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Former Trump Advisor's Libel Lawsuit Against Retired Mixed Martial Arts Fighter Can Go Forward
From Judge Jessica Clarke's opinion Monday in Delgado v. Sonnen (S.D.N.Y.):
Plaintiff Arlene Delgado is a lawyer and former senior advisor to Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. Plaintiff filed this action on March 1, 2024 alleging that Defendant Chael Sonnen, a retired mixed martial arts fighter who previously competed in the Ultimate Fighting Championship ("UFC"), defamed her while he was a guest on a podcast called Flagrant…. Plaintiff alleges that during Flagrant's March 7, 2023 podcast episode, Defendant Sonnen made false and defamatory remarks regarding Plaintiff's educational background and employment, and falsely claimed she "stalked" Sonnen such that she was banned from UFC venues. Below are Sonnen's statements in full context:
A President of the United States, in their absolute inner circle, had a phony, and I knew the phony. And I knew the phony because the phony had come after me and it got all the way to the chief legal officer of the Ultimate Fighting Championship that had to put a notice at every venue that we went to, to ban this person who was stalking me, and that person was on the inner circle of a President [elect] of the United States. So I have to reach to the president, of which I don't know, to let them know that this human being is not who they're claiming they are, and they're getting ready to set you up. Not to mention, you're going to look like a fool when it comes out that this person is not named, does not have the title, and did not go to the school that you're running around Hannity and Colmes and telling them that they are. And I did. I got it to the president who removed this person ….
Delgado sued, and the court concluded that some of her claims could survive defendants' motion to dismiss:
First, Sonnen repeats his argument that the nature and tone of the Flagrant podcast makes clear that reasonable listeners would not have taken his statements to be factual. In particular, he reiterates that the tone of the podcast is comedic, jocular, filled with emotionally charged language, and not to be taken seriously. But the R&R correctly concluded that the podcast episode at issue contained a mix of overtly serious and hyperbolic commentary. Moreover, the R&R also correctly noted that Sonnen delivered the alleged defamatory statements in an "unremarkable tone," prefaced the statements with hesitation, and that referred to himself as a "scumbag." This would suggest, to a reasonable listener, that what Sonnen was about to say was meant to be kept confidential, not that it was false.
Second, Sonnen objects to the R&R's finding of actual malice, arguing that the Amended Complaint has not met the "high standard" required. But the R&R correctly found, and the Court adopts the conclusion, that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges Sonnen knew of the falsity of these statements, given (1) Plaintiff confirmed she went to Harvard the first time they conversed; (2) Sonnen referred to her as "Harvard" throughout their friendship; and (3) Sonnen and Plaintiff had an amicable relationship for a not insignificant period of time.
Sonnen next objects to the R&R's denial of the motion to dismiss by arguing the alleged statements do not constitute defamation per se. Here, again, the Court finds the R&R to be well grounded in fact in law, because a statement that a lawyer did not actually go to law school or receive their degree would certainly injure their professional reputation. Similarly, assertions that someone is a "stalker" (i.e., that they committed a crime) also qualifies for per se defamation.
Still, Sonnen tries to object that Plaintiff suffered no special damages because "[w]here someone attends school is not relevant to their ability to engage in a profess[ion] or trade" and that "[t]here are countless people in this [c]ountry that did not attend Harvard." This argument can only be characterized as unserious: of course, the harm to Plaintiff lies not in a misstatement of the caliber of the school she attended, but the implication that she lied about having gone to Harvard, or any law school, at all. In other words, the damage lies in the suggestion that Plaintiff purportedly misrepresented her experience and credentials, which would lead a reasonable person to see her as a fraud or as not credible….
The Court finds that Podcast Defendants' [objections] lack merit for similar reasons. Podcast Defendants first object to the R&R's conclusion that "phony," as used in the context and in conjunction with Plaintiff's identifying information, qualifies as defamatory. According to Podcast Defendants, "phony" is a statement of opinion, not provable fact, and does not become provable "merely because that opinion was stated alongside allegedly factual statements about Delgado's name or academic credentials." The Court disagrees …. [A] reasonable listener would have understood Sonnen to be claiming Plaintiff is a "phony" with respect to the specific facts mentioned: her credentials and education….
The Court rejects Podcast Defendants' remaining objections regarding actual malice and whether "stalking" can be defamatory. Regarding the former objection, … [there were] sufficient factual allegations giving rise to the requisite inference, such as the decision to censor the name Sonnen used, and a failure to investigate the statements despite what Podcast Defendants insist was clear skepticism and non-belief by the podcast participants. And as to the latter, … in the context of Sonnen's full statement, which included the assertion that Plaintiff had been banned from entering UFC venues, it could indicate to a reasonable listener she had in fact been stalking Sonnen….
[T]he Court agrees with Plaintiff that Sonnen's statement she was banned from the UFC could be considered defamatory in context. The R&R correctly concluded that the term "phony" "alone may not be libel per se, [but] in the context of this case it is appropriately grouped with the other statements" that Plaintiff "was not using her real name, did not have a law degree, and did not graduate as claimed from Harvard Law." … [And] just as "phony" could be deemed as defamatory in its context, so too can the statement that Plaintiff was banned from UFC venues. Sonnen stated, in relevant part, "I knew the phony because the phony had come after me and it got all the way to the chief legal officer of the Ultimate Fighting Championship that had to put a notice at every venue that we went to, to ban this person who was stalking me …." Here, in context, a reasonable listener could believe Plaintiff had been banned from UFC venues because of the alleged stalking, and an individual being "banned" for committing what the R&R correctly recognized as a serious crime can suffice to establish libel per se….
The court also concludes that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, because of "her work on the 2016 Trump campaign, frequent media and primetime appearances, and public travels with Donald Trump." That will be relevant at later stages in the proceedings.
