The Volokh Conspiracy
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Should the Boeing Plea Deal on the 737 MAX Crashes Be Approved?
I have argued to Judge Reed O'Connor that he should reject the proposed "binding" plea deal because it obscures the relevant facts and fails to hold Boeing accountable for killing 346 people. A decision is expected soon.
For the last several years, I have represented families who lost loved ones in the crashes of two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft (see earlier posts here, here, and here). The families want Boeing held fully accountable for the harms caused by its federal conspiracy crime of defrauding the FAA about the safety of the 737 MAX. Last Friday, I argued before Judge Reed O'Connor (N.D. Texas) that he should reject the proposed plea agreement negotiated between Boeing and the Justice Department. Among other arguments, I explained that the proposed plea deal would improperly transform Boeing's conspiracy into a "victimless" crime rather than recognize the 346 deaths Boeing directly and proximately caused through its lies. This post summarizes a few of my arguments against the deal, along with linking to the main filings from both sides in the case--and the oral argument transcript--so that readers can see the competing positions. This post also includes an order from Judge O'Connor, issued yesterday, that directs DOJ and Boeing to provided additional briefing on a DEI provision in the proposed plea.
Some quick background to set the stage: In 2018 and 2019, two brand-new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft crashed in Indonesia and then Ethiopia, killing 346 passengers and crew. The Justice Department opened a criminal investigation into Boeing and soon developed compelling evidence that Boeing had defrauded by the FAA by concealing the capabilities of one of the plane's new software programs.
Faced with the Government's compelling evidence, in late 2020 and early 2021, Boeing secretly negotiated a lenient deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Justice Department. The parties then filed the DPA with Judge O'Connor in the Northern District of Texas. Receiving no immediate objection to the DPA, Judge O'Connor allowed the agreement to move forward.
In December 2021, I filed an objection to the deal. I argued that the Justice Department had violated the rights of the families of the victims killed in the two crashes. In secretly negotiating the deal, DOJ violated the families right under the Crime Victims' Rights Act to confer with the prosecutors during the DPA negotiations. DOJ (and Boeing) responded that the families did not represent "crime victims," because the connection between Boeing's conspiracy crime and the crashes was too attenuated. But after two days of evidentiary hearings, in October 2022, Judge O'Connor disagreed—finding that the families represented "crime victims" and that the Justice Department had violated the families' CVRA rights to confer about the deal.
But ultimately, after a further hearing, in January 2023, Judge O'Connor ruled that while he had "immense sympathy for the victims and the loves ones of those who died in the tragic plane crashes resulting from Boeing's criminal conspiracy," he was unable to award them any remedy. I sought review in the Fifth Circuit. Last December, the Circuit concluded that, if a properly presented issue came before Judge O'Connor, he did have the power to take victims' rights into account in deciding how best to proceed.
Since then, in the wake of the Alaskan Air 737 doorplug blowout, in April the Justice Department concluded that Boeing breached its safety and compliance obligations under the DPA. Following that breach determination—which ended the deferral of prosecution provided by the DPA—in July Boeing and DOJ announced that they had reached a plea agreement to resolve the pending conspiracy charge.
When the parties unveiled the terms of their plea deal, the families were outraged. Previously I blogged about the families' objections to the plea and their motion to Judge O'Connor asking him to exercise his discretion to reject it. Both the Justice Department and Boeing have filed responses.
Here is an excerpt from the Justice Department's response, essentially arguing that this plea deal is the best they could do:
In the Government's judgment, the Agreement is fair and just, as well as a strong resolution of this matter that serves the public interest. And ultimately, the Government's decision to enter into this Agreement is dictated by what it can prove in court and what it cannot. The Government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boeing defrauded the FAA, and that this fraud caused a gain of $243.6 million. For that conduct, the Government has secured the best criminal resolution possible. Yet despite exhaustive investigation—both prior to the 2021 DPA and more recently—the Government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boeing's fraud directly and proximately caused the 737 MAX plane crashes, and it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the loss (or gain) arising from Boeing's fraudulent activity exceeded $243.6 million. Guided by the law, the evidence, and the Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Government has obtained a resolution that sets out the facts it could prove at trial and carries a proposed sentence that satisfies each of the factors this Court must consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
I filed a reply for the families. One of the main points is that Boeing got special treatment through a "C-plea" (that is, a plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).) Under a C-plea, if the judge approves the deal, then he is required to impose the sentence that the parties stipulate. As the argument is commonly phrased, the judge's "hands are tied" once he approves the C-plea.
