The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Appeals Court Decisions
A mashgiach minister, a spicy habeas, and a Madlibs macro.
New on the Bound By Oath podcast: When a SWAT team blows up an innocent person's house, who should foot the bill for the damage? The public! Since 1872, the Supreme Court has consistently said that such damage is a taking requiring just compensation. Which was also the rule at common law. Plus, what might state constitutions have to say about the matter?
- Anti-abortion groups challenge New York labor law that prohibits them from discriminating against employees based on whether they've had an abortion (or any other reproductive-health decision). The groups also object to having to include information in their employee handbooks about rights/remedies under the law. Second Circuit: The groups may have an expressive-association claim, which needs more development, but the handbook claim fails.
- If you're the sort who reads Short Circuit on the regular, you've probably already consumed all manner of hot- and lukewarm-takes on the Second Circuit's decision upholding an NYC jury's verdict that Donald Trump defamed E. Jean Carroll.
- West Virginia parents of schoolchildren challenge the state's vaccination requirement for students attending public, private, or parochial school, arguing that it violates the Free Exercise Clause. The district court abstains, reasoning that state courts should first analyze the law under the state's recently enacted Equal Protection for Religion Act, which became effective the month after the suit was filed. Fourth Circuit (over a dissent): Which was error. Abstention is the exception, not the rule!
- Truck driver subject to a domestic violence restraining order is arrested for possessing a gun, in violation of federal law. He challenges the law as facially unconstitutional and wins … until the Supreme Court vacates and remands his case for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. Fifth Circuit: And his facial challenge cannot prevail. The district court should take another look at his as-applied challenge—and there are some as-applied challenges that might succeed (though we wouldn't hold our breath in this case).
- Man convicted of murder in Mississippi state court argues several jurors were struck based on their race and the prosecution's alternative reasons don't add up. District court: This looks bad! Fifth Circuit: The Mississippi Supreme Court already said this argument was waived and who are we to judge a state court when it comes to federal constitutional rights? Habeas denied.
- Man convicted of manufacturing spice (the illegal kind, not melange) in Mississippi federal court appeals pro se; he's dismissed for want of prosecution. He then files a habeas petition in district court. Meanwhile, though, he successfully moves to recall the appellate court's mandate, gets an attorney, the Fifth Circuit (2021) affirms his conviction and SCOTUS denies him cert. Then he files another habeas petition in district court. Is that a "second or subsequent" petition? Fifth Circuit (2025): Weird facts, so no, treat it as a first petition.
- Are broadband providers a telecommunications provider under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, thus subjecting them to so-called "net neutrality" rules? Under Chevron, federal courts just had to ask the FCC. Sixth Circuit: But in the wake of Loper Bright, we actually have to read and interpret the law. And the answer is no.
- Montana man pleads guilty to assaulting his girlfriend in 2013. In 2018, he's found in possession of firearms. He's charged and convicted of violating federal law, which prohibits gun possession by anyone convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Ninth Circuit: Vacated. Federal law applies only to convictions where use of force is an element, but Montana's law can be triggered by emotional abuse. Applying the Supreme Court's "categorical approach," the conviction can't stand. Concurrence 1: But this is a pretty messed up result that Congress or the Montana Supreme Court could do something about. Concurrence 2: The categorical approach is pretty messed up in general and the Supreme Court should reconsider it.
- A משגיח (mashgiach) is an Orthodox Jew who supervises food preparation to make sure it's kept kosher. But is one who sues his former employer over employment-related claims also a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception (which categorically bars certain employment-related claims against religious organizations)? Ninth Circuit: Yes; the ministerial exception takes a "broad" view of who counts as a minister. Concurrence: Yes, even though the ministerial exception actually isn't necessarily as broad as the majority says.
- An Idaho inmate claimed other inmates would attack him, exhausted the grievance process, was returned to his cell—and other inmates attacked him. He sues, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act bar the suit because he failed to file and exhaust another grievance after the attack? Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): Under the "continuing violation doctrine," which we now adopt, a properly exhausted grievance asserting continuing harm exhausts future events arising from that harm. The inmate's suit against prison officials can proceed. Reversed in part and remanded.
