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Third Circuit: No Establishment Clause Violation in School Lessons on Islam
From Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams, decided yesterday by the Third Circuit (Judge Thomas Hardiman, joined by Judge Arianna Freeman):
During the 2016–2017 school year, C.H. was a seventh-grade student at Chatham Middle School. He was enrolled in a mandatory World Cultures and Geography class taught in part by long-term substitute Christine Jakowski. The class canvassed world regions to help students "gain a greater sense of the world around them" and "become active and informed global citizens." Many resources for the class, such as "calendars, handouts, assignment and project directions, and grading guidelines," were located on Google Classroom.
The class was organized into seven units, six of which focused on a different region of the world. Within each of these units, students explored the history and culture of the highlighted region, which sometimes included studying its predominant religion. During the Latin America unit, students learned about Christianity. And in the East Asia unit, students viewed PowerPoint slides and videos about Buddhism and Hinduism. The curriculum implemented state standards, including that students will be able to "[c]ompare and contrast the tenets of various world religions."
Students encountered Islam during two class periods within the "Middle East and North Africa" (MENA) unit, both taught by Ms. Jakowski. The first lesson was presented through a set of PowerPoint slides entitled "Teaching Critical Thinking[:] Making Generalizations with Content." That presentation instructed students that "[a] generalization is a broad, universal statement of understanding based on specific facts and data" and cautioned that "[s]ome are valid" and "others are invalid or faulty." To test students' understanding, the final slide directed them to identify generalizations in a hyperlinked YouTube video and to label them either "valid or faulty."
That five-minute video, entitled "Intro to Islam," contains images and written text. Instead of a voiceover, the video features background music and Arabic chants. The first half of the video alternates between quotations from the Quran and a series of questions and answers about Islam, including:
- "What is Islam?" "Faith of divine guidance for Humanity, based on peace, spirituality and the oneness of God."
- "Who is Allah?" "Allah is the one God who created the heavens and the earth, who has no equal and is all powerful."
- "Who is Muhammad (S)?" "Muhammad (Peace be upon him) is the last & final Messenger of God. God gave him the Noble Quran."
- "What is the Noble Quran?" "Divine revelation sent to Muhammad (S) last Prophet of Allah. A Perfect guide for Humanity."
- "What does history say about Islam?" "Muslims created a tradition of unsurpassable splendor, scientific thought and timeless art."
After about two minutes, the video turns to a discussion of "Islamic Art and Architecture," as well as other Muslim contributions to society. Finally, text on the last substantive slide reads "May God help us all find the true faith, Islam … Ameen."
The second class in the MENA unit introduced students to "the 5 Pillars of Faith" and the "impact/significance of them in the Muslim culture." This lesson included a different PowerPoint presentation, entitled "Introduction to Islam." The slides gave students a broad overview of Islam, including: the symbol of Islam; key figures in Islam; the Quran; demographic statistics about Muslims; and a summary of the Five Pillars of Islam. The slides also included a hyperlink to a YouTube video entitled "The 5 Pillars of Islam."
"The 5 Pillars of Islam" is an animated cartoon. The video features a conversation between two children, a non-Muslim named Alex and a Muslim named Yusuf. Curious, Alex asks Yusuf a series of questions about Islam. Yusuf responds by explaining that "Muslims believe that there is only one God," whose name is "Allah" and who "is the creator of everything." After describing the Five Pillars, Yusuf invites Alex to join him in prayer. The video closes by providing an email address and a website through which viewers can "organise a mosque tour, or order an information pack."
At the end of the second lesson, students completed a "Scavenger Notes Activity," a worksheet instructing them to "[t]ake notes using the slides" and to "[f]ill in the blanks AND correct the false information" scattered throughout. One section of the worksheet read as follows:
Pillar 1: Belief/Faith (Shahadah)
The basic statement of the Islamic faith:
"There is no god but _______ and _______ is his messenger."
This statement is the centrifugal force to their religion.
Although Ms. Jakowski presented both sets of PowerPoint slides to the students, she did not show either video in class or explicitly instruct the students to view them. C.H. nonetheless watched the "Intro to Islam" and "5 Pillars" videos at home with his mother, Libby Hilsenrath. Concerned about the MENA curriculum, Hilsenrath emailed administrators and aired her complaints at a school board meeting in February 2017. At a later meeting, the Board defended its curriculum as a proper application of the school's policy on religion in the classroom. But citing "disruption," the school ultimately removed the video links from the MENA unit PowerPoint slides.…
Hilsenrath sued, "claiming that the school's MENA curriculum violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." No, said the Third Circuit:
[In recent decisions], the Court "instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings." This kind of historical inquiry "requires serious work." And that work is especially challenging here because "free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted." But "[h]istorical tradition can be established by analogical reasoning," and history teaches that established churches often bore certain "telling traits":
First, the government exerted control over the doctrine and personnel of the established church. Second, the government mandated attendance in the established church and punished people for failing to participate. Third, the government punished dissenting churches and individuals for their religious exercise. Fourth, the government restricted political participation by dissenters. Fifth, the government provided financial support for the established church, often in a way that preferred the established denomination over other churches. And sixth, the government used the established church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving the established church a monopoly over a specific function….
Hilsenrath first argues that the Board coerced her son into religious practice when it subjected him to "direct proselytizing." … But not all school activities touching on religion amount to "formal religious exercise." … [W]e must look at the whole record to discern the "proper context" in which an ostensibly religious activity took place. For example, while a teacher might recite the Ten Commandments as an act of worship, she could also use them to introduce students to the fundamental tenets of a major world religion. Context is key.
