Today in Supreme Court History: March 1, 1880

3/1/1880: Strauder v. West Virginia decided.

Comments

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Today's opinion held that a law that completely kept black people off juries was unconstitutional. The decision still left open various ways for states to keep blacks off specific juries.

It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.

The 7-2 opinion had a patronizing aspect:

The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect themselves. They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident.

The case relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. Some people (see the dissent) understood the amendment more narrowly. The result is reinforced by the Fifteenth Amendment. Jurors are often selected by looking at the voting rolls. They are a type of "voter." As noted by the dissent, it has a "political" character.

The Nineteenth Amendment, in that sense, reinforces the importance of having women on juries.

[Stupid Government Tricks]

Makes me wonder how much of this was admitting how badly whites had treated, and were treating, blacks.

The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect themselves. They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident.

Weird how it first blames it on their race's innate inferiority, then implies poor training was to blame. I've known what I think of as racialists, not racists, who don't think other races are less intelligent, they just think mixing races is immoral. They remind me of reading Churchill and others of his generation who discuss the English, French, German, Polish, Hungarian, and everybody else as separate races. I don't think I will ever understand that mindset.

[David Nieporent]

I've known what I think of as racialists, not racists, who don't think other races are less intelligent, they just think mixing races is immoral.

The Venn diagram of people who think mixing races is immoral and people who think other races are less intelligent is a single circle.

[Stupid Government Tricks]

The Venn diagram of people who claim to know everything but actually don't is empty. They don't know that they don't know everything.

Not my problem that subtle nuances are beyond your ken. I expect no better from a statist know-it-all.

[John F. Carr]

Can a white defendant complain that blacks are kept off juries? All the cases I have seen involve a defendant wanting jurors who were part of the same minority.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

See Powers v. Ohio.

[Syd Henderson]

I'm trying to figure out how that and Holland v. Illinois are consistent even though they were decided a year apart. Change in personnel during 1990-91?

[A Japanese Student]

Holland involved the Impartial Jury Clause; Powers involved the Equal Protection Clause.

[A Japanese Student]

I remember reading a case from Puerto Rico. Significant percentage of its residents speak only Spanish, yet federal law requires jurors to understand English. Some states do appear to allow them - in fact, New Mexico Constitution protects non-English-speaking people's right to serve as jurors. (State v. Samora, 2013 NMSC 38)

[Satchmo_Lives]

I guess needing, or rather wanting, a juror to understand my defense, or the prosecution for that matter, depends largely on whether I committed the crime and the evidence against me.

"Juror number six didn't understand a single word spoken during the trial but still found the defendant guilty" seems like a damn good argument for an appellate court.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (decided March 1, 1880): Fourteenth Amendment violated by state statute restricting jury duty to whites; the Court’s dictum as to some restrictions being permissible was overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 1975, insofar as restricting it to males

Swint v. Chambers Co. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35 (decided March 1, 1995): The Court here takes on the persistent issue of discretionary “pendent appellate jurisdiction”, i.e., appealing a normally non-appealable order along with an appealable one. In a §1983 suit against police officers and county arising from a narcotics raid on a nightclub, it holds that officers’ appeal from an order denying them qualified immunity (automatically appealable, 28 U.S.C. §1291, despite not being a final judgment) does not bring along with it county’s appeal from order denying summary judgment. The claim against the county involved different issues (e.g., formation of policy), and the Circuit Court had no discretion to hear it. (By contrast, see National Fire Ins. v. Bartolazo, 27 F.3d 518, where in an insurance coverage dispute the court heard the appeal of the denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion -- a nonfinal order -- along with the appeal of granting of defendant’s; the issues and evidence were the same and summary judgment to defendant had disposed of the entire case anyway.)