- Firearm instructor purchases a Glock pistol modified to prevent its safety from re-engaging after firing a round. Yikes! He drops the gun during training, it shoots, and he loses a leg. The instructor sues Glock arguing, inter alia, that the gun is unreasonably dangerous. Tenth Circuit: Glock's warning and testing instructions adequately warn that modified guns may cause unintentional discharge.
- Alabama State University pays its athletic director (a woman) $135k, and, once she quits, pays her replacement (a man) $170k. Eleventh Circuit: Which isn't sex discrimination given the non-sex-based reasons for the difference: He had more relevant experience (13 years v. 2 years) and more education (a PhD v. a master's degree). Dissent: Should've let a jury figure it out, particularly considering the decisionmaker's gendered comments when she asked for a raise.
- Upon finding an unconscious inmate, corrections officers respond. He arouses and becomes combative, and it ultimately takes officers 20 minutes to restrain and get him into a wheelchair and to the medical treatment room. They do not stop to let two nurses on the scene help, nor do they check his pulse—and he has no pulse upon arrival to the treatment room. He dies. Eleventh Circuit: Totally reasonable response. Dissent: Video shows that officers applied force for at least 20 minutes, leaving him face down and throwing up while handcuffed and not resisting. And rather than see if he was okay, they took their sweet time getting him to the medical treatment room. A jury should've determined if the officers were deliberately indifferent.
- And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will not be quickly escalating to the en banc stage a challenge to a Louisiana law requiring displays of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. Instead, the case will be heard by a three-judge panel on its already expedited basis later this month. Three judges noted they voted in favor of an initial hearing en banc but did not issue a dissent. What was issued—and was on the Fifth Circuit's website for at least a day—was the order plus a Madlibs macro that assumedly was prepared before the votes came in. It read (p. 5-6 of pdf, without any edits by Short Circuit staff) "In the en banc poll, [enter number] judges voted in favor of hearing [list judges' last names], and [enter number] voted against hearing [list judges' last names]."
- And in more en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will not reconsider a panel opinion denying qualified immunity to an Austin, Tex. officer for the death of a suspect following a high-speed chase. Eight judges would have granted en banc review, nine would not, and once again no one noted their reasons. But no Madlibs this time.
- Friends, last week's edition contained a damnable mistake. In the case of the Aurora, Ill. officer who leg swept and punched a man at a traffic stop, it was a jury who decided the punches were not excessive force. Rather, the Seventh Circuit (over a dissent) held that several other claims were properly not presented to the jury because dashcam videos definitively show that the man was fleeing from police. The staff regrets the error. Phooey.
Onward! This week the Ninth Circuit revived a challenge to an abusive system of fines. Humboldt County, Calif. issued fines reaching into the millions of dollars for code violations that property owners did not even commit. County staff threatened rapidly escalating fines based on sometimes-years-old satellite images without on-the-ground investigations, accusing owners of unlawful cannabis cultivation any time they suspected an unpermitted building or greenhouse. IJ filed suit on behalf of a number of property owners but the district court dismissed the case. Now with the Ninth Circuit's reversal (in two opinions), the fight against the outrageous conduct can move forward.
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In Montana you can go to jail for driving your wife crazy. Domestic assault includes causing her to suffer "mental illness or impairment."
Montana has the problem that Maine once had -- no Blacks.
Hence the only oppressed persons can be White females.
And that's how you get stuff like this...
Maine can oppress French Canadians and Native Americans. Montana can oppress Native Americans.
In Montana you can go to jail for driving your wife crazy.
"Your honor, my wife was already crazy."
"Case dismissed."
You missed two lines in the middle:
"Your honor, my wife was already crazy."
"What's your evidence that she was crazy?"
"She married me."
"Case dismissed."
Happy to accept an improving edit 🙂
From the Glock case:
Glock owners: How often do you go through the 13 part test sequence to check safe and proper operation? The plaintiff did not do all the tests.