The C-plea that the Justice Department and Boeing have presented to Judge O'Connor relies on a sentencing guidelines calculation that essentially assumes Boeing's crime caused no harm to anyone. But Judge O'Connor has already ruled that Boeing's crime killed 346 people, making the crime (by some measures) the "deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history."
The parties attempt to make the deaths vanish by arguing that Boeing must be sentenced based solely on facts that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But at sentencing, under long-settled law, a defendant is conventionally held accountable for all harms that can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The introduction to my reply brief focuses on the Department's incorrect burden of proof:
The parties create a distorted record by misleadingly conflating the demanding proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard used in jury trials with the lower proof-by-a-preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in sentencing proceedings. Under this lesser standard—which controls here—criminal defendants are responsible for all of their "relevant conduct," including all losses caused by their crimes. In this case, the Court has already found that Boeing's lies directly killed 346 people. For the parties, this is the truth that dare not speak its name. But faithfully determining the factual record on which to base Boeing's sentence requires considering these deaths. And with the deaths properly in mind, a host of features in the proposed plea agreement are revealed to be inadequate, such as its misleading guidelines calculations, paltry fine, non-transparent corporate monitor, insufficient remedial measures, and uncertain restitution awards. For all these reasons, the Court should reject the proposed plea.
To consider the competing positions, Judge O'Connor held a hearing last Friday. A transcript of the two-hour argument is found here. The Justice Department argued that the plea was the best they could do:
This plea agreement is a strong and in-the-public-interest resolution. The plea agreement convicts Boeing of the felony crime it is charged with and compels the company to pay the maximum legal fine, the most the government could achieve if this case went to trial and Boeing were convicted. It ensures that the Court can order Boeing to pay all lawful restitution to the families of the crash victims, the same as if Boeing were convicted at trial. It requires Boeing to continue to improve its compliance and ethics program, to better integrate that with its safety and quality, while respecting the jurisdiction of the FAA in that space and to have a monitor to oversee the improvements to compliance and ethics and to back up these efforts with an investment of almost half a billion dollars.
Were this case to go to trial, there's no guarantee that the Court could or would impose these conditions or similar ones, but this agreement guarantees them.
The government acknowledges the deep disagreement that the families have with the plea agreement, though we endeavor[ed] through our conferrals to incorporate their voices and their views as much as was appropriate and feasible in the document.
Boeing agreed with the Government and argued that a "C" plea (a binding plea) was required to provide certainty to the outcome of the case:
[A]s the Court may know, the Boeing Company is a pillar of the American economy and a pillar of the national defense. The Boeing Company employs 170,000, approximately, people. And it is not subdivided. In other words, the Boeing defense business is within the same company as Boeing commercial airplanes and Boeing global supply. It's all within one business that provides commercial airplanes, but also defense platforms.
And so, as the Court already said and knows and any guilty plea resulting in a felony offense, obviously, the DOD relevant personnel would review that. But it certainly has, under the federal regulations, debarment consequences. And that will be for the DOD programs to decide.
But what the "C" plea advances and accomplishes here is setting forth the record, if the Court accepts it, that those officials would have and can proceed to make their decisions on that record. I would submit that's important, not just for Boeing, but for the national defense, because it will enable to them to proceed with their decisions.
I argued for the families that the plea deal was "rotten" because it concealed the truth that Boeing's lies killed people:
Let me go straight to the heart of the matter, which is that the parties are swallowing the gun in this case--that is, they are concealing, through legal maneuvering, … the truth of the case.
Now, it's a well-established principle that in sentencing the Justice Department is supposed to provide the Court all relevant facts, but they failed to do that here. … I know that I'm making a strong assertion there and sometimes attorneys come in and make assertions that they can't back up -- but see, right here on the table is our 44-page Statement of Facts with redlining for the convenience of Your Honor and for the parties, showing exactly the facts that the Justice Department and Boeing are leaving out. And those are facts that go directly to the culpability of this company for the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history.
And indeed, let's talk specifically about the deaths. Your Honor has already found that Boeing's crime directly and proximately caused the deaths of 346 people, making it the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history. You would think that that fact would somewhere show up in the plea agreement that the parties are asking you to bless, but it doesn't. That is the fundamental reason why the families are here today asking you to reject this plea. It would be one thing if the parties said, 346 people died and now let's discuss with Judge O'Connor what the appropriate response is in terms of a criminal sentence. But they want you to go to sentencing in this case as though 346 people did not die.
