Today in Supreme Court History: March 16, 1925

3/16/25: Pierce v. Society of Sisters argued.

Comments

[Stupid Government Tricks]

Probably ought to start using 4-digit years.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (decided March 16, 1810): awarding land to purchaser in good faith, unaware that seller had obtained it by fraud

Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (decided March 16, 1953): not a denial of due process to detain “bad security risk” alien at Ellis Island without hearing where no other country would receive him (the story given of this man’s meanderings and unexplained rejection by every country he visited, including Communist ones, is remarkable -- he was finally released in 1954 when Ellis Island closed down) (holding was superseded by statute, see Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 2020)

Williamson v. Daniel, 25 U.S. 568 (decided March 16, 1827): Marshall for once attributes some humanity to slaves by holding that, in a dispute over apportionment of a decedent’s slaves, the child slaves follow their mother

Mason v. Matilda, 25 U.S. 590 (decided March 16, 1827): this time it’s Johnson, ruling against a mother and her children suing for their freedom; Court holds in favor of defendant (widow of original owner), even though Virginia law provided for emancipation if no compliance with 60-day registration requirement for bringing slaves into the state; “constructive registration” (my phrase) because he had openly possessed the mother for 22 years, during which she had given birth to the three co-plaintiffs

United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (decided March 16, 1827): conviction for slave trade “abetting” (overseas slave trade had been prohibited in 1808) even though ship not yet fitted out for slave transport

Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (decided March 16, 1896): ordering extradition of men who crossed from Texas into Mexico, killed Mexican soldiers (apparently as part of a rebellion against the Díaz government), then came back into Texas; not a “political question” (I wonder if it’s relevant that the United States supported Díaz)

Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (decided March 16, 1953): remanding to state court question of whether Michigan statute regulating Communist Party activities (state Attorney General prepared list, restricted access to space on ballot, etc.) was Constitutional (the Michigan Supreme Court then struck down the statute, holding that the field of anti-sedition legislation had been preempted by federal law, 345 Mich. 519, 1956)

Crancer v. Lowdon, 315 U.S. 631 (decided March 16, 1942): Are rings that protect pipe threads during shipping (thrown away before use) “scrap iron” or “pipe fittings” for the purpose of ICC tariffs? Bench trial verdict was pipe fittings. Court affirms.

Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (decided March 16, 1914): convicted of stealing “$1,000 in lawful money of the United States”, moved for new trial, then convicted of stealing “a check payable for the sum of $1,000 in money”; no new arraignment or plea needed before second trial

Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 647 (decided March 16, 1914): affirming a jury verdict for violating law prohibiting importing persons for contract labor; this was a civil action so leeway given to government on evidentiary matters (e.g., reading into evidence depositions of absent witnesses)

[SRG2]

re: Mezei - for some reason Justice Clark uses the word "captiously" when surely "capriciously" was meant.

[Dan Schiavetta]

At first I thought you were being captious, but you're correct. The case he is relying on said "capricious".

[SRG2]

I wondered whether Justia had had a typo but I checked another source and it too said "captious"

[Noscitur a sociis]

Captious is what’s in the reporter: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep345/usrep345206/usrep345206.pdf

It seems to make sense semantically though?

[Paladin_44]

Learning a new word every day.

[Dan Schiavetta]

I learned it myself only recently. Previously I thought it meant "uncertain".

This happens to me and I imagine it happens to other people too, where for years we think a word means one thing but in fact it means something else. A few examples. For years I thought "tendentious" meant "without support". Actually it means "biased". I thought "ingratiating" meant pleasing to the point of being irritating (perhaps because it sounds like "grating"). Actually it's not pejorative; it simply means "engaging", "attractive", i.e., acting or speaking in a way that gets into one's good graces. Another one was "redoubtable". It has nothing to do with "doubtful", in fact it's almost the opposite.

[Hugh]

If Justice Thomas really wants to overturn Obergefell and Lawrence, he's going to have to overturn this decision too.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

No, not really.