The record here shows that the Board did not proselytize. Even assuming students were compelled to watch the "Intro to Islam" and "5 Pillars" videos—a point which the parties dispute—they did so "as part of a secular program of education." The videos were embedded in PowerPoint slides entitled "Introduction to Islam" and "Making Generalizations with Content," which were presented during two sessions of a year-long class that also covered Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. In short, the MENA lesson was "integrated into the school curriculum" as part of "an appropriate study of history, civilization," and "comparative religion." …
[T]he Board assigned videos to help students "understand what a generalization is and the benefits and consequences of using them" and to "explore the 5 Pillars of Faith and be able to explain the impact/significance of them in the Muslim culture." Because the "Intro to Islam" and "5 Pillars" videos were presented in an academic rather than devotional context, they do "not come close to crossing any line" separating permissible curricular materials from impermissible proselytization….
Hilsenrath next argues that, even if the Board did not coerce students or otherwise proselytize, its curriculum still matches a hallmark of religious establishment because it favors Islam over other faiths. But even assuming the Establishment Clause requires equal treatment in primary and secondary school curricula, the record does not show favoritism here. Besides Islam, C.H. and his classmates were introduced to Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. And the World Cultures and Geography course represented only a sampling of the expansive world religions curriculum offered at the School District of the Chathams. As early as kindergarten, students learn about religious holidays such as Hanukkah and Christmas. That instruction continues through high school, when students analyze, among other things, "the doctrinal disputes … that fueled the Protestant Reformation."
Hilsenrath counters that, unlike the instruction on other religions, the MENA lesson "extol[led] Islam over all other faiths and encourage[d] conversion to the religion." This argument once again ignores context. It is true that the creator of the Intro to Islam video described Allah as "the one God" and Islam as "the true faith." But the videos were embedded within PowerPoint slides that refer to Muslims exclusively in the third person, repeatedly describing what "Muslims believe." The "Introduction to Islam" worksheet did the same, detailing Muslim beliefs and practices only from the perspective of a nonbeliever….
The United States of America is not Sparta, where children were considered wards of the state. Parents are the first and most important teachers of their children. But once children enter public school, the curriculum is dictated by local government policy, typically by an elected school board. That local arena is the proper place for debate and discussion about curricular matters. Our role as a federal court is limited to upholding constitutional rights. So we express no opinion about the propriety of the curriculum at issue, except to hold that it does not bear any of the hallmarks of religious establishment….
Judge Peter Phipps concurred in the judgment:
This Establishment Clause challenge comes at a time when the "one-size-fits-all test" from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) has been emphatically rejected, and there is no longer any lurking constitutional mandate of secularism in governmental affairs. To fill the jurisprudential void occasioned by Lemon's demise, the Majority Opinion uses a 'hallmarks' test: whether the challenged action bears any characteristics historically associated with an established church.
That approach has the salutary feature of being grounded in this nation's history and tradition, but I posit that history and tradition are more effective as exegetical tools for construing the text and structure of the Constitution than as freestanding constitutional norms. In addition, the use of the hallmarks test by the Majority Opinion leaves at least two critical questions unanswered: (i) whether governmental action that offends only one of the hallmarks is sufficient for an Establishment Clause violation, or whether the hallmarks should be considered in the aggregate; and (ii) if one or more of the hallmarks of an established church are present, whether that is dispositive of an Establishment Clause violation, or whether the government can justify its offending practice as comporting with history and tradition.
In my view, a hallmarks test applied to states through incorporation is not needed to conclude that the materials about Islam assigned to seventh-grade students at Chatham Middle School do not establish a religion. Instead, all that is needed is a recognition that teaching on matters of religion or even encouraging religious belief or practice in public school does not constitute a "law respecting an establishment of religion." Indeed, one of the other organic documents of the United States, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, encouraged the teaching of religion in schools: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Thus, with the lifting of the constitutional mandate of secularism, teaching about religious matters in a public school does not violate the Establishment Clause. For that reason, the instructional materials about Islamic beliefs, practices, and modes of worship do not offend that constitutional provision, and I respectfully concur in the judgment….
Ruby Kumar-Thompson (Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri & Jacobs) represents the school defendants.
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There has been a long history of plaintiffs using establishment clause arguments to selectively attack religions they don’t like by claiming the government establishes those religions. For example, the ACLU repeatedly attacked pictures of Jesus, but never attacked pictures of ancestors revered in ancestor-worshiping religions, or various other judicial practices (architecture resembling temples and churches, clregy-like robes, etc.) inherited from pre-Christian times when judges were priests.
Now it seems these Christian plaintiffs are adopting the practice, selectively attacking teaching about religions they particularly don’t like while leaving everything else in place.
They are effectively asking the courts to establish their religious preferences.
The fact that the module on Islam seems to stand out particularly to them compared to others doesn’t mean it would do so to a neutral, impartial observer not looking at things through the lens of religiously motivated bias.
Agreed, the decision seems correct to me.
The simple way to understand this is that it's fine to teach Greek mythology and include the belief that the seasons are caused by Persephone spending half the year in the underworld.
What's not fine is teaching that the seasons are actually caused by Persephone spending half the year in the underworld.
Apply the above to the tenets of whichever religion you chose.
So it’s necessary to say “The Greeks believed” in every single sentence? If a litigant finds a sentence without one, it’s open season for the litigant to present it as teaching the religion as fact?
Will every sentence really be enough? I mean some sentences can run awhile. And we are dealing with litigants with EXTREMELY short attention spans.
I wouldn't believe that such petty formalism is necessary. I think a court could determine how the tenor of the class was taken by a reasonable person and use that as a guide.
Of course, as in everything, to insulate yourself from an accusation of religious teaching, you would throw a few "X group believed" in there probably more than you would if you were discussing a different topic.
On the flip side, I don't think you can get away with preaching a Christian sermon simply by qualifying each statement with "Christians believe."
Is that the law now? The government can encourage religious belief and practice as long as it does not punish dissenters or subsidize a particular church? It would seem that the next step would be for the state, as an exercise in sound pedagogy, to devote to each religion an amount of time and energy proportional to that religion's historical importance in America, i.e., the government would teach about and encourage belief in Christianity, with an occasional nod to Judaism.
