The Volokh Conspiracy
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Private Universities That Reject First Amendment Principles Put Themselves At Legal Risk (Updated)
Conforming speech policies to the First Amendment would serve private universities well, legally and otherwise.
As private institutions, private universities are not legally obligated to comply with the First Amendment. Some university administrators relish this fact, and think this is a reason to adopt and enforce policies related to speech and expression that would not pass First Amendment muster. Some may even think this approach makes sense as a matter of reducing legal risk, given the existence of federal civil rights laws and the like. This is a mistake.
Failing to adopt and enforce speech policies that follow the First Amendment is actually a source of legal risk and potential liability, as Northwestern law professors Max Schanzenbach and Kimberly Yuracko explain in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
Universities are facing a tsunami of federal enforcement actions and private litigation stemming from their responses — or their lack of one — to campus protests. Some universities still do not realize how legally exposed they are. Their own speech policies are a big part of the problem.
Private universities are not bound by the First Amendment, but they are bound by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to enforce their policies in a way that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. But many universities have student-speech policies that are inconsistent, vague, and in some cases seemingly illegal on their face. . . .
the problem is not simply that universities have poorly written policies. It is that such policies are likely to lead to discriminatory enforcement. Universities are too one-sided and too politically homogeneous to be able to enforce ambiguous and vague policies in a neutral way.
As we have seen from recent campus controversies, universities get themselves in particular trouble when they do not enforce speech, expression, and protest policies in a neutral and consistent fashion. Thus, private universities that seek greater discretion in what sorts of speech and expression to allow actually put themselves at greater legal risk under federal law.
As Schanzenbach and Yuracko explain, conforming speech policies to the First Amendment solves these problems.
private universities should voluntarily commit to following the First Amendment with regard to student speech. Doing so will not shield universities from their Title VI obligations, but it will make compliance easier for several reasons. Committing to the First Amendment makes consistency across cases more likely. From a legal perspective, the main risk to universities from existing speech policies flows from their inconsistent and ideologically driven application. The First Amendment mitigates this risk in the first instance by simply shrinking the class of cases plausibly subject to university sanction. With less speech subject to punishment, there are fewer opportunities for administrative bias, inconsistency, and error.
Committing to the First Amendment also provides greater clarity regarding the scope of protected speech. While university speech codes are often vague and the outcomes of disciplinary proceedings secret, making it difficult for students and adjudicative bodies to understand the boundaries and parameters of university codes, there is a robust body of First Amendment case law to guide university decisions.
One thing that many university administrators seem to forget is that statutes like Title VI cannot require universities to suppress First Amendment-protected speech. For starters, the federal government cannot adopt and enforce a statute that violates the Constitution. Moreover, state universities--which are clearly bound by the First Amendment--are also fully capable of complying with statutes like Title VI.
One thing I have always found curious about university administrators who seek to avoid conforming their policies with the First Amendment is that they are implicitly adopting at least one of two arguments. Either they believe that their students, staff, and faculty are not deserving of the same speech and expression rights as their state university counterparts, or they believe that (as administrators) they are less capable of fulfilling the university's educational and truth-seeking missions than their state university counterparts. Were I an administrator at a private university, I would be embarrassed to embrace either premise, yet here we are.
[Note: I recognize that some universities have religious or other missions that may justify a different approach, but that is not the case at most private universities.]
Of course there are other reasons why private universities should embrace First Amendment values. Among other things, this can help ensure that universities protect divergent viewpoints, foster an environment of open inquiry, and support academic freedom. Indeed, there are few things a university can do that are more integral to its educational and truth-seeking mission than to safeguard the fullest possible right to hold and express opinions, to speak and write, to listen, challenge, inquire and learn. But if that were not reason enough, adopting this sort of standard can reduce a university's legal risk too.