The key passage in the Pierce decision:

"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

You can believe that and simultaneously deny that there's a constitutional right to sodomy.

[Dan Schiavetta]

At issue was not putting a penis into a mouth, but putting a penis into the mouth of someone who also has a penis. "Sodomy" was never prosecuted against het couples.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

In any case, my point about the relevance (or lack of relevance) of Pierce to the subject of sodomy remains the same.

[A Japanese Student]

That's the Justice O'Connor concurrence, which was decided solely on equal-protection grounds. Although Justice Thomas doesn't like substantive due process, he seems fine with equal protection argument so long as gays are not involved. (Also explains his view on interracial marriage - in his view Loving is all about race, not marriage.)

[Dan Schiavetta]

He pretty much has to say that Loving was about race. I would like to see someone point out to his face that by his own lights Loving was wrongly decided.

In the same vein, or maybe not, see openly gay male State Rep. Jeremy Moss (D, of course) thwart State Sen. Schriver's (R, of course) homophobic press conference by sitting right in front of him and then taking questions after Schriver bails. h/t to Fred at Slacktivist (one of my favorite bloggers).

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=676743458149169

[The Margrave of Azilia]

No, Thomas thinks racial discrimination is unconstitutional. Banning interracial marriage is racial discrimination, therefore it is unconstitutional.

Even people who don't like the justice are capable of understanding that Justice Thomas believes race discrimination is illegal, and that he would hold that view even if he hadn't married a white woman. Progressives simply seem to think that his interracial marriage is something deserving of frequent comment.

Don't worry, white progressives: Mrs. Thomas was never going to marry *you,* anyway, she didn't cheat you out of your racial birthright.

[Dan Schiavetta]

It was not racial discrimination to prohibit interracial marriage. Both races were treated equally.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

They said the same about segregated railways, schools, etc.

Or are you just kidding around with me? Please tell me you're kidding.

[Dan Schiavetta]

The “separate is inherently unequal” basis does not apply to interracial marriage.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

You're really going with this? Just to get your licks in against Thomas?

[Dan Schiavetta]

Tell me why it is incorrect.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

Because it treats people differently based on their race?

[Dan Schiavetta]

No it doesn’t. See above. It treated white people and black people the same.

My point is that someone with Thomas’s views (though of course not Thomas himself) would decide Loving differently.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

Doesn't sound like equal treatment to me.

Potter Stewart knew racial discrimination when he saw it, and his entire concurrence in Loving v. Virginia read:

"I have previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 379 U. S. 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that belief, I concur in the judgment of the Court."

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/388/1/#tab-opinion-1946731

What did Stewart get wrong? Why would "someone with Thomas’s views (though of course not Thomas himself)" disagree?

[SRG2]

I wonder whether Thomas would uphold Brown. The Margrave would appear to think so.

This article suggests otherwise.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/clarence-thomas-criticizes-brown-v-174419147.html

[The Margrave of Azilia]

I think your anti-Thomas hysteria has unhinged you.

You link to an article consisting largely of indignant comments on Twitter/X about a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, which mentioned Brown v Board. Missing was the actual opinion being criticized, or the fact that Justice Thomas's opinion actually presupposed the unconstitutionality of school segregation.

I had to look up the actual opinion and it is here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-807_3e04.pdf

He was criticizing the broad understanding of equitable remedies which the Court developed in the wake of the Brown decision: 'That understanding may have justified temporary measures to “overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution” prevalent at that time, but, as a general matter, “[s]uch extravagant uses of judicial power are at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and the Framers’ design.” Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 125–126 (opinion
of THOMAS, J.).'

Are you seriously going to translate this into a belief in the constitutionality of segregation?

[SRG2]

Thank you, Margrave, for providing the link.

You will note this line: "That understanding may have justified temporary measures to “overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution” prevalent at that time" (my bold)

IMO that line can only mean that the resistance no longer prevails and that therefore such measures were no longer justified. Ergo, he would not uphold Brown even though he might - and certainly implies that he would - have supported Brown at the time.

