Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Arresting the wrong Jose Vasquez. Arresting the wrong Bethany Farber. Arresting the wrong Juan Martinez.

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

This week on the Short Circuit podcast: A dog named Thor not behaving as man's best friend and speculation as to why "bigamy" is in the Mississippi Constitution.

And, over at the Fed Soc teleforum, IJ's own Robert McNamara moderates a debate on the merits of qualified immunity between Michael Perloff, interim head of the ACLU, and Prof. Chris Walker of the University of Michigan. Click here to check that out.

1. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the CDC imposed a temporary eviction moratorium that the Supreme Court held was beyond the agency's statutory authority. CDC: Which means the eviction moratorium couldn't possibly have worked a taking, right? Because takings are lawful, and we acted unlawfully, right? So, y'know, neener neener neener, right? Federal Circuit (over a dissent): That is very clever and entirely wrong. Case undismissed!
2. During 2020 police-brutality protests, D.C. police arrested quite a few people and then released them in relatively short order. They did not, however, release their cell phones for months and years—despite not pressing charges or seeking search warrants. District court: Which is fine. The Fourth Amendment only applies to the initial act of seizing the phones, not retaining them. D.C. Circuit: Vacated. Text, history, and tradition say otherwise. Concurrence: And the five circuits that have gone the other way on this employed unpersuasive reasoning. (IJ—with some friends—urged this course of action in an amicus brief.)
3. Maryland man who shares name and DOB with a fugitive wanted for a 40-year-old Illinois murder is repeatedly arrested by D.C. police. Egregiously, Illinois police had put the Maryland man's SSN on their warrant. But eventually, they correct that and instruct officers not to detain the Maryland man. Despite this, D.C. police detain him two more times. Jury: And D.C. owes him $100k for false imprisonment. District court: Vacated! Just because a D.C. officer knew the Maryland man had a different SSN than the one on the (corrected) warrant doesn't mean the officer knew he was a different person. D.C. Circuit: Doesn't it? The jury's verdict is reinstated.
4. Defendant robs a Maine bank, has a rap-sheet "longer than" the sentencing judge's "arm," and early in his subsequent prison term engaged in a fair amount of poor behavior. However, it's also true that falling on his head when he was four "'annihilated' his brain's impulse control center," that he has recently taken remedial classes in prison and has been much better at following prison rules. Worthy for compassionate release under the First Step Act? First Circuit: These are not "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for early release.
5. The Satanic Temple challenges the City of Boston's failure to invite them to give an invocation before its city council as a violation of the Establishment Clause. City: It's not that city councilors are favoring certain religions, it's that they're inviting people they like for non-religious reasons, like their good works in the community. First Circuit: Oh, well that's fine. Concurrence: The city also says that city councilors "might find it politically expedient to curry favor with a religious group and its constituent members," which seems at least a little problematic.
6. Virgin Island prisoner files a habeas petition with the territorial court in 2014, and all that court has done is since is hold a single status conference—seven years ago. So petitioner files his petition in federal court, where he has to show "inordinate delay" to excuse a failure to exhaust state-court remedies. District court: Sure, you kept filing motions and discovery requests while the territorial court dawdled, but you also could have sought the extraordinary relief of mandamus from the territorial high court, so the delay is your fault. Third Circuit: Are you kidding me? If the gov't doesn't have a very good reason for the delay, this habeas petition needs to be considered on the merits pronto.
7. In darker times, before Fortune's hand uplifted your summarist to life as a scrivener, he made a living extracting "withdrawal liability" from unwary unionized employers. (For an explanation of what that term means see this super-old and underread law review article.) Yet, one thing even he didn't do was represent a painters' union pension fund that sent its bill for $427,195 to an employer who had ceased making contributions to the fund 12 years prior. Was that "as soon as practicable" after the withdrawal? Third Circuit: A little bit long. And it's OK for us to second-guess the arbitrator.