UPDATE: Perhaps due to lack of clarity on my part, some readers seem to misunderstand the claim about why neutrality and consistency reduces legal risk for universities. To clarify, my claim (and the claim I understand Schanzenbach and Yuracko to be making) is not that Title VI requires private universities to be ideologically neutral or consistent. As private institutions, they have no legal obligation to be neutral about ideological or other matters, and no obligation to be consistent beyond that which is entailed in their own voluntarily assumed legal commitments (such as commitments to respect academic freedom and the like).
The claim here is that a lack of neutrality and consistency in certain instances that implicate matters covered by Title VI (such as, say, the handling of protest activity that may implicate protected classes) can be a source of legal risk, and that such neutrality and consistency can protect against Title VI liability. Further, a commitment to adhere to First Amendment standards can help ensure that a university maintains a sufficiently neutral and consistent posture that will reduce its legal vulnerability. Obviously, a university that neutrally and consistently allows for overt racial harassment or other conduct that is not plausibly protected by the First Amendment could not use its consistency or neutrality as a defense, but that is not a position I understand any university administrator to be advocating.
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Yeah a real Catch-22 here. You have to support the Liberal Socialist's right to say anything that they want. You have to suppress the Conservative viewpoint. Then there's having to deal with some who are and are not supported by factions of the Liberal Socialists. Otherwise the Biden Administration is going to find something to screw you over.
How does Alder's analysis work in the face of implied threats such as those expressed at MIT this week concerning the pro-HAMAS "Mapping Project" that expressly wants to dox Jewish organizations “to reveal the local entities and networks that enact devastation, so we can dismantle them. Every entity has an address, every network can be disrupted.”
This is close to an admission of conspiring to commit hate crimes.
Does MIT have to wait for a definite crime to act? Or should they just turn over CC-tv recordings to the FBI and let the Feds do their work?
That's not the crime the feds are looking for.
Somewhere, someplace somebody is praying near an abortion clinic.
MIT has to wait for a definite crime to act.
The names and addresses of non-profit organizations are matters of public record. Hamas supporters are entitled to publish public information.
If Hamas supporters actually encourage people to attack these organizations, that can be prohibited under what Professor Volokh calls the crime-facilitating speech exception.
"Waiting to act may be too late!" You, and ten thousand other Democrats, on Trump.
Doxing is bad, mmmkay? You, in the 1960s.
Doxing is bad, mmmkay? You, a few years ago on why the American people should be fine with removing a president based on secret testimony.
Doxing is great, mmmkay? You, tracking down regisered gun owners to hassle them.
Doxing is great, mmmkay? You, 15 years ago in a case where people sued for a list of names of people who signed a petition to get something on the ballot. This is a necessary public record so The People can verify it themselves. But it was for the literally expressed purpose of tracking them down to hassle them. The SC even mentioned that was a concern.
Hassling people is good, mmmkay, if it's RNC people in restaurants.
Hassling peole is bad, mmmkay beca damn, my thumbs are ge5ting sore.
I’ll summarize: people are shithead power mongers skilled in situational ethics, the high valuation of a philosophical principle when it supports their already decided-upon position, and the low valuation of it when it gets in the way of a different one.
Wait, I forgot about states’ rights and sanctuary cities and medical marijuana and recreational vs. Abortion and right to your own body and abortion or prostitution or druggggg gnnn thumbs tired, dying, flalling offff.
MIT should not be investigating actual (or prospective) crimes at all. That is a responsibility for law enforcement. So yes, they should just turn over their recordings to ... maybe not the FBI, though. I'd start with the local LEOs and let them figure out jurisdiction.
Wrong. MIT, like many universities, has a real police department. It's jurisdiction is limited to the campus. It's officers have the double status of Special State Police Officers and Deputy Sheriffs.
I honestly think this is overblown. Frankly, universities are entitled if they wish to e.g. support Hamas and oppose Israel without Civil Rights consequences.
For years, Conspirators have been arguing that the Civil Rights Laws do not impose a speech code, that people can’t simply scream “harassment” and run to the courts when people say something they don’t want to hear, that the definition of “harassment” is much narrower than proponents of broad definitions of harassment would like and doesn’t include political speech.
Now, all of a sudden, because this line leads to consequences they find inconvenient, Conspirators are reversing their positions?