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (decided March 1, 1977): new definition of impermissible “obscenity” announced in Miller v. California, 1973, did not apply to pending prosecutions (Court also makes the useful point that when it issues a plurality decision, its “holding” for precedential purposes will be the opinion of the judge(s) who concurred on the narrowest ground)

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (decided March 1, 1965): another obscenity case: can’t show a banned movie until you get a judge to overrule the censor’s order (though conviction vacated anyway because state statute didn’t provide for prompt judicial review)

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (decided March 1, 2005): Eighth Amendment prohibits executing those under 18 when crime committed (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989)

FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (decided March 1, 1972): Remember S&H green stamps? I do, though my mother never spent time pasting them into those redeemable booklets (she was too busy raising six kids). The FTC ordered S&H to cease a marketing scheme that supposedly unfairly inhibited competition. Court holds that though the FTC can enjoin practices that violate neither the letter nor the spirit of anticompetition statutes, in this case its order made no findings and gave no reasons. (From the opinion we learn that since 1896 S&H had issued more than a trillion stamps.)

The Mary Ann, 21 U.S. 380 (decided March 1, 1823): captain of slave ship screwed up the paperwork (slaves have to be listed in duplicate!) but Marshall vacates forfeiture because the indictment was also screwed up for lack of specifics; sends it back for correction

Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (decided March 1, 2016): child pornography statute increasing sentence if prior “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” (emphasis added) included prior conviction of abuse of adult

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (decided March 1, 2011): corporations don’t have “personal privacy” rights so as to resist Freedom of Information Act requests (FCC had granted FOIA request for records AT&T had provided to law enforcement in investigation of overcharging government) though they can assert the “trade secrets” privilege

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (decided March 1, 1995): marijuana seized as result of arrest warrant that had already been quashed held admissible; “good faith” exception to exclusionary rule because due to clerical error police hadn’t been told of the quash (the warrant, issued by a town judge because defendant hadn’t shown for a hearing as to traffic violations, was quashed by another judge when he did show several days later, apparently by clerk notating in ledger without telling defendant or police)

[A Japanese Student]

I've seen many cases with plurality decisions that does not work well with Marks analysis. Sometimes the fifth vote is procedural - Pico is a good example. Other times the opinions are contradictory, like with the pork case.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

There have been failed attempts to extend the under 18 rule.

A recent execution involved someone who argued he was mentally and developmentally under 18:

https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/florida-inmate-james-ford-execution-u-s-supreme-court/

There have also been attempts to draw the line at 21.

As to Marks, some want SCOTUS to take a case to clarify the situation. They had opportunities but didn't take them.

[A Japanese Student]

Asahikawa National Health Insurance Case (Grand Bench, decided March 1, 2006): Setting mandatory health insurance premiums by mayoral proclamation (instead of through city ordinance approved by legislators) does not violate the tax nondelegation doctrine; city ordinance required premiums to be set so that the total revenue reaches the amount calculated using ordinance's formula, which was specific enough (what's more interesting: the plaintiff - who likely had no legal background - filed suit pro se after no lawyer took his case, fully prevailed at the district court, lost appeal, and argued the case at the Grand Bench still pro se)

Dementia Patient's Train Accident Case (Third Petty Bench, decided March 1, 2016): Spouse of person with diminished capacity not liable per se for torts committed; family of a man with dementia not liable for train accident caused by him entering the rail track given the circumstances (rail company sued the man's wife (then 85-year-old) and son (who visited him on weekends only))

Unfair Competition Prevention Act Case (First Petty Bench, decided March 1, 2021): DRM anti-circumvention provision violated by software disabling a feature that prevented taking of screenshots; decryption capability not necessary

[SRG2]

Lockhart is a bad case. owing to unclear drafting. Had Congress bullet-pointed the grounds, there'd have been no ambiguity. But as Lockhart was a sleaze, unsurprising he loses.

[SRG2]

Predictable that Roper's dissenters included the three goddards Rehnquist Scalia and Thomas. I don't know O'Connor's specific biases, and she also dissented.