Reasonable to Deny Pseudonymity to Plaintiff Who Seeks to Conceal That She Has Epilepsy

So holds the Eleventh Circuit.

From today's Eleventh Circuit opinion in Tessa G. v. Secretary, decided by Judges Adalberto Jordan, Robert Luck, and Embry Kidd:

In June 2023, Tessa G. filed a pro se complaint against HHS, her former employer, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, illegal disclosure under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and deprivation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. In support of her complaint, Tessa G. explained that she has suffered from several disabilities, including epilepsy, for most of her life. Following surgical intervention that abated her seizures, she earned her law degree and began working with HHS in June 2013.

About a year into her tenure with HHS, Tessa G. disclosed her epilepsy diagnosis to request medical leave and inform her supervisor that she required an accommodation to be driven to any off-site meetings. Soon thereafter, HHS hired someone to replace Tessa G., gave her limited work to complete, and ultimately terminated her in November 2014. Tessa G. asserted that she found it difficult to find new employment and that she gained several new health conditions after her firing.

Tessa G. further explained that, shortly after her termination, she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complaint against HHS, challenging her demotion and termination, and alleging that HHS disparaged her to others in her field. Although an administrative law judge ultimately entered default judgment in her favor, her recovery was limited due to the nature of her fixed-term contract with HHS, so she brought the instant case to pursue further relief.

Tessa G. also sought pseudonymity, but the lower court said no, and the Eleventh Circuit upheld that decision:

In reviewing such an order [denying pseudonymity], we apply the abuse of discretion standard. "A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." …

As a general rule, "parties to a lawsuit must identify themselves in their respective pleadings." "This rule serves more than administrative convenience. It protects the public's legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties." … Nevertheless, "[a] party may proceed anonymously … by showing that [s]he has a substantial privacy  right  which  outweighs  the  customary  and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings."

Tessa G.'s arguments … regarding epilepsy's social stigma and intimate nature are largely based on the assertion that her diagnosis is sufficiently similar to conditions for which courts have previously granted anonymity. In Francis, we noted that the "utmost intimacy" standard had previously been applied to cases involving abortion, prayer, and personal religious beliefs. However, we noted that district courts have denied requests to proceed anonymously in cases involving sexual assault, "even when revealing the plaintiff's identity may cause her to suffer some personal embarrassment." In Frank, we held that the stigma attached to the disclosure of a plaintiff's alcoholism was insufficient to overcome the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. We noted that parties have been permitted to proceed anonymously in cases involving mental illness, homosexuality, and transgender status due to the social stigma associated with those disclosures.

We have never held that epilepsy carries such a stigma, and we are not now persuaded that having epilepsy status is sufficiently sensitive to warrant anonymity. In fact, Tessa G. concedes in her brief that she is unaware of any cases "expressly address[ing] whether one's epilepsy status is information of the 'utmost intimacy'—or directly assess[ing] whether the stigma surrounding epilepsy specifically justifies anonymity," so she attempted to relate epilepsy to HIV and mental illness. However, HIV, to which Tessa G. repeatedly draws comparison, differs significantly from epilepsy, as it is a communicable disease, is significantly more likely to be fatal, and can be associated with stigmatized statuses for which courts have permitted parties to proceed anonymously.

Tessa G. also contends that her diagnosis is of the utmost intimacy because it constitutes medical information, disclosure of her epilepsy resulted in discrimination, and further public dissemination of this information would result in more discrimination. However, disability discrimination suits regularly involve personal medical information and an allegation that the disclosure of that information subjected the plaintiff to discrimination. Indeed, as both the magistrate judge and district judge noted when denying Tessa G.'s motion, courts are aware of the sensitive information that a plaintiff must disclose to pursue these cases, so they regularly allow for redaction or sealed filings so that a litigant's privacy may be protected.

We further find that the district court properly evaluated the totality of the circumstances in reaching the conclusion that anonymity was not warranted in Tessa G.'s case. The court not only explicitly weighed the [various] factors we have identified as relevant to such an analysis, but as outlined above, it also considered the alleged social stigma associated with epilepsy and Tessa G.'s right to privacy in her medical information….

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as it did not apply the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner when concluding that Tessa G.'s interests in anonymity did not outweigh the requirements of Rule 10(a) and the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings….

Melaine A. Williams represents the government.