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Does the Big, Beautiful Bill Contain a Threat to Judicial Independence? (Updated)
Is it a problem if a provision requires judges to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
The New York Times reports on an ominous provision in the House passed "Big Beautiful Bill" through which Republicans are trying to "weaken federal judges." From the story:
The sprawling domestic policy bill Republicans pushed through the House on Thursday would limit the power of federal judges to hold people in contempt, potentially shielding President Trump and members of his administration from the consequences of violating court orders. . . .
The language in the House-passed bill would block federal judges from enforcing their contempt citations if they had not previously ordered a bond, a provision that Republicans said was intended to discourage frivolous lawsuits by requiring a financial stake from those suing. . . .
Democrats have argued that House Republicans' measure would rob courts of their power by stripping away any consequences for officials who ignore judges' rulings. They also noted that the measure would effectively shield the Trump administration from constitutional challenges by making it prohibitively expensive to sue.
"We've never said to American citizens and constituents that in order to vindicate their rights in federal court, they're going to be required to provide a security when their constitutional rights have been violated by their government," Representative Joe Neguse, Democrat of Colorado, said.
Curious, I looked up the relevant provision in the House-passed bill. It reads:
No court of the United States may use appropriated funds to enforce a contempt citation for failure to comply with an injunction or temporary restraining order if no security was given when the injunction or order was issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), whether issued prior to, on, or subsequent to the date of enactment of this section.
So the issue, then, is what is required by FRCP Rule 65(c). It provides:
The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. The United States, its officers, and its agencies are not required to give security.
So it would seem that Rule 65(c) already requires security to be given before such orders issue, subject to the judge's discretion as to what constitutes a "proper" amount.
This has become an issue because many judges use this discretion to set the security amount at zero. From the story:
The amount is supposed to be set at what "the court considers proper" to cover any costs that might be suffered if that injunction is later found to have been incorrectly issued. But federal judges have wide discretion to set their bonds, and often refrain from doing so.
Samuel L. Bray, a Notre Dame law professor, said many judges do not order injunction bonds in cases where people are seeking to stop government actions that they claim are unconstitutional.
"It doesn't wind up getting used as much as it's supposed to," he said, "and it especially doesn't wind up getting used when people sue the federal government."
I'll defer to Prof. Bray on this point, but it seems to me that the common practice of waiving any security is contrary to the rule as written. After all, if the rule were intended to give judges the discretion to set the security amount at zero, might it have been drafted to make requiring security at all a matter of judicial discretion? That is, giving judges discretion to set an amount is not the same thing as giving judges the discretion as to whether to require security at all.
In any event, this may all be moot as it is not clear that this provision will survive the Senate. Among other things, it is not clear how this provision is sufficiently budget-related for a reconciliation bill, but we will see.
UPDATE: It's a good thing I said I'd defer to Prof. Bray, as he was ahead of me in flagging this provision, and notes that it does more than I suggest. Indeed, in a post at Divided Argument he suggests the provision is "underinclusive, overinclusive, and likely unconstitutional." Going forward, judges could effectively evade its requirements by setting the security required at $1. But since the provision is also retroactive, it could blow up all sorts of federal court injunctions on the books (as in school desegregation orders or antitrust remedies). And, most significantly, he suggests the provision "is probably unconstitutional as an attempt to interfere with the inherent power of a court of equity to enforce its decrees with contempt." Duly noted.
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How much of a bond should I have to put up to enjoin unconstitutional executive branch conduct?
Since the United States will lose the war if the military is enjoined from acting based on your constitutional objection, let's say a trillion dollars to start. The inspiration for my hypothetical is Schlesinger v. Holtzman (plaintiff got court order to stop bombing Cambodia). Obviously you think your challenge is meritorious and you got a judge to go along. That does not mean the final decision will be in your favor. The bond is in case you were wrong. You could instead ask for a prompt declaratory judgment or a permanent injunction, which does not require the same bond.
There was a case in Indiana state court where the plaintiffs lost after they could not post a $1.9 billion bond.
You can sue and await final judgement.
But if you seek an Injunction the law saw you have to post bond to recover the costs of incurred from the Injunction.
