Today in Supreme Court History: March 26, 2012

3/26/2012: NFIB v. Sebelius is argued.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (decided March 26, 1962): federal courts have jurisdiction over suits alleging disproportionate redistricting in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection (on remand the District Court approved mixed by county/by population plan, 206 F. Supp. 314, probably would not pass muster under later case law)

United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (decided March 26, 2014): prior misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence qualified as “use or attempted use of force” so as to criminalize gun possession under 18 U.S.C. §922 (extended in United States v. Rahimi, 2024, to those adjudged a threat after a hearing)

Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (decided March 26, 2002): upholding eviction of family from public housing based on violation of lease provision prohibiting illegal drug use by household member, even though drug use (by grandchildren) was blocks away and unknown to lessees; unanimous decision

Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (decided March 26, 1996): Florida prohibited banks from selling insurance, but preempted by federal law permitting it

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (decided March 26, 1991): dismisses suit against federal regulators for negligent supervision of an S&L association which went belly-up; regulators’ informal methods were within Federal Tort Claims Act’s “discretionary function”

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (decided March 26, 1991): Title VII (can’t discriminate based on race, religion or national origin) doesn’t apply overseas; American employer can discriminate against its American employee (superseded by statute, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 2006)

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (decided March 26, 1986): stationing extra security officers in front row of spectator section did not deprive defendant of fair trial (he was being tried with four others)

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (decided March 26, 1985): Charging out-of-state insurers higher tax rate violated Dormant Commerce Clause; “promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose”. Opinion by Powell, who according to my legal writing professor was the clearest writer on the Court at the time.

Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (decided March 26, 1974): Another 18 U.S.C. §922 case, this time applying the provision criminalizing false statements made to registered gun dealers. In redeeming gun his wife had pawned, husband falsely told pawnbroker that he had never been convicted of a felony (redemption was “acquisition” under the statute).

Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1 (decided March 26, 2019): under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, when suing foreign country can’t serve papers on embassy in United States; must serve foreign minister’s home office (suit for personal injuries due to terrorist attack)

[A Japanese Student]

Castleman and Rahimi involved two different provisions. Castleman involved §922(g)(9). Rahimi was about (g)(8).

[Dan Schiavetta]

True, but the logic of Castleman was extended in Rahimi, especially when one notes that Bruen was decided in the meantime. The Castleman Court said that g(9) closed a "dangerous loophole" in gun control laws. Rahimi closed another "loophole", albeit a vaguer one.

[Noscitur a sociis]

The two cases have basically nothing to do with one another. Castleman is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. In Rahimi, on the other hand, no one disputes that the (different) statutory provision applied to the defendant: the issue was whether it was constitutional or not.

[SRG2]

Gaurbet brings up the S&L debacle, which has largely been memory-holed. If you deregulate the asset side while protecting the liability side you create a moral hazard, and sure enough...

[JoeFromtheBronx]

It is absurd that NFIB v. Sebelius (aka the PPACA Cases) ruled that the individual mandate was not authorized by the Commerce Clause and/or Necessary and Proper Clause.

Justice Ginsburg's dissent also (for two justices) explained why the Medicaid part of the ruling was incorrect. Vibes explains how it was not. Breyer and Kagan went along with that part of it probably as a compromise to obtain Roberts vote on the tax issue.

The tax part was fine. It wasn't a direct tax, which is a narrow constitutional animal. The tax penalty could be seen as an income tax or a type of excise. The tax system has a great many taxes that turn on you making certain choices as those doing their taxes now can see. Lots of tax credits that turn on lots of thing.

As Roberts noted in his opinion, the government offered two arguments, tax and commerce. The individual mandate penalty was crafted as a tax, including how it was determined and collected. The whole thing should not have been a problem.

Of course, there was a lot of debate about the matter on this blog, including people creatively making up new rules to determine why Congress did not have the power to pass a law that was justified (at least regarding some parts of the legislation) on even more than these three grounds.

A Joan Biskupic Roberts biography discusses some of the behind-the-scenes decision-making. I read the book. I'm not sure how much clarity it brings to the situation.

