The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
New Essay: Coping With a Court One Disagrees With
"The time is ripe for liberal and progressive professors, especially those who are having trouble coping with the current Supreme Court, to consider adopting our narrative approach to the constitutional canon and anticanon."
Randy Barnett and I have written a new essay, titled Coping With a Court One Disagrees With. This essay was inspired, in part, by a recent New York Times article that identified a "crisis" in teaching constitutional law. In our view, there is no crisis. But we can relate with professors who are having difficulty teaching decisions they disagree with. We've done it for the entirety of our careers. We suggests that our method of teaching may be useful for liberal and progressive professors who are having trouble coping with the current court.
Here is the abstract:
Is there a "crisis" in teaching constitutional law? In our view, there is not. Still, we can empathize. As libertarian-conservative-ish law professors, for years we taught Supreme Court decisions that we disagreed with. We teach constitutional law as a historical narrative that began at the founding and continues to this day. The narrative approach underscores the contingent nature of what at any given time appears to be fixed and unchangeable. The narrative also remains remarkably stable from year to year even as new cases are added. This approach also makes preparing one's syllabus relatively easy to do each year, regardless of what the Supreme Court may have decided in its most recent term.
The pedagogy we developed was premised on a Supreme Court jurisprudence we largely disagreed with. Indeed, we still disagree with much of this jurisprudence, especially the cases that were decided right before, during, and after Reconstruction. While some of these cases, like Prigg, Dred Scott, and Plessy are now in the anti-canon, others like Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Civil Rights Cases remain good law. This pedagogy worked before 2016 and it will continue to work no matter what happens in the future. We submit that the time is ripe for liberal and progressive professors, especially those who are having trouble coping with the current Supreme Court, to consider adopting our narrative approach to the constitutional canon and anticanon.
Part I of this essay focuses on our approach to teaching the constitutional cannon. Part II traces the evolution of our casebook from the First Edition to the Fourth Edition, and previews the forthcoming Fifth Edition. We demonstrate that the narrative about the development of the constitutional canon has remained remarkably stable. Even after accounting for the recent terms, our syllabus will be about 90% the same as it was in 2019. Part III addresses how we, and other like-minded law professors, managed to teach decisions that we fundamentally disagreed with. For those professors who are pained by the Supreme Court's current doctrines, our narrative approach provides succor. Such professors can, for example, teach what they believe to be "the good old days" of the Warren and Burger courts in contrast to what now exists. Students can then decide for themselves which era they prefer.
We welcome comments. And if any professors are interested, we are happy to provide review copies of our casebook for adoption.
We are also pleased to report that the twelve-hour video library from An Introduction to Constitutional Law will soon be posted on YouTube at no-cost, courtesy of the Foundation for the Constitution.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
Just from the abstract:
While history is obviously vital, perhaps the most vital element, the law is not a purely historical construct. It's also about language and Congress and logic and procedure and people.
Law as purely historical narrative seems on the cynical side of legal realism. I suppose that's a feature if you're in the 'Constitution in Exile' crowd, but I would hope you teach some of the just basic common law building of our legal cannon and not just 'this is because the liberal Court was into Civil Rights at the time.'
Or, the more concise version: Grow a pair. Anyone who thinks they should only have to teach law they agree with is too immature to hold the position of law school faculty. This sounds a lot like the students in the debate club who refused to argue positions they didn't agree with.
A lot of the NYT piece does seem like the academic version of whining, yeah. "“While I was working on my syllabus for this course, I literally burst into tears,” she told me. “I couldn’t figure out how any of this makes sense. Why do we respect it? Why do we do any of it? I’m feeling very depleted by having to teach it.”
"What feels different at this moment is the ambition and the velocity, how fast and aggressively it’s happening,” said Barry Friedman, a longtime N.Y.U. law professor and co-author of a book on judicial decisionmaking."
[Feels different from when you went to law school maybe but certainly not out of line with plenty of other times in our history!]