Congress set the injunction requirements, and nobody is above the law.
So if the government arbitrarily jails people for saying mean things about Donald Trump, those people should either sit in jail waiting for a final decision, or have to put up a bond equal to the government's costs if they want to get a court to order their release pending trial?
That's not what an injunction is.
People always have a right to bond or habeas.
This is only talking about civil suits, not criminal prosecution.
Fair enough, I could have been more precise. If the government announces it is going to arrest someone for saying something mean about Donald Trump and orders them to appear for imprisonment, that person should either sit in jail waiting for a final decision, or have to put up a bond equal to the government's costs if they want to get a court to order their release pending trial?
If you are arrested on charges of lèse majesté that's a criminal case. If you are held on criminal charges you can ask for bail. Bail is the kind of bond you don't like in cases of injunctions. It is common for an innocent person to be held in jail awaiting trial because he doesn't have enough money.
My state is more generous than most in this situation. We don't have bail bondsmen. You post 10% of a comparatively low total and if you show up for trial you get it back less a $25 processing fee. In many states you pay 10% of a ridiculous amount as a nonrefundable fee. And this is all routine. I think it is often unjust, but it is also routine.
Sure, but take an example that's actually happened: a number of student visa holders have sued for and obtained injunctions blocking the Trump administration from canceling their visas, detaining and deporting them for anything from saying bad things about Israel to having an old traffic violation. Under this rule, these people would have to post costs to avoid cancellation of their visa, arrest, detainment (likely in Louisiana), and possibly deportation to God knows where.
Why does Louisiana make a difference?
Kazinski, federal habeas corpus proceedings (including those seeking relief from deportation) are civil in nature. Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(4) specifies that:
Are you an injured party; do you have standing ?
Freedom is not free; excessive litigation is a cost we all pay for.
It's not freedom if you have to pay protection money to avoid your constitutional rights getting trampled.
Worth noting: the government is specifically excluded from having to post any such bond--regardless of the "costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained".
No man should be the judge in his own case, but being the legislator in his own case is not materially better...
What if they set the bond at one dollar?
If no bond is not proper, its hard to see how $1 makes it more proper.
And if it isn't "proper" then it wasn't issued persuant to the regulation.
only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
The interesting words are :
(a) "the court considers"
(b) "proper"
(c) "the costs and damages sustained"
(a) means the court gets a bit of discretion
(b) proper is not a synonym for sufficient, but I don't know what it means here
(c) tethers the court's discretion to a particular thing
It's difficult to see that $1 could ever pass muster. Zero might if the court reasonably considers that there aren't going to be any costs or damages. But $1 - not plausible.
It looks to me as if the courts have been ignoring the tether to the costs and damages, and reading as if it simply said :
"only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper"
ie total discretion.
But "the court considers proper" controls the whole thing. It isn't what a reasonable person would consider proper or what IS proper. The whole ball game rests on what the court considers proper. So if that is $0 or $1 or $1 trillion, then it seems that the phrase gives the court total discretion.
Otherwise the phrase would have said "reasonable" or "proper" security.
I disagree. “The court considers” obviously grants the court some discretion as to the amount which would be proper to meet the specified costs.
But it doesn’t knock out the rest of the provision. If the court’s consideration is manifestly unreasonable, it is exceeding its power.
If you found a similar clause in a contract - eg that a tenant may incur such costs as he thinks proper to deal with a hole in the roof, and recover from the landlord- if the tenant decides to instal a golden dome on the roof, the courts are going to limit his recovery to what a normal roof repair would have cost. The tenants opinion on proper expenditure gets some deference but is not controlling.
"...in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
The rule doesn't say the amount has to be sufficient to pay such costs (although that would be one possible way to measure what is "proper" in a given situation).
It is an interesting question, what amount would be "proper", when a court knows that a government has essentially "reserved the right" to contemn the same court...
It is an interesting question, what amount would be "proper", when a court knows that a government has essentially "reserved the right" to contemn the same court...
Difficult to see that this has anything to do with "what is proper to pay the costs and damages" etc. Whether a party is willing to sass the court has zip to do with their costs. And "proper" certainly doesn't mean feel free to indulge your pique.
