The Volokh Conspiracy
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Senate Confirms First Judicial Nominee of Trump's Second Term. How Many More Will Follow?
Indications are that the second Trump Administration will not have as significant an effect on the Courts as the first.
Yesterday the Senate confirmed Whitney Hermandorfer to a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A well-qualified nominee who I expect will make an excellent judge, Hermandorfer is the first judicial nominee to win confirmation in Donald Trump's second term.
As various news outlets have noted, judicial nominations are lagging in Trump's second term. The Administration has been slower to make nominations and the Senate has been slower to act than during the first Trump Administration. On top of that, there are fewer vacancies to fill, as many judges eligible for senior status are electing to remain on the bench (and there is speculation as to why that might be).
As of this morning, there are forty-nine current vacancies on the federal bench, and thirteen more future vacancies (which occur when judges announce their intent to retire or take senior status at a date in the future or upon confirmation of a successor). There are only eleven nominees pending before the Senate, however. (Three more nominees have been announced but have not been formerly submitted.) Of these, only five are on the circuit courts of appeals.
As for what could be, by my count there are forty circuit court judges eligible to take senior status, only two have which have announced their intention to create a vacancy. Of those twenty-six were appointed by Republican Presidents. What these judges decide to do could have a substantial effect on President Trump's ability to shape the judiciary during his second term.
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It seems a bit early to talk about "lagging" though it is true the Administration has focused on other things including a major funding bill. A big question is if Alito or Thomas will eventually resign.
Also:
https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/15/politics/emil-bove-former-judges-reject-trump-judicial-nominee
75 old men and women. Out of how many retired judges? Hundreds? Thousands?
Luttig as the quoted token GOPer as usual.
Trump is an old man. Some around here seem to like him.
And despite only being 44, Bove looks 65.
He's definitely aBove his chronological age.
AP reports the vote was "46-42 along party lines." I wonder if any of Trump's picks will have strong bipartisan support.
None.
If Trump nominated God the democrats would oppose it.
Probably many of the district court picks.
The bar for “well-qualified” federal judges has really fallen. She’s been a lawyer for ten years. Did one year as a first year big law associate, then clerked from 2016-2021. Spent another year as a big law associate and then gets a political job. Clerking used to be a way to make people better lawyers. Now it’s the one of the only things that’s looked at and we’re getting these super young picks whose main experience is clerking for ideologically aligned judges.
I anticipate a Crystal Clanton nomination before the end of this Presidential term.
Yeah. That’s a possibility. Also will be interesting to see whether they just start appointing people immediately after their clerkship ends (or before even). What better way to ensure ideological consistency than to go directly to the bench from Alito or Thomas’s chambers? Absolutely no risk of changing a perspective due to real world experience.
“appointing people immediately after their clerkship ends (or before even)”
She’s the perfect (from a MAGA perspective) guinea pig for this, IMO. They’ll save it for a dire moment when distraction is desperately needed.
ltg -
some good examples of how far "well qualified " has fallen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JeJxubD-Ih0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-Yg9qdb5QQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KwOLRfVqlsg
quite a few others - but everyone gets the drift
See also here to get another side of the story.
https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/maddowblog/trump-judges-whitney-hermandorfer-rcna218823
I know. Rachel Maddow Blog. And, the OP is a conservative who is inclined to support the nominee.
It remains curious, given all the judicial lawfare the administration is currently fighting, no one is recognized the importance of prioritizing judicial nominations. You would think someone would connect the dots on that. It's like the old Grey Poupon mustard commercial: how do you think I got so rich? They've been winning more than losing in the appeals courts. But I wouldn't expect that to continue in the future if this current opportunity is wasted. After Biden's work the last 4 years, keeping up with these appointments is just holding serve.
Probably too much to expect, given how MAGA only seems to care about the Epstein files and seems willing to sacrifice everything else in pursuit of its white whale.
So few vacancies, plenty of time to get every one confirmed before 2029.
There could be more. That was Professor Adler's final point. His count is that there are maybe 40 more eligible to take senior status. Maybe there is has already been back channel conversations. Maybe not.
(Recent, 21st century) history says don't wait. For anyone thinking Mr. Judicial Confirmations (Mitch McConnell) is now an obstacle and perhaps rooting for him to die, remember that with a Democrat governor, the state legislature updated the law to remove the governor's authority to make a temporary appointment. Which means the seat remains vacant. Add on top of that Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis, and maybe you don't want to wait too long so you're not backed into corner because you've given them deadline leverage.
It's a matter of prioritization.
Trump's priority is confirming his executive nominees before the judicial ones. The former can make policy decisions now while the latter may be needed to uphold them later. Maybe.