That's what bothered me about the lesson as presented -- instead of saying "Muslims believe", it was presented as fact.
But if the module on Christianity does the same thing, assuming everyone understands they are teaching about what Christians believe without prefacing every sentence with “Christians believe,” then these plaintiffs are asking the Court to establish Christianity by knocking out the Islam module and leaving the Christianity module, with identical “defects,” in place.
The Court cannot, if it wishes to keep its oath to uphold the Constitution, take the bait. It cannot look exclusively at the Islam module without comparing it to the others. If the modules are similar from a neutral point of view, then this lawsuit is itself nothing more than an attempt to establish religion. These plaintiffs would have to attack either all the modues or none of them. Not having done so, they have to lose.
But do there need to be any other modules? The court doesn’t include that in its analysis of what “establishment”means. Presumably a school could teach English history and not Chinese, so not only one religion?
Totally irrelevant ro this case. In this case, there are other modules. When a Christian plaintiff selectively attacks only the module on Islam for issues identical to ones in the module on Christianity, the plaintiff is simply using the courts to establish Christianity.
It’s exactly like saying “no shirt, no, shoes, no service” to only black people when all the white people are being served shirtless and shoeless.
Legal analysis usually involves not just saying the outcome of a particular case, but determining which facts were essential and which irrelevant to the decision. How essential are the other modules to this opinion? Can the school just do a unit as Christianity, as being the most important religion in American culture and history and the largest in the world, teach about Christianity, and urge the importance of religious belief, so long at the government doesn't punish dissenters, give money to churches etc.?
What if it were just Christianity and Judaism? Are there any Constitutional rules for determining which religions are included?
I think it could. But I do believe that the fact in this case that other religions were included is relevant evidence that the purpose was not the promotion of religious belief. I think in any case that should be the ultimate test.
No, it is not the U.S. government's, but Christianity's obligation to provide instruction to its adherents concerning "...being the most important religion in American culture and history and the largest in the world, teach about Christianity, and urge the importance of religious belief."
In the public school course at issue here, it certainly seems appropriate, not to "urge the importance of religious belief," but to teach the impact of Christianity's 2.3 billion, Islam's 1.8 billion, and Hinduism's 1.2 billion followers on the history, development and current societal norms of their countries and world regions, while also incorporating important influences of other religions (i.e., Buddhism, Judaism plus others, with extra curriculum emphasis per their local presence and impact).
Do you agree?
You don't believe that non-Christians and society in general should have a historical understanding about how Christianity has shaped and continues to shape world and U.S. history? And as part of that lesson be taught what Christianity is?
And suppose that there was limited time so we couldn't get into Buddhism and others. Wouldn't teaching of Christianity be paramount in Western society?
The standard criticism of my comments (often justified) is that I tend to write way too may words...but you wanted me to include more? OK.
1) My "...teach the impact of Christianity's 2.3 billion...followers on the history, development and current societal norms of their countries and world regions" certainly seems to cover your "a historical understanding about how Christianity has shaped and continues to shape world and U.S. history?"...no? And inherently includes teaching basics of what Christianity is. Same with the other religions covered.
2) Curriculum development (my BSc is "Occupational Education," which turned out to be surprisingly useful in my professional Information Security & Privacy consulting career) always includes balances and tradeoffs—you can never cover everything, otherwise one could just create the one big universal course, teach only it to all, and we'd all be done with education!
But as I understand the course in question, I said "...extra curriculum emphasis per [a religion's] local presence and impact" would be a decision-making factor in the relative amount of instruction devoted to all incorporated topics. And that decision could result in either more or less detailed coverage of an already better known locally predominant religion.
Glad I could help you that. Any other questions?
"It’s exactly like saying “no shirt, no, shoes, no service” to only black people when all the white people are being served shirtless and shoeless."
Does saying “no shirt, no, shoes, no service” mean that if if walk in wearing only a shirt and shoes that they have to serve me? You didn't say "no pants, no service".
No, it actually said "Muslims believe." Did you read the decision?
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1974), The Supreme Court upheld secular courses about religion.
It seems to me that these plaintiffs could well be biased in claiming that the content about Islam represents proselytizing but the content about Christianity is not. They might perhaps, for example, be inclined to regard ANY discussion of Islam to be proselytizing, but not to regard discussion of Christianity that way. By simply not complaining about the module on Christianity, they ignore that the same argument, if applied equaly to Christianity, could also be said to encourage Christian belief and practice.
So it seems to me that these plaintiffs’ claims cannot be taken at face value. The two modules have to be evaluated by people who do not have an interest in preferring one over the other. As the Supreme Court said in Schempp, simply teaching about the tenants of world religions as part of general education is not proselytizing. In this sense, “proselytizing” gets a secular definintion, applicable across the board.
The plaintiffs could argue they have a Free Exercise right not to have their children exposed to content about particular religions. Mahmoud v. Taylor may decide that question in their favor. But they have no Establishment Clause right to argue the state can’t teach about religions they don’t like at all. They can’t skirt the Constitution’s neutrality requirement by personal hypersensitivity, being especially offended by religions they dislike but not by religions they like. Nor can they force their will and their religious preferences on the State by using a legal strategem of complaining that teaching about religions they dislike is “proselytizing” while simply not complaining about religions they like.
The courts are not a free-ranging battlefield where litigants seek justice for all. Hilsenrath claims injury from the course material on Islam, but is under no obligation to also press claims about the Christian course material if that material doesn't also cause her injury.
The rules of the business plainly require wearing a Size 34 pink silk tuxedo or the police will be called on you for trespassing. All the customers present are white and they are all wearing jeans. A black person comes in, wearing a Size 35 pink silk tuxedo. The police are promptly called and the business owner presses charges.
