Supreme Court Nukes Universal Injunctions (UPDATED)

Justice Barrett writes for the Court's majority that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable power of federal courts.

in a major decision this morning, the Supreme Court has put the kibosh on the growing practice of issuing universal injunctions. In a 6-3 decision by Justice Amy Coney Barrett (the former civil procedure professor, natch), the Court grants the Trump Administration's request to narrow the injunction in Trump v. CASA (the Birthright Citizenship case). [Note, however, the opinion says nothing about the merits of the Trump Administration's position on birthright citizenship.]

The Court split on ideological lines. .Justice Thomas concurred (joined by Justice Gorsuch); Justice Alito concurred (joined by Justice Thomas), Justice Kavanaugh concurred. Justice Sotomayor dissented (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson), and Jackson wrote a separate dissent (to which the majority replies quite forcefully).
a dissenting opinion.

Justice Barrett's decision for the Court begins:

The United States has filed three emergency applications challenging the scope of a federal court's authority to enjoin Government officials from enforcing an executive order. Traditionally, courts issued injunctions prohibiting executive officials from enforcing a challenged law or policy only against the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. The injunctions before us today reflect a more recent development: district courts asserting the power to prohibit enforcement of a law or policy against anyone. These injunctions—known as "universal injunctions"—likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts.1 We therefore grant the Government's applications to partially stay the injunctions entered below.

Justice Barrett explains the core of the rationale:

The Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its argument regarding the scope of relief. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009) (holding that for a stay application to be granted, the applicant must make "'a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits'"). A universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such power.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 endowed federal courts with jurisdiction over "all suits . . . in equity," §11, 1 Stat. 78, and still today, this statute "is what authorizes the federal courts to issue equitable remedies," S. Bray & E. Sherwin, Remedies 442 (4th ed. 2024). Though flexible, this equitable authority is not freewheeling. We have held that the statutory grant encompasses only those sorts of equitable remedies "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at our country's inception. . . . We must therefore ask whether universal injunctions are sufficiently "analogous" to the relief issued "'by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act.'" . . .

The answer is no: Neither the universal injunction nor any analogous form of relief was available in the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the founding.
Equity offered a mechanism for the Crown "to secure justice where it would not be secured by the ordinary and existing processes of law."

The opinion closes, explaining the relief offered:

Some say that the universal injunction "give[s] the Judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch." Trump, 585 U. S., at 720 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (citing S.Amdur & D. Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 49, 51, 54 (2017); S. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum, 56, 57, 60–62 (2017)). But federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch; they resolve cases and controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given them. When a court concludes that the Executive Branch has acted unlawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power, too.

The Government's applications to partially stay the preliminary injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. The lower courts shall move expeditiously to ensure that, with respect to each plaintiff, the injunctions comport with this rule and otherwise comply with principles of equity. The injunctions are also stayed to the extent that they prohibit executive agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about the Executive's plans to implement the Executive Order. Consistent with the Solicitor General's representation, §2 of the Executive Order shall not take effect until 30 days after the date of this opinion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 55.

Check back to the blog for more on this important case, including how it jibes with theories that Justice Barrett is drifting or lacks "courage."

Comments

[Judge Magney]

A 6-4 decision? That would be quite the surprise.

[John F. Carr]

A few people, including Learned Hand and the Solicitor General, have been called the "tenth justice" of the Supreme Court.

[Glaucomatose]

Someone explain to me how the next Democratic president could be effectively stopped by the courts from issuing an executive order banning private ownership of semiautomatic rifles.

Of course it's nakedly unconstitutional, and every single person who challenges it will win. But then the next person who has their guns seized will have to hire a lawyer to challenge it as well. And the next person. And the next. And so on, for ten million individual plaintiffs. And if any cases actually get appealed and make it up to the Supreme Court, the government can just go on following the Supreme Court's decision as to the named plaintiffs only, and then make anyone else have to hire a lawyer and sue the government when the government claims their case is distinguishable on nakedly specious grounds.

