The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Second Amendment Roundup: Follow ATF into a Political Briar Patch?
27 States target agency overreach in Garland v. VanDerStok.
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments next week, on October 8, in Garland v. VanDerStok, the challenge to the radical expansion of the regulatory definition of "firearm" in the Gun Control Act (GCA). Neither Congress nor the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) ever touched that statutory definition passed by Congress in 1968. And both left the non-controversial regulatory definition of "firearm frame or receiver" undisturbed since 1968. But suddenly in 2022 ATF promulgated a Final Rule redefining those terms to include materials, tools, and information that a person with knowledge and skill can use to fabricate a firearm or a frame or receiver.
One of the most hard-hitting amici briefs filed in support of the challengers to the regulation is the brief of the States of West Virginia and 26 other States. ATF, the brief argues, "is a political briar patch because of its rulemaking authority." That characterization is from a law review article with the parodistic title "Almost Heaven, West Virginia?: The Country Road to Take Firearm Regulation Back Home to Congress and the States." That play on words brings together John Denver's "Take Me Home, Country Roads" with the major question doctrine set forth in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). If that rule of law applies to anything, it applies to ATF's recent the regulatory rampage.
Given the political volatility of the "gun control" issue, Congress has historically been torn between constituents who support the Second Amendment and those who wish to criminalize various forms of acquisition and possession of firearms. Because that the issue is a "major question," Congress writes gun statutes carefully and narrowly in a manner that leaves nothing to chance. As the States' Brief says:
Given the sensitivity of this work, one might at least expect ATF to tread carefully before purporting to regulate in unexpected and aggressive new ways. But recently, it hasn't. ATF has instead seemed determined to stretch the words found in statutes like the GCA and NFA [National Firearm Act] to reach conduct never anticipated by the lawmakers who passed them. This case, concerning ATF's efforts to regulate gun kits and other forms of private firearms assembly under the guise of calling them "frames or receivers" subject to the GCA, is just the latest example of that effort.
This is not the first, and it won't be the last, overreach by ATF. As the States' Brief continues, "many of the Amici States here have been compelled to step in and sue ATF multiple times over the past few years just to return the agency to its actual area of authority." Thus, "when the Court encounters another ATF regulation offering a purportedly creative solution to a long-standing problem, it should be wary." The Brief describes "some of the specific machinations ATF has used in the past to get to its desired results—erasing ordinary meaning, stripping words from context, ignoring comments, short-circuiting APA requirements, and blinding itself to the real-world consequences of its own actions."
Succinctly put, "The rule here overreaches. But the Court need not follow ATF into the briar patch." Instead of addressing just the specific statutory issue before the Court, the Brief demonstrates how this regulation is only one of four recent ones that reveal ATF's pattern and practice of usurping "major questions" that Congress reserved to itself.
The State's Brief goes on to discuss these four pushes of the envelope, each of which I've analyzed in this blog – bump stocks, pistol braces, definition of "engaged in the business," and definition of "firearm." It argues that ATF has disregarded the limits of its own authority and the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. While possession of firearms in the wrong hands poses danger, only Congress can address the problem: "Neither the ATF nor this Court can impose naked policy preferences, especially so on hot-button issues like these."
"But to understand just why ATF's regulatory work can't really be trusted," the Brief continues, "it helps to travel through the rabbit hole of its fickle regulatory scheme. It's a dizzying ride."
First, as the Court recently addressed in Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406 (2024), for years ATF classified bump stocks as mere accessories, but then in 2018 abruptly reversed course and redefined them as "machineguns." The definitions of various types of firearms in the GCA and NFA are in the hands of Congress, and ATF's regulatory definition contradicted the statute.
Second, after finding in seventeen classifications over several years that use of stabilizing braces on pistols is unrestricted, ATF reclassified them as short-barreled rifles under the NFA. Its proposed regulation included a worksheet to determine if a specific braced pistol is "designed and intended to be fired from the shoulder." The final regulation, adopted in 2023, scrapped the worksheet and relied on a vague, six-factor test based on subjective criteria under which virtually all pistols with braces would be short-barreled rifles. The Fifth Circuit in Mock v. Garland, and the Eighth Circuit in Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition v. Garland, found the final rule to violate the APA.