I don’t think legitimate civil rights claims require anyyhing like even enforcement of protest policies. Universities remain entitled to support one side of issue as opposed ro another if they want. Rather, they step in only when a “protest” group is actually doing something significantly more than mere protest, such as physically blocking students from accessing parts of the campus. And I don’t see that as a First Amendment issue at all. It involves conduct, not speech.
Conspirators have repeatedly said that universities needn’t be afraid of getting aued by disgruntled students, or at least, of losing such suits. This applies here to.
Look, everything carries liability exposire. Do something someone doesn’t like, and they can sue you. The Conspiracy has repeatedly argued that university administrators ahould stand their ground, they shouldn’t be afraid of people suing them, they shouldn’t cave in demands that take away their autonomy just because someone is going to sue them if they donmt. They should accept lawsuits as part of life, fight, and win. And they shouldnmt be afraid to move for sanctions after they do.
So here.
From a legal perspective, the main risk to universities from existing speech policies flows from their inconsistent and ideologically driven application.
If that is true, there is something systematically wrong with 1st Amendment jurisprudence. If the courts suppose they have legitimate oversight of a private university's ideological choices, there is something much worse going on in the courts than in the universities.
The courts get their oversight from the speech code (of whatever flavor) being treated as part of the contracts between the university and students and staff, not the first amendment. Inconsistent contract enforcement being taken to court is nothing new.
It’s a matter of contract law. Nothing to do with the First Amendment. If umiversities want to impose more restrictions than their current contracts permit, they can potentially renegotiate their contracts.
From the OP: "Private universities are not bound by the First Amendment, but they are bound by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to enforce their policies in a way that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin."
Mr. Lathrop, to be clear - are you proposing that universities (and other private actors??) ought to be able to discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin?
I’m going to agree with Stephen on this one. Discriminating on the basis of political opinions – favoring some political opinions and disfavoring others – simply isn’t discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. It’s an overly broad, incorrect reading of the kinds of discrimination that the Civil Rights laws actually prohibit to say that it is.
One has to do more than express political opinions members of a particular group tend to disapprove of to “harass” members of that group.
So MIT could let a "Make MIT White" student club harass Black students without consequences?
Really?!?
In Gay Association of Students v. Mathews, a 1970s decision, the 4th Circuit based its decision that Virginia Commonwealth university could not ban a gay student association (despite having a right to enforce Virginia’s sodomy laws) on National Socialist White People’s Power Party v. Ringers.
I think it remains good law. MIT, as a private institution, can choose what student groups to recognize if it wants. But if students at a public university organized a chapter of the National Socialist White People’s Power Party, I think a public university couldn’t ban them, so long as they stuck to ordinary political activities (marching, handing out leaflets, public speeches, ec.), no matter how harassing black (etc.) students might subjectively find those speech activities to be.
In the Mathews decision, the 4th Corcuit found that Virginia Commonwealth University could prohibit “peer counseling.” It held that if the Gay Student Alliance moved from general abstract advocacy to involvement with a specific individual, its activites get a different analysis. The Mayhews decision said the school could ban peer counseling activities within its powers to enforce Virginia’s law against solicitation of sodomy, which includes encouragement to commit the act.
Similarly, if a student white supremacist group went after specific individuals to e.g. “encourage” them to leave the school, that gets a different analysis from general public advocacy.
But engaging in general political advocacy simply isn’t harassment within the legal meaning of the term, no matter how hateful people believe the ideas advocated to be, and no matter how uncomfortable it makes them feel.
Only if they are Jewish.
Absaroka — Are you trying to drag this toward a debate about affirmative action? If so, I do not see that topic as an ideological question. At least not in the framework I have always insisted upon, which confines affirmative action application to the specific cases of blacks and American Indians as the groups appropriate for ameliorative policies.
Ideologies, it seems to me, share a characteristic to be open-ended with regard to time. Their advocates either say, or imply, that the tenets of the ideology endure, and exist at a level of abstraction which suits ideological applications to a broad variety of occurrences and experiences.
