The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Idling buses, an iPhone non-search, and high seas cocaine.
New on the Short Circuit podcast: Do NIMBYs like big bats and they cannot lie? Plus some remands and removals.
- Special education student sues D.C., claiming inadequate education under IDEA. D.C. Circuit: Summary judgment for D.C. There's no flaw in the student's individualized education program, even if he didn't reach the desired "educational outcome." Concurrence: Summary judgment is an awkward fit for IDEA cases. Even with a closed record, factual disputes remain. We should use Rule 52 bench trials instead.
- Eylea is a very expensive macular-degeneration drug ($2,000+ annual Medicare copay) with a far cheaper competitor. To appeal to patients, the drug manufacturer wants to reduce that copay. But giving a copay rebate directly to the doctor or patient is an illegal kickback, so instead the manufacturer gives the money to a charitable foundation that then distributes copays. Still a kickback, says the feds, which makes the Medicare claims the doctors file "false or fraudulent" under the False Claims Act. First Circuit: Not quite. There's no false or fraudulent claim if the doctor would've purchased Eylea anyway. The kickback must be a but-for cause.
- Bus company allegedly idled its buses for more than five minutes at a few Massachusetts bus stops, including the Harry Agganis Way shuttle stop. Apparently this violates state law and through some complicated regulatory machinations therefore violates federal law. Who knew? A few environmental groups. But do they have standing? District court: No more than anyone else who breathes air. Dismissed. First Circuit: Well, depends on the facts. Undismissed and remanded to figure those out.
- A student in Ludlow, Mass., informs school officials that they prefer to use a different name and pronouns. School officials honor that request, and, pursuant to an unwritten policy, do not divulge anything to the student's parents. Parents eventually find out and allege the policy violates their fundamental parental right to direct the upbringing of their children. First Circuit: A fundamental right, yes, but not one implicated by the school maintaining its own environment and declining to disclose this information to parents. And it survives rational basis. Dismissal affirmed.
- A U.S.-Egypt dual citizen alleges that in the 1990s Egypt expropriated his shares in an Egyptian paper company, causing him a loss of over $15 mil. He obtains a ruling and a ministerial decree in Egypt that purportedly require his compensation. Unable to collect for years, the dual citizen eventually sues Egypt's minister of finance in New York state court, who removes to federal court. There the suit is dismissed after the court finds it was effectively a suit against Egypt. Second Circuit: The minister is entitled to invoke the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the dual citizen waived any argument that an exception to that immunity applies. Dismissal affirmed.
- Is using an iPhone camera to see through a tinted window a search? Nope, holds the Second Circuit. Kyllo (that case about using a thermal scanner on a house) doesn't apply to cars. And touching the car while holding the camera isn't a search either. Jones (that case about putting a GPS tracker on a car) doesn't apply when a physical trespass isn't the source of the information.
- Generally speaking, parties involved with meth are not the winners in federal court. So what the hell needs to happen for the Fourth Circuit to find plain error, allow one of those defendants to withdraw his plea, and start talking about "egregiously impermissible government conduct"? The answer, apparently, is not "a new or isolated incident from the United States Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of North Carolina."
- Active service member living at Fort Campbell, Ky., is murdered. The feds prosecute her estranged husband and he's convicted. The fact that the fort is within the United States' "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" is established by judicial notice, not by the jury. Was that wrong? Sixth Circuit: No. Concurrence: This is a question without precedent, so I look to history. And in 1833 SCOTUS used a book called Stoddard's Louisiana to discern admiralty jurisdiction. Which seems good to me.
- An Illinois man was set to be released from custody on the Friday of a Presidents' Day weekend, but releases aren't processed on weekends or holidays, so they kept him locked up until the following Tuesday. Seventh Circuit: Bummer, but it's just four days and doesn't violate the Eighth Amendment.
- Years-long feud between a Minnesota cattle farmer and state regulators over feedlot permits and alleged violations culminates in a record $152,724 penalty. Farmer raises a due process claim (for permit delay) and a First Amendment retaliation claim (for the fine). District court: Dismissed. Eighth Circuit: Remand. No "protected property interest" in the permit—so the due process claim's dead. But the retaliation claim is revived—regulators allegedly fined farmer for lawful pushback, like petitioning the state legislature for help.
- Defendant: Sure, I routinely showed up to move marijuana shipments at my brother's giant marijuana warehouse from which you eventually seized almost half a ton of marijuana, but who's to say I really knew the bags I was moving contained marijuana? Eighth Circuit: The jury. The jury said you knew that. And, since they had darn good reason to think so, conviction affirmed.
- The caption reads Missouri v. Trump, but in this case the Eighth Circuit actually strikes down a Biden administration student-loan forgiveness program after the Supreme Court nixed its first attempt based on a different statute. Statutory-interpretation aficionados will enjoy cameos from the major questions doctrine, Loper Bright, and nationwide APA vacatur.
- Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act prohibit state officials from sharing motor vehicle records with other states to improve voter registration files? Eight Circuit: We can't say, but we do know the Act doesn't allow private lawsuits against state officials and agencies.
- Congress enacts the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, and the EEOC issues a regulation extending the Act's protections to employees who have abortions. A bunch of states sue to invalidate the reg. But do they have standing? Eighth Circuit: The states are employers the Act directly regulates and Congress has explicitly abrogated their sovereign immunity. Case undismissed.
- Ninth Circuit: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act means that, while the adult men who used Grindr to contact and eventually assault the minor plaintiff might be liable, Grindr can't be sued for hosting that contact in the first place.
- In which the Ninth Circuit politely notes (over a dissent) that the plaintiff has standing to object to the Air Force's failure to conduct an environmental review before deciding to dispose of unexploded ordinance on a nearby Guamanian beach because conducting that review might have persuaded the Air Force to, like, not do that.
- During a nighttime patrol outside of Reno, Nev., Bureau of Land Management rangers spot a group of motorcyclists riding around without lights. When one motorcyclist refuses to stop, the rangers give chase and arrest him. The motorcyclist is indicted for, inter alia, "driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight." He argues the statute authorizing that regulation unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the Secretary of the Interior. Ninth Circuit: The statute provides a "sufficiently intelligible" principle: developing a long-term management strategy to realize the land's value in a sustainable way. That's enough even though violations can result in criminal penalties. Reversed and remanded.
- This Tenth Circuit panel has some internal disagreement about how to allocate the burden of proof when a guard and an inmate dispute whether a prison sexual encounter was consensual, but that disagreement doesn't matter much at summary judgment when both the inmate's testimony and the video (!) of the encounter make it seem plenty nonconsensual.
- Sensationalists and yellow journalists might focus on this Tenth Circuit panel's disagreement over whether a transgender prisoner forced to stay in a housing unit that doesn't match her gender identity states an Equal Protection claim, but the loyal staff at Short Circuit wants you to know that footnote 15 in the majority opinion is more than a page long.
- Generally speaking, parties involved with meth are not the winners in federal court. So in a more typical result, here's the Tenth Circuit ruling for a Denver-area police officer who shot and killed a deranged man who charged at the officer inside a burning home. [Your editors, who hate qualified immunity, think this case is a good example of the protection for law enforcement already embodied in the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.]
- The Constitution gives Congress broad power to "define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high seas[,]" which means (says the Eleventh Circuit) that if Congress says you go to prison for having a honkload of cocaine on your boat, then you go to prison for having a honkload of cocaine on your boat.
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If I remember from high school, here are two honk-loads to a shit-ton.
"If John sells Mary an ounce of cocaine, how much is that in grams?"
About the bus idling case.
Around 2001 the EPA told the Houston, Texas planning district that it needed to reduce speed limits. The computer said that was necessary to reduce pollution. Houston said your computer is f-ing retarded. EPA insisted. So the Clean Air Act implementation plan dutifully provided for speed limit reductions. I conclude from this First Circuit case that while the plan was in effect, if you were speeding on Houston interstates somebody could sue you for violating the Clean Air Act.
The EPA's computer was indeed retarded. After it was fixed a few years later the compliance plan was changed to omit speed limits.
It's 90 MGL 16A:
It's "forseeable" and "unnecessary" in the statute (which the Constipation Law Foundation didn't even quote) and the Regs say the same thing.
Now what's being missed here is that Diesel engines don't have spark plugs. They ignite the fuel/air mix by compression, and that works fine when the engine is hot. When it isn't, a lot (sometimes 80+%) of the fuel is not burned. This (a) causes pollution, (b) is bad for the engine (skipping & knocking), and (c) dangerous because the engine could suddenly stall if the operator stepped on the accelerator-- when power is most needed.
Between keeping the buses warm or cool (the windows can NOT be opened), removing the moisture so that the windshield doesn't fog up, running the interior lights, etc -- outside of ideal daytime spring/fall days, you are going to need that engine running.
Of course no one working for the Constipation Law Foundation has ever driven a bus, so none of this occurs to them....
And don't get me going about the First Circus...
"Section 16A. No person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit the unnecessary operation of the engine of a motor vehicle while said vehicle is stopped for a foreseeable period of time in excess of five minutes. This section shall not apply to (a) vehicles being serviced, provided that operation of the engine is essential to the proper repair thereof, or (b) vehicles engaged in the delivery or acceptance of goods, wares, or merchandise for which engine assisted power is necessary and substitute alternate means cannot be made available, or (c) vehicles engaged in an operation for which the engine power is necessary for an associate power need other than movement and substitute alternate power means cannot be made available provided that such operation does not cause or contribute to a condition of air pollution. Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for the first offense, nor more than five hundred dollars for each succeeding offense."