All good? Rules are rules? Courts are not free ranging battlefields entitled to look beyond the litigants? The business owner is perfectly free to claim injury from and press charges concerning black people not following the rules, but is under absolutely no obligation to also press claims about white people not following the rules if white people not following the rules don’t cause the business owner any injury?
Really?
Case or controversy, Reader. A plaintiff who alleges that a defendant's behavior doesn't injure them except to offend their sense of fair play will not find sympathy in court.
If your poor parking scratches my car I can sue you for that, but I can't sue you on behalf of the other drivers in that lot who you also dinged.
In the example, the business owner may not have a claim against the white patrons. But the black person DEFINITELY has a defense against the trespassing charge.
Same here. The school district absolutely has a defense against the plaintiff’s claims. When plaintiifs are selectively offended by some races or religions but not others, anyone they sue over it, including the school district here, can simply point that out and has a complete defense.
No, that's not anything resembling law.
I'm not understanding the analogy. In your example, the business owner is clearly ejecting the black patron because of his race and using the clothing as a pretext.
Likewise, the plaintiffs in this case are upset over the portrayal of Islam. They aren't hiding that fact. You are complaining that they also are not complaining about the portrayal of Christianity, but as was said, that doesn't particularly bother them, so they don't care.
Your analogy doesn't work. There is no pretext here.
It works perfectly. The plaintiffs here are offended by Islam but not by Christianity.
The school district has a complete defense against the lawsuit that’s similar to the complete defense the black person has gainst the business owner who is offended only when black people violate the rules. When people selectively enforce nominally general rules against some religions but not others, they are engaged in religious discrimination, same as the business owner in my hypothetical was engaged in racial discrimination.
The defendents in both cases need only point that out, and the plaintiffs in both cases lose.
No. The plaintiffs are not "selectively enforcing" rules; they're not enforcing rules at all. And no law requires the plaintiffs not to discriminate anyway.
The plaintiffs are claiming the class materials violate the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause is a rule.
In general discrimination laws require the plaintiffs not to discriminate. But here I’m not relying on them.
Let’s take a more extreme case, where the plaintiffs seek to prevent the school from teaching about any religion other than their own by means of selective lawsuits. Suppose they file one Establishment Clause lawsuit after another to stop teaching of each religion until only their own is taught.
My argument is that the Establishment Clause itself would prohibit the court from allowing plaintiffs to manipulate it into establishing their religion by means of selective strategic Establishment clause lawsuits resulting in court orders prohibiting teaching any other. A court ordering a school to teach about one religion and one religion only would violate the Establishment Clause. And that’s true independently of all the objections you and others raise - whether plaintiffs have a duty or not to bring such a lawsuit, whether plaintiffs have standing or not, all those other issues become irrelevant. I don’t care squat about the plaintiffs. The concern is the powers of a court.
The establishment clause prohibits COURTS from issuing orders telling schools they can only teach about certain religions and they can’t teach about others. They don’t have the power to issue such orders. They are prohibited by the Establishmnet Clause from issuing them. It’s that simple.
That means that when plaintiffs file a lawsuit seeking such an order, they can’t get the relief they seek. And that’s true independently, in turn, means they lose their case.
That makes no sense. You are claiming that a defendant who harms a plaintiff can escape liability for that harm by pointing to the fact that he has committed other tortious acts which have harmed other plaintiffs but not this particular one. Have I got it right?
Your position, as is so often the case, is based on your ideas about what the law should be rather than what they are. And it's mistaken about how it works. The court's order in such a case would not "tell[] schools they can only teach about certain religions and they can’t teach about others." The court's order in such a case would tell them that they can't teach about X. It would not make any statement about any other topic that they could or could not teach.
That's simply not the case. The black person is guilty of trespass (assuming he refused to leave when asked). The business owner is likely also be guilty of civil rights law violations, but that doesn't give the black defendant the right to self help trespass.
The black person can leave and then sue the business for violations of public accommodations laws, not stand defiantly on another's property.
In any event, that has no relevance to this case. Your claim is that the plaintiffs are somehow disingenuous for not also complaining about the Christian classes. Why would they when they don't claim any harm from them? Perhaps some other person could sue over the Christian classes, but not this plaintiff. It would be sanctionable for these plaintiffs to claim an injury from the Christian classes when they, well, aren't claiming any such injury. Do they have to pretend to be harmed?
No, the courts cannot enforce the tresspass laws in such a situation, if it’s clear that this is what the business owner is doing. It would be discriminatory selective enforcement. The charges would have to be dismissed.
It would not be. The government would be enforcing the laws against everyone about whom a claim is brought, no selectivity at all.
They would not, in fact, have to be. No matter how adamantly you say it.
There's at least one case exactly on point. It's been a while and I'm not certain about a court record because the case was settled, but it received substantial publicity at the time.
A Washington DC family sued a restaurant after being denied service because their teenage son was wearing baggy shorts, a team jersey, and sneakers, which violated the restaurant's documented dress code.
The family was Black, and presented pictures they and others took the same and other days, showing at least four parties included teenagers wearing the same teenage uniform of the day—shorts/jersey/sneakers—seated and apparently enjoying their meal. I'll leave the racial composition of those other parties as an exercise to the student.
The restaurant settled for a substantial sum, and an enforceable legal agreement to revise their dress code and train all their employees to apply it equally and consistently to all potential customers.
A case on point would be the fictional one where Rosa Parks loses her lawsuit because she didn't also complain that white people were forced to ride in the front of the bus.
The analogies are completely inapt.
Your analogy is inapt. The correct, relevant analogy would be for the bus company to have a rule equally prohibiting anyone from riding in the front of the bus, but enforce that rule only against black people, never enforcing against white people. The bus company’s failure to also complain about white people would indeed be discriminatory. If it attempts to claim that because it isnmt offended by white people sitting in front of the bus, it wouldn’t have standing if it attempted to enforce the rule against white people, would not get it very far.
