Today in Supreme Court History: March 28, 1955

3/28/1955: Williamson v. Lee Optical decided.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (decided March 28, 1949): Krulewitch and a woman brought another woman across state lines for prostitution. They were arrested for conspiracy under the White Slave Traffic Act and Krulewitch’s partner told the prostitute that “it would be better for us girls to take the blame” rather than Krulewitch. At Krulewitch’s trial the prostitute’s testimony as to this statement (hearsay) is not admissible as a declaration of guilt because not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (decided March 28, 1966): Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman, civil rights activists, were lynched in 1964 near Philadelphia, Mississippi (which since then has been a symbolic place for politicians to give speeches). The Court here holds that the nonofficial men who assisted the Deputy Sheriff in the abduction and murder were “acting under color of state law” and could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §242 (the criminal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. §1983).

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (decided March 28, 1955): not a denial of Equal Protection for Oklahoma to regulate opticians but not drug stores selling ready-to-wear glasses

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (decided March 28, 1898): Fourteenth Amendment bestows citizenship on nonwhite children born here to foreign-born parents domiciled here

United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (decided March 28, 1921): prior Mexican grant, not California claim to submerged land, determined ownership of North Island and surroundings (eminent domain by United States to become a naval air station, still in existence; island was later joined to the mainland)

Sester v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (decided March 28, 2012): dual sovereignty not violated by federal sentence (for meth possession) to run concurrently with expected state sentence (for probation violation)

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (decided March 28, 2000): anonymous tip (that 16-year-old black man on corner in plaid shirt was carrying a gun) was too vague to support Terry stop where no other evidence of illegal conduct (vacating conviction for carrying concealed weapon without license)

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (decided March 28, 1995): color of press pads (used in dry cleaning) could be trademarked (such that competitor using same color might confuse dry cleaners)

Clemmons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (decided March 28, 1990): Due Process and Eighth Amendment not violated by state appellate court salvaging death sentence arrived at by invalid aggravating factor by reweighing proper factors or conducting harmless error review, but it has to say which one of these it is doing

United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (decided March 28, 1978): Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951, covers all extortion, not just “racketeering” (which is mentioned in legislative history but not the statute); affirming conviction of solitary man who got money from bank president by threat of force (I wonder if it would cover Dick York’s actions against Philip Coolidge in the Alfred Hitchcock Presents episode, “The Dusty Drawer”?)

[David Nieporent]

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (decided March 28, 1898): Fourteenth Amendment bestows citizenship on nonwhite children born here to foreign-born parents domiciled here

Wow. Seems potentially relevant to current events. How come nobody has discussed this case at the VC before?

[David Nieporent]

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (decided March 28, 2000): anonymous tip (that 16-year-old black man on corner in plaid shirt was carrying a gun) was too vague to support Terry stop where no other evidence of illegal conduct (vacating conviction for carrying concealed weapon without license)

I know the case, but I didn't remember the lineup, so I went to check how Thomas and Alito justified the search. Was pleasantly surprised to see that even they thought this went too far. (Kennedy, of all justices, tried to narrow the ruling with a concurrence explaining how anonymous tips could still be relied on sometimes. Not saying his concurrence was incorrect, but it was gratuitous.)

A bipartisan lineup of state AGs tried to salvage the conviction with amicus briefs, presumably the Republicans motivated by "4th amendment bad" and the Democrats motivated by "guns bad."

One thing I just noted (or reminded myself of) by reviewing the decision is how awful cops really are. The facts, as noted, were that an anonymous tip with zero indicia of reliability said that a black kid in a plaid shirt at a bus stop had a gun. So with no basis of any sort to reasonably suspect wrongdoing, the cops went there, saw three black kids at the bus stop, one wearing a plaid shirt, and they frisked him and found the gun. But they also frisked the other two black kids, just for funsies.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Thanks!

(always glad when my posts prompt readers to read the opinions)

[A Japanese Student]

"Unlawful Terry stop" sounds very rare, but this case is definitely the one. People criticize Terry as being too lenient to the cops, but I think the point of Terry is that Fourth Amendment still applies to it.

