The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Crypto disclosures, high-risk stops, and protecting the curtilage.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
Peter and Annica Quakenbush want to use their 20-acre property in rural Brooks Township, Mich. as a green cemetery and nature preserve, but township officials banned all cemeteries to stop them. This week, however, a state trial court noted that it's "Zoning 101" in Michigan that officials can't ban legitimate land uses—and ruled from the bench that the county is violating the state constitution. A rational-basis win at the motion-to-dismiss stage? Eureka! Click here to learn more.
- EPA economist has severe allergies. When a nearby coworker starts wearing cologne that causes reactions, economist asks to be moved from a cubicle to an office with a door. EPA refuses but says he can work from home. (Coworker also refuses to stop wearing cologne.) Economist says he doesn't want to WFH as he actually likes interacting with colleagues (just not with cologne). District court: EPA did enough. D.C. Circuit: Lots of facts here, talk to a jury. Dissent: WFH sounds pretty good to me.
- "Although Fresh Line chickens and turkeys, according to allegations we accept as true, were raised strictly indoors, the approved product labels depict birds freely roaming outside a barn." Does a member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund have standing to sue the Department of Ag and challenge its approval of this feathered propaganda? D.C. Circuit: The member alleges the label is misleading, but that means she already knows it's misleading. So she won't be misled. (And who cares what anyone else thinks.) So she doesn't have an injury. Case dismissed.
- A century ago, when zoning laws were shiny and new, they were a favorite tool for targeting racial minorities. City of Cromwell, Conn.: As a nation, we've evolved since then. What we like to use our zoning laws for now is targeting people with mental-health disabilities. Cool? Second Circuit: Decidedly uncool―and unlawful under the Fair Housing Act. But the mismatch between the jury's award of $181k in compensatory damages and its award of $5 mil in punitive damages was so large as to violate the Due Process Clause's limit on excessive punitive damages. The punitive damages are reduced to $2 mil.
- Driver pulls over to fix his malfunctioning GPS; a Waterbury, Conn. police officer knocks on the window, and driver hands over his driver's license and gun permit and tells officer there's a legal pistol in the driver's side door. Yikes! Officer violently drags him out of the car, handcuffs him, detains him in squad car for half an hour, and searches the driver's car and trunk. Second Circuit: Having a lawful gun doesn't give police carte blanche to arrest you for over half an hour and ransack your car. No qualified immunity
- One man is murdered and another grievously wounded in Lebanon, Penn. in drug-money dispute. Three people were seen leaving the scene of the crime; one pleads guilty to a 20-count criminal information, naming one of the others seen as a co-conspirator. At the latter man's trial, the court reads aloud to the jury the entirety of the former man's criminal information—without having him testify—and he's convicted, sentenced to life. Third Circuit: A clear violation of the Confrontation Clause. Habeas granted.
- The first rule of ex post facto challenges to sex-offender registration and residency requirements is that the sex offenders lose. Fourth Circuit: Applying that hoary legal principle here, we conclude that the sex offenders lose.
- Circuit split alert! In July, the Fourth Circuit (over a dissent) held that "geofence" warrants ordering Google to provide law enforcement with information about every accountholder who enters a particular area in a particular time period are totally cool under the Fourth Amendment. But lo! A mere month later, here comes the Fifth Circuit to tell us that these same warrants are, in fact, totally bogus under the Fourth Amendment! This problem can only be solved by SCOTUS (or by Google, which has apparently changed the way it stores data to put a stop to these warrants no matter what the courts say).
- This Sixth Circuit opinion is an absolute banger for anyone who's a huge fan of the Social Security Administration's org chart or who gets super-excited when federal courts reaffirm that the Appointments Clause of Article II doesn't really pose any obstacle to federal agencies' doing whatever they want so long as the nominal agency head says the right magic words. The slim minority of you who fall into neither category can probably give it a miss.
- Cleveland, Ohio woman is found in a park in 1974, fatally stabbed. Near her body is a newspaper with a bloody palm print and a bloody pillowcase from a nearby hotel, both with ties to another man. Despite no physical evidence linking the woman's husband, he's convicted, spends 46 years in prison—and is exonerated in 2021. (He died six months after his acquittal.) He sues the detectives' estates (they've since died) and the city of Cleveland. Sixth Circuit: He's too late suing the detectives' estates, but a jury should have the chance to consider whether evidence was unconstitutionally withheld. Partial concurrence/dissent: The claims against the detectives' estates should go forward, too.
