The Volokh Conspiracy
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Professor Barrett Was At Home In CASA
After the Supreme Court decided Trump v. CASA, the Wall Street Journal editorial page took a victory lap. The editors, who have consistently defended Barrett, wrote "What an end-of-term rejoinder to the MAGA loudmouths who have been complaining that Justice Barrett is a pushover." On July 4, the WSJ published a letter to the editor as a follow-up:
A few months ago I ran into Justice Neil Gorsuch and lamented some of his colleagues' recent opinions. I criticized Justice Amy Coney Barrett and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in particular, both of whom had recently ruled against the Trump administration. Justice Gorsuch was characteristically gracious and spoke of how each was entitled to his own opinions.
I once was what your editorial "The Supreme Court Kills 'Universal' Injunctions" (June 28) refers to as a "MAGA loudmouth." After reading Justice Barrett's superb opinion in Trump v. CASA, I am a repentant MAGA loudmouth. She is a star—and I regret ever doubting it.
Joel Marks
Richmond, Va.
Did this encounter with Justice Gorsuch actually happen? I find this conversation so implausible. And I cannot find any record for a Joel Marks who is an attorney in Richmond. I searched the Virginia State Bar for a Joel Marks and found nothing. I did find a news story from Henrico County, Virginia, where a Joel Marks complained about a broken water main.
I provide this background to illustrate how poorly the criticism of Justice Barrett is understood. If Marks criticized Barrett for simply ruling against Trump, he has no idea what he is talking about. And if he thinks that Justice Barrett's decision in CASA suggests she will not rule against Trump in the future, then Marks really has no clue what he is talking about. Why then did the WSJ give Marks the time of day? Marks fit the template--those who doubted Justice Barrett now have no doubts.
My doubts remain. Indeed, they are reinforced. These doubts predated Trump's re-election, and were never premised on whether Barrett rules for Trump. Brackeen and Vidal are critical data points, combined with a string of emergency docket rulings, and a consistent record of denying cert on important cases. My concern is this: how much evidence does Barrett requires to reach an originalist ruling? Academics, as a whole, require fully-developed theories based on a volume of scholarly articles to reach a solid conclusion. Judges, generally, do not.
Trump v. CASA should not have been a particularly difficult case. There is fairly overwhelming evidence that universal injunctions are recent innovations, and that under Grupo Mexicano, such novelty is doubtful. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch reached this conclusion years ago with ease. I can imagine Justice Scalia disposing of this case pretty easily.
Yet, Justice Barrett's opinion reads like a law review article that summarizes the academic literature. On point after point, Barrett contrasts the views of Sam Bray, Will Baude, and Michael Morley on the one hand with the views of Mila Sohoni on the other. Indeed, Barrett refers to Amanda Frost as the "mainstream" view. For readers of this blog, these names may be familiar. But for most lawyers, this sort of scholarly debate is quite esoteric.
Footnote 7 illustrates the point.
7There is some dispute about whether Wirtz was the first universal injunction. Professor Mila Sohoni points to other possible 20th-century examples, including West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913). See M. Sohoni, 133 Harv. L. Rev., at 943; Brief for Professor Mila Sohoni as Amica Curiae 3; see also post, at 21 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But see M. Morley, Disaggregating the History of Nationwide Injunctions: A Response to ProfessorSohoni, 72 Ala. L. Rev. 239, 252–256 (2020) (disputing these examples).
Justice Sotomayor in dissent argues that West Virginia v. Barnette and Pierce v. Society of Sisters were examples of universal injunction. Yet, in a footnote, Justice Barrett leads off by citing Professor Sohonoi, with a see also to Justice Sotomayor's dissent! Doesn't that seem backwards? Shouldn't the Justice come first? And does Justice Barrett discuss those landmark cases, and explain why Sotomayor is wrong? No, she includes a But see citation to Michael Morley who "disputes" those examples. I suppose it is fair enough to cite a law review article that parses some history or arcana. But wouldn't it fall to a Supreme Court majority on how best to interpret landmark Supreme Court cases? I would like to know why Barnette and Pierce did not approve of universal injunctions. This is the sort of footnote that is all too common in academia. When there is contrary authority, just cite someone else who disputes it. But this is not how the Supreme Court usually handles a central disagreement.
