Today in Supreme Court History: April 24, 1963

4/24/1963: Sherbert v. Verner argued.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (decided April 24, 1944): allegation that faith healing advocates knew that their claims of religious belief were false and were used just for solicitation was precluded by Free Exercise Clause; entire mail fraud indictment thrown out even though question of defendants’ good faith in their beliefs was not submitted to jury (this was the “I Am” movement, followers of the late “Guy W. Ballard, a/k/a George Washington, Jesus”)

United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (decided April 24, 1916): any White Slave Traffic (Mann Act) offense can be prosecuted in D.C. because element of offense is failing to mail in registration of woman to immigration office in D.C. (though offense can also be prosecuted in the state where the mailing should have been from)

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (decided April 24, 1990): can’t sue territories such as Guam under §1983, just states (assaulted by police and forced to sign confessions)

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. 241 (decided April 24, 2018): “artificial entities” like (foreign) corporations can’t be sued under Alien Tort Statute (bank allegedly funded terrorism) (so here, a corporation is not a “person”)

Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325 (decided April 24, 2018): no separation of powers problem with Patent Office procedure for “inter partes” review (post-patent review sought by outside party which can result in patent canceled; decision can then be appealed in federal court)

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (decided April 24, 2001): can make warrantless arrest where no “breach of peace” (here, officer noticed driver and children all in front seat without seat belts, and she was also driving without a license and without insurance; defendant’s account makes the officer look vindictive and unprofessional)

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (decided April 24, 1990): This is actor James Stewart, and the movie “Rear Window”, based on a 1942 magazine short story by Cornell Woolrich, who assigned his rights to the production company (formed by Stewart and Alfred Hitchcock) and promised to renew the copyright and assign the rights to the renewal, but died before the original copyright expired. With dissemination of the movie in the 1980’s in various media, the publisher (which held copyright on the entire magazine issue) sued for infringement. The Court holds that the original copyright (Woolrich’s) is not extinguished when incorporated into a derivative work (the movie).

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (decided April 24, 1979): waiver of right to remain silent under Miranda must be explicit; defendant (arrested on another charge) refused to sign “Advice of Rights” form though agreed to talk; inculpatory statements should have been excluded (this happened in the FBI office which later became my law firm’s office – I could have been sitting at the exact desk where it happened! – and over those 18 years I did say some things there that were later used against me)

Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (decided April 24, 1979): upholding against Equal Protection attack Georgia statute precluding father of child he never formally acknowledged from suing for wrongful death

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (decided April 24, 1979): Oklahoma statute prohibiting interstate sale of minnows violated Dormant Commerce Clause (apparently there are “licensed minnow dealers”; they’re used for bait -- no not the dealers, the minnows)

[F.D. Wolf]

In Lombardo, the Court held that the prosecution, which had been brought in the state of Washington, MUST be brought in District of Columbia, so it dismissed the case. The federal crime at issue was part of sec. 6 of the Mann Act, which required the keepers of a bordello which employed alien women to file a certificate with the names of those women with the Commissioner of Immigration. The Court held that since the Commissioner's office was located in D.C., then the crime (the failure to file the certificate) occurred solely in D.C. The government had argued the crime was a continuing offense, and the statement could be “filed” in any post office or mailbox in the United States. (Presumably, under that logic, venue would be proper anywhere in the country). The Court didn’t buy that argument but noted that if the government didn’t like the result, it could easily change it by amending the statute.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Thanks!

(Doesn't sec. 6 require self-incrimination?)

[F.D. Wolf]

It certainly does, so, presumably, any prosecution for a related offense using that certificate as evidence would be barred by the Fifth Amendment.

[Dan Schiavetta]

It seems that the statute can be attacked directly, as facially unconstitutional.

[F.D. Wolf]

Yes, I believe you are correct, and, in fact, the indictment in this case was attacked on both that ground as well as the venue issue. The district court dismissed the case on both grounds, though the Supreme Court explicitly said it was limiting itself to the venue question, dismissing it on those grounds alone.

The statute in question did explicitly provide a grant of immunity with the filing of the certificate, though the district court held the immunity granted was less than what the Fifth Amendment required. I believe the rule is that such statutes requiring incriminatory statements are permissible as long as they provide immunity for those statements in future prosecutions, in line with the prohibition of using compelled testimony in future prosecutions.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Thanks

[David Nieporent]

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (decided April 24, 1990): can’t sue territories such as Guam under §1983, just states (assaulted by police and forced to sign confessions)

No, you cannot sue states at all under § 1983. You can only sue state officials acting under color of state law. The holding of Ngiraingas v. Sanchez is that you can't sue territorial officials or territories.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Yes -- will rephrase. Thanks.

[SMP0328]

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (decided April 24, 1979): waiver of right to remain silent under Miranda must be explicit; defendant (arrested on another charge) refused to sign “Advice of Rights” form though agreed to talk; inculpatory statements should have been excluded (this happened in the FBI office which later became my law firm’s office – I could have been sitting at the exact desk where it happened! – and over those 18 years I did say some things there that were later used against me)

That is what was said by the three-Justice dissent authored by Justice Brennan. The five-Justice majority said waiver of Miranda could be inferred:

An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases, waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.

