The Volokh Conspiracy
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DePaul Professor Who Wrote Anti-Palestinian Article, Was Censured by Faculty Council, Loses Contract, Defamation, and Discrimination Claim
From Hill v. DePaul Univ., which was decided in September by the Illinois Appellate Court (Justice Martin, joined by Justices Rochford and Hoffman) but which I missed at the time:
Jason Hill is a tenured professor of philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago. Professor Hill authored an article, which he describes as an "op-ed," that appeared in the online publication The Federalist in April 2019 titled "The Moral Case for Israel Annexing the West Bank – and Beyond." The article noted that Benjamin Netanyahu had been recently elected to a fifth term as Israeli prime minister, having campaigned on a promise to "annex Jewish settlements in occupied Palestinian territories." Professor Hill wrote that the election victory "will, hopefully, see the enactment of Netanyahu's promise." He went on to argue that "Israel has the moral right to annex all of the West Bank *** for a plethora of reasons." The article contains the following subheadings: (1) "Israel's Mistake Was Allowing the Palestinian Pretense," (2) "The Palestinian Authority is a Terrible Government," (3) "Israel Has Every Right to Defeat Terrorists," and (4) "Why Palestinians Have No Moral Authority." Among Professor Hill's opinions, he wrote:
"Not all cultures are indeed equal. Some are abysmally inferior and regressive *** a strong argument can and ought to be made to strip Palestinians of their right to vote—period *** They constitute a national security threat to Israel because a core feature of their identify is a commitment to destroying Israel as a Jewish state *** only a policy of radical containment or expulsion remains a viable option."
A note printed below the article stated, "Jason D. Hill is honors distinguished professor of philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago."
Two weeks following the publication of Professor Hill's article, Dr. Paeth [President of DePaul's Faculty Council] drafted a resolution titled "Faculty Council Resolution on Academic Freedom and Responsibility," which contained statements critical of Professor Hill's article while also acknowledging Professor Hill's academic freedom to publish it. A copy of the draft resolution appeared by hyperlink in conjunction with an article in DePaul's online student newspaper The DePaulia on April 30, 2019. The next day, Dr. Paeth presented the resolution to the Faculty Council for consideration. Following discussion, the Faculty Council voted 21 to 10 to approve the resolution with amendments that removed some language from the original draft. An article regarding the approved resolution appeared in The DePaulia on May 6, 2019. The article provided a link to the original draft resolution that did not reflect the amendments approved by the Faculty Council.
The preamble of the resolution asserts that Professor Hill's article (1) "misrepresents the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," (2) "distorts the facts about the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations," (3) "promotes racisms toward Arabs generally and Palestinians in particular," and (4) "advocates for war crimes and ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." It goes on to state that the Faculty Council "affirms Professor Hill's right to publish and express his opinions consistent with the Faculty Handbook, the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and the Guiding Principles on Speech and Expression" and "affirms that Professor Hill's article failed to exercise adequate concern for accuracy, restraint, or respect for the opinions of others, as per the AAUP guidelines." The resolution continues, stating that the Council:
"condemns in the strongest possible terms both the tone and content of Professor Hill's article, and affirms the claims that it expresses positions that are factually inaccurate, advocate war crimes and ethnic cleansing, and give voice to racism with respect to the Palestinian populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as Arabs generally."
Finally, the resolution concludes that the Faculty Council:
"urges Professor Hill to seriously reconsider his positions on these issues, to take cognizance of the perspectives of other scholars on these issues, as well as the real harm his words have caused to students and other members of our community, and to refrain from abusing his freedom as a scholar in writing on controversial issues in the future."
A few weeks later, Provost Ghanem sent an email to the entire DePaul community with the subject line: "A Message from Acting Provost on Free Speech and Vincentian Values." In part, the message stated:
"While I am deeply saddened that Professor Hill used his right to academic freedom and free speech to disparage one group over another, resulting in some members of our community feeling unwelcome and unsafe, I am extremely impressed by the way members of the DePaul community made their voices heard."
Hill sued, but the court concluded his claims lacked legal merit. It rejected Hill's claim that DePaul's actions breached promises made in its Faculty Handbook (see the opinion for that), and it rejected Hill's claims that the statements condemning him were defamatory.