Here are the good points from the piece, IMHO:
1. "“One of the primary challenges when one is teaching constitutional law is to impress upon the students that it is not simply politics by other means,” [Yale Prof Justin Driver] said. “And the degree of difficulty of that proposition has never been higher.”
2. Michael McConnell, a conservative former federal appeals court judge who teaches at Stanford, was fine with the ultimate result in the New York gun case, but he rejected the legal reasoning the court used to get there. “Bruen is not right under its own principles,” he told me. “It purports to be applying originalist and historicist interpretation, and it gets it wrong.”
3. “We’re witnessing a transformation in the New Deal consensus,” said Mark Graber, a leading constitutional scholar and Regents professor at the University of Maryland. “Our students are increasingly rejecting it, progressives and conservatives. They are less judicial supremacists. They are more willing to question courts.” He added, “We have to figure out what the new world is going to look like. I don’t know.”
The profs want to teach fidelity to the system and institutions of the judiciary.
The Court does have a new penchant for opinions that say 'all previous precedent is bad here's the new way.' That's hard to square with general jurisprudential principles. But that's hardly the only way to teach that the system we work in is legitimate.
I don't think a 'lets ignore teaching legitimacy and call it all a historical narrative' answers the mail on this concern, however.
That's not coping, that's just being anti-intuitionalist.
I think the NYT Article is full of self-indulgent whining. But the solution offered in this essay is just to not worry about law students institutionalizing fidelity to our system. That's worse.
I think these are good points except Driver's statement that the difficulty of demonstrating to students that conlaw is not just politics by other means "has never been higher." That is a hell of a stretch. What about the New Deal or Warren eras, when decision after decision came down making major changes - essentially legislative changes - with scarcely any effort to justify them on anything but policy grounds?
Of course there are fair critiques of the most controversial cases over the past few terms. And one can reasonably conclude that there is a shift driven by the majority's shared political views. But as an objective proposition, it strikes me as a bit ridiculous to say the current court is uniquely motivated by raw politics. One would hope conlaw teachers would strive for a bit more historical perspective on their subject.
Yeah, that's a pretty fair point. Presentism fueled drama.
We do live in times where cynicism and skepticism about our institutions are particularly widespread, but it's a lot to say that's flowing from the Court.
"We do live in times where cynicism and skepticism about our institutions are particularly widespread, but it’s a lot to say that’s flowing from the Court."
I think you are suffering from the same presentism here. The judiciary has been a lightning rod for "cynicism and skepticism" pretty much since day 1.
So you didn't just have "Impeach Earl Warren" billboards in the 60s. You had the Four Horsemen (talk about intemperate language!) and the Court Packing Plan in the '30s, Dred Scott in the Civil War era, and even "Mr. Marshall has made his decision, now let's see him enforce it" from Randy Andy.
But those issues seem "settled" now, so we don't appreciate their gravity any more.
I don’t really care to read a “victory lap” essay responding to a fluff piece that ran months ago in the NYT. Did it really take you guys seven months to mull this one over?
That said – no, there shouldn’t be any particular difficulty in reading, reporting, and teaching the opinions being handed down by this Supreme Court, or talking about how the lower courts are attempting to make sense of those opinions. Obviously there are a number of doctrinal questions that are basically unanswered right now by controlling case law. But what you do with those is you read the cases and try to answer those questions. What is a “major question”? How does the “historical analogue” standard from Bruen apply, particularly after Rahimi, and does it have implications for other constitutional rights? How will Loper Bright work in practice, as courts are asked to consider challenges to regulations that conform with the applicable statutes in broad strokes, but delve to a level of granularity not expressly addressed by statute? How seriously are we to take the “MFN” standard for considering whether a facially neutral and generally applicable law with certain secular exceptions must also provide an allowance for religious practice? What does Dobbs really mean for other “substantive due process” rights, and for constitutional rights more generally?