If I despise Thomas for a vile and loathsome hypocrite, it is because he is a vile and loathsome hypocrite, tolerant of executing the innocent, willing to give a pass to officials on QI for the most horrendous violations, whining about CAF while doing nothing about it when he can, writing well=poisoning disssents, ...oh, and being an unethical sumbitch.

I presume you'd regard these as qualifications.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

"I presume you'd regard these as qualifications."

Would you do me one small favor? Would you go and perform an anatomically-difficult act upon yourself? Thank you.

[Noscitur a sociis]

IMO that line can only mean that the resistance no longer prevails and that therefore such measures were no longer justified. Ergo, he would not uphold Brown even though he might - and certainly implies that he would - have supported Brown at the time.

With all due respect, you may want to read it again. Because it’s a pretty bad O.

[ReaderY]

See Poe v. North Carolina, 445 US 947 (1980).

[A Japanese Student]

Nah, Justice Thomas would just base this decision on First Amendment. Both Meyer and Pierce have some connections to speech. It is Griswold where the connection gets cut, and you need an alternative theory.

[ReaderY]

Even Griswold retains a tenuous connection to speech, at least by its own terms. The idea is that the First Amendment protects institutions integral to the transmission of ideas, and marriage as an institution is one of these protected institutions. It is Eisenstadt v. Baird that completely cuts even a pretense of connection.

[A Japanese Student]

Took some time as I was busy. Search and seizure law is always in search for seizure-inducing complexities.

Preparation for Murder, Duel Case (Second Petty Bench, decided March 16, 1951): Preparation for duel, if committed with intent to kill, can be punished as preparing for murder (and yes, Japan has a law specifically criminalizing duels)

Criminal Regulations to Control Explosives Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 16, 1976): Bomb still "used" when fuse lit, even if it did not explode due to some flaws

Road Traffic Act Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 16, 1976): Many 4A questions in Japan are instead statutory questions, including CoCP §197 (that "compulsory dispositions" must be authorized by law). Compulsory dispositions generally require a warrant; non-compulsory dispositions do not require warrants or statutory basis. Rejecting theory that all uses of force are compulsory dispositions, it rules that grabbing the wrist of a drunk driver trying to leave the police station is not a "compulsory disposition"; it then holds that some non-compulsory dispositions can still be unreasonable under the circumstances, but says this is reasonable as well (so, what is a compulsory disposition, then? two theories exist - one reads this case textually to hold that "restraints on one's body, house, or property through suppression of one's will" are compulsory in nature; the other is the "substantial infringement of important interest" test, which the GPS Investigation Case used) (This would've been a very easy case in the US - the defendant would have been arrested for DUI long before the confrontation under exigent-circumstance exception; here they waited until they could get the breath alcohol level reading before arrest, even though the defendant was found visibly drunk in an accident scene. Probable cause alone does not justify warrantless arrest here, and arrests in general can only be made if it is necessary (such as to prevent flight or destruction of evidence))

Public Office Election Act Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 16, 1978): Unlawful campaign expenditure is included in total campaign expenditure limit

Ienaga Textbook Case I (Third Petty Bench, decided March 16, 1993): One of the three Ienaga Textbook Cases. The Government rejected Mr. Ienaga's high school history textbook, making it unavailable in public schools. Court rules this is not censorship because he can (and in fact did) sell it in bookstores. Court also held that because high school students aren't capable of criticizing the contents of the textbook, the Government has an interest in ensuring accuracy, neutrality, and fairness. (In 2014 they added a requirement that textbooks must include the Government's position on contested matters; 8 years later, when the Government made an official position on Korean "comfort women" issues, publishers amended textbooks to reflect the new, more conservative position)

[Thought about __ all my life]

Oregon that will do anything to get you to abort your child but NOTHING to help you keep it

Oregon sought to shutter parochial schools and force parents to send their children to public schools.

Study: 96% of women who couldn't access abortion don't regret that after 5 years
https://thelifeinstitute.net/blog/2021/study-96-of-women-who-couldnt-access-abortion-dont-regret-that-after-5-years