Thinking about it a bit more the likeliest meaning of "proper" seems to me to refer to the reasonableness of the costs, and whether the party seeking damages is partly responsible for those damages. Using the word "sufficient" instead of "proper" might suggest that the court can't discount the security for possibly excessive costs and damages for which the defendant might be partly responsible.
'SEC. 70302. RESTRICTION OF FUNDS.' seems reasonable, but what is the cost of disrupting both personal freedom and operation of government ? The latter is for the former and both can, and do, transgress on each other.
Today's climate of responsibility is a continuation of events which has been built over generations of work to where turning to the courts is misplaced in trying to resolve disputes.
This bill is an Enabling Act.
The first of many, perhaps.
We should all applaud it with an appropriate "MAGA salute".
All I remember is demonically furious Afghans looking at Biden's Pride flags on the American Embassy.
Biden admin. grants 'blanket authorization' to fly Pride flag at embassies
The move overturns the Trump administration's effective ban on Pride flags.
I would think that asking for relief for only yourself would result in a rather small bond. Asking for relief for thousands or millions of others (read national injunction) might be a bit more pricey. But the lawsuits seeking national relief are generally financed by those with some means, so perhaps the pricey nature in not unfair.
Looks like the update says that Rule 65(c) was unconstitutional all along. At least that appears to be the implication. Because all the new act is saying is that Congress refuses to pay for enforcement of contempt orders where Rule 65(c) was violated, and if Rule 65(c) isn't unconstitutional, those injunctions were illegal to begin with.
But the Constitution is quite explicit that, "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law;" and that seems pretty definite. So I'm pretty sure Congress can refuse to fund absolutely anything, regardless of a judge's ruling, save maybe payment of a debt Congress authorized.
I do not think this is a hill the judiciary should chose to die on.
Agree. I also question Baude’s comment that such a provision would be unconstitutional as a restriction on a court of equities authority to enforce its decrees by contempt. The only inherent authority of the court is to pass judgment. Even it’s authority to independently prosecute contempt in the FRCP is enabled by a Congressional delegation of authority in the Rule Enabling Act. By that same logic, if Congress zeroed out the judiciary’s budget, could the judiciary rule that unconstitutional and issue an injunction ordering funding on the basis that cutting off funding inherently interferes with a courts ability to exercise it’s equitable powers?
Again, not necessarily endorsing this a policy. But I worry sometimes lawyers get too caught in their own bubble where they can rationalize a world where the legislative and executive branch strip the judiciary of equitable power and they think the judiciary in any way wins that power struggle. It’s one thing for the executive to ignore judicial contempt in normal course of business; its very different for the executive to ignore a judicial contempt finding if Congress divested the judiciary of that power by statute and the judiciary itself tries to ignore that divestiture by claiming any attempt to remove it’s power as unconstitutional. I mean seriously does any lawyer see that political battle ending well for the judiciary?
"Looks like the update says that Rule 65(c) was unconstitutional all along. At least that appears to be the implication."
No, Brett, the update doesn't say that at all. I realize that reasoned legal analysis is foreign to you, but a good rule of thumb is: first, take your head out from up your ass.
At least I provided my reasoning. Apparently you can't be bothered.
The new law is just saying that there can't be any expenditures to enforce contempt of orders violating Rule 65(c). And since the Constitution is quite adamant that no money can be paid out of the treasury except pursuant to Congressional appropriations, that would appear to settle the matter.
The only bit of wiggle room apparent would be a claim that Rule 65(c) itself is unconstitutional. If so, took a long while for anybody to notice...
I haven't researched the question, but contempt power is inherent in the judicial branch. For Congress to limit enforcement of judicial contempt orders would pose significant separation of powers problems.
It may also pose a problem with the petition clause of the First Amendment. The right of access to the agencies and courts to be heard is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972), see also, Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
In the specific context of habeas corpus, there could also be problems under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), SCOTUS ruled that Iowa statutes that required an indigent prisoner of the State to pay a filing fee before his application for a writ of habeas corpus ($4) or the allowance of his appeal ($3) in such proceedings will be docketed in a state court denied him the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "We hold that to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws." Id., at 709.