[MollyGodiva]

The point is there won't be a next Democratic president. Trump can now order that only pre-selected people can vote and the courts can not do anything about it.

[Bob from Ohio]

Worse, he can order all Democrats executed and the courts can not do anything about it.

I suggest you immediately flee the country.

[Stupid Government Tricks]

Yes, better safe AND sorry than dead and heroic.

[John 4]

You’re an absolute dork.

[agarrett]

Would the obvious answer of putting together a class action suffice?

That does require more work up front, and also agreement and supervision from the courts - but again, I think this is rather the point.

[Alkali]

The difficulty is that the class action can't protect people who are not seeking to exercise the right now but may do so in the future (including, but not limited, people not yet born or who are otherwise unable to exercise the right in question).

In theory you could imagine defining a class to include the whole universe but at that point we are just back to universal injunctions.

[JHR]

Rule 23 specifically allows for injunctive classes. But as a practical matter, one the Supreme Court has ruled, even in a case with just a single plaintiff, the question is settled nationwide. If executive agents take your guns after that, you can just sue them for damages and hold them individually liable.

[Glaucomatose]

one the Supreme Court has ruled, even in a case with just a single plaintiff, the question is settled nationwide.

Not really, no, as again, the government can argue, nakedly in bad faith, that any future plaintiff is distinguishable from that Supreme Court decision. Again, the government will lose each time, but so what? Only people with lawyers and the wherewithal (and time) to file a federal complaint and obtain an injunction will be able to get the benefit of that Supreme Court decision.

Keep in mind that this is specifically the circumstance here, where the Court in Wong Kim Ark made clear that birthright citizenship applies to anyone other than the children of diplomatic ministers, people in territories occupied by invading armies, and native tribes on tribal lands, but the Trump administration issued an executive order saying otherwise. Every district court has found that the government doesn't have a leg to stand on, but that executive order will now still go into effect for every child it purports to apply to, unless those children (or the states they reside in, which will only happen in blue states) get lawyers and sue.

[M L]

LOL. No, this isn't the circumstance here, by any stretch of the imagination.

Your initial question is a good one, but you followed right up with an illustration of why perhaps 600 unelected, buckwild judges all having individual veto power over the President isn't a good idea.

[Glaucomatose]

Explain.

[M L]

First, if you read the discussion of those who drafted and adopted the citizenship clause, they clearly intended to exclude anyone subject to a foreign power, such as temporary visitors (even those temporarily visiting from a quasi-foreign Indian tribe within U.S. territory to other parts of the U.S.). Second, assuming for the sake of argument that Wong Kim Ark was correctly decided, it does not apply to temporary visitors or those not legally domiciled in the country.

[Glaucomatose]

Every single court that has looked at this question has said you’re wrong.

[David Nieporent]

Again, the Wong Kim Ark court explicitly traced the concept of birthright citizenship back centuries and found exactly the opposite. It's bad enough to cherrypick a couple of random phrases from the Congressional record to try to claim that the drafters of the 14th amendment "really" meant something entirely different and esoteric, and therefore conclude that the WKA court got its decision wrong. It's another to just lie about what WKA said.

[QuantumBoxCat]

If a Democrat wins the presidency in 2028 conservative legal scholars will start churning out law review articles and think pieces narrowing the scope of this decision. The arguments in those articles pop-up in federal court opinions and then ultimately make their way to the conservative justices on the Court.

[Rossami]

The next president will be stopped from enforcing unconstitutional executive orders by the class action lawsuits filed against them - the process that should have been followed in the first place.

Class action lawsuits will achieve the same result in meritorious cases but have considerable additional safeguards and procedures which (when they're done right, at leat) weed out the non-meritorious cases.

[Josh R]

At first, it baffled me as to why SCOTUS took this case to address universal injunctions. But, now I understand. They wanted the doctrine to not permit a universal injunction even when we have 128 years of nationwide settled law in support of the injunction. That is, unlike in many other instances where SCOTUS narrowly addresses issues, they took this case to establish a maximalist doctrine.