Affirmative action is not like that at all—although advocacy for, "diversity," which I have always regarded as suspect, is closer to being ideological.
From Judge Stearns' decision in Kestenbaum v. Harvard (24-10092, D. Mass.) (lawsuit over allegedly antisemitic campus protests):
https://www.thefp.com/p/bill-barr-moral-clarity-in-massachusetts
Carr — Do you join me in wondering where that , "consequently," comes from? Or in questioning whether judicial prejudice is manifest by, "hide behind the First Amendment?" I thought the 1A protected both expressive freedom, and the various liberties to agree with government, to disagree with government, or to say nothing at all. Also, aren't questions about those topics distinguishable from questions about how Harvard budgets, or otherwise acts in fulfillment of properly founded government regulations?
Real simple solution. Any university that gets federal money should be required to abide by First Amendment principles as a condition of the money. Don't like that, fund your own university.
...from your endowments.
Title IX would also like a word...
To attempt prohibit a private university from exercising ITS free speech rights would almost certainly be blocked by the current Supreme Court.
Private universities have their own first amendment rights, including freedom of association, and students who don't wish to be exposed to certain types of speech have a right to attend schools that ban such speech.
Freedom of association does not generally (*) extend to discriminating on the basis of race, etc. If it did, anti-discrimination law in employment and public accommodations would be unconsitutional.
(*) A notable exception is expressive association (see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale).
I didn't think I suggested that it did.
And private universities are certainly expressive associations. IIRC Sasha Volokh has suggested that private universities have a first amendment right to engage in affirmative action.
Correct. My own institution is a Jewish institution and we are enthusiastically supportive of DEI. You can only pay our policies away from our cold dead computer keyboards. You don't like it? Not my problem.
SCOTUS struck down affirmative action last year in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard.
I don't work for Harvard.
I am not sure that even equal, consistent enforcement of content-neutral, First Amendment-inspired "free speech" policies is much of a shield against litigation, in the current environment.
That seems evident from many of the claims that have been filed. UCLA's case involved some physical blocking of Jewish students from campus facilities and programs, but a lot of the complaint was hoisted on claims that students felt "unsafe" walking past protests, due to the rhetoric used, or "unwelcome" at events where Zionists were discouraged by the organizers from attending.
So as students come back to campus and encounter a new set of rules, more rigidly enforced, what can we expect to happen? Will they not just find ways to express themselves within the bounds of the rules? Will "From the River to the Sea..." not inspire the same outrage and claims brought by the students at Columbia? Are we confident that university administrators, armed with a First Amendment-styled free speech policy, will not read into it their own "content-based" restrictions that permit them to discriminate against certain statements that are not associated with any protected class? Will we find that statements in favor of Zionism are categorically protected, while statements against are not?
One big problem is that the Hamas brigade has been attacking Jews and Jewish culture at these schools. And then the schools haven’t cracked down on violations of school policy, on the grounds that the Hamas position is popular, esp with much of the faculty and some of the students. Yes, it’s a geopolitical debate, which should be open for discussion. But it is also religious, with Israelis in particular, and Jews in general, being the target of the attacks. That’s the problem, and where inconsistent application of the rules potentially violates Civil Rights laws. If they can prevent students from slurring transsexuals, etc, making them insecure, then they had better prevent other students from threatening Israelis and Jews by chanting “from the river to the sea”, etc, which openly threatens genocide against them. If they insist on making sure that LGBTetc don’t feel threatened, then they have to do the same with Israelis and Jews.
Hayden — Why would anyone suppose that the notion of expressive liberty is a demand for expressive consistency? Let alone take the next step, to empower a court to decide which expressions are properly consistent, and which are not.
"[Note: I recognize that some universities have religious or other missions that may justify a different approach, but that is not the case at most private universities.]"
I'm not certain that second part is true... At this point, it might be fairer to say that most private universities DO have "secular religion or other missions" which COULD justify a different approach... but they have not yet officially admitted to it.