Japanese cops can conduct stop-and-frisk for suspicions of crime - and despite being "consensual search" for constitutional purposes, in reality it is far from one.

[Bob from Ohio]

"black kid in a plaid shirt at a bus stop had a gun."

100% accurate tip

"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” comes to mind.

"just for funsies"

Or, because they were with a guy with an illegal gun and were rightfully concerned for their safety.

[David Nieporent]

100% accurate tip

By definition, suppression motions only happen when the defendant had something to suppress. That doesn't retroactively justify an illegal search.

Or, because they were with a guy with an illegal gun and were rightfully concerned for their safety.

Absolutely; any time you see three black people on the same street, just go ahead and search all three of them just to be safe.

[SMP0328]

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (decided March 28, 1955): not a denial of Equal Protection for Oklahoma to regulate opticians but not drug stores selling ready-to-wear glasses

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (decided March 28, 1898): Fourteenth Amendment bestows citizenship on nonwhite children born here to foreign-born parents domiciled here

Between these two cases, which do you think is more important and more relevant to current events? I know these "Today in Supreme Court History" posts were established many years ago, but an updating is in order. Many times, trivialities are referenced instead of important events.

[Dan Schiavetta]

I started these posts on May 7, 2022 and have posted them every day since (except for maybe one day recently when Josh didn’t post his series). I’ll add to them yearly; in August to prepare for the next edition of my book I’ll add 2024 - 2025 term cases.

I’ve never had to look at SCOTUS cases at any point in my career as an attorney so my take on them might be unusual or fixated on some aspect which I found interesting (which is why I pick them). I’m grateful for the occasional correction when I get something wrong or I miss the import of a case.

[SMP0328]

Dan, I wasn't criticizing you. I was talking about Josh Blackman highlighting Williamson v. Lee Optical rather than United States v. Wong Kim Ark.

[Dan Schiavetta]

ok

[A Japanese Student]

Wait, this was part of a book? Didn't know that.

Ever since I started mine I realized how time-consuming it is. It's very easy to search for American cases - I could check the court website, Justia, CourtListener, Casetext, Cornell LII, etc. In contrast the only publicly available database is the official one, which has a terrible search interface. (I'm not using commercial database as it likely violates terms of use.)

I do tend to focus on cases that best describe the difference between US federal law and Japanese law. That's why I usually don't pick contract, property, or family law cases.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Yes, if you search Amazon, now that we know his name, you can find the book. I appreciate the time people take to do these projects.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Jackson, joined by Frankfurter and Murphy, concurred in Krulewitch v. United States to note the "present drift in the federal law of conspiracy which warrants some further comment because it is characteristic of the long evolution of that elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense."

The concurrence repeatedly uses such language as "ominous expansion" and "difficult to see any logical limit" to suggest its level of concern. It ends with "The most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice." Don't soft soap it now, Robert.

[Noscitur a sociis]

Sester v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (decided March 28, 2012): dual sovereignty not violated by federal sentence (for meth possession) to run concurrently with expected state sentence (for probation violation)

1. It’s Setser.

2. This is not the holding and the case has nothing to do with constitutional sovereignty principles. The issue was whether a federal court, in imposing sentence, can order that the sentence be served consecutively to a state sentence that hasn’t been imposed yet. (The court said yes.)

[Dan Schiavetta]

I don’t see how my description wasn’t correct nor how the decision didn’t implicate dual sovereignty.

[Noscitur a sociis]

I don’t see how my description wasn’t correct nor how the decision didn’t implicate dual sovereignty.

1. Your description of the facts is wrong. This was about a federal sentence that was ordered to run consecutively to a state probation sentence, and concurrently with a new state conviction for the same conduct.

2. No one suggested that “dual sovereignty” might prevent the imposition of the consecutive sentence. Rather, the argument was that the federal Sentencing Reform Act didn’t authorize the the federal judge to make the federal sentence consecutive to the state sentence that hadn’t been imposed yet. There was no question that the consecutive sentence would have been fine if the state sentence had been entered first.