Sotomayor's dissent on why universal injunctions are appropriate for such solidly settled law is far more persuasive.

[Riva]

128 years of settled law? Hmm..not exactly. "The universal injunction was conspicuously nonexistent for most of our Nation’s history." Where was it hiding? Maybe this explains it. "That this Court had no occasion to reject the universal injunction as inconsistent with traditional equity practice merely demonstrates that no party even bothered to ask for such a sweeping remedy—because no court would have entertained the request. Cf. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 332 (“[E]quitable powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence”)."

[Josh R]

The 128 years refers to birthright citizenship, not nationwide injunctions.

[Riva]

In that case, we can simplify the response. There is no settled law with respect to according birthright citizenship for the children of illegals or other itinerants. Or I should say, the law is only settled that the children of permanently residing legal residents are entitled to citizenship under the 14th amendment. And even that sloppy precedent should be re-examined.

[Josh R]

There has been 128 years of uninterrupted decisions that disagree with your interpretation. To me, that should justify a nationwide injunction (while of course, the case can be made to SCOTUS that those decisions were wrong). But under today's decision, that does not suffice.

[Riva]

Uh huh. Where are those controlling decisions hiding? With the universal injunction case law?

[M L]

No, there has not. Broad universal birthright citizenship began as an administrative practice in the 60-70s and the court has never ruled on it with respect to, for instance, illegal immigration or temporary visitors.

[David Nieporent]

It ruled on it directly in WKA.

[Josh R]

We didn't have broad universal birthright citizenship (except for the exceptions noted in Wong) between Wong and the 60s?

[MollyGodiva]

Jackson said it right.

"The Court’s decision to permit the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not yet sued is an existential threat to the rule of law."

"Do remember: The Executive has not asked this Court to determine whether Executive Order No. 14160 complies with the Constitution. Rather, it has come to us seeking the right to continue enforcing that order regardless—i.e., even though six courts have now said the order is likely un-constitutional."

[MaddogEngineer]

She did not. This is just the Demi Moore "I strenuously object!" standard from A Few Good Men for allowing national injunctions. Which are still not authorized by law or rules of procedure.

Jackson's tantrum is pretending there is a merits decision before the merits are even argued.

[Glaucomatose]

There has been a merits decision - in fact, there have been a bunch of them. The government hasn't even bothered challenging any of them.

[MaddogEngineer]

Where exactly? THIS case was not on the merits of the citizenship EO (which I oppose as unlawful and unconstitutional). How can the Supreme Court decide something not argued before it on this case?

[Glaucomatose]

See 763 F. Supp. 3d 723 (Md. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–1153 (CA4); 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142 (WD Wash. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–807 (CA9); Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266 (Mass. 2025), appeal pending, No. 25–1170 (CA1).

[MaddogEngineer]

That's not what I asked. I did not deny there might be merit decisions elsewhere. None of those cases are this case, and the merits question was not the one SCOTUS accepted. The Court does not typically go around plucking cases out of the district courts on its own initiative to correct constitutional wrongs.

Sure, they could have decided, after oral arguments, to expand the case and ask for additional briefing on the merits. They did not do that. So you're complaint is not with this decision today, it is with their prior decision to limit the question to universal injunctions (irrespective of the underlying merits question).

[Glaucomatose]

That's literally the point: the government knows it will lose on the merits and so hasn't bothered appealing any of its losses on the merits. But it has, in fact, lost on the merits every single time a court has looked at it - and yet is still going to be able to act illegally, for every individual (at least in a red state) who doesn't have the resources to get a lawyer and challenge the result.

[MollyGodiva]

This Court does go around plucking cases out of the district courts on its own initiative to crate constitutional wrongs

[MaddogEngineer]

*or equity, I guess I should have included

[Riva]

That's some first class calm measured legal reasoning there. Although leftist agitators are normally a calm and restrained group, it is still very wise to tone down the rhetoric like that. Thanks Justice Jackson.

