The Volokh Conspiracy
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Justice Kagan Doth Protest Too Much About The Emergency Docket
Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson could have joined Justice Kavanaugh to grant cert in the CPSC case, but they didn't.
In Trump v. Boyle, the Court granted a stay, and allowed President Trump to remove members of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. This order seems to follow from Trump v. Wilcox. The per curiam order states, "the case does not otherwise differ from Wilcox in any pertinent respect." There has been some debate over the years on whether emergency docket rulings are precedential. I think that debate has been settled.
The vote here was (likely) 6-3. Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Kagan once again complains that the Court "[o]nce again . . . uses its emergency docket to destroy the independence of an independent agency." She writes that the "same majority" granted relief in both Boyle and Wilcox. With emergency docket rulings, it is not known that the same justices joined both majorities, but Kagan confirms the obvious. Kagan says that "majority has also all but overturned Humphrey's Executor v. United States" (she's right). Kagan also cites Justice Barrett's concurrence in Doe v. Mills abut deciding cases "on a short fuse," but I no longer think even Barrett agrees with that opinion. One could say that Moyle cut the fuse short. I'll show myself out. [Update: The case is in fact Boyle, not Moyle, so my bris joke does not work.]
Yet, there is a shortcoming with Justice Kagan's ruling. She is unhappy that the Court is deciding this case on the emergency docket. The obvious rejoinder would be to decide the issue on the regular docket by granting a petition for a writ of certiorari. If the case was granted now, it could be argued in the fall, and settled definitively.
Indeed, there was a fourth vote for cert waiting. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a brief concurrence, explaining why he would have granted certiorari before judgment. Why didn't Justice Kagan and her colleagues join Justice Kavanaugh, and put the case on the regular docket? If Humphrey's Executor is "all but overruled," why not decide the case in the normal order, and settle the issue nationwide? Methinks that Justice Kagan doth protest too much. Then again, does it take four votes or five votes to grant cert before judgment?
Justice Kavanaugh's brief concurrence reiterates his CASA concurrence:
When an emergency application turns on whether this Court will narrow or overrule a precedent, and there is at least a fair prospect (not certainty, but at least some reasonable prospect) that we will do so, the better practice often may be to both grant a stay and grant certiorari before judgment. In those unusual circumstances, if we grant a stay but do not also grant certiorari before judgment, we may leave the lower courts and affected parties with extended uncertainty and confusion about the status of the precedent in question. Moreover, when the question is whether to narrow or overrule one of this Court's precedents rather than how to resolve an open or disputed question of federal law, further percolation in the lower courts is not particularly useful because lower courts cannot alter or overrule this Court's precedents. In that situation, the downsides of delay in definitively resolving the status of the precedent sometimes tend to outweigh the benefits of further lower-court consideration. So it is here. Therefore, I not only would have granted a stay but also would have granted certiorari before judgment.
In short, given the importance of this case, percolation is not very useful, and the Supreme Court should settle the issue definitively sooner rather than later.
It seems that the Court's docket next term will have cases on birthright citizenship, overruling Humphrey's, the Voting Rights Act, transgender athletes, and much more. Things will heat up!
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Possibly the three declined to join the cert request because they knew the decision would be against them and set the wrong precedent?
There is also the question of why the other five in the majority did not go along with Kavanaugh's cert before judgment idea. They are probably not chomping at the bit to actually come up with unlaughable reasoning about the fed carveout. Lev Menand thinks it will be quite tricky.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5266613
It's a good read and I think he hit the nail on the head. My question is if the Fed is an acceptable carve out, is it just a drafting guide for Congress to structure every other organization as a quasi-private entity with the same organization as the Fed and make it immune from at will removal?
Or is it something unique that the Court finds about banks or banking regulation? Of all human pursuits, banking stands alone atop the Constitution as a different power for, mumble, reasons?
*champing.
Yes, "champing" is used in the original idiom. But chomping is much funner to say, and is a widely accepted alternative. Yes, "funner" is not word.
I thought cert-before-judgement required five votes.
Edit: that appears to be correct, per https://x.com/steve_vladeck/status/1737648294539727292
Look, of the two of Vladeck and Blackman, which one is a law professor?
The post seems to address the uncertainty of needing 4 or 5 votes
You mean Josh edited the post to add that after reading the comment.
So are you saying Josh doesn't know what he is talking about???
