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No Pseudonymity for Attempt to Get President-Elect Trump Disqualified and to Allow Him to Be Privately Prosecuted
From Doe v. Chutkan, decided today by Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.):
In this pro se lawsuit, Plaintiff John Doe seeks, first, a court declaration that President- elect Trump is constitutionally ineligible to serve as President and the Supreme Court's recent decision holding otherwise is "void"; and, second, an order requiring Defendants Judge Tanya Chutkan and Attorney General Merrick Garland to preserve and provide Plaintiff grand-jury materials and other documents so that he and other private citizens may "prosecute" President-elect Trump.
Plaintiff moves here to proceed pseudonymously on the ground that bringing this lawsuit will "expose [him] to retribution." As Plaintiff has not made the detailed showing required to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure, the Court will deny the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned….
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. That requirement reflects the "presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants' identities], which stems from the 'general public interest in the openness of governmental processes,' and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial proceedings." A party moving to proceed pseudonymously thus "bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its own name." As a result, the court must "'balance the litigant's legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in full disclosure'" ….
The court concludes that the public interest in identifying the plaintiff is especially strong here:
[Plaintiff] aims to remake large swaths of the American constitutional landscape. It is hard to imagine a case in which the "public interest in open and transparent proceedings" would be more "intensified."
The court also concludes that it would be especially unfair to the defendants to allow plaintiff to sue pseudonymously while "'disparag[ng]' multiple 'government employees,' including one of the Defendants" through "his vituperative filings." (Courts have often held that it's especially unfair for plaintiffs to shield their own names while impugning the reputation of individual defendants.) The court concludes that this is not a case where pseudonymity can be justified by a concern for personal privacy:
Nowhere in his Motion or Complaint does Plaintiff suggest that this lawsuit will touch on anything related to him, much less the kind of "sensitive and highly personal" information that can weigh in favor of pseudonymity, such as information related to "sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors."
And it rejects plaintiff's argument that he should be pseudonymous to avoid retribution against him:
Doe asserts that … bringing this lawsuit will "expose" him to "retribution" from the President-elect's incoming Administration and its supporters. Plaintiffs' claims, however, are "speculative and unsubstantiated." To be sure, his Motion notes instances in which supporters of the President-elect have reportedly lashed out at those they perceived as a legal or political threat to the President-elect. Indeed, as the Motion partially points out, both the Special Counsel who prosecuted the President-elect and the judge of this Court assigned to that case (whom the Plaintiff has made a putative Defendant here) had their homes "swatted."
But Plaintiff's claims of impending retribution are ultimately too bare and attenuated. This case is a far cry from those in which the second factor has supported anonymity. Rather than offer "detailed declarations supported by [his] prior experiences" or those of others similarly situated, he invokes examples of Soviet and North Korean repression. Because he provides no concrete basis upon which to conclude that this lawsuit might provoke retaliatory "physical or mental harm" from the President-elect's allies and supporters, his allegations are "conclusory" and therefore "must be rejected."…
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Everyone gets their day in court, I guess. Hopefully we won't spend it wasting people's time like this.
I'll try to preempt the predictable comments by noting this sort of claim is utterly banal. Obama weathered dozens of pro se suits challenging his election, and I've seen complaints from the mentally ill targeting every president in my adult life. I can't fault Professor V for posting an opinion on pseudonymity, but I suspect the most boring part of this will be irresistible to the usual suspects.
Is there any collection of those, especially for those of us without WestNexus? Sounds like they could be fun to peruse.
Not quite pro se because he’s technically an attorney (or was), but anything involving Larry Klayman would work.
Attorneys and former attorneys can also proceed pro se.
Sure but Klayman has acted as an attorney on behalf of others or on behalf of judicial watch, in addition to proceeding pro se on his own.
Haven’t heard from Larry Klayman in a minute
What do you expect the "predictable comments" to be?
Personally, I remain surprised by Eugene's focus on trivial cases brought by nutters while lawsuits with profound First Amendment implications are being brought, all without any comment by our resident VC "expert" on the subject.
The Court strongly hints the plaintiff doesn’t have standing. But I suppose pseudonymity has to be decided before standing, because one has to decide what name to file the case under before anything else.
But since pseudonimity depends in part on the merits, that means plaintiffs get to have a preview of what the judge thinks of the merits - a sort of advisory opinion - before standing gets determined.
I was opposed to anonymity in his first impeachment, and also here.
Let's remove an elected official based on "secret testimony, trust us!"
Yeah, let's assume their concerns are fully valid.
Still, no.
"Plaintiff has chosen to use the pseudonym: Blamala Farris."
(Or is "Jillary Glinton" funnier?)
The court knows the plaintiff's real name. Maybe the plaintiff's argument for standing would reveal his identity, but it's not inherently incompatible to argue standing in this kind of case while maintaining anonymity. I also think it's wrong that approval of anonymity relates to likelihood of prevailing -- this order enumerates the factors it considered, and the closest any get to the merits is the one about fairness of letting the plaintiff proceed anonymously.
However, it seems likely that his argument for standing would fare little better than the argument for anonymity.
Leaving questions of merit for any particular case out of my discussion, there has been an overlooked aspect of public information about judicial proceedings: threats of violence against trial participants or their families.
Seems to me that fully informed public insight into judicial process requires the public to know something about intimidation in the courts. If judges, juries, prosecutors, defense attorneys, other court participants, witnesses, and the families of those receive threats of violence, the public should know how many occur, when they happen, and what those threats say specifically.
Necessarily vague and general discussion about the extent of protection used to defend trial participants might also make sense. For instance, why would it not be relevant for insight into judicial procedure for the public to know whether security officers have advised or assisted a trial participant to change his/her place of residence?
Without information of that sort, I do not see how members of the public can evaluate whether court procedures have been affected by purposeful campaigns to induce such threats. Or worse, whether the administration of justice has been affected by laxity in the government to defend trial participants, with an eye to deliberately leave trial participants open to intimidation, especially in cases where government officials may be on trial.
To know whether and to what extent court procedures might be affected by duress seems at least as salient a judicial policy requirement as punctilious identification of non-public figures trying to protect themselves from duress by seeking anonymity. At the very least, it would help the public understand whether judges properly discipline defendants and their supporters who seem to be trying to gin up threats to intimidate the courts.
Whether that kind of concern ought to be expanded to include disclosure of threats against other public figures also seems a question relevant to the nation's present politics more generally.
Heck lathrop, I figured you were the nudnick bringing the suit.
Yet another bot-like response from XY. I have a growing suspicion that a metabolic test on XY would disclose silicon levels inconsistent with life.
Threats of violence are investigated (when reported), and when appropriate, prosecuted which is on public record and often reported in the press.
This has the fingerprints of not guilty all over it.
lmao
Not guilty is not stupid enough to think this kind of claim has any merit or is worth pursuing.
You, however, are stupid enough not to be able to see that for yourself.