John,
MOOG sells aftermarket chassis parts -- if I buy one they list for my truck and install it correctly and it fails, isn't MOOG liable?
So if Acme Spring sold springs for Glocks and they didn't meet Glock specs, why isn't Acme liable?
The plaintiff did sue parts makers. There were originally 13 defendants plus "unknown John and Jane Doe entities." It looks to me like the lawyers named everybody known to make aftermarket parts for Glocks and dismissed most of them after discovery turned up no evidence that the Glock in question had parts from the named defendants. It is possible that some of them settled. The documents available on CourtListener don't say whether the counts were dismissed for lack of evidence.
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16940244/oglesbee-v-glock-inc/
In the Mississippi struck jury case, it can be argued that as the 5thC found that the defence's failure to challenge the jury meant that the defendant had waived his relevant rights, counsel was ineffective/incompetent. Indeed, I think it a logical conclusion from the 5thC ruling. But is the defendant foreclosed by AEDPA from filing another habeas petition? Is this going to be one of these quasi-Catch 22 legal games of which the US judicial system is pathologically fond, where you can't argue ineffectiveness of counsel where the ineffectiveness was not claimed by the defendant, but only arose as an appellate court finding?
In the athletic director case, the employer bears the burden of proof to justify unequal pay based on sex. In other discrimination cases McDonnell Douglas says the employer only has to produce evidence of a legitimate reason.
"...modified to prevent its safety from re-engaging after firing a round."
Idiot.
The facts of the case do not show that the gun was modified with the intent to disable a safety feature.
Was it modified by Glock? If not how would Glock be liable?
Under Oklahoma law the maker of a product is liable for foreseeable modifications by third parties unless the product comes with an adequate warning. The manual for the Glock explained how to test whether the safety features still worked.
Thanks.
" The pistol had been modified with 'aftermarket' parts—a trigger spring, firing pin spring, firing pin safety spring, and
internal connector piece—that differed from the corresponding Glock factory parts."
If he knew the springs weren't standard when he bought it, he's an idiot. If he didn't know, but didn't check first (Who doesn't completely strip a firearm after purchase?) he's an unlucky idiot.
A safety is a mechanical device prone to failure. Monkeying with it is not recommended for a reason.
I am willing to bet that the overwhelming majority of gun owners do not do this.
Sounds to me like he was repairing a broken firing pin or something.
The "משגיח" case is an interesting one. Many years ago, I met a guy who was the Wisconsin Secretary of Agriculture. Under Wisconsin law, the Sec of Ag had the authority to declare food products kosher. (He told me his Jewish friends didn't think that was ... you know.) The court probably didn't know about this. I don't even know if it's still the law. But perhaps if the case had been decided under Wisconsin law the result would have been different.
"Kosher" has both a civil and a religious meaning -- if it is a brand that I have never heard of before, I will buy it if it is Kosher because that has a CIVIL meaning, much like if a gear oil meets certain military specifications.
The religious part means nothing to me -- I am a Congregationalist (Puritan). I respect it, I'd rather have someone who is afraid of upsetting God than upsetting the Bureau of Something, but to me Kosher has a civil meaning.
I understand that others have a different viewpoint.
Now I argue that a lobster, caught at least 30 miles offshore and in water that is at least 30 fathom (180 feet) deep and where the tide runs 8-10 knots is Kosher because (a) it's not on the shallow shore of the Mediterranean where human & animal feces is washing in and contaminating it (that's why only fish with a backbone are kosher), (b) there is way too much water moving way too fast for any contaminants (or even mud) to remain, and (c) humanity in Biblical times didn't have the Diesel engines and Hydraulics to get out there and pull lobster traps up from that depth, let alone the GPS and Radar necessary to find their way back, or the VHF radios to call for help if they couldn't.
Not to mention that no one knew that this part of the world actually existed...
It is 100% guaranteed that any Dr. Ed sentence that starts this way is going to not just be wrong, but looney.