The five [allegedly defamatory] statements were that Professor Hill's article: (1) "failed to exercise adequate concern for accuracy, restraint, or respect for the opinions of others, as per AAUP guidelines," (2) "represents an abuse of [Professor Hill's] academic freedom," and expresses positions that (3) "are factually inaccurate," (4) "advocate war crimes and ethnic cleansing," and (5) "give voice to racism." …
[W]e find that the resolution's alleged defamatory statements are nonactionable, pure expressions of opinion. Insofar as the statements bore on Professor Hill's conduct, qualifications, or character, the resolution stated the factual basis for the opinions it expressed—the existence and content of Professor Hill's article…. [And] the resolution's opinions about the article are evaluative. That is, they express a value judgment of Professor Hill's article…. Evaluative opinions are not actionable since, by definition, such statements are based on disclosed facts, i.e., the work product evaluated.
Like a movie or book review, one can judge the merit of the evaluation or form their own opinion of the work product simply by viewing it independently. Such is the natural consequence of publishing a work for public consumption. Evaluation, positive or negative, is to be expected. Just as the first amendment protected Professor Hill's freedom to publish his "op-ed," it also protects responsive criticism like the statements in the resolution….
Further, the context weighs toward finding that the resolution's statements are not actionable. The resolution is fundamentally an academic's or group of academics' criticism of the views expressed in another academic's work on a controversial subject. "[I]t is well established in Illinois that academic evaluations and decisions are not subject to judicial review." Some courts and commentators have suggested that courts should not be the arbiters of academic debate. Rather, "[m]ore papers, more discussion, better data, and more satisfactory models—not larger awards of damages—mark the path toward superior understanding of the world around us." …
And the court rejects Hill's discrimination claim:
Professor Hill describes himself as "a dark-complected man of Afro-Caribe descent," of Jamaican origin, and homosexual. Professor Hill alleged that other DePaul faculty members—none of whom shared Professor Hill's race, national origin, or sexual orientation—have made "controversy-generating" statements concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but were not subject to a Faculty Council resolution, as he was. In addition, he claimed that DePaul faculty orchestrated a student protest against him, and DePaul allowed a digital bulletin board to be created in which pejorative postings accumulated that discouraged students from enrolling in his courses. Thus, Professor Hill alleged that DePaul discriminated against him on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, and sexual orientation….
To qualify as an adverse employment action [under federal antidiscrimination law], the action must be "tangible" or "material." A "tangible employment action" connotes a "significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." "Materially adverse" employment actions can also include "a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, … or other indices … unique to a particular situation." "'[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.'"
In Professor Hill's opening brief, he asserts that he pled an adverse employment action by citing "numerous instances of loss of pay." However, he fails to cite any portion of the complaint in support. As best as we can glean, the complaint's only allegations that could be construed as claiming a loss in pay is that "[t]he opportunity for Dr. Hill to be awarded promotions, with concomitant wage increases, has been diminished." In his reply brief, Professor Hill contends that the Faculty Council's approval of the resolution was itself an adverse employment action.
We find that Professor Hill failed to plead that he suffered an adverse employment action. As acknowledged at oral argument, Professor Hill remains a tenured professor at DePaul. He was not fired. He was not suspended. He was not demoted or reassigned. And his pay was not reduced. Professor Hill has pled no tangible loss, only amorphous speculation that his prospects are diminished.
We observe that Professor Hill characterizes the Faculty Council's resolution as a censure and DePaul disputes that characterization. We need not resolve the question but note that even if we were to regard the resolution as a censure, we would find that a censure alone is not a materially adverse employment action. "[W]here a censured employee retains his job and does not suffer any loss of pay or rank, any alleged harm to his stature or earnings prospects is purely speculative."
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Professor Hill needs to write more Op-eds. Vigorously exercise that academic freedom. 🙂
This reminds me of a scene from a Tom Clancy novel. A Navy officer does something bad but not bad enough for discipline to stick. His superior decides he will always come out the loser in any head-to-head performance evaluation. It isn't discipline to promote the other guy instead.
The Sum of All Fears. Submarine Captain Harry Ricks screws over his crew to justify his being promoted. Admiral Mancuso who is Ricks' Evaluating Officer states that Ricks is the fifth of five "good men". That isn't punishment, that's leadership.
