "subject to our laws" outside of their territory or foreign homelands, when they are temporarily visiting. This is just blatantly obvious to anyone who reads the ratification debates.
No, the whole point was that Indians were sui generis, unlike foreigners.
Incorrect. Trumbull specifically likened Indians, within their territories, to Mexicans, in Mexico.
His point was, notwithstanding these territories being within the geographical U.S., they were not subject to our laws, and thus sufficiently foreign.
His point was they could not be held accountable in US courts for their conduct within the entire of the USA. That distinguishes them from foreigners.
I think that, after CASA, the 9th Circuit only had authority to provide relief in the states that were named plaintiffs, and might not have had jurisdiction over Illinois, which is not in the 9th Circuit.
While the Supreme Court left ways to accompish what CASA prohibited trying to accomplish through universal injunctions, this is not one of them.
No. Again, the issue in CASA had nothing to do with geography, even if many inaccurately described it as being about "nationwide injunctions." The issue in CASA was who the injunctions could benefit, not where they were effective.