The Volokh Conspiracy
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A Ruling That Eliminates Important Privacy Rights in Many Stored Internet Contents—And The Legal Challenge to It
With a petition for review now pending before the Supreme Court of California.
18 U.S.C. § 2702, part of the Stored Communications Act, is one of those laws that you rely on every day but you have probably never heard of before. The law blocks Internet communications and storage providers from disclosing the contents of your online accounts. Think about the really private stuff you store online, like your emails, photos, text messages, and other communications. Section 2702 is basically the Internet's privacy wall for all of those stored contents. Unless an explicit exception to the statute applies, such as the government coming with a warrant, your provider is not allowed to share your private account contents with others.
Or so everyone has thought.
On July 23, 2024, the California Court of Appeal handed down a surprising ruling in Snap, Inc. v. Superior Court (Pina), holding that the SCA does not apply to most remotely-stored online messages. The court interpreted the law's privacy bar to not apply if providers have a right of access to customer data for their own business purposes. In the court's view, the § 2702 disclosure bar can only apply if the companies have no right of access to user accounts beyond the access required for providing storage and processing. The court then applied that standard to the contents at issue in the case—a Facebook account, an Instagram account, and a Snapchat account—to hold that § 2702(a) does not bar their disclosure.
The case arose in a criminal prosecution, in which the defendant is trying to compel companies to turn over user messages from the victim's accounts. The defendant, Adrian Pina, is accused of murdering his brother Samuel. Samuel purportedly had accounts with Instagram, Snapchat, and potentially other providers. To help prepare his defense, the defendant wants the contents of his brother's accounts. To that end, his counsel served subpoenas on Snap (which operates Snapchat) and Meta (which operates Facebook and Instagram) seeking disclosure of account contents.
Snap and Meta declined to produce account contents, however, invoking the privacy bar imposed by § 2702. According to Snap and Meta, the privacy wall of § 2702 applies and protects their users' messages and account contents. That's where the new ruling comes in: The Court of Appeal rejected the arguments of Snap and Meta, ordering them to comply with the subpoenas on the ground that the § 2702 privacy wall does not apply to Instagram accounts or Snapchat accounts—and perhaps lots of other kinds of accounts.
This is, I hope, not the end of the story.
I have joined the legal team representing Snap. We have filed this Petition for Review asking the Supreme Court of California to review the Court of Appeal's decision and to reject its reasoning. We hope that the Court will restore the proper role of § 2702 in protecting the privacy of everyone's online accounts. Meta has also filed a Petition for Review, which you can read here.
I don't plan to blog about this case again, given my role as counsel for Snap. But I did want to flag the case for interested readers.
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As I understand the law: The government is able to get a warrant if they can convince a judge that there is a reasonable chance of finding evidence of a crime in these records. However they have to be specific about what they are looking for, they can’t just go on a fishing expedition. The government can’t simply ask for all of these records as a matter of course.
Is there a similar mechanism for the defense that’s different from the subpoena’s mentioned here? I.e., if they could show a rational basis that would indicate that there would be exculpatory information in these records, they would be allowed to search for it? If not that seems a bit unfair to the defense since they are denied avenues of investigation that are more open to the government. However the defense presumably also should be restricted from random fishing.
As is plain to see I’m not a lawyer. Without a little further information I’m not even sure what the stakes are here or whom I should be rooting for!
As I understand it, privacy rights expire at death -- and here a person on trial for murder is seeking testimony that otherwise wouldn't exist -- the dying declarations of the victim.
Dying declarations?? How would the defendant make a threshold showing that the decedent posted to Facebook or Snapchat while he knew he was about to die?
And why should the defense surmise that any such online postings would exculpate him? (Not that that is impossible. He could conceivably have identified a third party as the shooter. But how likely is that?) If the prosecution was in possession of exculpatory online postings, it would of course have been obliged to disclose them to the defense.
Seems to me that the court got to the right outcome but for very wrong reasons. The accusation is that Samuel was murdered. Presumably, that means he’s known to be dead. Absent some very limited data elements (like genetics), privacy interests terminate upon death.
Common law privacy interests terminate but this case isn't an application of common law privacy. It concerns a statutory constraint on an information service provider.
I think there is a big difference between saying that if a customer consents to use of data for certain business purposes, it does not have a defense to a subpoena, and saying that if a customer consents to use of data for certain business purposes, the data can be used by anyome for anything.
Ordinarily, government can search data if it obtains a warrant, which a subpoena can more or less function as if the requirements for a warrant are otherwise met. After all, the personal data here is equivalent to the “papers and effects” mentioned in the 4th Amendment. So I don’t think it’s unreasonable to construe Sec. 2702 somewhat narrowly when a search or demand related to a prosecution for a violent crime is involved and the essential elements of a warrant, e.g. probable cause and particularity, are satisfied.
So the circumstances aren’t necessarily as wide open or as catastrophic as the headline suggests. Some clarification might be in order.
I certainly hope that Orin is able to help win this case. Regardless, this is a great argument in favor of end to end encrypted systems that prevent the provider from accessing content for any reason, whether it be for business, response to a government demand, or any other.
I am baffled why anyone would suppose the contents of personal communications are not routinely ransacked by online service providers, or by governments.
Most user agreements require the user to permit the provider to use otherwise private information for specific purposes. While I would consider these agreements "adhesion contracts", it seems that the contractual agreement should be considered in determining whether the statute applies.
This post is a bit old, but the hype of "privacy" is so vastly overblown as to overshadow the legitimate (i.e. lawful) needs of private litigants for information in the hands of tech companies. Only the government gets access? Does anyone think Congress really meant to provide access ONLY to government and no one else? It's about the Fourth Amendment, as Orin Kerr has written. But he's wrong to argue there's some absolute privacy privilege to the detriment of all non-government persons with the unfortunate need of the judicial machinery to resolve disputes.
Big Tech ought not to have a free pass to withhold discoverable information that could exonerate a criminally accused or prove/defend a civil litigant's claim or defense. Prevent them from voluntarily disclosing private communications? Sure. I wouldn't want Google to make public my private emails. Give them a complete shield to refuse to disclose it to those who need it (and can include protections for public disclosure)? No. It's totally bonkers that the CDA has been interpreted in the way Big Tech and its allies have advocated.
The California Supreme Court is poised to finally start chipping away at this misguided understanding now that it has granted cert. Case No. S286267