I am grateful that Bray, Baude, and Morley have made such a compelling case against universal injunctions. But what if they hadn't? What if the theoretical framework was not so airtight? What if some earlier injunctions could plausibly have been characterizes as universal? Or what if this case came to the Court several years ago when many of these arguments were still being developed? Would Barrett have had enough of a theory to go on? I'm not sure. In short, Justice Barrett was able to write the strong opinion she did because of the scholarly work done by others. What would she have done in a case like Lopez, or even Heller, where the scholarly literature was not so solid?
We will have to wait for the next case that presents a novel constitutional question, and where there is not a clear scholarly consensus. That will provide the real test of where Justice Barrett is--and not the uncertain views of a MAGA loudmouth.
I appreciate my friend Ilya Shapiro's defense of Justice Barrett in the Washington Post. I find myself in agreement with much of it. Still, there are caveats. Ilya writes that Barret "will join the conservative majority on the substance of issues that are squarely presented [like] overturning Roe v. Wade." But Barrett voted to deny cert in Dobbs, and the Court only took the case after (likely) Justice Kavanaugh granted cert. Ilya writes that Barrett gave "Trump the immunity he needed to escape the lawfare he faced in the run-up to the last election." Sort of. It isn't clear which parts of the majority opinion she actually joined, and she would have allowed a trial to consider a range of otherwise immune conduct. Ilya writes that Barrett has "join[ed] the conservative majority" to "preserv[e] religious freedom." Except she refused to join Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch on overruling Employment Division v. Smith, and has shown no interest in revisiting the interest since Fulton. Ilya wrote that Barrett voted to "end[] racial preferences in college admissions." But she has denied review in cases where schools are flagrantly violating Students for Fair Admissions. Justice Barrett's Skrmetti concurrence read like the efforts of a law professor to make sense of Footnote Four--a Footnote that has no basis in the Constitution. I am still befuddled why Justice Thomas joined it, given that he agreed with Justice Scalia that Footnote Four should be jettisoned. And Ilya does acknowledge Barrett's opinion in Murthy, which erected an almost insurmountable standard for standing.
I could go on, but I won't. At a high level, Barrett's record look great. But if you drill down just a bit, things look differently. See the wall of receipts.
Still, OT 2024 was far better for Barrett than last term, or the term before. If we are grading terms, I would give her a solid B. I would give Justice Kavanaugh a B+. And Justice Gorsuch would get an A-. All three Trump appointees lose points for AARP. There is always hope for next term.
And with that, I have finished blogging about the decisions of the OT 2024 Term. Perhaps.
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My concern is this: how much evidence does Barrett requires to reach an originalist ruling.
Wait, you're still claiming to be doing originalism? I didn't realise anyone had tried to argue that it was originally understood that George Washington could run the country on his own, as he pleased.
Seem strange to criticize a Justice for writing thorough opinions.
Poor Josh. He thinks the WSJ is obsessed with him; meanwhile the WSJ doesn't even know who he is.
I remain unconvinced that Josh Blackman is actually a real person, despite his extensive digital trail.
(The "goodness" of a Supreme Court justice, let alone her fidelity to the rule of law, is not primarily determined by whether they vote for your preferred outcomes.)
"My concern is this: how much evidence does Barrett requires to reach an originalist ruling. Academics, as a whole, require fully-developed theories based on a volume of scholarly articles to reach a solid conclusion. Judges, generally, do not."
Originalists claim they can establish the definitive public understanding of an (often hotly contested) legal document at a particular time in the past. What's more, they claim this is the only legitimate method of interpretation and that their interpretation must remain the prevailing one until potentially cumbersome legislative action or the discovery of new historical information changes it.