(There is one additional wrinkle: recall that the federal court ordered the federal sentence to by concurrent with one future state sentence, but consecutive with another. The state judge, however ordered those two state sentences to be served concurrently. Setser argued that because there was no way to actually implement the federal judgment the way the judge had ordered, that was another reason it was invalid. He lost on that one too.)

[Dan Schiavetta]

From Scalia's opinion:

"In our American system of dual sovereignty, each sovereign—whether the Federal Government or a State—is responsible for “the administration of [its own] criminal justice syste[m].” Ice, 555 U.S., at 170, 129 S.Ct. 711. If a prisoner like Setser starts in state custody, serves his state sentence, and then moves to federal custody, it will always be the Federal Government—whether the district court or the Bureau of Prisons—that decides whether he will receive credit for the time served in state custody. And if he serves his federal sentence first, the State will decide whether to give him credit against his state sentences without being bound by what the district court or the Bureau said on the matter. Given this framework, it is always more respectful of the State's sovereignty for the district court to make its decision up front rather than for the Bureau of Prisons to make the decision after the state court has acted."

Nevertheless I'll look at the decision again and rephrase. Thank you.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

A key bit from Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma:

The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.

This opinion became a reverse Lochner for many people, cited whenever a judge argues something is not the business of the courts. The question then became how broad the reach of the principle would be.

So, Justice Douglas focused on the "regulatory of business and industrial conditions" part in Griswold to treat "privacy" differently. In his concurrence, Justice White also treated economic regulations differently.

But what happens when sale of contraceptives is involved? Or even non-doctors giving them away? The Constitution does limit governmental regulation of economic matters in some ways. It is not just that something is "unwise" etc.

Others more broadly said "social" policies should be primarily the role of legislatures. So, Rehnquist in his dissent in Roe v. Wade argued:

But that liberty ["unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions"] is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.

The lines might become a bit more complicated, including for some who post here when they challenge licensing laws and so on.

Also, as Professor Leah Litman argued in a recent article, the post-Dobbs Court second guesses economic regulations in other ways.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/3065/

[The Margrave of Azilia]

If the Bill of Rights generates penumbras and emanations and produces a generalized right of privacy - a concern reflected in many Bill of Rights clauses - then it also generates penumbras and emanations producing a generalized right to property. I mean, don't the provisions of the Bill of Rights reflect as much concern with property as with privacy?

And how can you have privacy if the government has a broad power to take and regulate your stuff?

[A Japanese Student]

Since I didn't do yesterday's, I'm posting here now.

Special Wards Mayoral Election Abolition Case (Grand Bench, decided March 27, 1963): Despite what tourists believe, there is no city called "Tokyo". Instead, Tokyo Metropolis has 23 "special wards" - like boroughs of New York, except they are directly under the prefecture. Their mayors were originally elected until 1952, but was changed to an appointed office, despite Constitutional mandate of having elected mayors for local public entities. District Court: Obviously unconstitutional! Supreme Court: Actually, Tokyo's special wards are not "local public entities". (The procedural history is also unusual; someone bribed assembly members to receive mayoral appointment, and their defense was that mayoral appointment was unconstitutional. Also one of the few cases decided on leapfrog appeal - allowed only in cases where the district court invalidates a law.)

Income Tax Act Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 27, 1984): Privilege against self-incrimination applies during administrative tax investigation because results are expected to be used in criminal tax-evasion prosecutions; also holds that there is no constitutional right to be informed about such privilege

White-Collar Workers' Tax Case (Grand Bench, decided March 27, 1985): Differences in handling of deductible expenses do not constitute discrimination

Kokaryo Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 27, 2007): What happens when the plaintiff loses official recognition during suit? Republic of China filed an eviction suit in 1967 (!) against 8 students living in ROC-owned dorm in Kyoto. In 1972, while the case was pending in the district court, Japan severed diplomatic relationship with ROC. After decades of case being held in abeyance, Court finally rules that all proceedings since that moment were void, as the plaintiff was never substituted with the People's Republic of China. To this day, the case remains pending due to refusal of service by PRC.

