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#TheyLied Libel Claim Brought by N.Y. Mayoral Candidate Accused of Sexual Assault Can Go Forward
The case is Stringer v. Kim, decided Monday by N.Y. trial court judge Richard Latin; Scott Stringer is a former New York Assemblyman, New York City Comptroller, Manhattan Borough President, and prominent candidate for New York Mayor in 2021, and is apparently running for Mayor again.
Under New York's "anti-SLAPP statute," plaintiff had to show a "substantial basis" for his lawsuit in order for the case to go forward, and the court said that he did (though of course without deciding the facts):
Plaintiff has adequately plead a substantial basis for his claim of defamation. Plaintiff alleges that, on April 28, 2021, Defendant held a press conference in which she falsely accused plaintiff of sexually assaulting her 20 years earlier, while she worked for Plaintiff's campaign. Defendant also allegedly stated that Plaintiff groped her and put his hands down her pants without her consent. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant repeated these accusations to the press and on social media throughout 2021 and that the accusations were repeated by Congresswoman Maloney in August 2022. These statements, if false, are defamatory per se.
Plaintiff has also adequately pled a substantial basis for actual malice. Plaintiff alleges Defendant engaged in a campaign to ruin his political career after he declined to give her a position in his campaign, and she went to work for his opponent. Plaintiff further alleges that, despite the alleged sexual assault having occurred 20 years earlier, Defendant first raised her allegations during Plaintiff's campaign for mayor, when Plaintiff was gaining momentum in his campaign and the allegations would be widely circulated[.] The defamatory statements were then repeated to the press by Congresswoman Maloney on August 20, 2022, shortly after Defendant attended a campaign event with Maloney, who was running against defendant's mentor.
Thus, for the purposes of the instant motion, Plaintiff has shown a substantial basis in the law for actual malice (see Celle v Filipino Reporter Enterprises Inc. [2d Cir 2000] ["Evidence of ill will combined with other circumstantial evidence indicating that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement may also support a finding of actual malice"]).
Here is the New York intermediate appellate court's decision earlier this year reversing the same trial judge's decision to dismiss the case on statute on statute of limitations grounds:
There is no dispute that defendant's original statements concerning plaintiff were made in April 2021, which is more than a year before this action was commenced, and therefore fall outside the statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 215(3). Thus, the burden shifts to plaintiff to raise an issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations has been tolled or whether an exception to the limitations period is applicable.
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant republished her original defamatory statements concerning him when a third party, then Congresswoman Maloney, was quoted in a newspaper article making reference to those statements. "Republication, retriggering the period of limitations, occurs upon a separate aggregate publication from the original, on a different occasion, which is not merely a delayed circulation of the original edition." Retriggering by republication also requires that the original publisher of the statement participate in or approve of the decision to republish the allegedly defamatory statement.
Here, the pleadings as to the proximity in time between the August 3, 2022 Maloney campaign event where defendant was present, and the subsequent August 20, 2022 New York Post article quoting Maloney, raises an issue of fact as to whether defendant had a role in or authorized the decision to make the allegedly defamatory comments.
Kim also sued Stringer, alleging sexual abuse; you can read the Complaint and the Answer.
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I had thought the essence of an anti-SLAPP staute was to require a libel plaintiff to make a prima facia factual ahowimg beyond mere allegations before being allowed to proceed. Here, the decision seems to be based on whether or not the complaint was well-pled, without requiring any further factual showing. That standard is the same as a normal motion to dismiss. The effect of the statute seems to be simply to require fee-shifting if the complaint doesn’t allege the tort validly.
I would think that the net effect of all this woild be to strongly encourage libel plaintiffs to have lawyers, so it would cut down on frivolous pro se cases. But I would expect most lawyers would be able to make facially valid complaints regardless of the truth of the underlying facts, and hence escape fee-shifting at the anti-SLAPP stage.
Say I post that I saw you kill a cat, and you sue me for libel, saying that you've never killed a cat. The prima facie showing as to falsehood can rest simply on your assertion that the statement about you is false; then it will eventually be up to a jury to determine who's telling the truth (which is the jury's normal role). Likewise, any required prima facie showing as to knowing falsehood can generally rest on the same assertion, since if I'm wrong on the matter (I didn't see you kill a cat), that would normally be a lie and not an honest mistake. Indeed, one's own personal assertion is often all a plaintiff can have in such a situation.
Anti-SLAPP statutes can still be useful for disposing of cases that are legally insufficient -- e.g., if the statement is, as a matter of law, a statement of opinion, or if the statute of limitations has run. They can likewise often dispose of cases in which the plaintiff can't plausibly allege "actual malice" on defendant's part (where such an allegation is required), because the defendant is reporting what sources told her rather than speaking based on personal knowledge.
But if the underlying dispute is a swearing match, with the key question being which percipient-witness/party's account of the facts is accurate, that's for a jury to decide, not for a court to resolve on an anti-SLAPP motion.
"But I would expect most lawyers would be able to make facially valid complaints regardless of the truth of the underlying facts"
Based on my observations, I think you have an overly high estimation of the level of practice of many attorneys.
I just read a complaint by an attorney based on a contract. They alleged six counts. Three counts weren't even possible (as in ... you can't make them). Two counts were obviously and facially barred as a matter of law. And the final count was clearly contradicted by the language of the contract that was attached.
And that's not close to the worst thing I've seen. So yes, competent attorneys should be able to avoid this. But there's a lot of terrible attorneys out there.
(I would still say that even the terrible attorneys can at least produce better law-like substance than 99% of pro se civil filings, which usually hurt the litigant or are just batshit crazy.)
running for Mayor again
No, thank you. I'm all for a strong opponent to Eric Adams. Not likely to be that guy. Putting aside the legal issue here.