This is the type of situation Purple Martin, and I, are talking about.
Your analogy is inapt. The correct, relevant analogy would be for the bus company to have a rule prohibiting anyone from riding in front of the bus, but enforce that rule only against black people, never enforcing against white people. The bus company’s failure to also complain about white people would indeed be discrimatory.
This is the type of situation Purple Martin, and I, are talking about.
Purple,
Reader's assertion was that the plaintiff Hilsenrath should lose because she only claimed injury from her son being taught about Islam, and not from being taught about Christianity.
In the case you reference the plaintiff was the Black family. Should they have lost because they failed to make a claim about someone else's injury or some action by the restaurant that didn't harm them?
Agreed. She couldn't make any allegation of harm. She would have to admit that she agrees with the Christian teaching but allege that some other person could potentially be harmed if they did not subscribe to Christianity. That is textbook no standing.
The issue isn’t whether the plaintiffs have standing. The issue is whether the defendants have a defense.
You defend against allegations that are made. Not some hypothetical other allegation that could have been made.
It’s a complete defense against the allegations that are made. This woman has no standing. The government teaching religion doesn’t offend her at all. She has no problem at all with it. Only the government teaching religions age doesn’t like offends her. If she wins, government would still be teaching religion. Her grevience has nothing to do with that.
In fact her “injury” has nothing at all to do with the government or its conduct. The government teaching religion in school doesn’t jnjure her. Her injury is caused solely by her objection to Islam, and has nothing to do with any government establishment of religion. Her dislike of Islam is simply not an injury that can be redressed by courts.
If she actually objected to schools teaching religion or proselytizing, THEN courts could redress it. But she has no such objection. She merely objects to a particular religion on sectarian grounds. Such objectikns are none of the courts’ business. She has not suffered an injury redressable by courts and has no standing to sue.
This is not correct legal analysis. She objects that the Islam course teaching offend her and violate the establishment of religion. If she is right (and the Third Circuit says she is not) then she has shown that she suffered an injury in fact that is fully redressable by the court entering an order enjoining the Islam class or forcing it to change. Period.
You take another step not relevant to the litigation. You complain that she has only selected the Islam class as violative of the establishment clause when, according to you, the other religion classes should violate the establishment clause as well based on her theory. That's legally unrecognizable. She is not required to assert the interests of other potential plaintiffs who may be offended by the other religious courses. She is not required to assert her own interests if she herself is offended by the other religious courses.
The Plaintiff is the master of her complaint. No principle of law stands for your proposition that unless she addresses all potential causes of action she may have in a single complaint or many complaints that it makes other complaints deficient. She can pick and choose.
This is really pretty basic law and your protestations otherwise have no basis in law.
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
The facts, if true, provide a good example of what world cultures class should look like. Learning the overview of major religions, and finding the differences between them, is an essential part of world history. As a Japanese student, we had to learn not just the world religions, but also different schools of Buddhism - I assume American students learn in school different denominations of Protestantism.
I do believe separation of church and state is important - but the plaintiff's claim here is questionable at best.
I assume American students learn in school different denominations of Protestantism.
It starts and ends with "All Christians are Catholic."
It starts and ends with "All Christians are Catholic."
That will be news to the Protestants and Orthodox Christians.
SMP,
Be careful.
The meaning of "catholic" is not restricted to the Roman Catholic Church. The Church of England in its recitation of the Nicenecreed states that "I believe in one, holy and cathoclic apostolic Church. Most Protestent (though not all) denominations are Nicene Christians.
Dr. Ed 2 said "Catholic," not "catholic." I take to be a reference Roman Catholicism, not the dictionary definition of "catholic."
Technically, all (or nearly all) Orthodox churches are big-C Catholic, as opposed to Protestant.. They are just not, for the most part, in communion with the Roman Catholic church.
Ed does not know what he says.
The text in the Greek Orthodox Church is "One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
The some parishes of church of England do use a small "c," while others write "And I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church."
As I said, watch out especially concerning Mr Ed
My sources tell me it's "μίαν, ἁγίαν, καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν", so Church is capitalized but catholic is not.
It depends on which congregation you choose, and whose Greek of what century.
For example: https://www.orthodox.net/services/symbol-es.html
My comment "be careful" was that the matter was not as black and white as Mr Ed, made it
Weird. Did they take all of the stuff about the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation and Henry VIII making a new church so he could get rid of his wife out of the history textbooks since I was in school? What do they teach about the Troubles in Northern Ireland?
Sure, until you get to the specifics around the unit on the ME and Islam, when it crosses over into pushing acceptance and advocating adoption of a specific faith.
I think the concurrence hit the nail on the head. Under Lemon, the lessons on Islam would have been problematic because they go beyond being historical and start teaching the fundamental tenants of the religion. Under Kennedy, the school has an easy win.
This was an easy case both pre- and post-Lemon. You could always teach about religion -- though, as this case illustrates, lots of people don't want that -- which necessarily involves teaching what the fundamental tenets (not tenants) of whatever religion you are teaching about are. And you can insist that students accurately regurgitate them on the final exam. You just can't teach that the religious tenets in question are true or false or require the students to affirm, or, for that matter, deny them.
Even though all of this is well-established law, we can't have academically honest and sound teaching about religion -- a very important topic -- because noisy people (usually religious christians, not commie lib'rul atheists) get their undies in a twist if anyone attempts such a thing. Our education is impoverished as a result, and this is why we can't have nice things.
We would also likely find some people upset if different political ideologies, including communism, socialism, and so forth, were all taught without putting a thumb on the scales in support of one.
I think under Schempp it was clearly permitted. There’s nothing new here.
Schempp struck down teacher-led Bible readings in a public-school class, but suggested referencing religion as part of secularly teaching history would be acceptable. The standard Schempp used was similar to the test that would be articulated in Lemon.