KSD Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 27, 2008): Member of the Diet receives money "in connection with his duty" (element of bribery) when he was paid to make a specific question to the Prime Minister in the Diet (a common defense in bribery case is that the money is not in connection with the recipient's duties, or that the recipient lacked authority to perform such duties - see Feb. 22 entry)

[A Japanese Student]

Forgot to add: due to corruption, in 1975 they made Tokyo special ward mayors elective office once again.

[John F. Carr]

London is also an amalgamation of many small municipalities. The City of London in the strictest sense is a square mile with a population of 11,000.

[A Japanese Student]

Injury Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 28, 1950): Corroboration of defendant's confession (which is constitutionally required) need not prove all elements of the offense (because the reason this requirement exists is not to prevent punishing the wrong person, but to stop punishing for made-up crimes)

Pachinko Machine Taxation Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 28, 1958): Pachinko machines are "entertainment equipments" subject to excise tax; rejected argument that the Government started taxing them only after an internal guideline was issued (without statutory amendment) on the basis that the guideline interpreted the existing law correctly (in another famous dispute, tax officials were puzzled as to whether records of "Oyoge Taiyakikun" were taxable; phonograph records of popular music were taxable but children's music weren't - although the music was kid-friendly, it was more popular with adults. in the end it was determined to be non-taxable)

Parody Photomontage Case I (Third Petty Bench, decided March 28, 1980): To cite a copyrighted work, the cited work must be easily distinguishable from the citing work, and the cited work cannot be the predominant feature; unauthorized creation of a photomontage infringes on "right to integrity" (moral rights) under copyright law (there is no parody exception or fair use under Japanese copyright law; compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose) (the photo was taken by Shirakawa Yoshikazu and used by auto insurance ads; you can see the two works at https://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/507/014507_option1.pdf)

Tort Claims Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 28, 1989): Statute requiring gross negligence for accidental fire claim applies to firefighters' failure to fully extinguish fire (I don't think other countries have this rule)

Fraud Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 28, 2014): Gang member plays at a golf course that denies access to gang members - just like any other golf players would. He gets charged with fraud. Court reverses conviction because he wasn't explicitly asked whether he was a gang member, meaning there was no fraud. (I'm sure this has come up in US case law - time to do some research)

[John F. Carr]

Massachusetts' version of the corpus delicti or corroboration rule is similar to Japan's.

As for the fire case, I'm sure there is no heightened standard in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (2002). Homeless people accidentally started a fire and did not report it. Six firefighters died trying to put it out. The manslaughter indictment was found to sufficiently allege "wanton and reckless" conduct. The defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to probation. The building owner paid around $1.5 million to settle a lawsuit.

[A Japanese Student]

The law establishing fire rule was enacted in 1899 (and coincidentally, became effective March 28 of that year). Most people lived in wooden houses back then. Anyone could start a fire by accident and lose everything. The fire could then burn down the entire neighborhood. Nobody could afford to pay the damages anyway.

More than a century later, it still hasn't been amended despite changing circumstances. This law also does not apply to criminal prosecution, though without gross negligence or occupational conduct, all they can seek is a modest fine.

[Noscitur a sociis]

As for the fire case, I'm sure there is no heightened standard in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (2002).

What does that case have to do with the rule A Japanese Student is describing?

[JoeFromtheBronx]

I was talking about Josh Blackman highlighting Williamson v. Lee Optical rather than United States v. Wong Kim Ark.

I tried to find out if he highlighted Wong Kim Ark another day, for instance, on his birthday or something. Could not find it, though maybe a deeper search would find something.

The video provided links the case of the day to a wider discussion of economic liberty. In that sense, it is, as I said, of some note.

Wong Kim Ark is still clearly more important. Perhaps, he discusses that along side something else as part of those videos.