- Under federal law, anyone who receives more than $10k in cash in the course of their trade or business has to make certain disclosures to the gov't. In 2021, Congress amended the law so that "cash" now includes "digital assets," such as cryptocurrency and monkey pictures. Crypto folks sue. Sixth Circuit: And their enumerated powers, Fourth Amendment, and First Amendment claims can go forward. But their vagueness and self-incrimination claims are not yet ripe.
- Security guard at a Cincinnati public library posts an insensitive meme to his personal Facebook page concerning the BLM protests. He takes it down less than 24 hours later, but some of his Facebook friends who work with him at the library complain. He's fired from his job. He sues for First Amendment retaliation: Sixth Circuit: He spoke on a matter of public concern, and nobody could think that his post would actually disrupt the library. He wins. Dissent: How are we supposed to weigh whether his interest in speaking outweighs potential disruption at work? We should defer to the library.
- After a warning, Barron County, Wisc. officer lets canine loose into home to apprehend man wanted on several outstanding arrest warrants for violent crimes. The dog locates the man, and the K9 officer shouts that he'll call off the dog if the man shows his hands. Amid tortuous screams, the man explains he can't do that because of the dog trying to tear one of his arms apart. After about 2 minutes the dog is successfully commanded to stop. The arm is now severely disfigured. Qualified immunity? Seventh Circuit: Too many disputed facts to assess at this stage. Get thee to a jury.
- You might think two affected firearms industry manufacturers, a gun association, and an individual are enough to make a federal case out of a new ATF rule reclassifying pistols equipped with "stabilizing braces" as "short-barreled rifles." But apparently 25 states—fully half of the Republic—needed to be plaintiffs as well. And their AGs can now ring the register (and prepare talking points for future gubernatorial runs) because their additional presence seems to have been just enough to convince the Eighth Circuit to find the rule likely is arbitrary and capricious under the APA and therefore is preliminarily enjoined. Dissent: A judge in Texas already vacated this rule so how can we enjoin it?
- Man in Columbia County, Ark., wanted for a murder earlier that evening, is said to be driving a white SUV. Officer finds a matching SUV, blocks the vehicle into its parking space, gets out and asks the driver his name. Which—in an unusual tactic for a wanted murderer—he honestly provides. However, he then puts the SUV in reverse, slamming into the cop car, and is about to drive over the curb when the officer shoots him dead through the window. His estate sues for excessive force. Eighth Circuit: Dude, he just murdered someone. Qualified immunity. Dissent: The facts of the encounter are genuinely disputed.
- Iowa passes law requiring school libraries to remove any books that are not "age-appropriate" and prohibiting any "program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six." Lawsuits are filed and the law is enjoined. Eighth Circuit: Enjoined a little too hastily. Why don't you take another look at it and hew a little closer to the Supreme Court's standards.
- Conservation group sues Minnesota, saying the state isn't doing enough under the Endangered Species Act to protect the threatened Canadian lynx. Minnesota agrees to a consent decree that imposes regulations on trappers to prevent harms to the lynx. But wait! Three pro-trapping organizations intervene and object to the consent decree. Eighth Circuit: The decree seems fair and reasonable to us and doesn't appear to violate state administrative law.
- Los Angeles police looking for a stolen limo encounter a limo driving by, the license plate of which doesn't match the vehicle because of DMV error. Yikes! Escalating rapidly, roughly a dozen officers (with a helicopter assist) conduct a "high-risk" stop, swarming the innocent and terrified occupants—a mom and two teens. When the limo occupants sue, alleging excessive force, the district court grants qualified immunity to the individual officers, and then a jury rules for the city on the remaining claims against the LAPD. Ninth Circuit: It was clearly established that reasonable suspicion a vehicle is stolen isn't a constitutionally sufficient basis to go all Heat on the car, so plaintiffs get another crack at their claims against the individual officers. But jury instructions were OK, so verdict for the city affirmed. Dissent: Given how the jury was instructed, it's clear they didn't think the officers acted unreasonably and would have rejected the individual-officer claims too, so any qualified-immunity error was harmless.
