Today in Supreme Court History: March 25, 2014

3/25/2014: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores argued.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141 (decided March 25, 2014): must withhold FICA from severance pay because it’s “wages” (??)

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (decided March 25, 1992): statute declaring that new management of timber operations (balancing survival of spotted owl with economic growth) resolves the issues in two named lawsuits (thereby directing judges to reach a certain result) did not violate separation of powers; statute is saved because it also sets new legal standards, binding both officials and judges

Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (decided March 25, 1992): can’t sue for state agency’s failure to provide services to neglected/abused children; Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act doesn’t provide for private cause of action nor is actionable via §1983

Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (decided March 25, 1987): subsection in Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 providing for Congress to approve or veto any rule issued by new agency was legislative veto (a no-no since INS v. Chadha, 1983) but can be severed from rest of Act, which provided for employee protections

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (decided March 25, 1987): county Affirmative Action Plan can allow females to be promoted over males with higher test scores despite Title VII (that’s pretty much what affirmative action means)

Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (decided March 25, 2021): bullets hitting suspect’s car as she tried to get away was a Fourth Amendment “seizure” so remanded for determination of whether it was “reasonable” and whether qualified immunity

Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (decided March 25, 1986): school board member had no standing to appeal order allowing students to hold nondenominational prayer group on school grounds (the district itself decided not to appeal)

Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (decided March 25, 1986): ordained rabbi was required to take yarmulke off per Air Force regulations while on duty despite First Amendment

Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (decided March 25, 1986): I learned a new word with this case: capias, an Ohio term for warrant for arrest. County could be sued under §1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violation because it set policy and ordered the sheriff to enter physician’s office in welfare fraud investigation after physician did not respond to subpoena and barred the door when they tried to serve capiases, forcing them to chop down the door with an axe (I bet that caused the patients in the waiting room to look up from those old magazines).

Orozaco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (decided March 25, 1969): confession obtained in defendant’s bedroom at 4 a.m. while under arrest inadmissible because not given Miranda warning; in dissent White and Stewart, who had dissented in Miranda, point out that there was no prolonged or abusive interrogation; Harlan, who had also dissented, sees no way out of applying Miranda in any custodial context

[SRG2]

Torres was decided 6-3. Gorsuch, and inevitably Thomalito, dissented

[Dan Schiavetta]

To be fair, it is an odd application of the word "seizure".

[Noscitur a sociis]

I learned a new word with this case: capias, an Ohio term for warrant for arrest.

It’s a bit archaic today, obviously, but it’s not an Ohio thing: capias was one of the traditional common law writs.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

The Hobby Lobby case, not to be confused with an earlier free exercise case about "Hobbie," covers an overall subject that received repeated attention on this blog.

The case reminds me of U.S. v. Lee that held imposition of social security taxes is not unconstitutional as applied to persons who object on religious grounds.

"The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief."

The matter is not merely a matter of private choice:

When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.

Hobby Lobby applied the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was supposed to have "restored" religious freedom to pre-Smith standards. In practice, RFRA has gone further, probably too far, resulting in unjust harm to third parties.

https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/do_no_harm_fact_sheet.pdf

[Krayt]

Harm to first parties also counts. And the notion you must give up your religious beliefs or the government will not permit you to put food in your mouth, charity aside, is a peculiar power grab. Religion isn't a quaint anachronism the government gets the honor of wiping from chosen domains of existence, at its whim.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Harm to first parties also counts.

A basic principle is that you can swing your fist unless it hits my nose. Religious liberty can be broadly practiced. When it harms third parties, their liberties are threatened.

And the notion you must give up your religious beliefs or the government will not permit you to put food in your mouth, charity aside, is a peculiar power grab.

Yes, employees shouldn't have to give up their religious beliefs to obtain employment to put food in their mouths.

The basic point of the opinion is that once an employer steps into the public sector, they have certain requirements that do not exist privately because they are affecting third parties. This results in more obligations. Employers can be required not to discriminate by race or religion, while a church can do just that.

Religion isn't a quaint anachronism the government gets the honor of wiping from chosen domains of existence, at its whim.

Strawman. Public accommodations have specific aspects that open up more regulations, partially because of the different religious interests of employers, employees, and customers.

[Purple Martin]

The Little Sisters of the Poor (LSotP) was the owner and manager of a large chain of non-profit long-term care facilities, mostly leveraging Medicare funding to provide assisted-living and nursing home services. I’m glad they are motivated to do that, as I am glad many non-religious non-profits do the same.

In its 2020 Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania decision, SCOTUS said LSotP has a religion-based the right be free even of knowledge that:

• Some of their employees (both Catholic and not) are having sex in violation of Catholic religious belief that sex not intended to lead to pregnancy within a life-long marriage of a man and a woman, is sinful, and...
• These employees are supported in that sin through funding provided through the US Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate—and not involving LSotP at all.

