No Pseudonymity and Sealing in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Over Man's Apparent Suicide, Despite …

wife's concern "about public embarrassment and potential harm to Decedent's surviving children."

From Wednesday's decision by Manhattan trial judge Hasa Kingo in C.D. v. City of New York:

Petitioner C.D. ("Petitioner"), as administrator of the estate of C.L. ("Decedent") … requests permission to proceed under a pseudonym and to seal this proceeding, citing the sensitive nature of the circumstances and the potential for undue harm to Decedent's surviving children should these matters become public. {Notably, two of Decedent's surviving children are adults, and a third child is fourteen years old.} … [T]he court … denies the motion to proceed anonymously and under seal….

On November 8, 2024, C.L. experienced a mental health crisis and was transported by an EMS ambulance to Bellevue Hospital. He was admitted and passed away less than 24 hours later on November 9, 2024. The petition alleges that Respondents departed from accepted medical standards, resulting in C.L.'s death. Petitioner, Decedent's widow and proposed administrator of his estate, asserts claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death….

New York law strongly presumes that court proceedings should be open to the public, reflecting a fundamental principle of judicial transparency and accountability…. "Confidentiality is clearly the exception, not the rule, and the party seeking to seal court records has the burden to demonstrate compelling circumstances." This presumption ensures that the judicial process is conducted fairly and efficiently, while fostering public trust in the legal system.

Petitioner's request for anonymity and sealing is predicated on concerns about public embarrassment and potential harm to Decedent's surviving children. While the court is deeply sympathetic to the family's loss, such sympathy cannot supplant the rigorous legal standards required to justify sealing or anonymity….

[A] plaintiff seeking to proceed under a pseudonym must establish that their privacy interest outweighs the presumption of openness and that disclosure will result in specific, identifiable harm. Petitioner has not satisfied this burden.

The sensitive nature of the allegations, coupled with Decedent's professional status, does not constitute "compelling circumstances" under prevailing case law. Courts have consistently held that embarrassment, damage to reputation, or general privacy concerns are insufficient to warrant sealing court records. The claim that anonymity is necessary to shield the children from ridicule by classmates is speculative and unsubstantiated. Moreover, as potential deponents during the forthcoming litigation, Decedent's children are obligated to testify truthfully under oath, irrespective of whether the proceedings are sealed.

This case is distinguishable from actions involving allegations of sexual abuse or highly stigmatizing conduct, where courts have permitted anonymity to protect vulnerable parties. The allegations here—medical malpractice and wrongful death—do not carry the same societal stigma that would justify shielding Petitioner's identity and sealing the case file.

Furthermore, Petitioner's argument that anonymity will encourage candor from Decedent's children is unpersuasive. As noted, the obligation to testify truthfully under oath exists regardless of whether proceedings are public or private. Speculative claims about potential harm or embarrassment cannot override the public's right to access judicial proceedings.

Petitioner's subjective proposition—that Decedent's potential act of self-harm should be shielded and sealed to spare the sensitivities of his surviving children—rests on no discernible foundation within the framework of existing legal precedent. Rather, it reflects a normative judgment, rooted in personal sentiment, as to what a court ought to permit. Such a view, untethered to the rule of law, is inherently malleable, subject to fluctuation depending on the identities, circumstances, or sensibilities of the parties before the court.

This is precisely why the judiciary eschews reliance on subjective, individualized assessments. Justice demands constancy—an unyielding adherence to enduring legal standards that transcend the particularities of the litigants and the caprices of public opinion. To allow otherwise would risk eroding the very bedrock of equality under the law, substituting impartial adjudication with the uncertainty of personal attitudes. It is this steadfast commitment to impartiality that ensures justice is not only done but is seen to be done, without regard to the divergent positions or stations of those who seek it. To be sure, "[t]he ladder of law has no top and no bottom" (Bob Dylan, "The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll").

The judiciary has long resisted such subjective evaluations precisely to uphold the principle of enduring and impartial standards. Courts are not arbiters of individualized sensibilities but are instead tasked with ensuring that justice is administered evenly and consistently, irrespective of the differing opinions, social positions, or emotional responses of those appearing before them. This commitment to equality under the law is the cornerstone of a fair and impartial judicial system. This is precisely why the speculative reactions of Decedent's surviving children can neither compel nor permit this court to disregard the foundational principle of openness in judicial proceedings, save for the rarest of circumstances.

In sum, while the court acknowledges the difficult circumstances faced by Decedent's family, these considerations do not meet the exacting standard for granting anonymity and sealing. Openness in judicial proceedings remains a cornerstone of our legal system, ensuring accountability and fostering public confidence in the judiciary….

I think this case fits well with the American legal norm of pseudonymity. At the same time, even here the cases are divided. See, for example, C.R.M. v. United States (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2020), which allowed pseudonymity based on the deaths of plaintiff's three prematurely born children, and miscarriage of two fetuses at nineteen weeks of pregnancy. I wrote about that,

Anyone would sympathize with the plaintiff's desire "'to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature'—a soul shattering family tragedy," see [the Apr. 10, 2020 Motion in that case]. But it is hard to meaningfully distinguish this plaintiff from almost any wrongful death plaintiff, since all such cases stem from family tragedies that can be "soul shattering" in their own ways; yet wrongful death litigation routinely happens under the plaintiff's real name, and it seems unlikely that the decision in C.R.M. would be applied evenhandedly to other such cases.

Philip Lamson Sutter and Natalie Socorro represent the hospital defendants.