Third, in 2024 ATF adopted a final rule expanding what it means to be "engaged in the business" of dealing in firearms. As passed in 1968, the GCA had no definition. A 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report found that ATF agents were "anxious to generate an impressive arrest and gun confiscation quota," so they "repeatedly enticed gun collectors into making a small number of sales." In response, the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986 provided that persons are "engaged in business" only if they: "[1] devote[d] time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms [2] as a regular course of trade or business [3] with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through [4] the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms." That was tweaked by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 to insert "predominantly" for "principal objective" and to delete "livelihood."
But ATF's final rule on this subject says that there is no minimum number of transactions required, one may be enough, and the seller need not obtain pecuniary gain. Indeed, a mere offer to sell could be "engaging in the business," while selling zero firearms. Since under this new definition almost anyone selling a firearm becomes a "dealer" requiring a license, almost all sales will require a background check, a result that Congress never intended and never enacted into law. As the States' Brief puts it: "So by making almost everyone a 'dealer' under the GCA, ATF sneaks universal background checks in the back door."
The States' Brief makes a point that applies to all of these regulatory expansions: "the GCA does not give ATF authority to define terms in the first instance." Section 921(a) of the GCA, which consists of "Definitions," begins "As used in this chapter," after which it states what each term "means." Congress delegated authority to ATF to expand the meaning of a single term, "collector," which Congress said "means any person who acquires, holds, or disposes of firearms as curios or relics, as the Attorney General shall by regulation define…." As the Brief observes, Congress thus "instructed ATF to create a definition only for one minor phrase in the GCA…."
That said, § 926(a) also provides that "The Attorney General may prescribe only such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter…." As the Brief adds, "even if ATF could define a minor term here or there, there is no world in which it is 'necessary' for ATF to redefine the statute's most crucial terms, thereby eviscerating the definitions Congress created."
Fourth, with that, the Brief clamps down on the Final Rule at issue here. In each of these rules, to use Justice Gorsuch's observation in one of the bump stock cases, "[t]he law hasn't changed, only [the] agency's interpretation of it." Guedes v. ATF, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (denying cert.). Congress has not changed its definition of "firearm" since it enacted the GCA in 1968, and ATF did not alter its definition of "frame or receiver" it promulgated in 1968 until it adopted the Final Rule here.
ATF's 1968 definition provided that a "firearm frame or receiver" is "[t]hat part of a firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel." Under the proposed rule, a "frame or receiver" was drastically reduced to include any part that could "hold" or "integrate" "one or more fire control components," which was in turn defined as "a component necessary for the firearm to initiate, complete, or continue the firing sequence." As the Brief notes, "that definition would have covered all sorts of firearms parts, which meant modern firearms would then have many different 'frames' or 'receivers.'" ATF conceded that definition to be unworkable and nixed it.
Instead of proposing a new definition for public comment, ATF adopted its Final Rule with quite a different definition focusing on, in its words, the "primary energized component designed to hold back the hammer, striker, bolt, or similar component." In the words of the Brief: "Put differently, ATF shifted from focusing on every discernible component of a firing sequence (and any housing or structure for it) to fixing on just one specific piece."
So "frame or receiver" began as the complete housing of a firearm's operating parts (1968), changed to potentially multiple housings for the same firearm (proposed rule), and ended with the housing for a single part, excluding the complete housing for all of the parts (final rule).
As the States' Brief argues, this case thus presents a "logical outgrowth" problem—a situation in which the agency "significantly amended the rule between the proposed rule and final versions, making it impossible for people to comment on the rule during the comment period." Ohio v. EPA, 144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024). In other words, "the agency preferred to skip to the end and reach its desired result. This bait-and-switch is yet another reason not to countenance this rule."