This seems correct. I feel like the people who are advocating essentially the same thing in reverse are getting much worse treatment.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/feds-probe-can-us-students-be-suspended-for-chanting-from-the-river-to-the-sea/
There is a reason why I keep saying "Nuke Gaza" and it isn't that I really want to see that done.
At some point the 14th Amendment (equal protection) will become relevant.
You like to say things you don’t want to see done? Have you always been like this?
“a strong argument can and ought to be made to strip Palestinians of their right to vote—period”
That’s pretty messed up.
The victorious allies in WWII stripped the Germans of their right to vote for Nazis.
Stripped of the right to vote > stripped of right to vote for one party.
"Stripped of the right to vote > stripped of right to vote for one party."
lol really? You can vote, as long as you vote for the party we let you vote for.
You’re confusing “can’t vote for one party” with “have to vote for one party.”
Heck, we did the same thing with the 14th Amendment...
The Palestinians currently have no "right to vote," so there is nothing to strip them of.
Palestinian citizens of Israel have the right to vote in Israeli elections. Indeed. Palestinian parties did fairly well in 2020.
Arab citizens of Israel are not "Palestinians."
They aren’t?
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-israels-palestinian-arab-citizens-turn-out-to-vote/
Don't disagree with him, he'll accuse you of blood libel.
Who called the clowns in?
“The Arab citizens of Israel form Israel's largest ethnic minority. They are mostly former Palestinian citizens who have continued to live in what became Israel, and their descendants. The majority of Arabs in Israel now prefer to be identified as Palestinian citizens of Israel.”
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_citizens_of_Israel
I do not accept Wikipedia articles, which are notorious for being edited for political bias.
In any event, it appears clear that the professor meant Palestinians living in the "occupied territories" and not Arab citizens of Israel.
The former have no voting rights, so there is nothing to strip them of.
I thought it rather clear that the professor meant stripping Palestinians with the right to vote, of the right to vote. Israel would rather not engage one way or the other with Palestinians outside their jurisdiction.
The original article is here:
https://thefederalist.com/2019/04/16/moral-case-israel-annexing-west-bank-beyond/
Seems pretty clear he is referring to the Palestinians in the conquered territories.
So much the worse for him. The result is classic "settler" thinking (these people are savages and so don't deserve basic human rights, that's what happened to the Native Americans).
Seems not only correct, but obviously correct.
Yup. Apparently s snowflakes come in all colors and ideologies.
No two are alike.
A weak lawsuit. What would the remedy be?
I didn't sue Indiana University when back in 2019 they called me a lot worse names. I did think of suing them after they Title IX'ed me, but since I was going to retire anyway, I just did that. One of these days I'll write up the whole story.
From my kerfuffle webpage at https://www.rasmusen.org/special/2019kerfuffle/
The Provost of Indiana University-Bloomington, Lauren Robel, and the Dean of its Kelley School of Business where I was employed, Idalene Kesner, then published statements calling me reprehensible, sexist, racist, homophobic, intolerant of women, disrespectful to women, intolerant of racial diversity, unchristian, vile, stupid, bigoted, and loathsome. Hard to believe? Take a look at Lauren's statement and Idie's. I published a fisking reply going over the Provost's false claims one by one, and an article titled "Fire Professor Eric Rasmusen? Or Fire Provost Lauren Robel Instead?". I have a page of 2019 updates that I didn't incorporate on this page, including the story of the blood (fake) dripped at my house.
Something like vandalism can very easily become a "hate crime" -- in fact, it was vandalism that the hate crime laws were written to address.
And I assume you live/lived off campus and hence it wouldn't be the University PD necessitating...
And real blood is a bio-hazard and I would have asked the local board of health to respond to it as if it was human blood. Do you know how much paperwork they would have to fill out???
“in fact, it was vandalism that the hate crime laws were written to address.”
There are lots of hate crime laws. Nearly every state has one and there are federal ones. What support can you provide for your claim that “in fact, it was vandalism” that all or even most of them “were written to address?” To take a major example, it’s doubtful the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, while applying to it, was *written to address* vandalism….
As it was explained to me, there were situations where someone would spray "faggot" or "nigger" on the side of a building, and the existing vandalism laws only dealt with the cost of removing the paint, dealing with the same way as if someone had spray painted a smiley face on the building.
But the smiley face didn't cause the same level of trauma and hence these laws were introduced. And as to James Byrd, I will go back to what Bush 43 said -- the state is going to execute the perps, what more would you have Texas do -- draw and quarter them as well???