There's no guarantee that a judicial nominee will uphold an executive action later, but there's a 100% certainty that an executive nominee will get the ball rolling now.
Sorry for the length here but it is what it is. I am going to suggest that the problems of the judiciary and the nomination process are joined at the hip and structural in nature due to problems inherent in a presidential form of government. Therefore, I call for a parliamentary and federal system based on the principles of decentralization, limited government and the idea that partisan politics has no place in the judiciary.
As such, I propose amending the Constitution to separate the Head of State and Head of Government with the Head of State chosen by the electors who are chosen by the state legislatures and only has the limited authority to be a ceremonial leader and nominate judges. And second, restore the Senate to a body chosen by the legislature of their respective states.
The separate Head of Government position is not discussed here for the sake of time and space.
I. How the Current System Politicizes the Judiciary
1. Presidential Political Incentives
Current system: Presidents serve four-year terms and often seek reelection.
This creates strong incentives to appoint judges—especially Supreme Court justices—who will appeal to their political base or party leadership, rather than selecting on legal merit or independence.
Judicial nominations can become campaign promises, further politicizing the process.
2. Senate Confirmation Dynamics
Senators are popularly elected, often facing re-election themselves.
They vote on nominees with an eye toward public opinion, interest group pressure, and partisan advantage.
Result: Confirmation hearings become political theater, and judicial nominees are often selected and scrutinized for their perceived ideology.
3. Short Institutional Memory and Volatility
Rapid turnover in the executive and legislative branches leads to dramatic swings in judicial philosophy, especially at the appellate level.
The judiciary can become a battleground for policy changes instead of a consistent arbiter of constitutional meaning.
II. How the Freedom Amendments Depoliticize the Judiciary
A. Depoliticized Presidential Selection
Long, Single 8-Year Term (VI.A):
The President, as Head of State, does not run for reelection.
This removes the temptation to nominate judges who will energize the base or help win swing states.
No re-election = less short-term political calculation in judicial appointments.
Indirect Election by State-Legislature-Appointed Electors (VI.B):
By taking the popular vote out of the presidential selection, the process insulates the President from the whims of mass political sentiment, interest groups, and campaign donors.
Result: A more politically insulated President with a longer time horizon and stronger focus on institutional integrity.
B. Senate Chosen by State Legislatures, Serving Long Terms (XII)
Senators are chosen by state legislatures, not popular vote.
Nine-year staggered terms, with 1/3 replaced every 3 years.
Result:
Senators are less beholden to public pressure or interest groups.
They are incentivized to act as institutional stewards rather than partisan actors.
Judicial confirmations by this Senate would likely be less ideological and more deliberative.
C. Judicial Appointments Controlled by the Head of State (VI.E.3, XV)
The Head of State appoints all judges, subject to Senate confirmation.
Again, the Head of State cannot seek re-election, and is politically insulated by the method of election and length of term.
Result: Judges are nominated by a non-partisan, long-term focused executive, rather than one focused on short-term partisan gains.
The proposals:
VI. The Head of State
A. The President of the United States shall be the head of state of the United States. He shall hold his office during one term of eight years.
B. The President shall be elected, as follows:
1. The Legislature of each state shall appoint a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
2. The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States.
4. No person except a natural born citizen shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.
5. The President shall not be a member of Congress or of the legislature of any state nor shall the President hold any other office of profit or trust of the United States or any of the several states for a period of five years before his election.
C. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.
D. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
E. Duties of the President of the United States
1. The President shall designate the principal officer who shall execute the laws of the United States and appoint the other principal officers of the executive departments on the basis of a majority of the House of Representatives with the exception of the officers charged with the administration of justice.
2. The President shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations, exonerations and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
3. The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint judges of the Supreme and inferior Courts and councilors of the Constitutional Council.
4. The President shall, on the recommendation of the Head of Government, appoint ambassadors who shall serve as representative of the United States. Ambassadors may be removed from office by the Head of Government.
5. The President shall bear the title of commander in chief of the defense forces of the United States, and of the organized militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States. The command of the defense forces shall be exercised by the Head of Government.
6. The President may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper.
7. The President shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers and heads of state.
8. The President shall commission all the officers of the United States.
9. The President shall recognize individuals or groups for extraordinary achievement and acts of bravery and heroism.
F. The President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors, or other behavior that renders them unfit for office.
G. Whenever the President transmits to the Head of Government his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the President of the Senate as Acting President.
H. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the President of the Senate until a new President is chosen.
XII. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of three Senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for terms of nine years, with a power reserved to a two-thirds majority of each legislature to recall its Senators, or any of them.