At the end of the Friday hearing, Judge O'Connor promised a ruling quickly. And then, the next business day (yesterday, October 15), Judge O'Connor ordered the Justice Department and Boeing to file additional briefing on a DEI provision in the proposed plea related to the selection of a corporate monitor for Boeing. Judge O'Connor explained (footnotes omitted):
The Government has confirmed Boeing's fraudulent misconduct has burdened safety and compliance protocols. Accordingly, the corporate monitor's role centers precisely on Boeing's "current and ongoing compliance with U.S. fraud laws," specifically focusing "on the integration of [Boeing's] compliance program with [Boeing's] safety and quality programs as necessary to detect and deter violations of anti-fraud laws or policies."
Given this, the Court needs additional information to adequately consider whether the Agreement should be accepted. Specifically, it is important to know: how the provision promotes safety and compliance efforts as a result of Boeing's fraudulent misconduct; what role Boeing's internal focus on DEI impacts its compliance and ethics obligations; how the provision will be used by the Government to process applications from proposed monitors; and how Boeing will use the provision and its own internal DEI commitment to exercise its right to strike a monitor applicant. Accordingly, the parties should address the following:
• The Government SHALL provide the Court with the specific DOJ policy it referenced during the October 11 hearing and in the Agreement; definitions for the terms "diversity" and "inclusion" as stated in the Agreement; supplemental briefing explaining how the provision furthers compliance and ethics efforts; and how it will use the provision in selecting a proposed monitor.
• Boeing SHALL provide supplemental briefing explaining what it understands the provision to require; an explanation of how its existing DEI policies are used in its current compliance and ethics efforts; and how it intends to use DEI principles in exercising its strike of a proposed independent monitor.
Judge O'Connor directed the parties to file their briefs on the DEI issues by October 25. A ruling on whether he will accept or reject the plea will likely follow soon thereafter.
Note: I have been joined in representing the families by (among other excellent lawyers) Bob Clifford and Tracy Brammeier at Clifford Law Offices, Erin Applebaum at Kreindler & Kreindler, Pablo Rojas at Podhurst Orseck, and Warren Burns and Darren Nicholson at Burns Charest (very capable local counsel in Dallas).
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It's an obvious stitch-up. If Fred Bloggs a builder puts up a house which later collapses killing its inhabitants and it turns out he hadn't complied with code and lied about it to the local inspectors, I doubt he'd merely be fined some fraction of the construction cost.
I doubt even Fred's case would ever be so cut and dried, and the ultimate bankruptcy or dissolution of Fred's building company would not have a major impact on US defense and industry.
How is Boeing responsible for a bird strike on an Angle of Attack sensor and poor pilot training? Why is this case even in the US, instead of the Court System of the country that the airliners operated out of?
How is Boeing responsible for setting up the plane so that it knows a problem is present, but doesn't alert the pilot because issuing the warning is a luxury feature they charge extra for even though it doesn't cost extra to enable?
Boeing says optional 737 MAX alert was 'not activated as intended'
"SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Boeing Co said an alert for angle-of-attack (AOA) sensors on its 737 MAX jets was "not activated as intended" for some customers, responding to reports it failed to tell Southwest Airlines Co and the U.S regulator that the optional feature was deactivated before a crash in Indonesia in October.
Erroneous AOA sensor readings that led to aggressive nose-down inputs by a computer have been linked to deadly 737 MAX crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, according to preliminary reports from investigators.
Boeing offered customers two optional paid features relating to AOA. The first was an AOA DISAGREE alert when the two sensors disagreed and the second was an indicator giving pilots a gauge of the actual angle.
Southwest, the largest 737 MAX customer, in November told Reuters the alert was installed and it planned to add the indicator as well following the Lion Air crash in Indonesia.
The Wall Street Journal on Sunday reported that unbeknown to Southwest and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the alerts were not activated on the carrier's 737 MAX jets."
Imagine people dying because Ford decided to make functional Check Engine lights an expensive option; The light would be present, but unless you paid extra it wouldn't actually light up when your engine was about to explode.
If there was a bird strike of any significance, the airworthy directive mandating additional AoA sensors of a different design would not have occurred.
Why not? Physical independence is a thing, at least as of ARP 4754B.