- With no warrant, Los Angeles police snoop onto driveway ("curtilage") and spot an uncle handling meth in his nephew's garage. Drug convictions ensue for both. They push for post-conviction relief, claiming their lawyers messed up by not raising the obvious: Police can't snoop onto curtilage without a warrant, so the evidence should've been tossed. Ninth Circuit: Nephew's lawyer dropped the ball since the police had no right to invade his curtilage. But the uncle? It's not his house. Concurrence: Few things are more serious than a (literal) overstep of gov't power. Protection of curtilage, tracing back to English common law, is an ancient right deeply rooted in our history.
- Children's Health Defense, a nonprofit founded by RFK Jr., wants to distribute information via social media about what it views as the dangers of vaccines. But Meta Platforms, operator of Facebook, adds warnings these views are, in fact, bunk. The nonprofit sues, alleging that Meta violated their First Amendment rights and even effectuated an unconstitutional "taking" by removing their donation button. Ninth Circuit: But Meta is not the gov't, so all of these wacky claims fail. Dissent: All of the wackiest claims fail, but there are enough allegations that Meta was acting on behalf of the gov't that the First Amendment claims should go forward.
- Mexican national is connected to the fatal shooting of a Border Patrol agent in the United States. Seven years later, FBI agents interrogate him in a Mexican prison. After reading him his Miranda rights, they hit him with everything: good cop, bad cop; your friends told us a different story; we're not charging you with anything. He doesn't bite. Then his lawyer says, you were just in the mountains looking to rob drug dealers, and that's not a crime, so tell these guys what they want to know. So he does. Ninth Circuit: That is extremely ineffective assistance of counsel. Dissent: We should make this guy who admitted to participating in the murder of a federal agent work at least a little harder before we vacate his sentence.
- Mexican national—who had previously been removed from the country—reenters, gets caught, and is charged with illegal reentry. His lawyer collaterally challenges his initial removal, arguing that he has major brain damage and unknowingly waived his right to counsel in the first case because when he was told the gov't would not pay for his attorney and he would have to "hire" one, he thought that precluded him from getting a pro bono attorney. Ninth Circuit: The waiver was invalid. Dissent: Oh, come on. He was expressly told about the availability of pro bono counsel.
- Man abducts pregnant woman from her home at gunpoint, forces her to steal stacks of money from the bank where she works. The man faces kidnapping and robbery charges, along with a solicitation of murder charge based on a jailhouse informant, who said that the man asked him to kill the woman, her husband, and baby for $10k. The informant also testified that his motives were altruistic and he'd received no parole consideration—a lie. Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): And that lie results in a habeas grant.
- And in amicus brief news, IJ—and some friends—are asking the Supreme Court to hold that a civil rights plaintiff is a "prevailing party" when they win a preliminary injunction and then the gov't capitulates, by changing the law being challenged or otherwise mooting the case before a final judgment on the merits. Last year, the Fourth Circuit—in line with every other circuit—ruled that indeed they are, which entitles them to attorneys' fees under Section 1988. And that's a holding the Court should not disturb.
- And in en banc news, the Eleventh Circuit will reconsider its decision that the Houston County, Ga. sheriff's office is violating Title VII by offering health insurance that lacks coverage for sex changes.
New case! Indiana's state motto is "The Crossroads of America," and for years Indiana police have exploited one of the nation's biggest shipping hubs to profit from that status―plucking parcels en route from the East Coast to the West, subjecting them to K-9 sniffs, opening them, and, if they contain money, suing to forfeit the money in Indiana state courts. What violation of Indiana law supports these forfeitures? Indiana doesn't say. Since 2022, the state has sued to forfeit more than $2.5 mil in this way. Now, IJ has teamed up with a small California jewelry company (whose money was recently snatched up in Indiana) to file a class-action lawsuit and put a stop to Indiana's money grab.
New case! Friends, do you love meat but have ethical or environmental qualms about the more than 34 million cows and 8 billion chickens killed annually to satisfy America's appetite for it? Then you're the sort of consumer UPSIDE Foods wants to appeal to with cultivated chicken, which is grown from real chicken cells without the need to kill animals and has been greenlit for interstate sale by the FDA and USDA. The state of Florida, however, is not a fan: At the behest of in-state agricultural interests, it recently banned cultivated meat from the state. But Florida can't wall itself off from the interstate market just to please favored in-state interests. So this week IJ and UPSIDE joined forces to challenge this protectionist ban. Learn more here.
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Re #5: As a non-lawyer, it bugs me that lawyers (prosecutors) will write information in an information.
"Re #5: As a non-lawyer, it bugs me that lawyers (prosecutors) will write information in an information."