In spite of the fact they bear no tangible burden beyond this terrible knowledge, LSotP mandates that their non-Catholic employees (without whom they could not operate) must abide by purely Catholic religious beliefs, or else government-provided benefits intended to be available on an equal basis to all Americans, will be denied.

As JFtB observes, this is certainly a matter of the religious freedom of LSotP employees. In this, the LSotP (and their litigation funders including the US Conference of Catholic Bishops) are on the wrong side—the side that assumes Freedom of Religion means only Freedom of [everyone to practice MY] Religion.

btw, it's also one the great case-naming victories, as the original case, Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania (brought by an assisted living facility/nursing home), was allowed by the courts to be renamed for its large business owner, the far more corporately savvy and sympathetically named religious order, Little Sisters of the Poor.

[Thought about __ all my life]

Can't tell what you meant to say but Hobby Lobby was a fine judgment. We have to stop hurting physcially visible and present human beings in the name of posterity or public good or 'the future'

The most basic foundation of our Founding is that conscience is sacred

"Nothing is more dreaded than the national government meddling with religion." —John Adams, in a letter to Benjamin Rush. 1812

"[T]hat the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction; that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty." —Thomas Jefferson, 1779.

"The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man: and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate." —James Madison, 1785.

"Driven from every other corner of the earth, freedom of thought and the right of private judgment in matters of conscience direct their course to this happy country as their last asylum." —Samuel Adams, Speech on August 1, 1776.

"While we are contending for our own liberty, we should be very cautious not to violate the conscience of others, ever considering that God alone is the judge of the hearts of men, and to Him only in this case are they answerable." —George Washington, in a letter to Benedict Arnold.

"Conscience is the most sacred of all property." —James Madison, 1792.

Students today don't even know the idea of 'tyrrany of the majority" but from what I can take of your post it is your guiding principle.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Interesting article:

Japanese Court Awards $1.4 Million to Exonerated Man
Iwao Hakamada, 89, who is believed to have been the world’s longest-serving death row inmate, was exonerated last year of a 1966 murder conviction.

In part:

.Japan’s Supreme Court sentenced him to death in 1980. In 2014, Mr. Hakamada’s lawyers won a retrial and his release after testing showed that blood on clothing that the police had used as evidence didn’t contain his DNA.

After the Shizuoka District Court granted Mr. Hakamada a retrial in 2014, the Tokyo High Court reversed the decision and refused to reopen the case. In 2020, the Supreme Court sided with the district court and ordered a new trial, which ended with his acquittal in September.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/25/us/japan-death-row-inmate-payout.html

[A Japanese Student]

The Constitution of Japan guarantees every acquitted person the right to seek compensation for wrongful confinement. Mr. Hakamada received the maximum payment - 12,500 yen ($83) per day. From his 1966 arrest to his court-ordered parole in 2014, he had been in jail for 17,389 days in total.

(Had he been executed, the amount of compensation would have instead been 30M yen, or $200k. What?)

[John F. Carr]

By statute my state allows a payment determined by a jury, but not more than $1 million in total, for wrongful imprisonment. To win compensation a person must have been imprisoned based on a felony conviction that was set aside on grounds suggesting actual innocence.

[apedad]

From Orozaco v. Texas:

Here, there was no prolonged interrogation, no unfamiliar surroundings, no opportunity for the police to invoke those procedures which moved the majority in Miranda. In fact, the conversation was, by all accounts, a very brief one. According to uncontradicted testimony, petitioner was awake when the officers entered his room, and they asked him four questions: his name, whether he had been at the El Farleto, whether he owned a pistol, and where it was. He gave his name, said he had been at the El Farleto, and admitted he owned a pistol without hesitation. He was slow in telling where the pistol was, and the question was repeated. He then took the police to the nearby washing machine where the gun was hidden.

It is unquestioned that this sequence of events in their totality would not constitute coercion in the traditional sense or lead any court to view the admissions as involuntary within the meaning of the rules by which we even now adjudicate claims of coercion relating to pre-Miranda trials.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/324/

"It is unquestioned that this sequence of events in their totality would not constitute coercion in the traditional sense . . . . "

Sheesh.....I like how the dissent just freely believes they understand everyone's feelings.

Having four cops surrounding your bed at 4 am is not coercive?!?

[Dan Schiavetta]

Indeed. thanks!

[JoeFromtheBronx]

" Petitioner left the scene and returned to his boardinghouse to sleep. At about 4 a.m. four police officers arrived at petitioner's boardinghouse, were admitted by an unidentified woman, and were told that petitioner was asleep in the bedroom. All four officers entered the bedroom and began to question petitioner."