Except in trials of impeachment, each state shall cast one vote in the Senate, to be determined by the majority of its Senators. In the event the Senators fail to agree, the vote of that state shall not be counted. In trials of impeachment, each Senator shall have one vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided equally into three classes, each class composed of one member of each state delegation so that one third may be chosen every third year; and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.
XV. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court consisting of nine judges and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
The judges of the Supreme Court shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint the Attorney General for the United States. The Attorney General shall hold their office during one term of ten years.
The Attorney General shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Attorneys for the United States for any district for which a Judge having criminal jurisdiction shall have been provided by law. They shall hold their offices for a term of eight years, eligible to succeed in office for one additional term of office.
The Attorney General and all appointed Attorneys of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors, or other behavior that renders them unfit for office.
I note that the appointment of AG is a disconcerting trend that would move the judicial actions in the US toward the horrible system of juridical supremacy that abuses the elected government of Israel.
The concern that judicial nomination of the Attorney General would create “juridical supremacy” misunderstands both the structure of the proposal and the actual sources of judicial overreach.
Under this proposal, the Supreme Court’s role is limited to nominating the Attorney General, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The judiciary does not appoint unilaterally; it proposes a candidate who must pass through a politically accountable Senate, composed of state-legislature-selected Senators with long terms designed to foster deliberation, not partisanship.
In contrast, juridical supremacy refers to situations where courts override the other branches with no external check. Here, the judiciary has no power to enforce laws, control prosecutions, or dictate legislative policy. It merely nominates one key officer in a limited capacity.
Crucially, the Attorney General serves a fixed 10-year term and is not subject to removal by the judiciary—or by the President or Head of Government. The only removal mechanism is impeachment for cause, as with other officers.
This fixed term does two things:
• It prevents the judiciary from exerting ongoing influence over the Attorney General after appointment.
• It also protects the AG from executive political pressure, ensuring that law enforcement decisions are grounded in legal principle, not partisan expedience.
Far from creating judicial supremacy, this structure creates a constitutional firewall between prosecutors and political actors—including judges.
Currently, the President controls the DOJ and selects the Attorney General. This centralizes both political power and law enforcement authority in one person—an arrangement more conducive to tyranny than judicial nomination.
By assigning the nomination of the Attorney General to the Supreme Court—an institution designed to uphold legal norms and constitutional fidelity—we shield prosecutorial discretion from political interference.
Critics of Israel’s system often refer to a judiciary that can:
• Strike down basic laws,
• Override elected officials’ appointments,
• Impose policy preferences directly through constitutional interpretation.
None of that exists here
In this proposal, the judiciary:
• Does not make laws,
• Cannot override legislation by decree,
• Cannot remove officials unilaterally, and
• Is not self-perpetuating, since judges are still nominated by the Head of State and confirmed by the Senate.
Moreover, juridical supremacy arises when the judiciary becomes both policymaker and final authority. In contrast, this proposal constrains judicial authority to its proper domain—interpreting the law—and simply entrust it with one nomination, to ensure the rule of law, not the rule of men.
Far from enabling judicial overreach, the Supreme Court’s role in nominating the Attorney General under this proposal enhances the integrity and neutrality of federal law enforcement. It introduces institutional checks against politicization, not judicial supremacy. Unlike Israel’s critics fear, this is not a power grab by judges—it is a structural safeguard against the concentration of executive power, fully consistent with constitutional separation of powers.
TL:DR but skimmed a bit. Too complicated, plus never happening
"They are incentivized to act as institutional stewards rather than partisan actors."
Not the 19th century experience at all.
And in the 19th century, the 17th Amendment did not exist.
Right, that's my point. Your proposal calls for a modified return to legislature election but you expect a different result, its naive, not supported by our experience.
By your own admission—"not the 19th century experience at all"—you acknowledge that legislative selection of senators produced different incentives than direct election. That's precisely the point: the structure influences the behavior. The proposed changes deliberately restructure multiple institutions, not just revert to the 19th century. The 19th century had legislative selection without the supporting architecture needed to reduce politicization. I am proposing a comprehensive redesign.
Together, this structure creates a constitutional environment in which senators are less responsive to national party dynamics, the head of state is insulated from political ambition, and the judiciary is nominated and confirmed through institutions designed to resist short-term partisan pressure.
Interesting developments with Trump’s second-term judicial nominations—definitely a slower pace than his first term. It’ll be worth watching how the current vacancies and senior status decisions play out. On a different note, if you're looking for info on facilities like FCI Dublin (https://prisonsinformation.com/fci-dublin/), it's a key part of the federal system with its own unique role and history.