[tylertusta]

"The Court’s decision to permit the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not yet sued is an existential threat to the rule of law."

"Therefore, Courts should make up whatever rules they need to in order to do whatever they feel is necessary to protect the rule of judges. Judiciary Uber Alles."

I think ACB's response aptly answers the pitfall in Jackson's thinking:

We will not dwell on JUSTICE JACKSON’s argument, which is at odds with more than two centuries’ worth of precedent, not to mention the Constitution itself. We observe only this: JUSTICE JACKSON decries an imperial Executive while embracing an imperial Judiciary.

[MaddogEngineer]

To save the rule of law from an existential threat, we have to commit an existential threat to the rule of law.

[tylertusta]

Indeed.

I'm glad SCOTUS is (finally) stepping in to end the nonsense lest the independent judiciary declare its independence from the nation itself.

[David Nieporent]

An injunction telling a party to a case that it can't do something because that thing is illegal/unconstitutional is not a threat to the rule of law, existential or otherwise.

[KenveeB]

I enjoyed that quote of ACB's, along with "Justice Jackson would do well to heed her own admonition: 'Everyone, from the President on down, is bound by law.' That goes for judges too."

Advocating that judges should just not pay any attention to silly little things like jurisdiction or authority when they really really think it's a bad case is completely against the entire purpose of the judiciary.

[Darth Buckeye]

Waiting for a District Court judge to issue an injunction against SCOTUS to stop action on this decision. Oh, wait ...

[MaddogEngineer]

ACB also nuked KBJ's dissent, along with a gratuitous and deserved slap at district courts more generally obstructing the executive branch.

Obviously this still will not satisfy Blackman, even with the chief delivering 6 votes on this (and giving the opinion to the CivPro academic).

[John F. Carr]

Thomas writes, concurring, that plaintiffs might not be able to get complete relief.

Courts therefore err insofar as they treat complete relief as a mandate. Some judges have read our precedents to suggest that courts should provide plaintiffs whatever remedy is necessary to give them complete relief.

He refers with approval to the majority's characterization of the government's argument, which the majority expressly declined to adopt:

After all, to say that a court can award complete relief is not to say that it should do so. Complete relief is not a guarantee—it is the maximum a court can provide.

[thenotoriousrbg]

what's up with that? why would the Court not grant a remedy that ensures complete relief if it can?

[John F. Carr]

An injunction is supposed to be an exercise of discretion that might balance competing factors. I remember a case in Massachusetts. A law directed a state agency to sell some land. The agency did not. A prospective buyer sued for an injunction. The trial judge declined to order the state to sell the land. Affirmed on appeal. Even when the statute is mandatory an injunction is an exercise of discretion. I forget whether the judge's reasoning was convincing to me.

I think Thomas may doubt that the states' interest is substantial, if they have standing at all. On one hand, some number of dollars in federal funding unless Congress changes the formula. On the other hand, the states want to order around a large number of federal officials.

I would say the states lack prudential standing. There are plaintiffs who clearly have standing and bring a more developed set of facts. The government did not appeal preliminary relief granted to individual plaintiffs.

[Widmerpool]

Universal injunctions have long been the subject of complaints by politicians and jurists of both ideological perspectives, for perfectly obvious reasons. Obama complained. Biden complained. Trump complains. Executive action which has a reasonable basis is thwarted nationwide by forum shopping. Something had to change. Throwing out ridiculous hypotheticals is unhelpful.

[OpinionsVary]

Stripping millions of their citizenship is as close to a "ridiculous hypothetical" as you can get, except its real.

[Widmerpool]

Trump's executive order is not retroactive.

[OpinionsVary]

Trump has no constitutional authority to grant citizenship by execrative fiat. If those people don't have citizenship by the US constitution (or law) and Trump is arguing the US constitution doesn't give that grant, they don't have that citizenship. Trump could pretend they do (executive discretion and all that) but it wouldn't grant those people citizenship.