(Rev A of that guidance document didn’t mention physical independence in so many words, although the objectives relating to functional and item development independence had clear analogues in physical failures. Rev B explicitly cites “a common mode icing condition” as one rationale for physical independence, but an ARP 4761 [pre-A] Common Mode Analysis should have flagged icing conditions as a concern. Physical separation is also mentioned, and could mitigate a bird strike.)
The issue isn't a bird strike. It's the unactivated alert. Boeing knew the plane could behave in an unexpected and potentially deadly manner under certain circumstances. The plane was capable of detecting these circumstances and warning the pilot.
Sure, a bird strike, among other situations, could cause the problem. But the issue is that the pilot wouldn't be TOLD the problem existed unless an expensive option had been purchased.
Expensive to buy, mind you, but not costing Boeing anything extra to provide.
It's exactly as if Ford knew that, under certain circumstances, their car would abruptly turn and run off the road. And had built into the car the capability of detecting these circumstances, and warning the driver.
And then made the warning a premium option you had to go out of your way to buy.
The issue is charging people to activate a safety feature the plane already had installed.
The fuselage plug that blew out is an entirely different issue. Where the AOA-induced crashes were a design issue without any workmanship issue, the plug blowing out was entirely a workmanship issue without a design issue. Boeing allegedly valued a "diverse workforce" and DEI over a _competent_ workforce, and someone forgot to secure the fasteners.
Or there might be a design issue: Does anyone understand why the plugs and the doors they replaced were not inserted from the inside, so even if all the fasteners unscrewed themselves, the plug would remain in place until the airplane was completely unpressurized? That's how I understood all jet liner doors were designed, except for the kind of tail ramp added to a few multi-use aircraft so the military could shove out a pallet or a light tank on a parachute (and D.B Cooper could parachute with a fortune in extorted cash).
It goes much deeper than the failure to alert the pilot that the two AOA sensors disagreed so much that one of them was probably damaged. It seems to me that Boeing deceived the FAA as to how serious the changes in the MAX were from previous versions of the 737, and deceived customers as to how much retraining in emergency procedures was needed to transition pilots from previous versions to the MAX.
In previous versions of the 737, the pilot would read the AOA and decide how to respond; if the AOA continued to claim that the aircraft was about to stall after the pilot brought the nose below the horizon, he would probably realize there was a bad AOA and use other clues to the attitude before he actually flew the airplane into the ground. In the MAX, software that was intended to mask the differences in control response of the MAX took over and drove the tail trim control wheel to force the nose down if the AOA was too high; with a broken AOA that always indicated too high, this continued until it was forcing full nose down even though the pilot was pulling the stick back for nose up as hard as he could.
If I understand correctly, what the pilots needed to do was to note that control wheel spinning on its own, grab it to stop it, which disengaged the software, and roll it back enough to regain control. Then manually fly a horribly unbalanced plane to an emergency landing without the aid of software. The foreign pilots had not been trained to do this, and probably were insufficiently trained in flying the MAX manually even if they had stumbled upon the fix. This was because Boeing did not want to scare off purchasers by requiring many hours of retraining!
In the first place, to use modern more efficient higher-bypass engines, Boeing should have redesigned the airplane sufficiently that these fatter engines could fit under the wings. They could have designed a new airplane rather than trying to stretch the old one for another generation, but the FDA would have required millions of dollars of tests and retraining every pilot. They could have changed to gull wings, making room under the wings, but the FAA might have considered that a new airplane. They could have lengthened the landing gear, at the cost of raising the doors much further off the ground and possibly having the FAA require thorough testing of the new landing gear and the hull or wing changes needed to make room to retract it.
Instead, they shoved the engines out in front of the wings, which unbalanced the plane to the extent that they did not want pilots flying it manually in anything but a dire emergency, but somehow convinced the FAA that it was just another engine change.
I don't know if I'd call it a "conspiracy", but IMHO, Boeing was guilty as hell. They let marketing override sensible engineering and safety. If top management understood what they were doing, it was murder through reckless indifference. If they did not understand, it was reckless indifference in taking a job that was beyond their understanding.
I would make a stronger argument. I would argue the evidence that Boeing’s criminal behavior caused the crash is so overwhelming that the Justice Department could easily prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and its claim it can’t is disingenuous to the point of being collusive. i would use the fact that it mysteriously got the evidentiary standard completely wrong as merely additional evidence of collusion, not the main argument.
“The fix was in. Dicks took their end without a beef; we had it down to a business. And it really stunk, kid. There’s no sense being a grifter if it’s the same as being a citizen.”