How is that a potential problem? A criminal information comes into play only after the accused has agreed to waive his right to a grand jury indictment. Defense counsel ordinarily participates in agreeing what charge(s) will be brought by information. Who else other than the prosecutor would draft the charging document?
That having been said, in the Third Circuit habeas corpus case described above at ¶5, the Pennsylvania trial judge and the habeas petitioner's defense counsel at trial had their heads far up their asses.
You really can't see why it would bother someone. You're probably unfazed by the government forfeiting money forfeited by a person, too. Heck, I bet you'd breeze right through Buffalo buffalo Buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo Buffalo buffalo without even checking the capitalization. This is a symptom of too much analytical reading and not enough reading for funsies.
I have found that I can rarely go wrong underestimating the ignorance of many dilettantes who comment on this law blog. Michael P is among the worst offenders.
I think that Michael P’s comment is what is sometimes referred to as a “joke”.
My tongue was somewhat in my cheek, but I am somewhat annoyed by the use of "information" as jargon with a meaning that is so different from its lay meaning; the word even changes from a mass noun to a countable noun.
"Then his lawyer says, you were just in the mountains looking to rob drug dealers, and that's not a crime"
Back around the 2000s police detained a suspect in a fatal arson in western Massachusetts. They told him don't worry, the death was just an accident, not murder, and confessing to arson won't put you in prison for life. He confessed and was convicted of murder. The Supreme Judicial Court threw out his confession because police had lied to him. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Many years later the SJC prospectively abolished felony murder. Now arson resulting in unintended death could legitimately result in a manslaughter verdict.
“Back around the 2000s police detained a suspect in a fatal arson in western Massachusetts.”
Well, no, they convicted him in the ’80s and he was in prison for 30 years. This is the Rosario case, recognizable even with all the details screwed up.
“The Supreme Judicial Court threw out his confession because police had lied to him.”
There was also a small matter of fabricated evidence, kickbacks from insurance companies trying to avoid paying claims, and a couple other didos. But I’m sure the police lying about potential charges was definitely the main reason, even if the SJC’s opinion didn’t indicate anything like that.
“Many years later the SJC prospectively abolished felony murder. Now arson resulting in unintended death could legitimately result in a manslaughter verdict.”
Weird that they still prosecute it then. The change, of course, was that specific intent is now needed to charge felony murder as first-degree murder and instead it must be charged as second-degree murder if that intent requirement isn’t met. I wouldn’t call that “abolished,” nor would I call a second-degree murder charge a manslaughter charge.
But you do you. If you want to reimagine a very old case for no apparent reason, who am I to stand in your way?
Here is the case: Commonwealth. v. Baye 967 N.E.2d 1120 (Mass. 2012). I was wrong about the procedural posture. He was not convicted of murder. The SJC allowed an interlocutory appeal in the murder case and ordered the confession suppressed. Then he pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
I have seen many reports of murder cases pleaded down to manslaughter when there are evidentiary problems.
My mistake - thought I recognized it. Looking at it now, you seem to have overlooked the part where the cops wouldn't let him talk to his lawyer, but police dishonesty was indeed part of the analysis.
The Eighth Circuit did not enjoin the ATF pistol brace rule. The Appeals Court ordered the District Court to reconsider, this time assuming the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.
He speaks only Spanish and is unable to read or write in Spanish or English.
Re 21: The guy was told (in Spanish) he could get a lawyer free of charge, but the majority says that doesn’t count because the Spanish word for hire was used. But the key takeaway here is that our border is so weak that we’re getting invaded by operators who aren’t even literate in their own language.
For years, couriers carried marijuana in backpacks across the Seep. At some point, perhaps sensing opportunity, small gangs known as “rip crews” began robbing drug couriers at gunpoint.
Re 20: Also our border is so insecure we have invaders hunting other invaders as profit seeking activity.
Well, actually, the rip crews may be robbing the smugglers on the Mexican side of the border.
The shootout occurred in The Seep, which the opinion says is 11 miles north of the border. The invader infiltrated America, murdered an American, and retreated back to Mexico before being found again.
He wasn’t told he could get a lawyer free of charge. He was told “The government does not pay for the service of an attorney. Each one who, then, wants to hire an attorney goes and hires one at his own expense.” He didn’t qualify for an appointed lawyer. He was told he could hire his own attorney but not that an attorney might choose to represent him for free.