Also, Josh also ignores the fact that the stay would have issued with or without cert as there were 6 votes to stay (Kavanaugh didn't say he wasn't going to vote to stay and his vote wasn't even necessary to the stay). The stay effectively decides the case.
This emergency docket ruling is about what happens in the interim. Even if Kagan and the other dissenters got on board Kavanaugh's cert before judgment train, Trump could still merrily pursue partisan agency terminations for the next eleven months or so before the matter was settled definitively (and with reasoning!).
Contrast this with what happened with biden's student loan forgiveness. The court deferred its resolution of biden's emergency request to continue with the program in the interim.
Kagan and the other dissenters probably would have preferred that the case proceed through the lower courts without interference. It is not a dichotomy of either being for or against cert before judgment, the court could have chosen not to intervene at all. And if that is what Kagan preferred, it would have been inconsistent to vote for cert before judgment.
I am trying to square the "Biden can't do student loan forgiveness" with "Trump can dismantle the entire Dept of Education though" circle.
Given the deference to the executive now... if Trump tried dismantling or modifying some student loan repayment program it seems like they should let him.
You don't see a difference between a boss firing his own subordinates and a president saying that he is unilaterally abolishing debt obligations on behalf of the United States?
A lot is thrown around about dictators. How can a president just simply abolish an obligation to the tune of multiple billions of dollars? How is that like firing a subordinate?
Congress passed a law giving authority to the head of the dept of ed to modify repayment arrangements etc... so there was a delegation of Congressional authority which was exercised but then enjoined by the Court.
Congress passed a law establishing the dept of education. The president says he wants to abolish the dept and begins taking steps to do so. What Congressional action has been taken to repeal that law?
If the President is all powerful as the Sup Ct says to NOT stop or interfere in the second example then why isn't the President powerful enough (through his pick to lead the dept of ed) to carry out a Congressional delegation of power to take an action that is specifically granted to the head of the dept of ed by a Congressional statute?
Are some presidents' executive authority more powerful than others?
Perhaps you could read the briefs in the case instead of me repeating the arguments. The executive power to "modify" debt obligations in individual cases does not empower him to wholesale forgive large swaths of debt in most every case.
Why this is equivalent to firing subordinates I have no clue. Perhaps your complaint is that the DOE is not as robust as you like. The same could have been said about ICE under Obama and Biden. It's a political question; the courts do not police the executive branch.
He can not dismantle the entire Department of Education, his executive order says cut it back to its statutory minimum functions.
They are preparing another recission bill for congressional consent to cut it further.
He can not dismantle the entire Department of Education, his executive order says cut it back to its statutory minimum functions.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/improving-education-outcomes-by-empowering-parents-states-and-communities/
"Sec. 2. Closing the Department of Education and Returning Authority to the States."
> In Trump v. Moyle
Is someone using GenAI?
I think they will grant cert on Slaughter and that should be before the Court in short order.
Why should the Court be so eager to overturn its precedents?
Why shouldn’t normal order apply? The shadow docket is decided based on existing precedent, and questions about whether to overturn precedent are entertained only after the issue has percolated fully in the lower courts.
Under Humphrey’s Executor, members of independent commissions have an interest in executing the powers of their office, not just an issue in being paid. Indeed, taking the Court’s logic to its extreme, because all government officials, Presidents included, are nothing more than employees of the people, they too have no interest in their office other than in receiving the salary associated with it, which can be fully satisfied by money damage. Hence courts equally lack authority to issue preliminary injunctions when someone claims a right to aany government office.
If a military coup installed someone as President, by this logic courts would be powerless to issue injunctive relief. (They might well be practically powerless. But this logic makes them legally powerless.)
Two points:
First, I started to address your point about jobs in the other thread and asked why your logic shouldn't apply to all jobs. I have thought about it and am now asking why your logic shouldn't apply to all contracts.
I sell my car to a guy for $15k. He doesn't pay. Under your logic, I am not just out $15k, but I am out the enjoyment of driving the old car and any nostalgia I attach to it. I should be able to get a TRO because those harms are immediate and irreparable.
It would upend contract and employment law. Sure, we all get intangible value from things but the law does not give you that. It gives you money to compensate you for things. Maybe in your government job hypo the power and prestige would have a value of the $salary +$X. That might be the real compensation he gets. Specific performance is very much disfavored in the law and your proposal would make it routine if applied broadly.
The second part about a military coup illustrates the problem with the analysis. As you note, after a coup, nobody is listening to judges anyways. That's why the system is not set up for such eventualities.