==

I felt Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker was an unfortunate decision. I wished that there was at least one justice voicing the other side.

Justice Breyer's brother wrote the district opinion, which explains why he recused. The appellate court opinion ruled for Rucker et. al.

https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/2002/9/pilon.pdf

(Prof. Michael Dorf also wrote an article for what is now Verdict but the link I have of his original piece is now dead.)

[Dan Schiavetta]

I was upset with the decision and also disappointed that it was unanimous. It was further proof that there were no longer any “liberals” on the Court, as the word is commonly understood.

It’s unlikely that any private landlord would prevail on such an argument or would even try to make it.

[John F. Carr]

A private landlord would be subject to state law limits on eviction. Usually states require good cause for eviction but not for nonrenewal of a lease.

[Dan Schiavetta]

I don't see why government landlords would be exempt.

[John F. Carr]

A federal law requiring eviction for arguably unjust reasons preempts any state rule to the contrary.

The natural state of affairs is, I can chose who to allow on my land and make leases for my property terminable without cause on no or very short notice. State tenant protection laws have limited my rights as a landlord. What the state gives it can take away.

[A Japanese Student]

If I were the fifth vote, I would uphold it as a tax without touching Commerce Clause. Though I don't disagree with it, it was patently unnecessary.

The government clearly had the power to increase the income tax by a set amount - let's say, $695. (This should not be a direct tax under precedents, and even if it is, I don't think apportionments would become an issue.) The government also clearly had the power to establish a tax credit of a set amount - let's say, $695 for having a health insurance. And the government could call it by whatever name it wanted.

[IANNAL]

What "government"? Congress has the power to do all sorts of things that it doesn't do.

[SMP0328]

It is absurd that NFIB v. Sebelius (aka the PPACA Cases) ruled that the individual mandate was not authorized by the Commerce Clause and/or Necessary and Proper Clause.

Since the mandate was upheld under the Spending and Taxing Clause, the parts of the majority opinion dealing with other clauses should be considered obiter dicta.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Gorsuch writes a 7-2 opinion upholding a ghost gun regulation.

(with color photos)

When will JB write a post about him lacking courage?

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-852_c07d.pdf

[A Japanese Student]

Stimulant Control Act Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 26, 1957): Inculpatory statement voluntarily made to prosecutor may be admitted without showing "circumstances that afford special credibility" (because that's what the statute says, duh)

Business Negligence Causing Death Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 26, 1957): Not a denial of equal protection to enhance sentence for negligent homicide committed "in the pursuit of social activities" (which ranges from medical malpractice to traffic accidents on personal vehicles); business negligence and gross negligence usually results in suspended jail sentence, while only fines are authorized in ordinary negligent homicide

"Confused Chivalry" Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 26, 1987): A Briton with karate experience witnesses a drunk man and a woman. (Mistakenly) convinced that he was assaulting her, the defendant intervenes. After the man tries to fight back, the defendant does a karate trick, killing the man. Court upholds manslaughter conviction, finding this was an "imperfect and excessive self-defense" - and this case will forever live in the Penal Code casebook.

Business Negligence Causing Injury Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 26, 2007): Surgeons have a legal duty to confirm who they are operating on; affirmed conviction for operating on a wrong patient

Minor Offenses Act Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 26, 2009): Defendant had "legitimate reason" to carry concealed weapon (chemical spray) because he frequently carried large sums of money as part of his job; reverses conviction for misdemeanor (what likely happened: Terry stop, police asked for "consensual" search, and found the spray)

Henoko Reclamation Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 26, 2020): National government (here, Okinawa Defense Bureau) can petition the national government (here, infrastructure minister) for administrative review of Governor of Okinawa's revocation of reclamation permit; Solely-intragovernmental-action exception to Administrative Complaint Review Act does not apply since private persons could seek reclamation permit (reclamation was for a new Marine Corps station; Okinawans have long opposed US military presence)

Same-Sex Spouse's Crime Victims Payments Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 26, 2024): Same-sex partner is a "person not married but is in de facto marital relationship" entitled to victims' benefits despite nonrecognition of same-sex marriage (here, petitioner's same-sex spouse was murdered)