As fish are vertebrates, they all have backbones. And that is not, of course, the test for kosher fish. They must have fins and scales (the word "scale" has a specific meaning in Halacha.) Why fish with fins and scales are kosher is because that's what the Bible says, not because of whatever bizarre fantasy Dr. Ed has.
(I wonder if Dr. Ed is unaware that lobsters aren't fish.)
Also, kosher does not have a "civil meaning," unless Dr. Ed just means that the phrase can be used colloquially to mean that applicable rules were followed — for example, if one did an audit of a business and all the money was accounted for, one might say that the finances were kosher. But that has nothing to do with any context of either the above post or the discussion thread.
(the word "scale" has a specific meaning in Halacha.)
According to most Orthodox authorities, placoid scales (found on, e.g., sharks), ganoid scales (sturgeon), and elasmoid scales (coelocanths), don't count, but ctenoid (perch) and cycloid scales (salmon) are. The last two can easily be removed by scraping, while all the others can't. The argument goes that the word for "scale", kashkeshet is also applied to scale armour and hence fish scales which don't resemble scale armour don't count. A quick googling reveals that the word is of Phoenician origin, describing the overlapping of planks on a clinker-built boat.
But the halachic tradition is not supported by the text nor a first-order interpretation, because the Torah itself doesn't make any kind of distinction or specification, e.g., by providing examples of fish that are or aren't kosher, unlike for land animals and birds, where examples and counterexamples are provided.
I don’t think it’s all that surprising that the Torah doesn’t mention salmon or coelacanths.
Nor does it mention a number of kosher land animals - e.g., bison, moose, etc. But they readily pass the criteria.
FWIW nonetheless, there are one or two ultra-frum groups which hold that no animal not mentioned in the Torah is kosher regardless.
That stringency is most applicable to birds, because the Torah does give rules to use for assessing fish and land animals (even if those rules are not always easy to apply — but a rabbi's ruling is subject to Chevron deference, right?), but for birds it only lists examples, from which the rules must be inferred.
This is maybe the least insane part, but are you actually under the impression that people didn’t travel more than 30 miles offshore (including to harvest marine animals! Including in the North Atlantic!) until the invention of diesel engines, radar, and shipboard radios?
In Biblical times?
Moses was 1300 BC (or so) -- over three thousand years ago, and maritime technology advanced a lot over the centuries. For example the compass was invented (by the Chinese) sometime between 200 BC and 100 BC -- it didn't exist in Biblical times. Nor did the sextant, nor the clock, nor a whole bunch of other stuff.
My grandfather lobstered in a Friendship Sloop, his father lobstered in a Peapod (type of rowboat) but neither had a winch and they didn't set traps in 30 fathom of water, I can assure you. And their grandfathers had gone out to the banks after Cod, dried it, and then sailed it down to the Caribbean to trade for molasses and rum.
So yes, I do know, more than you realize, but not in 1300 BC!!!
And why isn't "Kosher" also a civil quality? If a product says "Orange Juice" and there is no Orange Juice in it, I can sue -- it's fraud. Why wouldn't it also be fraud to label a product "Kosher" if it was not?
Mariners in the ancient Mediterranean generally tried to avoid losing sight of land (which is part, but only part, of why there wasn’t a vibrant lobster fishery in the Levant). But the technology that prompted a change there long predates GPS, radar, or internal combustion engines.
Precisely because “kosher” is a religious term, and so there isn’t—and under the First Amendment, cannot be—a governmentally-recognized definition of what is and isn’t kosher.
There are organizations that certify products as kosher, and if you represented that they had certified your product when they hadn’t, that could be a problem. Likewise if you claimed that you’d done something specific as part of the preparation that you hadn’t actually done. But if you want to start marketing Rabbi Ed’s Kosher Lobsters, go nuts.
Because only God or a rabbi can decide "if it was not," and the rabbi's interpretation is binding only on those who choose to follow him, and God isn't allowed to testify.
Both the 2nd and 3rd Circuits, and perhaps some others, have held that its meaning is exclusively religious and government isn’t entitled even to have an opinion on what it means.