The question is: if those people covered by 'no retroactive' don't meet the US constitution's test for citizenship where are they getting their citizenship from?

[David Nieporent]

Trump's executive order is not retroactive.

To the extent is valid — it's not, of course — it's inherently retroactive. Either the constitution and federal law grant citizenship to children of H1Bs and illegals, or the constitution and federal law do not grant citizenship to children of H1Bs and illegals. If the constitution and federal law do, then the EO itself is simply illegal. If the constitution and federal law do not, then the children of H1Bs and illegals aren't citizens, regardless of when they were born.

Trump has no power to confer citizenship on those born before his EO any more than he has the power to take it away from those born after.

[Widmerpool]

Thanks - I stand corrected.

[M L]

No, David is wrong, and biased by his political preferences. He wants to make this reasonable change to citizenship policy out to be an unworkable impossibility, because he knows that the Trump EO actually has a good originalist argument.

Those born here previously have been treated by the government as citizens in every way, granted citizenship documents and privileges and so on, ostensibly granting citizenship. Citizenship does not cease except by expatriation or revocation upon certain crimes. This may come as a shock, but different government officials and politicians often have differing, varied, and changing interpretations and applications of the law. Sometimes when a statute isn't clear, they might be entitled to multiple of those different interpretations and applications. Otherwise, if one interpretation is ultimately deemed correct, such a determination does not automatically retroactively nullify all of the prior actions taken according to a different interpretation, especially when reliance interests are considered.

[David Nieporent]

Those born here previously have been treated by the government as citizens in every way, granted citizenship documents and privileges and so on, ostensibly granting citizenship.

Estoppel doesn't run against the government. (There have been numerous individual cases over the years — never giant classes of millions of people, but that's irrelevant to the point — where people thought they were citizens, acted as if they were citizens, were treated as if they were citizens, and then the government learned some fact that meant they were not, and the courts uniformly agreed that they were not.)

Citizenship does not cease except by expatriation or revocation upon certain crimes.

Agreed. But if Trump's interpretation of the 14A is valid — if it's not, his order is null with respect to everyone — then these people were never citizens, so their citizenship is not "ceasing." It was void ab initio.

[John F. Carr]

As I recall it's not explicitly prospective or retroactive. The federal government can and sometimes does decide that a person previously considered to be a citizen is not a citizen. If Trump's order is upheld as to some class of people the administration can revoke passports issued to members of that class.

[Glaucomatose]

So what will restrain executive action that doesn't have a reasonable basis?

[Widmerpool]

For one thing, the practical desirability of such an action. See the example above re EO outlawing assault rifles. Would anyone but the most crazed gun control advocate have advised Biden, say, to take such a step? Also - read ACB's criticism of the KBJ dissent for the problems inherent in your approach.

[Glaucomatose]

Your counter here is quite literally that there is no legal means to stop an unreasonable executive, because the executive will always be reasonable. And this, again, is in the context of a case where the President signed an executive order openly denying the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment to millions of people without any legal or constitutional basis.

[Widmerpool]

You really need to grapple seriously with the limits of judicial authority. You sound like KBJ. Again, read ACB's discussion.

[Glaucomatose]

I did read ACB's discussion. It basically says that's not her problem.

[gVOR08]

Is someone going to publish an online Green Book listing where in the country it’s safe for birthright citizens to travel and where it’s not?

[Josh R]

Not yet. The EO won't go into effect for 30 days. In the meantime it is possible a universal injunction will be issued in order to give complete relief to a state plaintiff.

[David Nieporent]

I assume someone is going to rush to file a class action at this point.

[jb]

At least superficially, both the Massachusetts District Court and the First Circuit have already ruled that the states need a universal injunction for complete relief. I'd be very surprised if they find differently upon taking another look.