These are all paradigm-shifting questions, they’re all coming at once, and their apparent answers often do not cohere doctrinally with the last century of constitutional law. And it’s also not entirely clear whether the right way to teach them is to treat them as ordinary (if new) principles of law that will be followed diligently and carefully by studious inferior courts, or rather as policy declarations whose future development will largely depend on the political valences of challenges and where they’re brought, and even future elections.
As might be expected, Randy and Josh are attempting to treat a dramatic shift in constitutional law as just “business as usual.” That aligns with their broader conservative project. Setting aside that this could lead us to a constitutional crisis and degradation of the rule of law, it’s a little obnoxious to treat it as just ordinary business. We may well be at an inflection point in constitutional jurisprudence, heading out of a period of stability and incremental change, into a period where the judiciary is blatantly political and corrupt. Just because we’ve spent decades teaching constitutional law one way doesn’t mean that’s the appropriate way going forward.
I often disagree with Professor Blackman. But it’s at least plausible that liberal law professors who now find their way of thinking sharply out of alignment with the current court’s viewpoint might be able to learn a thing or two about how to teach cases they disagree with from conservative law professors who have had a long history of dealing with this experience.
Oh, for fuck's sake. If you're not going to say anything besides repeating what's said in the post, don't even bother.
Suffice it to say, yes, I read that. I think it's self-aggrandizing nonsense and have dismissed it as such.
"dramatic shift in constitutional law"
What about the dramatic shifts in constitutional law by the New Deal and Warren Courts?
Were those“business as usual" or "leading to a constitutional crisis and degradation of the rule of law"?
It was the direction of the change that mattered for SimonP. New Deal and Warren were business as usual, but Rehnquist and Roberts are leading us astray.
"Part I of this essay focuses on our approach to teaching the constitutional cannon."
Boom!
Easy to cope----be a law prof and write cogent arguments against the decisions. Teach your students what the law "is" and teach them the pros/cons.
If I were teaching Con Law, I would not teach my opinions, just the holdings. If a student asked me what I thought, I would say: “It is not my job to teach you my opinions. It is my job to teach you Constitutional Law — that is, the meaning and effect of the Constitution as the courts have construed it.” If they to know about when I celebrated and when I vomited, I'd ask them to speak to me outside of class.
I disagree with this method. Intellectually engaging with opinions, including reading it critically, is part of the baseline skillset a lawyer should have. It's also part of the joy of the legal discipline.
Don't be so attached to your opinion you can't take pride in those who disagree with you skillfully, and you'll do fine.
Blogging and podcasts provide one outlet for law professors to discuss their opinions on case law.
Anyway, what is the usual practice these days? Do law professors discuss their own opinions much in class, including in Q&A periods?
Also, here's an interesting conversation (he's a liberal sort who many probably are familiar with including his books):
https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2024/09/mentoring-and-teaching-students-in-age.html
I went to a very liberal law school well over a decade ago.
It varied, but for the most part profs related their opinions, unless the class was already really opinionated in one direction in which case they'd take the opposite.
Though my Con law prof - super liberal - he was institutionalist/positivist, and invariably defended the rationale behind the state of the law (which has now changed a lot).
I really got into it with him on BSA v. Dale and got roundly dismantled.
The 2 exceptions were when he rolled legal realist - outcome-oriented standing and how the Justices all switched side between the constitutionality of protest distance limits for abortion and...some liberal cause.
I don't like Plyler v. Doe. It's a joke of a case and part of the magnet that brings illegal migrants here.
Coping With a Court One Disagrees With
Coping with a Court with Which One Disagrees
Coping with a Disagreeable Court
Ending a sentence with a preposition is an error up with which I will not put.
Oh, nonsense. The “rule” against ending sentences with prepositions come from Latin. English isn’t Latin. 17th century “scholars” who had Latin envy shouldn't be relied on for modern day English grammar.