The Third Circuit decision involved teaching the foundational tenants of Islam. Is that similar to the Bible readings in Schempp or to a secular history lesson? I think the Third Circuit case would have been a much closer call under Schempp and Lemon, but is an obvious win for the school under Kennedy.
To quote the Schempp opinion:
In addition, it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.
This is a study of "comparative religion," or as the opinion noted, the students "canvassed world regions."
The study of "study of the Bible or of religion" would include lessons on the tenets of the religion, including Christian, Jewish, etc., religious beliefs and practices.
Does that mean if the school in Schempp had Bible readings as part of its history classes, those readings would have been upheld?
[meandering response deleted]
Just for the record, "establishing" a religion consists of declaring that religion to be the official religion of the country and providing government support to that religion alone.
The founding fathers did not want a "Church of England in America".
So teaching about religions in a public setting, even a government setting (school should NOT be a government setting, of course) is not "establishing". Nor is permitting display of quotations from Confucius or the Ten Commandments, or including "under God" in the pledge to the flag.
" . . . (school should NOT be a government setting, of course) . . . . "
37 state constitutions disagree with you.
See pg 2, Language in Education Clause of Current State Constitutions
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/assets/articles/2020/education-clauses-in-state-constitutions-across-the-united-states/education-clauses-in-state-constitutions-across-the-united-states.pdf?la=en
(Note: This is from 2020, so things may have changed.)
I have lost track of the vast number of people and things that disagree with me.
(and I have outlived half of them)
It is unlikely that you will outlive public education, however.
"The founding fathers did not want a "Church of England in America"."
Technically, they didn't want the federal government getting into the game of having an established church, OR messing with the states, several of which DID have established churches. So they made the whole topic of established churches off limits for federal legislation: "Congress may make no law respecting, (That is, having to do with.) an establishment of religion."
Congress couldn't legislate to have its own state church, but neither could it legislate to interfere with states having one.
Luckily Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), came along "incorporating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as binding upon the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (wiki)
That's one of the main issues with the whole incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights were in two parts:
1) Things the newly created national government cannot do because no free government should ever do such a thing, and
2) Things the newly created national government cannot do because we are setting the rules and reserving unto the states whether these things can be done.
Incorporation assumes that the entirety of the BOR is #1 when history shows that there were many #2 rules contained in there.
Paradoxically by having those number #2 rules enumerated in the BOR, the founders set up a system whereby the national government (through the Supreme Court) can take away those very state powers they tried to reserve.
"Just for the record, "establishing" a religion consists of declaring that religion to be the official religion of the country and providing government support to that religion alone."
Exactly. Its a term of art that the courts butchered and refuse to correct.
I agree. Having a non-sectarian prayer before class is nowhere close to the historical understanding of the establishment of religion. It would likely be a free exercise violation if compelled but I think the Court took a sharp wrong turn in this line of cases.
Perhaps it would be best in a multicultural district to refrain from such prayers but I believe that those questions are best left to the people through school boards.
No Bob, just that it's a tenet of the right-wing's Christian Nationalist movement, does not establish concerning, or having to do with the 1st Amendment's establishment of religion, can mean only establishment of an official religion or establishment of a government-favored church.
Nor does it matter that the choir you're preaching to here, already believes that.
If I were hearing the case, I'd study the materials on Christianity and Buddhism and compare them to the materials on Islam to see if they were promoting one of these religions at the expense of the others.
But, yes, ours is a Constitutional tradition where - e. g., in the Northwest Ordinance - there was deemed to be a connection between education and religion, with religion being considered a good thing.
How that works out in practice would require me to think of a lot more details.
Appeals courts do not typically conduct investigations. (Trial courts don't either, usually, though it's a little more complicated.) The litigants create the record, and what's in the record is the basis for the decision, with presumptions against various parties in some instances where evidence is lacking. If the entire curriculum was not in evidence, the court cannot supply the lack.
If the materials on Christianity and Buddhism aren't in the record, of course the courts shouldn't consider them.
Accepting your (unsourced) suggestion that neither side put the Christian and Buddhist material in the record You would think that one side or the other would benefit from such context, so I would be curious about why neither side thought fit to put in evidence on the subject.
.
"ours is a Constitutional tradition where ... there was deemed to be a connection between education and religion, with religion being considered a good thing."
Specifically the Christian religion, broadly defined.
The judge did that, and said the Islam materials aren’t especially different from the others. The difference is in the way the plaintiff sees things, not in the way a neutral observer would.
That was my question. So where did y81 get the idea that these other materials weren't in the record?
This seems well beyond the objective, academic description of others' beliefs presented in the opinion, so I was more than a bit puzzled that it was explicitly quoted but then not addressed in any way.
I thought maybe there might be something else on the slide that would in some way put the quoted language in a different context, but pulling up the video (which I ultimately found by digging up a copy of the 7-year-old(!!) complaint -- thanks, CA3!) that's not the case at all. The quoted words (around 4:40) are the only text on the slide (making really interesting the choice to write "text on the slide" rather than "THE text on the slide," and to include an ellipsis that actually omits nothing).
I'm curious how the virulently anti-school-prayer crew might try to cleverly distinguish this. Sort of like a fleeting expletive? Doesn't count if it's recorded?
I agree with you on that last statement. It's not a statement of Islamic belief but a proactive request for everyone to follow it. It's not using the same phrasing at all as the rest of the statements, but making a prayer at the end. I think that statement goes beyond what's allowed, and I'd rather it be removed. But I don't think it's enough to turn the whole lesson into a problem.
Ah, so basically a "come on, it was just the tip!" theory. I can appreciate that position, but again it's really weird that the opinion goes out of its way to include that problematic language and then just leaves it hanging rather than even trying to deal with it.
I think the unit should've been banned for this abomination of a physics metaphor.
Indeed.
You are an easy grader. I was going to post that the person who wrote that sentence should be beheaded.