That's an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. So while I still think the whole framework is nonsense I absolutely want originalist judges showing their work. If they don't, that kind of gives the game away that its not a serious interpretive endeavor and is just a pseudo-historical gloss to advance contemporary right-wing political goals. If you're complaining that a judge or justice considered too much historical evidence or scholarship...you're kind of giving the game away that you don't actually want a search for original public meaning.
Also not for nothing, but doesn't scholarship require an engagement with both primary and secondary sources? Kind of weird to frame it in terms of "scholarly articles."
It's not an extraordinary claim, because you misrepresent it as if originalists say it can resolve all legal questions every time. No credible originalists claims that. It's a straw man used to attack and discredit. Your problem is you reject, for ideological reasons, the work originalists do show, because you want a different outcome. That is why the left opposes originalism. Because it prevents the kinds of progressive decisions they want.
When someone makes an "all or nothing" claim, it's often the case they not engaging in good faith. Ironically what is often wrong with Blackman's advocacy. I say that because he is actually not a good faith originalist, being outcome oriented as all his blog posts document.
I reject the originalism because historical evidence is often messy and self-professed serious originalists often just ignore it and historical context generally. Gorsuch is an originalist who has a strong view of the non-delegation doctrine (which is a concept that is inferred from the text). Bagley and Mortensen gathered a lot of evidence showing that there wasn't a widespread belief in the concept. Gorsuch just ignores it and doesn't change his priors. Or take Clarence Thomas on the 15th Amendment. If originalism somehow leads a justice to conclude that the Court has a lot of power to restrain Congress on enforcing voting rights by deciding what's appropriate legislation with federalism concerns at the forefront, it's a bad theory. A really bad one.
And if you just say "well those people aren't credible originalists" its just "no true Scotsman."
Perhaps, in lieu of constitutional originalists who respect the limits of their judicial power, you would prefer a "Nietzschean vision of... unelected, life-tenured judges--leading a Yolk who will be 'tested by following,' and whose very 'belief in themselves' is mystically bound up in their 'understanding' of a Court that "speak[s] before all others for their constitutional ideals"? Let's not do that.
Originalists deciding Congress can’t decide what is appropriate legislation or how to structure the government is pretty much the opposite of respecting a limit on judicial power.
Taken at face value, I don't really understand what you are trying to argue. If you write something coherent, I'l try to respond.
Originalism as a theoretical concept is already dubious and as practiced by self-described originalists is often ahistorical nonsense that empowers courts rather constrains them. The "originalist" approaches to non-delegation and the Reconstruction Amendments perhaps the most stark examples of this.
You seem to be projecting the flaws of the "living" constitution theory onto originalism. Originalism is grounded in the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original meaning, as understood by those who drafted and ratified it. It is not "dubious" but a practical guide to judicial restraint. And it is most definitely not "ahistorical nonsense." The accusation of being "ahistorical" assumes that originalism ignores history or distorts it. Originalism entails interpreting the Constitution according to the public meaning of its text at the time of its ratification, not necessarily the subjective intentions of its framers and certainly not the subjective views of sitting justices. Interpreting the 14th amendment according to its original meaning is certainly NOT an act of judicial overreach. Neither is observing an approach to non-delegation that simply recognizes there are limits to congressional power in our constitutional structure.
"Originalism is grounded in the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original meaning, as understood by those who drafted and ratified it."
1) original public meaning originalism is broader than that because its not drafter or ratifier focused, it is public focused. It's what the entire public would understand, which is why it often uses sources like dictionaries. 2) This is a bold claim for any piece of language, let alone hotly debated political documents!
"It is not 'dubious' but a practical guide to judicial restraint."
It is in no way practical. It offers little practical guidance for lower courts, litigators, or the public. Commonly accepted understandings and rules can be easily upended by an originalist justices embrace of new scholarship. We have had over a century of settled law on birthright citizenship and now its being attacked by some hacks calling themselves "originalists" trying to undo it. That is the opposite of practical or restrained.
"The accusation of being "ahistorical" assumes that originalism ignores history or distorts it."
I'm not "assuming" anything. I'm looking at the results. The "originalist" arguments advanced in opinions often completely ignore inconvenient evidence or historical context. You could only conclude that an originalist interpretation of the 15th Amendment constrains Congress's power to enforce voting rights by treating states differently if you completely ignored the entire history of the Reconstruction.