For whatever reason the compliance plan cited redundant regulations instead of statute. When it comes time to write regulations some bureacrats start by reproducing the statute. Why bother? In some cases like the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority there was a financial motive, but it's a more general habit.
(MTA when it was an independent agency could choose to adopt a state driving law or make its own regulation on the subject. For reckless driving instead of the state law crime they adopted an administrative infraction with a $50 fine, payable to the Turnpike.)
In the Fort Campbell case, the instruction to the jury read "If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime occurred at 4217 Contreras Court, that is sufficient to find that it occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." I think this fits into the rules of procedure I remember for judicial notice. In a criminal case judicial notice is permissive, the jury may accept it. In a civil case the jury must accept it.
I have heard of such judicial notice in another case. An inexperienced prosecutor was trying a traffic case. At the close of evidence the defense attorney moved for a not guilty verdict on the grounds that the prosecutor had not proved the offense was within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The judge saved the new guy by taking judicial notice that the road on which the event allegedly occurred was in the county.
I would have ruled that the Secretary of the Interior did not have a sufficienctly intelligible principle to lead him to the rule that off-road vehicles require taillights.
Maybe the Assimilative Crimes Act would have led to the same prosecution without a rule. I don't know if Nevada law requires taillights when fleeing law enforcement on public land but not on a public road, at night.
What struck me was that they didn't cite headlights -- and if there is a nearly full moon, you really can see BETTER without headlights. On an empty interstate, you are better off without them because the road is straight and marked, and all you really are looking for are Moose...
Is that in your dissertation?
I am glad to learn that the Golden Greek, Harry Agganis, is commemorated with a street bearing his name.
Harry Agganis Way is at Boston University -- not sure if is BU property or City property.
"that doesn't match her gender identity"
HIS gender identity.
Fixed.
In the 9th Circuit case involving the motorcyclists without taillights, it’s been long established that Congress’ powwr to regulate federal territory gives it unusual delegation power. It can set up complete territorial legislatures and empower them to make their own laws if it wants, and it has done so many times. Why can’t it delegate this power to an administrative agency?
I find the Ludlow tranny case infuriating because FERPA gives the parents of a minor child the absolute right of access to the ACTUAL educational records. This means that the student's report card would have to be sent home in the tranny's new name because that's what the school's educational records state that the child's name is.
Remember that they found out about this when a teacher made the mistake of using the child's new name.
I'd like to see what the lawyers say on this issue -- forget the tranny issue and just address the fraudulent record aspect. If the records are officially kept in the name of Jane Doe, and the parents have an unquestioned right of access to these records*, is it not FRAUD to generate records in the name of John Doe to send home to parents?
Those are not copies of the real records.
*There are FERPA exceptions under child abuse but (a) that has to be reported to DC&F ("Chapter 51A") and (b) is a case-by-case situation. Hence Mitchell Chester's 2012 memo violates FERPA.
No.
Thanks for your participation in another round of easy answers to dumb questions.
"Special education student sues D.C., claiming inadequate education under IDEA. D.C. Circuit: Summary judgment for D.C. There's no flaw in the student's individualized education program, even if he didn't reach the desired "educational outcome."
I am amazed that two licensed lawyers who purport a knowledge of SPED law, and both of whom have Graduate Education credits, screwed up this case as badly as they did.
There was an allegation that the IEP said "X, Y & Z" and the school wasn't doing "X, Y, & Z." If they weren't, that's breach of contract and you essentially sue just like you would for any other breached contract because an IEP is an actual signed contract between the parents and the school.
This is why I, as a classroom teacher, ALWAYS went to IEP meetings because I would be legally bound by whatever wound up in that IEP, and the school was small enough that the child would be in my classroom at some point.
Assuming that the parents went to the IEP meeting (most don't), they should have objected and while they are not completely out of luck for not doing so, they don't have a good case. Likewise the ones more than two years ago. But not doing things in the current IEPs?!? Why didn't these incompetent barristers mention that?!?
BTW: The exception involves misdiagnosis and the landmark case on that is Draper v. Atlanta -- the child, diagnosed as retarded, actually was dyslexic.
https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/draper.aps.comped.htm
You are, predictably, incorrect. The allegation was that the plans themselves were inadequate, not that the school wasn’t following through on them. That’s why the opinion says, “Note that each of these alleged deficiencies concerns the content of Edward's IEPs, not their implementation”.
Judge Selya has written his last vocabulary quiz.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/02/23/metro/federal-judge-bruce-selya-dies-at-90-ri-boston-harvard/
Sadness!