This quote is from the majority. The quote provided by the first comment is from the dissent. I agree that police coming to your room at 4 A.M., even if you were awake once they entered (he could have been asleep until the police arrived), is coercive.

As the majority noted: "According to the officer's testimony, petitioner was under arrest, and not free to leave, when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning."

The stationhouse might be more isolating, but police questioning you at your residence is coercive too. It is overall constitutionally offensive on other grounds too. It invades the privacy of the home.

The "knock at the door at night" is a typical concern.

[apedad]

Police surrounding a person in ANY setting, e.g., restaurant, public park, parking garage, your auto, etc., is coercive.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

I don't disagree with the reply. I'm just touching upon the specific facts. Also, I checked the oral argument, and this part of the dissent's comment came to mind:

"According to uncontradicted testimony, petitioner was awake when the officers entered his room"

Near the beginning of the oral argument, it was stated that there was some doubt about whether he was sleep or "just awakened" when police entered the room.

[A Japanese Student]

Tokyo District Court ordered judicial dissolution of Unification Church today, becoming the third religious corporation to be dissolved under Article 81. (See https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/3898/je#je_ch9at6). This is the first case in which a dissolution was ordered for civilly tortious acts - here, fraud and financial exploitation that destroyed the lives of many adherents and their families.

The main effect of the dissolution is the loss of tax exemption. The Church can still act as an unincorporated association. A court-appointed liquidator would pay obligations, and the remaining assets (if any) would be transferred to someone named in the corporate charter.

The Church says it intends to appeal the decision. The order is automatically stayed during appeal.

[A Japanese Student]

The controversy brought into attention children of religious parents - "Shukyo nisei". Some of them suffer from poverty due to the parents making large donations.

Is this a problem in the US as well? I've heard of stories about CPS coming to homes of religious parents, but they are mostly from proponents of religious freedom.

[Krayt]

Home shopping channels, which specialize in draining lifetime savings of retirees by pretending to be their friends, should watch out!

Just kidding! Drain away! You've been at it 50 years.

[A Japanese Student]

I wonder how many decisions below would be ruled differently in the US. At least three, I expect.

Employment Security Act Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1960): Penal labor by reason of inability to pay fine is constitutional (here, sentence of fine must also authorize penal labor - for example, one day per 5,000 yen ($33) of unpaid fine; cf. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983))

Special Kokoku-Appeal to Order Transferring Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1969): Cannot appeal order transferring a case between divisions of the same district court (e.g. admin-law cases must be filed at the prefecture capital)

Public Offices Election Act Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1975): Citing precedents, holds that the Constitution permits admission of ex parte testimony made before a judge if the witness later died (likely violates Crawford)

Forest Act Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1977): Penal Code §242, extending theft to cover one's own property possessed by others, only applies to offenses "under this Chapter" and not to Forest Act offense of stealing forest products

Tactile Paving Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1986): Tactile pavings, invented by a Japanese man in 1965, allow blind people to safely navigate the streets. Unfortunately for the appellate, the station he visited in 1973 did not have the paving yet, causing him to fall into the railroad track and lose his legs. Court holds that tactile paving is still an emerging technology and remands for additional factual inquiry as to whether the station design was defective.

Esso Oil Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1993): Union fees cannot be deducted from wages without employee's consent

Tort Claims Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 25, 1999): Publisher not liable for claim by adherents of religion that reading an article (criticizing a church) hurt their feelings (I wonder if this precedent forecloses speech-related NIED claims; could not find sources discussing this case)

Revocation of Patent Cancellation Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 25, 2002): Patent co-owner can severally appeal cancellation of patents; no need for other co-owners to join the appeal

Special Kokoku-Appeal to Order Reversing Grant of Bail (Third Petty Bench, decided March 25, 2014): District court did not abuse its discretion in granting bail to defendant because he pled guilty, was not a flight risk, and evidence had already been examined; reverses appellate ruling to the contrary and reinstates district court order (if he was a white-collar offender, this might've been a reasonable decision, but he was the polar opposite: he pled guilty to six counts of drug-facilitated rape!)

Retirement Income Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 25, 2021): Spouse of deceased employee in defunct marriage not entitled to retirement income payout by Small Enterprise Retirement Allowance Mutual Aid System

[Syd Henderson]

The inventor of tactile paving was Seiichi Miyake, who died in 1982. One of those little things that make life better for some people and the rest of us take for granted.

[John F. Carr]

On the duty to upgrade American streets, see Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). The case was about ramps replacing vertical curbs. Under current rules ramps must have textured surfaces.

I remember watching a blind man trying to navigate a construction zone at the edge of the street. The paths were clearly marked with orange barrels and tape. (I knew him and would have helped but I was a passenger in a car driving past.) The people who design permanent parts of the street have ADA compliance in mind. In my area work zones are badly designed for everybody.