"At the end of the second lesson, students completed a "Scavenger Notes Activity," a worksheet instructing them to "[t]ake notes using the slides" and to "[f]ill in the blanks AND correct the false information" scattered throughout. One section of the worksheet read as follows:"
I suspect the students were supposed to "correct the false information" in this prompt by striking out the incorrect word and using whatever word was actually used on the slide. Hopefully this is the case, but then again it is New Jersey.
I agree with the opinion. The lessons go a bit further than I would personally prefer and the supposedly neutral teachings veer somewhat afield into showing proselytizing behavior. If I was a teacher, I would tone it back a bit.
However this does not come close to establishing a religion, especially given that all other religions were (I think) given the same sort of treatment. It's past time that courts are de facto boards of education in this area.
I note that the materials fail to state that the Muslims worship a god called God. That would probably go too far for many Christians.
Given that the material states that Muslims worship a god named "Allah," and "Allah" is just the Arabic work for "God," I'm not sure that would make a difference. Unless we think a large percentage of the population doesn't realize that Jews, Christians and Muslims all worship the same deity...
A large percentage of the population doesn't realize that Jews, Christians and Muslims all worship the same deity. Or, rather, a percentage of the population doesn't realize that Jews, Christians and Muslims all worship the same deity, and another percentage of the population doesn't agree that Jews, Christians and Muslims all worship the same deity.
One doesn't normally come across the claim that French Christians worship a god called "Dieu"
Students encountered Islam during two class periods within the "Middle East and North Africa" (MENA) unit, both taught by Ms. Jakowski. The first lesson was presented through a set of PowerPoint slides entitled "Teaching Critical Thinking[:] Making Generalizations with Content."
"Class, here's a bunch of seductive BS used by the powerful to gather as many followers as possible, to seize control and live like the newly-displaced kings were just doing. This afternoon, we move on to Christianity in Europe doing the same thing but preceding it by a thousand years, then tomorrow look at modern political platforms, which change a few seductive words but adopt the aspects of religion which made them horrible to be ruled by."
I went to a Catholic high school.
We learned about Islam, and the teacher had us declare the statement of faith aloud. I wonder how some of the parents would have felt if they knew about that.
The concurrence notes, "the lifting of the constitutional mandate of secularism, teaching about religious matters in a public school does not violate the Establishment Clause."
The "mandate of secularism" present is a barrier to state establishment of religion. It is not to avoid all religious things, including teaching world religions, and religion's role in history.
Reference in a comment to "pictures of Jesus" reminds me of a recent oral argument regarding Muslim students not being required to see images of Muhammad if it violates their religion.
Also, some litigation challenged non-Christian objects, including menorahs. A challenge to a picture of Jesus would turn on context.
It is not a matter of "not liking." A picture of someone currently worshiped by millions as a son of god and a judicial robe can be differentiated on other grounds than that. Again, I would need to know the context to determine the strength of the challenge.
"We learned about Islam, and the teacher had us declare the statement of faith aloud. I wonder how some of the parents would have felt if they knew about that."
Was the school one of those modern, enlightened Catholic schools which prepared the kids to be proper liberals, or one of those reactionary, backwards Catholic schools which taught the Catholic faith?
I think the question has one too many possible dubious premises.
I, for one, welcome the next study sheet on the 5 Points of Calvinism that is sure to come now that the way has been cleared to teach religious doctrine in public school.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Points_of_Calvinism
The Armenians will be up in arms over that one.
+1
Harvard founding/mission statement, 1642
Rules, and precepts that are observed in the college.
1. When any scholar is able to understand Tully, or such like classical Latin author extempore, and make and speak true Latin in verse and prose, And decline perfectly the paradigms of nouns and verbs in the Greek tongue: Let him then and not before be capable of admission into the college.
2. Let every student be plainly instructed, and earnestly pressed to consider well, the main end of his life and studies is, to know God and Jesus Christ which is eternal life, John 17:3, and therefore to lay Christ in the bottom, as the only foundation of all sound knowledge and learning.
And seeing the Lord only giveth wisdom, let every one seriously set himself by prayer in secret to seek it of him Prov. 2, 3.
3. Every one shall so exercise himself in reading the Scriptures twice a day, that he shall be ready to give such an account of his proficiency therein, both in theoretical observations of the language, and logic, and in practical and spiritual truths, as his tutor shall require, according to his ability; seeing the entrance of the word giveth light, it giveth understanding to the simple, Psalm. 119. 130.
4. That they eschewing all profanation of God’s name, attributes, word, ordinance, and times of worship, do study with good conscience, carefully to retain God, and the love of his truth in their minds else let them know, that (notwithstanding their learning) God may give them up to strong delusions, and in the end to a reprobate mind, 2 Thes. 2. 11, 12. Rom. 1. 28.
https://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=CT15MBCBI8H9B8J
The retreat of Christianity from the American culture is nearly complete. Not a rout, but nearly just.
The retreat of Christianity from the American culture is nearly complete
There are many forms of Christianity, from monastic asceticism to the Prosperity Gospel movement and most Americans still self-describe as Christians. Christianity dominates Congress and the Supreme Court. Yes, there are parts of American culture where Christianity of any form appears under=represented, but a nearly complete retreat? Not remotely. If that were true, would Trump have engaged in, e.g. virtual papal cosplay?
I just looked at that picture. Trump looks like a Pope - maybe a Renaissance Pope, but still a Pope.
"What does history say about Islam?" "Muslims created a tradition of unsurpassable splendor, scientific thought and timeless art."
That must be why Muslim countries are so advanced. It seems to be this is bad pedagogy even if it's constitutional. Nobody would teach about Nazism by passing along what Nazis say about themselves uncritically, yet this is an accepted practice with Islam.
There was a time when, by standards we ourselves currently use to "rank" civilizations (whether that is a useful exercise or not is for another day), the Islamic world was well ahead of the European, Christian west in a variety of ways. That changed in what we call the early modern era and "we" are now "ahead," but it wasn't always so. We in the west are largely unfamiliar with that history, but ignorance isn't proof of anything.