I don’t think your equal protection thing flies. The plaintiff doesn’t have to pay to sue, he has to put up security iff he wants a preliminary injunction, before his suit is heard.
Anyway I’m intrigued by the idea that inferior courts which the constitution says explicitly are creations of Congress, can have “inherent powers” that persist even if Congress says they shall not.
"I don’t think your equal protection thing flies. The plaintiff doesn’t have to pay to sue, he has to put up security iff [sic]he wants a preliminary injunction, before his suit is heard."
Uh, no. Federal Rule 65(c) doesn't mean that at all. A plaintiff has to pay a filing fee, prepayment of which may be wived upon an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Rule 65(c) comes into play only if and when the District Court issues a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order upon the plaintiff's application.
No. Rule 65(c) comes into play BEFORE the judge issues a preliminary injunction or TRO because the judge’s power to issue such things is expressly conditioned on the movant giving the requisite security.
“Yo, Mr Movant, I’m toying with granting your application. The security I require is $10,000. OK with you ?”
If the movant declines the offer the judge has no power to issue the injunction. That’s what “only if” means.
But the movant can decline the security and still continue to the merits on his suit, without getting a preliminary injunction. He still gets his day in court. He just does without an injunction in the meantime.
No, District Courts do not bargain with litigants regarding the bond requirement or the amount thereof.
However you want to slice it, if the movant declines to pony up the security the judge requires, the judge has no power to issue the injunction. The security is a necessary precondition for the injunction.
No. Although I can see how one could read Rule 65 that way, that's not how it has ever been implemented. It's not "You want an injunction? Okay, put up a $10,000 bond and I'll issue it." The order to pay the bond (if any) is part of the same order as the injunction. "Defendant is ordered to do [or not to do] X, Y, and Z. Plaintiff is ordered to pay a $10,000 bond."
Well I have limited interest in past practice, if past practice doesn’t comply with the actual law.
I don’t believe the text of the law permits the judge to order the movant to pay anything, before the movant has heard the judges demand.
The text merely forbids the judge from issuing the injunction unless the movant provides the security that the judge specifies.
No litigant would move to get a TRO or preliminary injunction if that ipso facto committed them to an open ended financial liability.
Yes, but my understanding is that until the bond is posted, the injunction is not in effect. So until the ordered bond is posted, you can't move for contempt for a violation.
Why? You don't (I assume) think Congress can say, "Courts cannot acquit defendants," right? Because that's an inherent power of a court; that Congress created it does not give Congress authority to tell it how to decide a case. If Congress could do that, the thing wouldn’t be a court at all; it might have some of the trappings of a court, but wouldn't functionally be one.
1. If Congress creates something that isn't a court at all, within the constitutional meaning of "court' (or "tribunal") then .... it's not a court at all. Consequently it has no inherent authority to do anything. But if Congress creates something that does fall within that meaning - it has the powers that Congress gives it. Limited only by express constitutional limitations - eg the good behavior thing for judges.
Strange that you should understand this point so clearly for Article II, while missing it for Article III.
2. As to what a "court" or "tribunal" might be, within the constitutional text, who can say ? But there are lots of different sorts of courts around the world, which the locals think are courts, but which operate under somewhat different rules to US courts. As to declining to "acquit" defendants - would you say the Scottish courts are not courts because they can bring in verdicts of "not proven" ?
I don't doubt that the courts have and will continue to invent all sorts of inherent powers for themselves. But the constitution leaves all that to Congress. If Congress goes so far away from the constitutional notion of a court that its creation is not a court, then .... it's not a court.
I haven't researched the question, but contempt power is inherent in the judicial branch. For Congress to limit enforcement of judicial contempt orders would pose significant separation of powers problems.
Contempt requires a valid injunction that has been violated. Under Rule 65(c) and this bill, until there is security, there is no injunction.
Even inferior courts have the power to interpret and enforce federal statutes and the United States Constitution. Stripping them of the power to make and enforce orders requiring compliance with these laws for litigants who can’t pony up millions of dollars to enjoin illegal actions by well heeled and governmental defendants would seem to raise separation of powers issues, regardless of what Jim Jordan thinks.