But what I want to know is when did that become part of your constitutional right to counsel? What someone pays for an attorney isn’t part of the right to counsel. An attorney may agree to represent you for a high price, a low price, barter system, or at no cost at all. That’s just between you and them. All you have to be told is that the government won’t give you one but you can get your own.
“[T]o each one who would like to look for an attorney to hire
one, a list of local legal services has been provided. When
the people signed up on the list, those attorneys indicate[d]
to the judge that they can do cases free of charge and others
for a low fee.”
Being given a list of attorneys and told that some of them work free of charge is more than good enough. There's still the issue that he's illiterate, but honestly that's a him problem. So we don't even have to reach the merits of "but he should have been told he could get a free attorney!" He was told.
Legend has it you used to get one phone call when you were arrested. You could use the call to summon your lawyer. If this was true, it would only help people who knew the phone number of a lawyer who could help.
The D.C. Circuit appointed a team from a big law firm to assist the EPA economist who was pro se.
Fifteen years ago the First Circuit found a lesser detention for having a licensed gun not actionable. Schubert v. City of Springfield 589 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2009). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/204123/schubert-v-city-of-springfield/
In the not-so-murderous husband case, Ohio law says claims against an estate can be filed (1) six months after death, or (2) two months after a contingent claim becomes live. Judge Clay considers this period too short and would presumably allow the plaintiff's estate to sue the defendant's heirs using the general statute of limitations for torts committed by living people. In The Wabbit Who Came to Supper Elmer Fudd gets a large inheritance that somehow leaves him in debt after fees and taxes. Such is the life of a police officer's children without a statute of limitations.
That seems unlikely, as almost every jurisdiction indemnifies cops, either as a matter of statute or contract.
“Although Fresh Line chickens and turkeys, according to allegations we accept as true, were raised strictly indoors, the approved product labels depict birds freely roaming outside a barn.” Does a member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund have standing to sue the Department of Ag and challenge its approval of this feathered propaganda? D.C. Circuit: The member alleges the label is misleading, but that means she already knows it’s misleading. So she won’t be misled. (And who cares what anyone else thinks.) So she doesn’t have an injury. Case dismissed.
30 years ago, I recall a brand of paper plates having pictures of pine trees on it, with “Made from trees. A renewable resource.”
Though young at the time, it struck me as curiously squirrely. No mention as to whether their trees were part of a managed regrowth cycle, of course.
"Made from oil. Did you know oil can be created in a lab?"
The court's logic here strikes me as bizarre.
If you know the label is misleading you can't sue over it, but if you don't know, you won't sue.
So no one can sue?
Someone who has received actual damages, rather than merely seeking declaratory relief, would have standing. It's pretty obvious they were trying to manufacture standing but even under their contrived scenario the court is forced to pretend to take seriously (this lady must buy chicken breasts for her dog, wants humanely raised chicken, but insists on relying solely on the graphic design of the package to determine if the chickens were humanely raised) they don't actually show declaratory relief would do her any good.
OK, that works if the manufacturer doesn't list an ingredient, say, that makes a buyer sick.
But not in this sort of case.
I was afk so way late but: What do you mean "this sort of case?" The sort of case where you can't identify a plaintiff who was actually damaged? Pretty big clue that this shouldn't be a lawsuit, then.
The court specifically observed that the woman claiming injury has the concrete and particularized injury necessary for standing. What that doesn't do is give associational standing for injunctive and declaratory relief, which requires ongoing or repeatable harm. They claim the ongoing harm was that she can't trust labels as long as the gov't approves bad ones, and that's the kind of argument. . . well, it's the kind of argument you get from a small group of like-minded activists if you put them in a hotbox.
My feelsies say suing the label-approving agency for money would not be a productive route, however, and her damages against the actual poultry company would be in small claims territory. But that's neither here nor there.
Why wouldn’t loss of money buying a product that wasn’t what she though not be a financial injury?
I mean would she really have to produce psychiatrist receipts for treatments for her fooled shame spiral?
Are you replying to the wrong person? She does have a financial injury sufficient for standing. But you can’t use associational standing to recover money for a party and she lacks the ongoing/repeatable injury for the relief they can request.
As to a psychological injury, they’d have to plead it for starters but then they lose anyway because Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982). It’s not directly on point, admittedly, but demonstrates a lower boundary that I don’t think is cleared. There isn’t an eggshell-thin ego rule like there is for skulls.