I think Kelo v. City of New London is a disgraceful decision that allows for corporate welfare in the form of seizing working-class citizens’ homes. Nonetheless, if I was a law-school professor, I would be able to teach what the Kelo majority ruled and the dissenters’ response. Any professor who can’t teach a SCOTUS decision due to his disagreement with it is showing a great deal of immaturity.
I find it funny the howling and gnashing of teeth from the left -- this is indeed what those who support our constitutional system have been dealing with forever, but especially in the New Deal era and after.
Pick a state and screw it up to your heart content.
Sadly, it's all too little, too late -- there is no way to re-cage the beast and restore limited government -- and the people themselves are to blame for not only tolerating it, but in many cases demanding it.
"Sadly, it’s all too little, too late — there is no way to re-cage the beast and restore limited government "
And that's the problem with modern originalism: Living constitutionalism prevailed for too long, by the time originalism got a purchase, they were faced with such an accumulation of bad precedent that they quailed. And began accommodating the precedents that their own principles told them were illegitimate.
The job of originalism isn't to undo the damage, it's too late for that. It's to identify the damage, so that a future generation under a future constitution can avoid the failure mechanisms that led here, and at least fail in a novel way, rather than one depressingly unoriginal.
The fatal flaw of the current constitution is that it lacks a check on the court on the same level as the veto/override.
Judges are no more angels than other men.
No, I think the real fatal flaw is that it is no better that a man nominate and confirm the judge in his own case, than that he BE the judge in his own case.
The federal judiciary are chosen entirely by federal officers. It might not have been until the New Deal that those officers realize the full implications of that, but they did eventually dawn on them. And now nobody can arrive on the Court if they're suspected of harboring some desire to enforce the Constitution strictly against the federal government.
I tend to think that the reason it took so long for that fatal flaw to materialize is that, prior to the 17th amendment, states still held at least a theoretical lever over the Senate, which confirmed judges. Even though they allowed their own citizens to pick Senators, they could have taken back that power, and the Senators knew it, and restrained any desire they had to usurp state authority.
So it was no accident that the real accretion of federal power, and a Court that would bless it, came after the Senate had been defeated as a mechanism for state leverage over the federal government.
Judges will ALWAYS show favoritism towards whoever picks them, all you can do is point that favoritism in a less damaging direction. Control over the composition of the federal judiciary needs to be held by the states, at least in part.
Not going to happen under the current Constitution, of course; Not only does the federal government already have too much power to be beaten back, but democracy as a superstitious belief rather than a considered mechanism has taken root.
But I think we need to leave a record of how the Constitution failed, so that the next one can, as I say, at least fail in an interestingly new way.
I continue to be mystified by how personal integrity and principles other than personal benefit is so alien to you.
I'm a bit mystified at how you can look at history and actually believe personal integrity and principles explains much of it.
I do find the more conservative law professors mostly tend to be more open-minded and better able to frame their opponents’ arguments in a fair light than the average legal academic. Working effectively with people they disagree with politically is a necessary survival skill for them career-wise, so it would make sense.
The difficulty many law professors write about in teaching con law is less about agreement and disagreement, and more about the amount of it that is just arbitrary and made up out of whole cloth.
(This comment brought to you by 1973-2021)
(This comment brought to you by 1789-2024)
Liberal law professors have already had experience teaching law they disagree with. Those who lean strongly left probably have many things they find distasteful about law for quite some time.
The law involving sovereign immunity comes to mind.
It is a useful lesson to teach that you often have to work with the law as it is. Likewise, you have to be able to correctly understand things you disagree with.
A person can also be both principled and very wrong. That confuses some people since they find certain things “obvious” so only basically liars and cheats (or morons) would use different types of approaches.
Today we are going to discuss the Insular Cases. I understand you might find this a triggering event and you should feel free to walk out. I may walk out myself. While I am gone you should hold a mock slave auction and discuss whether the slave should have standing to sue for his freedom and lose on the merits, or should not have standing to sue.
It seems remarkable that lawyers so recently startled by the Trump immunity decision can muster sober-looking faces, and use them to urge dispassionate respect for this Court.