[Lee Moore]

But as with most questions of law, the policy pros and cons are beside the point.

Amy's best line.

Sufficiently short and snappy that it might be worth her getting some T shirts printed.

[MollyGodiva]

"But as with most questions of law, the policy pros and cons are beside the point."

They took the opposite approach with the immunity decision.

[David Nieporent]

+1,000.

[WHODINI]

It's also nonsense when you read literally any other of these right wing grievance opinions. Establishment clause? Never heard of it.

[Lee Moore]

I imagine Prof Bray is having a quiet smile and a quiet glass of sherry.

[bye]

Well, my comment history is there to see. I knew from the Amici Curiae that Trump had it in the bag. Birthright Citizenship called forth the hubris of all liberals and Reason readers and they said "naaah, can't possibly, the text is so clear"

CASA v. Trump (the Birthright Citizenship case)

Here is the amicus curiae that predicts this
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A884/357774/20250505153711401_CCJ%20Amicus%20Brief%20Final%20rev1.pdf

[David Nieporent]

Um, not only is everything in that brief garbage, but it has nothing to do with today's decision.

[bye]

Anyone who commented on the amicus curiae I cited to predict this win, was abusive. But I am right
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A884/357774/20250505153711401_CCJ%20Amicus%20Brief%20Final%20rev1.pdf

This was a slam dunk , they had to decide this way

[bye]

the issue
the Court decides is whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal
courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions

BIG FAT UNDENIABLE SCREAMING : NOOOOOO!!!!!

[Sarcastr0]

"No one disputes that the Executive has a duty to follow the law. But the Judiciary does not have unbridled authority to enforce this obligation - in fact, sometimes the law prohibits the Judiciary from doing so.”

What a time to dive into departmentalism.

Imagine if this had come up during the student loan thing…oh wait it did. And the commentariat here were all making up exceptions to mootness and standing.

[LexAquilia]

I hope one day the forum commenters will earn your respect!

That's so important to everyone here.

[WHODINI]

So, because a Court in England, that we fought a war to escape, did a thing, we are all now bound by it? This "orginalism" is such nonsense. Any practitioners should simply be called "resultists" because that's all it is. I like result A, so I found one city council meeting in 1777 where Ephraim Jesohafat IV signed a law banning women talking. As Logan Roy said, I love this county, but we are not serious people.

[MollyGodiva]

When SCOTUS can't find precedent to support their position in US law, they go back to pre-US law. It makes zero sense. There is no reason why the US now should in any way be bound by British law of the mid 1700s.

[tylertusta]

There is no reason why the US now should in any way be bound by British law of the mid 1700s

American legal tradition stems from English Common Law. The divergence from English law happened during the American Revolution because, among the many violations committed by the British, colonists were not treated like Englishmen should have been treated in the courts.

So, yes, we regularly apply old English Common Law from before the Revolution in our courts.

[MollyGodiva]

What is the point of having a revolution against injustice laws if you are still bound by I just laws?

[tylertusta]

Because the laws we revolted against we didn't keep. We kept the good ones.

[MollyGodiva]

Up until 10 am this morning we did not keep the one in question either. Does it makes sense to apply a British 1700s law to today when it was not for the last 200 years?

[M L]

Do you think it's a good idea for 600 unelected judges to have veto power over the President? If so, pass a law to make it so. You're not bound.

[Sarcastr0]

ML continues to pretend the 14A just doesn’t exist.

[LexAquilia]

I'm so glad they stole 2020, Trump 2.0 is awesome!

[LexAquilia]

Comrade King President-Unelect Boasburg and not guilty most affected.

[wvattorney13]

Tough day for the left at SCOTUS. Probably want to think about court packing again--but that's only good policy when a Dem is in office.

ETA: Barrett seems to have found her lost conservative card.

[tylertusta]

They're increasingly unhinged about politics; it's all about immediate gratification with no serious examination of the long game for them these days.