"certainly not the subjective views of sitting justices."
The choice of sources, how they treat sources and information is absolutely governed by their subjective (and amateur) approach to historical inquiry. Every good historian recognizes that "objective" history is at best a pipe dream and accounts for that in an effort to be fair. Ones who actually believe in objectivity have blinders on where they can't see that their subjective desires are why they look to some sources and not others, even if the others are more compelling.
"Interpreting the 14th amendment according to its original meaning is certainly NOT an act of judicial overreach. Neither is observing an approach to non-delegation that simply recognizes there are limits to congressional power in our constitutional structure."
It certainly is when you do so by getting the history completely wrong with the goal of disempowering Congress. This is especially true when there is an explicit textual commitment of authority to Congress like in the Reconstruction Amendments.
What constrains the judiciary from imposing their own value judgments if one rejects originalism? The unbounded "reasoned judgment" of 5 out of 9 nine lawyers?
If it were that simple, there wouldn't be much (if any) disagreements among originalists about what constitutes a proper "originalist interpretation". But there are lots of disagreements. And even the purest of the pure originalists will sometimes disagree. Blackman probably thinks that his vision of originalism is the correct one, and if Barrett deviates from that, she must be using some other type of interpretation.
If originalism is so objective and straightforward to execute, it should be the easiest form of interpretation to hand over to an AI model. That would take all of the personalities out of it.
Well, it may be that originalism is not always perfectly executed but it is the best available approach if your goal is to limit judicial overreach. In the example of Planned Parenthood v Casey, an originalist judgment would have recognized that abortion was not a liberty protected by the Constitution because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed." The alternative approach using an expansive, living constitution found otherwise by "rattl[ing] off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate[d] a value judgment and conceal[ed]l a political choice." I would prefer not being ruled by an imperial judiciary.
A flash to the past:
https://originalistsagainsttrump.wordpress.com/2016-statement/
As to the "fairly overwhelming evidence that universal injunctions are recent innovations," I reference in opposition the testimony of Professor Kate Shaw. I wish to be careful here.
There have been "recent innovations." Equity has a much flexibility that develops over time as the situation warrants.
But they have as a whole been around for a significant amount of time. Our host put forth another point of view.
https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-questions-witnesses-on-nationwide-injunctions-during-senate-judiciary-joint-subcommittee-hearing (etc.)
I am quite open to criticism of Justice Barrett.
JB has not been a good vehicle. The comments to many of his entries, from people who often strongly disagree with each other, provide receipts.
Truth often can arise from a collision with error. So, there is some value in his remarks.
It is completely and obviously apparent from my literal 20 second skim of the decision that Barnette is not a universal injunction:
"Appellees, citizens of the United States and of West Virginia, brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated asking its injunction to restrain enforcement of these laws and regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses . . . . The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges. It restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class."
Is there a plug-in that will hide any Blackman posts? Would be a win for him, fewer people would be reminded daily how stupid he is.
I would settle for a mandate ALL articles use the read more function at the end of the first paragraph.
"I cannot find any record for a Joel Marks who is an attorney in Richmond."
Where did Mr. Marks represent himself as an attorney? Does everyone who criticizes the Supreme Court or any of its Justices have to be an attorney?
Were you able to read the entire letter to the editor? It is behind a firewall and I could not read it in its entirety. Could it have been mentioned there?
No, I didn't, so I suppose it could have. I thought the post was quoting the entire letter.
It might be. I am not sure either.
It is the entire letter. The only difference is that the original links to the article it references.
Which CASA? Mi CASA, or su CASA?
It was a statutory case about interpreting the Judiciary Act. What does originalism have to do with it?
You think originalism doesn't apply to statutory interpretation?
Barrett and her fellow SCOTUS fascists are creating world where Trump's illegal actions have no remedy.
"Professor Barrett Was At Home In CASA"
IOW, Mi Casa Es Tu Casa.