Bringing together the four recent instances in which ATF attempted to extend its regulatory reach to an unprecedented magnitude, the Brief affirms what should be obvious:
Congress has not outlawed weapons parts kits, stabilizing braces, or bump stocks. Nor has it dubbed every person handling a gun a firearms dealer. ATF can't take these actions in Congress's place. The agency's error, here, provides another peek behind the curtains. And looking backstage, it's clear that ATF is a legislative body poorly disguising itself as an executive one—even going so far as to use procedural maneuvers to avoid scrutiny. ATF has a history of ignoring statutory text and APA mandates.
The States' Brief ends with the truism that policy concerns can't trump statutory text. "Left with little in the way of textual support, many of ATF's amici argue that this Court should depart from the statute's plain meaning because excluding 'ghost guns' from the GCA's scope would purportedly have dire consequences." But that's a matter for Congress, not the agency or the Court.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
All this elides the real source of the problem, which is that the BATF, alone among federal agencies, was created for the very purpose of violating an explicit constitutional right. Nobody goes to work for the BATF who isn't comfortable with violating that constitutional right.
So, it doesn't inexplicably over-reach. Over-reach is its very mission, and the agency goes on a rampage any time we have an administration hostile to the civil liberty it regulates.
"Civil liberty it regulates" sums up the problem, and the Court needs to address that. But after Rahimi I have little confidence they will.
That agency needs disbanding.
At least that way it will have served a useful purpose to show other government agencies what happens when you think your reason for existing is to violate constitutional rights and make criminals out of American citizens.
Shorter version:
The BATF: "We want to make every firearm owner a criminal."
27 States: "The BATF can't do that".
The Courts: "?????" (TBD)
Has it always been the case that the attorneys general of various states get automatic standing to thwart federal policy in the courts, whether or not there is any particularized state interest?
How much standing does an amicus brief require, anyway? None, so far as I know. It's parties to cases who need to have standing.
And when the AGs of a majority of the states agree on something, the Court should probably at least give them a listen.
the point of this post that you may have missed: Congress sets Federal policy, in a way that Executive agencies can enforce. Congress explicitly did not set the policies that ATF is trying to enforce here. So State AGs aren't thwarting anything but an agency acting outside its ambit.
It's called "over reach". Right now, as I type this reply, according to some ATF rulings I have 12 machine guns. I'm at work, on my break, in our machine shop. There is a CNC lathe and CNC Milling machine, a drill press and the associated tooling. On the rack there are aluminum billets and raw steel stock. The computer that I am typing this on has CAD/CAM software loaded on it and I know how to use it and the other equipment that I've mentioned. While I have no intention of making a machine gun, I do have the capability and materials to do it.
jimc5499 — And you abide by laws against doing it. Good for you.
Absent objection to those laws, your comment would be pointless. And please, do not pretend your objection is based on a personal ambition that in every case, on every subject, Congress must be constrained to do by explicit law what for many decades it has done instead by law plus regulatory authorizations. For some reason, you want more untraceable guns added to the stock of private arms. Why?
Why?
If you don't know the reason, you're the reason.
Miles Fortis — Untraceable private arms to intimidate me, or anyone, is no part of the right protected by the 2A. Nor does the 2A protect any notion of armed vigilantism, nor any power of insurrection.
We’ll have to agree to disagree sir, the point of the 2nd is to intimidate those who would exceed their constitutional authority. That was the stated reason if one reads the writings of the people who voted it into the BoR shortly after they successfully fought and won an insurrection.
ScottM1A — It is because I have read the writings you refer to that I know you are mistaken; it is also the reason I know you have not read them, except perhaps in cherry-picked excerpts urged on you by professional pro-gun advocates, who presented them out of context.
Among those professional pro-gun advocates who comment on this blog, none has any scholarly credentials to support a conclusion that they are qualified to opine on any but modern-day sources. Whatever they tell you about the founding era you would be wise to distrust, at least until you see it confirmed by someone better qualified to read those sources in their contemporaneous contexts.
Those better-qualified sources will typically be numbered among the elite of academic historians. Of course I do not expect you to read those, or to delve extensively into founding era documents either. You have already shown you know the conclusion you want, and demonstrated a willingness to say groundlessly that history supports it.