And Matthew Shepard was drug related. It's why you don't associate with druggies...
As it was explained to him, folks!
It was clearly explained to you wrong. However you may understand the Matthew Sheppard and James Byrd cases the law in their name was clearly not *written to address* vandalism. Use your noggin some.
Hate crime laws address much more than vandalism. A good illustration is the only time SCOTUS considered hate crimes law, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/476/.
The theory of hate crimes laws seems to be that some motivations for crime are worse than others, so they deserve more punishment.
Mitchell is a good example. In that case, a gang of black kids beat up a white boy. The "group ran toward the boy, beat him severely, and stole his tennis shoes. The boy was rendered unconscious and remained in a coma for four days."
Now there could be different motives for that: (1) racial hatred (as in MItchell, who said "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?'" and then later said, as the victim walked by "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him.'"); (2) theft (the gang wanted to steal his shoes and he resisted) or (3) personal jealousy (the victim had made a move on Mitchell's girl friend.)
If Mitchell had caused the exact same harm -- inciting a gang to beat the victim unconscious and sending in a coma for 4 days -- for motivations (2) or (3), he would have gotten a lighter sentence than for motivation (1). That makes little sense to me, but SCOTUS upheld it.
"Hate crime laws address much more than vandalism."
Uh, yeah. You see, my point was that they address lots of things, including vandalism, but the idea they *were written to address vandalism* is laughable. So your reply here is...odd.
"The theory of hate crimes laws seems to be that some motivations for crime are worse than others, so they deserve more punishment."
Uh, the case you cited addressed this head on. Are you really a lawyer?
"Traditionally, sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 820-821 (1991); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 246 (1949). The defendant's motive for committing the offense is one important factor. See 1 W. LeFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.6(b), p. 324 (1986) ("Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives"); cf. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137, 156 (1987) ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished"). Thus, in many States the commission of a murder, or other capital offense, for pecuniary gain is a separate aggravating circumstance under the capital sentencing statute. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (1989); Fla. Stat. § 921.1415(f) (Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1992); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (Supp. 1992)."
Result seems correct. The First Amendment protects your right to express your opinion, but does not grant you the right to be free from criticism.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vincent???
I'm not saying that was correctly decided, mind you, only that it was.
What the ….? In Meritor the defendant did not criticize the plaintiff for her speech, instead the defendant supervisor “made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and after business hours; she estimated that over the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”
"hostile environment"???
Read the paragraph you’re responding to and the OP again. Can even you equate the two again?
Faculty council censures Black professor, several members of which use the word "nigger" in the debate to do so.
Are you seriously telling me that said Black professor doesn't have a hostile environment discrimination claim?
"Faculty council censures Black professor, several members of which use the word "nigger" in the debate to do so."
Cite?
He very well might have a hostile environment claim if that happened. He didn't say it did, probably because it didn't happen, and, therefore, he didn't bring a hostile environment claim.
A hostile environment claim does not require adverse employment action. It is enough if people act in ways to create a hostile environment, in this case a racially hostile environment. (Mere hostility or general sh**ty behavior, unconnected with protected class status, doesn't violate anti-discrimination laws.)
But if, like the plaintiff here, you are claiming that somebody did something to you because of your race, there has to be a tangible adverse employment action, not just sh**ty behavior, even sh**ty behavior motivated by your race.
It’s not obvious to me whether the admonition to which the plaintiff objects is a legal nullity, or whether it qualifies as a “strike” which might be legally relevant in a future dismissal or suspension case.
If the latter the question arises as to when is the proper legal moment to object to the first “strike” call. When it is originally called, or when the third strike is called and consequences flow.
Get the facts straight, Mr. Volokh: Professor Hill did NOT lose his Contract at DePaul University. He is still a tenured, full professor there.
Damian,
I get the sense that you didn't bother to read EV's actual post. I read it, and there is ZERO DOUBT, after reading what Eugene wrote and also the text that he copied into his post, that Hill is still tenured, suffered No salary reduction, etc.. Your outrage is what Earth Two Prof. Volokh wrote, not what actually happened in this slice of the Multiverse.
Nor did he eat, shoot, and leave. (Claim should probably be plural though.)
However, I understand on good authority that Prof. Hill may be an 800-year-old demigod and a dildo collector.
After 800 years he needs a professor position?