Anyone can sue for damages they already (supposedly) incurred by (allegedly) being misled. They can't sue for injunctive relief for the reasons stated. But relevant government agencies can.
A government official may be able to sue.
Does this mean I can't expect to win a million-dollar lawsuit on the grounds that Keebler cookies aren't actually baked by elves?
Were that there were upvotes to give!
Well, we can safely put you in the "Lying liars who lie" category.
.
The FBI was interviewing someone in a Mexican prison. It would be interesting to know if he had a US lawyer for this interview or if he was relying on a Mexican lawyer.
The Ninth Circuit opinion indicates that the defendant was arrested by Mexican authorities, and the interview occurred while extradition proceedings were underway. Mexican officials told U.S. agents that the accused had requested the presence of his attorney, and everyone waited for almost three hours, but that attorney didn’t show up.
Thereafter Pimentel (the Mexican attorney who gave the bad advice) showed up. The Ninth Circuit opinion recites, “It is unclear where Pimentel came from or what he was doing at the prison that day.” Footnote 3 of the opinion quotes the District Court’s remarks at the suppression hearing: “Now, the facts that I don’t have are, and I could have had but I don’t have, Pimentel didn’t drop out of a bag at this prison. Somebody had to call him, contact him, hire him, request him, instruct him, or ask him to come to this statement.”
Quite a curious occurrence there.
#11: "We should defer to the library."
Of course we should. The government always knows best.
Didn't that judge hear Chevron is dead? He needs to learn his job is to judge, not defer to others all the time.
Chevron is about deference to regulatory agencies in interpreting regulations. This is a government-as-employer speech case.
Chevron isn't even about that. It's about regulatory agencies interpreting statutes to determine the scope of their authority. Regulations are Auer deference, which isn't dead yet.
The argument is not a general deference to government, it's a deference to the government as employer as to what would or would not disrupt the particular workplace and its mission.
Leaving the snark aside, wouldn't the library have a better idea of how much disruption the incident would cause than the judges?
And BTW, isn't the 6th Circuit also part of the government?
That said, I think firing the guy was not remotely justified, 1A or no 1A.
"wouldn’t the library have a better idea of how much disruption the incident would cause than the judges"
Maybe yes, maybe no.
Imagine the Jim Crow south and "Security guard at a Birmingham public library posts a meme supporting desegregation to his personal Facebook page. He takes it down less than 24 hours later, but some of his Facebook friends who work with him at the library complain. He's fired from his job. He sues for First Amendment retaliation: Sixth Circuit: He spoke on a matter of public concern, and nobody could think that his post would actually disrupt the library."
Should we still defer to the library's claim of disruption?
I do not think that any Facebook posts would be disruptive in 1963.
They probably do, but are unlikely to research precedent in order to determine whether the disruption was legally "substantial" under 1A. As an employer, they have the facts, but they aren't qualified to determine the state of the law and apply those facts to it.
There's also a question of bias, of course - most people think they did the right thing and are not well-situated to investigate themselves. If the "library" were able to determine whether the disruption was too great, it would actually be a person doing that - probably the person who actually fired him, or a close colleague. Librarians don't have a code of judicial ethics.
Probably. Wouldn't the library be perhaps non-objective on that question, though?
"wouldn’t the library have a better idea of how much disruption the incident would cause than the judges?"
Sure, that's why they would have the burden of proof. That doesn't mean courts should defer and give their claims special weight.
Re 18:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule isn't to provide a remedy for a violation of your rights; it's to deter the government from violating rights in the first place. And they would be more deterred if they couldn't use illegally gained evidence against anyone, rather than only excluding it against certain people.
Nevertheless, it is a remedy, and you don't get to the issue of remedy until you get past standing.
Iowa passes law requiring school libraries to remove any books that are not "age-appropriate" and prohibiting any "program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six." Lawsuits are filed and the law is enjoined.
Interesting list of parties who think its good to show porn to elementary school students.
A "survey...relating to gender identity" is porn to you? That's an odd kink you got there!
"When a nearby coworker starts wearing cologne that causes reactions"
The ultimate issue here is that most scents are organic hydrocarbons, which the EPA would not tolerate a company dumping into the outdoor air.
The smog of the "Smoky Mountains" is naturally occurring -- the pine trees release organic hydrocarbons (the scent of pine) which the sun then turns into smog (like any other organic hydrocarbons).
So she's polluting the air of the EPA office. Irony?