As a youth, I was certainly taught about the Islamic world's influence on the development of Western learning. I wasn't sufficiently appreciative at the time when I learned that they developed algebra.
Speak for yourself. "We" are well aware of that history.
Prove it.
Commission a poll. And pay for it.
Meanwhile, I was always aware that Islamic culture in the Middle Ages was more advanced. I even remember some of that from high school. We had a world history course, IIRC in 8th grade, and it had a chapter on Islam. (Started with the Sumerians, who apparently invented money.)
The smart money is always on "most people don't know X" for almost any value of X. For random samples, see TextFirst and jb here.
Hey man, if you're going to throw shade you should probably learn to trace the reply lines up to see which poster my note you're offended by was actually responding to. Or alternatively: consult the musical stylings of Carly Simon.
This is dumb. By your logic, Rome and Greece weren't incredibly advanced civilizations at the time because current Italy and Greece are relatively poor Western European countries.
Maybe. This was a unit about Islam, not Islam in the Middle Ages. Islamic culture was more advanced during the Middle Ages. It is less advanced now. If you leave out the latter, then you are giving a distorted picture.
Sure, you'd want to see the overall syllabus and not just any one quote or even presentation.
Having said that, it's not obvious that "Islam" is less advanced now. "Islam" is Dubai as well as Kabul, and while the Saudis' approach to human rights is terrible, the bulilding of The Line is miles more ambitious than anything going on in the "Christian" world.
Not by any logic of mine. Try re-reading.
Nobody would teach about Nazism by passing along what Nazis say about themselves uncritically
Uncritically seems load-bearing here.
Like a lot of legal questions, the answer to this one is "It Depends." The general principle is easy to state: public schools can't teach religion as truth, but they can teach about religion as a cultural phenomenon. The "Depends" is on how it's carried out.
IMO, requiring students to state a declaration of faith, any faith, crosses the line. As does treating one religion uncritically while treating the others critically.
The court here looked at the evidence and found that the school was teaching the Islamic module in an academic manner, no different from the other religion modules.
But if it had found the Islam module to be taught in a more proselytizing manner than the others, the remedy would be to order the school to change the content to teach it in a manner similar to the others, not to order it not to be taught as the plaintiff was seeking.
It seems pretty clear this woman sued not because she objected to the government teaching religion generally, nor because she thought the curriculum went to far towards proselytizing, but simply because she didn’t like Islam and wanted to use the courts as a device to prevent it from being taught.
Let’s assume the school is actually teaching all the religion modules equally and the woman is simply offended by the Islam modules because she doesn’t like Islam. It’s been rpeatedly argued that not only would such motivation on her part be irrelevant to the merits of her case, but she wouldn’t have standing to make a more general claim about the school teaching religion if teaching her own doesn’t offend her, so all she has standing to complain about are the others.
I think this turns things on their head. I think the exact opposite is true.
A court can entertain a complaint that the school is inappropriately teaching religion by a plaintiff who finds the school teaching religion generally, or the general manner in which it is teaching it, offensive. But a plaintiff who only finds the school’s teaching a specific religion like Islam offensive has suffered no legal injury and has no standing to sue.
Such a plaintiff is not hurt by the government’s teaching of religion. The source of the plaintiff’s injury is not the government, but the specific content, Islam. This is a sectarian grievance, not a legal one. The fact that the plaintiff does not like Islam doesn’t injure her in a legal sense or in a manner redressable by a court. Only a plaintiff actually injured by government action - the school’s teaching of religion, independently of what that religion is - would have standing to sue.
argued that a women who is n
"A court can entertain a complaint that the school is inappropriately teaching religion by a plaintiff who finds the school teaching religion generally, or the general manner in which it is teaching it, offensive. But a plaintiff who only finds the school’s teaching a specific religion like Islam offensive has suffered no legal injury and has no standing to sue."
You can keep repeating this, but until you cite a case, nobody is buying it. Nobody is buying it because it does not represent any legal doctrine known to the common law.
If she finds Islam offensive and the class violates the establishment clause, that is her injury in fact, her redressability, and thus her standing. Period.
The fact that other classes might also violate the establishment clause, or should offend her, or it only makes sense that she would also complain about makes NO DIFFERENCE in the litigation of her suit against the Islam class. If you disagree, post a cite.
Seems awfully close to the line. Why does the state get to have a position on what Muslims believe or don't believe? What if a Muslim student in class disagrees? Does he fail the class?
Why does the state get to have a position on what Muslims believe or don't believe?
...That's the way to teach about a religion. There is no other way.
Your issue would be the same as if a student had opinions about some historical event. Something for the teacher to handle in the classroom; not for the courts.
"Your issue would be the same as if a student had opinions about some historical event. "
Nothing in the constitution prevents the state from taking a position about historical events. But they can't take a position about which beliefs count as Islam, and they certainly shouldn't be punishing Muslim students who believe that there are other gods than Allah or disagree that Muhammud speaks for god for saying that such beliefs are not the "centrifugal force" of Islam.
That is not any current or past reading of the establishment clause.
And unless you want to go with a wild hypo, no students are in danger of being punished.
I am a Christian believer, reared among fundamentalists who claimed to take the New Testament literally -- at least those parts thereof that support their worldview. I understand fundamentalist dogma, and I am glad for those who sincerely take comfort therein.
But I fervently wish that my fellow believers would realize that our deity is not such a weenie as to need help from Caesar.
Jesus had a good grasp of the distinction between matters spiritual and matters temporal. Why can't his followers understand that distinction?
The question of what should be given unto Caesar has been hotly debated among Christians for two millennia. Have we now reached a consensus, leaving all prior disputation behind?
The issue here has more to do with Mohammad getting help from the public schools.