The first order of business for a Dem trifecta is ending the filibuster. If they manage that, the second order of business is packing the courts.

[Glaucomatose]

"It's all about immediate gratification with no serious examination of the long game for them these days."

You really don't think there's any matter on which conservatives will want to be able to get a universal injunction against a future Democratic president?

[tylertusta]

I think there are plenty of things, but for all of those hypothetical future universal injunctions that I'm thinking about, none of them are affected one iota by today's decision.

Today's opinion is a lot more limited than most reporting lets on.

[Glaucomatose]

What’s the limit you’re referring to?

[tylertusta]

Today's decision was about district courts' equitable powers and issuing universal injunctions based solely on those powers.

The majority explicitly stated that does not cover universal injunctions based on the Administrative Procedures Act, and the ruling does not cover universal injunctions for class actions.

Left undecided was whether states can get universal injunctions.

[Lee Moore]

"Tough day for the left at SCOTUS."

Really ? The left won three, the right won three. With six alleged conservatives on the court, to three liberals, I should have thought 3-3 would count as a champagne day for the left.

[The Turtle Dove]

Nukes indeed, or at least goes ballistic. And leaves much unclear, while jumbling the arguments at the center. (Not that I agree with the Great Dissenter either. "Both your houses," as Mercutio says.)

Here's the quagmire at the center of the court's reasoning. The historical analogy to Chancery powers at founding is itself a creation of common law, and the Court's own decisions. It asks what might cabin the inherent powers of a federal court, and looks to 18th c. paradigms to answer that. (If I can use a Souter line to paraphrase Scalia's explanation.)

Unlike the "Congress shall make no law"-type amendments, this question isn't looking to define the words in a specific constitutional proscription. The specific words that it interprets are those of the 1789 statute, and (here's the nub of the gist), this is talking about jurisdiction over the claim, not the remedies available.

The 2A jurisprudence legitimately looks to historical practice to answer the question of what the grant of power and the proscriptions actually in the constitution mean. But to shift the calculus of the balance of power between the branches to debates about empirical historical practices, to allow those facts rather than ideas about law and reasoned liberty to control the debate, basically just points at the statues in the park and tells people to be more like them, to do as they did, and the Republic will be preserved. Perhaps we should make bigger statues. T'would embiggen us.

There are good arguments against the practice of nationwide nonparty preliminary relief, and they probably have the better part of the argument. If I were designing a judicial mind to make that so, I might have said that equity implies a balancing, and that balancing of policy impacts in matters of preliminary relief (a nation of hundreds of millions and immense interests versus however many names can fit in the caption) should always balance the actual policy costs versus the interests of the movants directly before the court. Since shutting down a continental givernment is a larger matter than giving a few plaintiffs liminal relief (the interests of non-parties not being considered in matters of preliminary relief), the policy is presumptively legal, until the case has played out, and a decision is reached, though the court should ensure that those parties to the action are able to play out the case and make the claim.

Instead, to say that the magic bestowing hand of powers and capacities that descended from a cloud at the precise instant of ratification by the people in the states was incapable of bestowing any power not already existing in the British chancery system reaches beyond legal fiction to legal Gothic fantasy. The limit is regulative, not constitutive. As Alito points out, there are constituional limits on what Congrss could empower the courts to do, and if you read the Grupo Mexicano Scalia/Ginsburg debate, you see that inherent powers were never cabined by statutory grant; both conceded that it was at least possible that there was daylight between the two. There are three types of power and corresponding limitation here: inherent, statutory, and constituional. Reducing this complexity to the terms of the statute commits the entirely characteristic error of the present jurisprudence.

It would have been much better for the court to have discussed the ideas at issue. There are many old thoughts percolating on this issue, not least of which is that equity is unavailable when there is a remedy in law. (This decision is precisely the opposite of that central principle of equity: that there is no remedy in equity unless there is a remedy in law.) The ideas of the past, not the imitation of the past, should govern. We need leaders, not guides.

Mr. D.