A series of laws on the subject in states in the East Coast have been struck down as unconstitutional by the 2nd and 3rd Circuits. It sounds like this Wisconsin law (if there is one) would violate the Establishment Clause in a very literal way.
The thing that made those laws particularly silly is that the people who actually care about kashrut would never rely upon a business saying, "Oh, yes, our product is kosher" anyway. They rely on the hechsher, not secular assurances; the hechsher's authority is reputational rather than legal.
How do you misspell "Mad Libs?" Also the real term you're looking for is "boilerplate."
I keep waiting for a case where the defense is "We discriminate against poor negotiators".
The law in this area is evolving. In part due to a belief that some women are not as aggressive as men when negotiating states are requiring salary ranges to be stated up from.
..to be stated up front.
Mass law now requires listing of wages -- that could be quite interesting.
And, as a guy, why is it our problem?
I should note that it isn’t all women, but just some. My daughter’s mother was a terrr negotiating for salaries. Far better at it than I was. One guy tried for four years to hire her, before he finally succeeded. Every time, he would make an offer, and she would counter that she had a better one, and give him a new one. A year later, he would come back with an offer matching her demands. Nope. Circumstances changed, and it will cost you this much more. So, no surprise that our daughter did more than satisfactorily when she was laid off last year, and got a big bump with the new company - despite being 5 months pregnant (which meant 3 months maternity leave 4 months into the new job). Heck, she was able to crank up her stipend for grad school by playing one school off against another. Her advisor’s top pad grad student.
When a SWAT team blows up an innocent person's house, who should foot the bill for the damage? The public! Since 1872, the Supreme Court has consistently said that such damage is a taking requiring just compensation
Some have been pushing this for a while now, that they need a SC ruling on such. Not now it is claimed fait accompli, a long time ago? Why, then, an issue?
It'd make a great movie plot -- someone whose house was blown up by the SWAT team retaliates by blowing up the houses of the team members. First is an "accidental" furnace malfunction, second a freak "sewer gas" explosion, third attributed to a leaking backyard propane grill that seeped into the basement. IJ attorney recognizes the names of the victims from a SWAT raid 15 years earlier and is torn between warning the other members of the long-dispanded team and not doing so.
And yes, part of this *was* a movie -- Backdraft.
Short Circuit had a case about a revenge bombing against a police officer. The legal question on appeal was whether planting a pipe bomb (which didn't hurt anybody) was an act of terrorism. The target officer had been convicted of manslaughter for killing a relative of the bomber. Was he acting in his official capacity at the time? Retaliating for an on-the-job homicide is terrorism. If the officer was moonlighting retaliation was not terrorism. The practical difference was 10 vs. 30 years in prison.
Arson is a federal crime, like building a pipe bomb without paying the $200 tax on destructive devices, and the same terrorism considerations would apply in sentencing.
In the movie, the arsonist dies in a fire.
In the 9th Circuit Mashgiach case, the concurrence took the view that it’s sufficiently clear that a mashgiach is a kind of minister under any reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent that there’s no need to decide exactly how broad the precedent actually is. This case is well within the heartland of the ministerial exception, and nowhere near the boundary. I agree with the concurrence, and therefore also agree with the concurrence’s conclusion that because federal courts shouldn’t say more than is necessary to decide the case before them, they should wait for a case that’s closer to the boundary, where it’s necessary to decide where the boundary lies, before opining on that subject.
Also, the case summary contains a factual error. A mashgiach isn’t necessarily an Orthodox Jew. There are Conservative mashgichim, and it’s possible other denominations have them.
https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/general/13089/ny-conservative-rabbis-open-hashgacha.html
https://www.thejewishnews.com/news/local/michigan-prisoners-attorney-objects-to-conservative-kosher-certification-agency/article_399978dd-d376-58bc-be90-c8ef941b1a0e.html
The defendent Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations requires its mashgichim to be Orthodox Jews, just as the Lutheran Church requires its ministers to be Lutherans. But that no more makes being Orthodox part of the definition of “mashgiach” than it makes being Lutheran part of the definition of “minister.”