— Henry Gondorff, The Sting (1973)
Johnny Hooker: Can you get a mob together?
Henry Gondorff: After what happened to "45", I don't think I can get more than 90, 100 million guys.
If I were deciding the case without a prior agreement between the parties I would say the United States is the only victim. Boeing obtained by fraud a certification that its airplane was good when the airplane was really bad. The value of the fraud is the amount Boeing didn't have to spent to get a properly certified airplane.
As the case stands now the parties previously agreed that there were hundreds of victims. If dead passengers are victims airlines are also victims, notwithstanding any disclaimers in the agreement. So under the case as presented by the parties a really huge fine is in order. If Boeing didn't want this outcome it should have negotiated a better deal.
"The value of the fraud is the amount Boeing didn’t have to spent to get a properly certified airplane."
That would be about $0...
Older daughter flies the 737-900 ER(I’d tell you….) for one of the Legacy carriers, Max was the answer to a question nobody should have been asking, it’s like how you can’t get a new Vette with a stick shift, newer isn't always better. Difference is Boeing’s were designed to be flown by real Pilots, who fly airplanes, Airbuses were designed to be flown by Illiterate Yemenis with a few hundred flight hours, most of that with "George"(I'd tell you) flying. The Max was first Boeing designed with the Airbus Philosophy, with the expected results.
Frank
I guess my question is why do your clients need the US government to do this through criminal process as to fraud, rather than murder by the way? What prevents the families from filing a civil claim? Why do you need them to be fined more, rather than civilly liable to your clients?
The plea agreement calls for Boeing to pay restitution to the victims. Prof. Cassell’s clients want the company to be punished by paying additional fines in addition to compensating them for the damages inflicted.
So they aren't hiding from the fact people died like he is arguing. Even more reason to reject their objections.
I don't know if this is a good deal or not.
I don't know if the fix is in.
Lord knows I'm no friend of Boeing, and they sure do look like they need a very close look at their past and future products. But looks like to me isn't the most useful.
I do know that the way to determine the merits of a deal is whether the families of victims is no longer litigeous.
Wow. You submit this confused verbal vomit of a sentence and have the audacity to mock (meritlessly it should be noted) the slightest typos in comments with which you disagree.
Wow. You don't know what a sentence is.
Also, when have I mocked typos?
You should write for Harris. Actually given the dumpster fire that is her campaign and the lying bs in her ads, you probably do.
Nice subject change.
My $0.02:
Plea deals shouldn't exist.
However as long as they do, it may be good policy to allow victims/victims families to have input, but that ought not rise to the level of being able to veto a plea deal.
Not even Prof. Cassell is suggesting that the victims can veto a plea deal.
There's an aspect of this case that got some attention early on (it seems so long ago) but I don't recall hearing much about it recently.
The FAA has considerable oversight duties with respect to aircraft design and certification, but doesn't have the staff to do all that work with its own people so it operates a program, the Organization Designation Authorization, to outsource some of these responsibilities to private companies.
The allegation was that there was no mechanism to prevent a company like Boeing that designs airplanes and also operates under an ODA from overseeing its own work. The FAA denies that self-certification can happen, but the DOT IG reported in 2021 that
The FAA almost certainly has a much narrower definition of "self-certification" than you do. In the vacuous sense that Boeing cannot publish a type certificate without the FAA being involved to some extent, they're right.
The IG report I linked to has some interesting data about the ODA program:
– the FAA’s Boeing oversight office has [in 2021] 47 employees responsible for overseeing the certification work delegated to 1,500 Boeing ODA members.
– in 2018 ODAs at Boeing, Cessna, Bell Helicopter, and Gulfstream approved about 94 percent of the certification activities for their company’s aircraft
"Faced with the Government's compelling evidence, in late 2020 and early 2021, Boeing secretly negotiated a lenient deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Justice Department."
I wonder which corporate-loving president was in office during this time.
And FYI, the "early 2021" was actually January 7, 2021.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion
I don't think BA should walk scot-free from culpability of the 346 deaths. If BA needs to set aside a portion of earnings to pay compensation for their wrongdoing, so be it. They won't go bankrupt. They are #111 on S&P500, economically, a drop in our 20T bucket. Are you telling me Lockheed (or 10 others) cannot do what Boeing does? I question the defense and national security rationale, also; sounds like a total cop out.
What is the personal liability of corporate officers in cases like this? Can they be criminally charged (for what? obstruction? fraud?)? Sued civilly by each of the 346 estates?