[Brett Bellmore]

Sherbet and Vernors, a classic combination.

[Syd Henderson]

But not as profound as Ice Cream v. Custard

[Thought about __ all my life]

Barnett is slipping
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah was wrongly decided and obiter dicta from long ago nailed why Barnett and the ruling are wrong.
Justice Morrison Waite
" This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. . ."

Barnett might have been sick when that was covered in class but it is well over 100 years old

[David Nieporent]

First, the Supreme Court cannot be "wrong" simply because an earlier Supreme Court ruled differently, so your entire argument is nonsensical. Second, you don't understand the facts of Lukumi Babalu. This didn't involve a general law of neutral applicability, like banning polygamy; it involved a law designed solely to target that church. It in essence said, "Killing animals is fine unless you're doing it for this Church's purposes."

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Sherbert v. Verner held that denial of unemployment benefits because a person was unable to work on Saturday for religious reasons violated the Free Exercise Clause.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the principle in three rulings in the 1980s. It limited the opinion in Oregon v. Smith, which involved denial of unemployment benefits after being fired for a criminal act. The case was used for an open-ended rule while the state court limited things to the benefits.

(Oregon showed no real concern about peyote use & the lower court held the ban of peyote was not necessary to uphold the sanctimony, let's say, of unemployment benefit system.)

Sherbert had a possible wider reach in protecting religious exemptions but the Supreme Court itself only protected unemployment benefits. The one exception would be the case involving Amish students, which turned out to be idiosyncratic.

Justices White and Harlan dissented. They argued that it would not violate the First Amendment to allow a religious exemption for unemployment benefits, but it was not compelled by the First Amendment. White ultimately went his own way in religious liberty cases as seen in his votes in the creation science case (majority) and Widmar (solo dissent accepting a stricter separatist approach). He also generally broadly accepted school aid.

Justice Stevens, a strong separatist, later noted that unemployment provides a logical individual exemption process that made religious exemptions in this area particularly suitable.

As seen in recent years, the justices have moved on from the general applicable rules of Oregon v. Smith though have split so far on clearly overruling it.

[David Nieporent]

(Oregon showed no real concern about peyote use & the lower court held the ban of peyote was not necessary to uphold the sanctimony, let's say, of unemployment benefit system.)

Not sure if that was a typo or irony.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

I did intend some irony, including taking into consideration the now obsolete meaning cited in the dictionary ("holiness").

The usual word would be "sanctity," but decided the other one worked so left it in. OTOH, perhaps, just assume all my typos are ironical. I am so very ironic.

[A Japanese Student]

There was only one interesting case yesterday.

Public Offices Election Act Case (Grand Bench, decided April 23, 1969): POEA §129, prohibiting election campaigns outside short period of time preceding election day, is constitutional; necessary to ensure each candidate gets a fair chance (for general election the campaign period is 2 weeks)

April 24, on the other hand, has several:

Shimizu Post Office Case (First Petty Bench, decided April 24, 1952): Defendant, convinced that theft was committed by another person, finds the true culprit and secures his conviction while appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. Court says it has authority to examine additional evidence and acquit the defendant without remanding first.

Sankei Newspaper Case (Second Petty Bench, decided April 24, 1973): Free Speech Clause does not grant the right of reply, and such right may in fact chill speech; given lack of statutory authority, says courts cannot require newspapers to post replies absent showing of tort; advertisement by LDP criticizing the Communist Party of having inconsistent policies ruled not defamatory (one opinion in support of the Communist that I saw was that right of reply would expand the marketplace of expression by subsidizing those who are otherwise too poor to compete in the marketplace - yet another reason why marketplace analogy is flawed)

Special Kokoku-Appeal to Determination of Extraditability (First Petty Bench, decided April 24, 1990): Cannot appeal court order determining defendant to be extraditable (must instead seek review of Minister's extradition order)

Tort Claims Case (Third Petty Bench, decided April 24, 2007): Knowingly filing a meritless attorney discipline petition against the bar association constitutes a tort (in Japan any person can file such petition - sometimes in order to harass the attorney)

Enforcement Judgment Case (First Petty Bench, decided April 24, 2014): Appellant filed a suit in US federal court (Anastasia Beverly Hills Inc v. Chisato Katoh Daiko (C.D.Cal. 2007, case 2:07-cv-03008)) under California trade secrets law, and got an injunction against Japanese defendant, which it tried to enforce in Japanese court; in reversing lower court's holding that C.D.Cal. lacked personal jurisdiction under Japanese law, holds that foreign courts have jurisdiction over injunctions if the defendant was likely to commit unlawful act to be enjoined in that country (rejecting argument that, because the place "where the tort occurred" has jurisdiction under Japanese law, C.D.Cal. lacked jurisdiction for enjoining future acts)

Special Kokoku-Appeal to Detention Order (Third Petty Bench, decided April 24, 2024): Using pseudonyms to describe the alleged offense does not violate the right to be informed of the charges against the defendant