We hear repeatedly, "Well what if Trump is kidnapping you off of the street and sending you to El Salavador?" What we have then is a broken system, not one that will be fixed by a judicial ruling. And for that reason, the law does not have to allow for a "fix" for such an eventuality. The law presumes regularity.
We hear in other contexts, "But what if the law prescribes the death penalty for jaywalking?" Then we have a breakdown in our system. The courts and our whole system of government are for a rational, representative government and do not take into account what would happen if we lose our collective minds. Because if we do that, we aren't listening to courts anyways.
Cynicism, as ever, is an ally of despotism. Those who have achieved comfort, and imagine a measure of safety, will always postpone with cynicism any reckoning that the true price of safety involves risk. It is by that logic that despotism chiefly advances.
I gave the answer to your ”question” very clearly in my post. Official government positions are completely different from ordinary contracts for exactly the reasons I said. Government officials have an interest in their entitlement to exercise official powers, not just collect salaries.
In Powell v. McCormack, Powell had asked for an injunction ordering the Soeaker of the House to immediately seat him. The District Court declined dismissed the entire case and didn’t reach the injunction, so the issue was never decided, and by the time the matter reached the Supreme Court only backpay rendered the issue non-moot. But I find it very doubtful that the only interest a wrongfully excluded member of Congress or judge has is in his salary. I think the same would be true for other government officials. Officials entitled to protection from firing due to the need to exercise independent judgment under Humphrey’s Exectutor, it seems to me, are entitled to be reinstated if wrongfully fired, not just receive back pay. The purpose of Humphrey’s Executor is defeated if the President can fire protected officials but merely has to buy them out in order to do so. I think that for this to change, Huphrey’s Executor would need to be overruled.
What you are missing is Officers under the United States only execute executive authority, the executive authority of the United States is vested in the President, therefore they must be subordinate to the President, and the only way to make them subordinate to the President is preserve his power of removal.
That was the logic of the First Congress, which the Myers court found convincing.
What you are missing is that Humphrey’s Executor says otherwise. And so far as the shadow docket is concerned, Humphrey’s Executor is the law of the land and binding on the Supreme Court.
If the Supreme Court wants to overturn Humphrey’s Executor, it needs to wait until the issue has fully percolated in the lower courts and have full briefing and argument before doing so.
Up and until that point, including for shadow-docket preliminary motions and writ requests such as injunctions and stay orders, it is bound by its precedents. So Humphrey’s Executor ought to control what it does. Whether you agree with it or not.
You sure are telling the Supreme Court how to conduct its business. It seems to disagree with you on how these things work.
Humphrey's Executor is a dead case, no different than Bivens or Lemon. Are you saying that the Court must do things by your book?
And really, the matter has been argued to death. Nobody has some brilliant new idea about whether Humphrey's Executor should be revitalized. The Court has heard the arguments and will not use this case anymore--that is except for the Fed which I have said is unprincipled.
The Supreme Court itself has repeatedly said over the years that lower courts are not entitled to ignore its precedent even if intervening cases have drastically undermined the persuasiveness of that precedent. Until SCOTUS says "Humphrey's Executor is overruled," Humphrey's Executor remains binding.
You mean like in the gay marriage cases? Or the application of Lemon? Or Bivens?
The Court routinely smacks down lower courts for applying disfavored precedent, despite the official position.
wvattorney13 — Lack of general consistency can seem unprincipled, without thereby contributing much to decide which of any competing principles ought to govern. Everyone can see that you like right-wing populist principles, with the example of the Fed standing so strongly against adopting your view that demand for principled argument tends more to call other cases into question, than to undermine Fed independence.
By the way, history and tradition stand strongly against the recent novelty to argue a unitary executive power, beyond the scope of Congress. It is straightforwardly obvious that Congress has since its inception authorized executive oversight for agencies outside the national Executive. Arguments to the contrary based on present-day Constitutional readings have nothing to do with history—they belong entirely to the language of the present.
If people weren’t allowed to tell the Supreme Court how to condict its business, most law professors would be out of a job, and this blog wouldn’t have very much to talk about.
Powell did not involve Humphrey's Executor. It involved an independent case involving a constitutional office. It, as you noted, only involved back pay as damages.
If your opinion is correct, why didn't Powell get a TRO to be seated earlier? Or why wasn't he compensated by more than backpay because of his power or enjoyment of the job?