8. Late one night a Pittsburgh man—a felon on probation—and his girlfriend see shadowy figures breaking into her car behind their house. Girlfriend gets out her handgun she keeps in a safe, hands it to the man, and takes her three kids out of the house and to safety. Man then confronts the figures, who flee, but while fleeing he fires shots and hits one in the thigh. Man dutifully calls his probation officer and admits to this—for which he's charged with being a felon "in possession" and sentenced to 84 months imprisonment. Second Amendment violation? Third Circuit: History, tradition, and Shays' Rebellion. Conviction affirmed.
9. In 2013, Maryland banned the sale and possession of so-called "assault weapons," a term that, as defined, includes the most popular rifle in the country. A coalition of firearms activists sue, arguing the ban violates the Second Amendment. Their case ping-pongs around the lower courts for years, gets a GVR at SCOTUS after Bruen, and then finally lands back at the Fourth Circuit (en banc) which says: These "arms" aren't even covered by the Second Amendment. Concurrence 1: We're drowning in history. Concurrence 2: I think the law's OK, but we're not supposed to be balancing stuff. Dissent: "Arms" are "arms." Also see footnote 2 for some opinion-drafting funny business.
10. Did Mick Jagger and Keith Richards say hi and, like a spider to a fly, steal a Spanish musician's musical compositions for their 2020 song "Living in a Ghost Town"? Fifth Circuit (unpublished): Can't say. Why'd you file this in Louisiana?
11. Man and woman conspire to kill woman's former husband, which they accomplish. Both are sentenced to death. Yikes! Turns out the judge (ex parte) tasked the prosecutor with drafting the sentencing opinion with the aid of the judge's notes. (The judge and prosecutor are publicly reprimanded.) The condemned man gets resentenced—to death by the same judge who refused to consider new mitigating evidence and in an opinion that is almost identical to the original. Sixth Circuit: Habeas granted. The judge was unconstitutionally biased. He also should've considered all relevant mitigating evidence. (For those keeping count, that's the second Sixth Circuit habeas grant of an Ohio conviction in as many weeks.)
12. Chinese spy would invite aviation experts from foreign companies to give presentations in China, cover their travel and provide additional payments, with the goal of stealing proprietary information. A GE Aviation engineer who specialized in composite fan-blade technology fell into the spy's trap—and eventually into an FBI investigation. Working with the feds, the GE engineer gets the spy to Belgium where the FBI arrests the spy. He's convicted, sentenced to 20 years in prison, based in part on the spy's intent to deprive GE of $50 mil. Sixth Circuit: Affirmed.
13. Missouri parent complains that a book in the school library system, Cats vs. Robots #1: This is War, features three pages discussing a character's nonbinary gender identity. Following district policy, the school district automatically pulls the book from the shelves and a committee votes to permanently remove it from elementary-level libraries. Parents who object to challenged books being removed automatically—with no notice or possibility to appeal the final removal decision—sue. Eighth Circuit: But they lack standing. Though hundreds of books are challenged around the country annually, who knows if it will ever happen here (again, that is)?
14. Kansas man neglects to tell his sexual partner he has HPV. When she, too, is later diagnosed with HPV, she threatens to sue her former lover and sends a demand letter to GEICO, which insured the car in which at least one of their sexual encounters took place. GEICO seeks a declaration that its policy does not cover these particular injuries. Eighth Circuit: And GEICO's right. Though an errant semicolon may suggest that the policy covers all "bodily injury" for which the insured becomes liable, context and common sense suggest the injury must be associated with the use of the car as something other than a mattress.
15. Old and busted (Supreme Court, 2020): "[A]s a general rule, our system 'is designed around the premise that [parties represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.'" New hotness (Eighth Circuit, 2024): Courts can compel defendants to assert qualified immunity (and then grant it), even if those defendants' counsel "didn't see grounds" to do so.
16. California woman is arrested in Los Angeles on a no-bail warrant from Texas (a state she says she has never been to) that identifies her by name, DOB, driver's license number, and more. After 12 days in jail, Gainesville, Tex. police confirm that—whoops!—they indicted the wrong woman. The real suspect (wanted for vandalism) has the same first and last name, but a different middle name. Can the wrongfully jailed woman sue the City of Los Angeles? Ninth Circuit (unpublished): No.
17. California man is detained in Stockton for public intoxication and then jailed for five days after the officer discovers a no-bail warrant from Los Angeles for a man with the same name and DOB. Yikes! The warrant actually identifies a different man who is significantly taller and heavier and has an entirely different set of fingerprints. Can the wrongfully detained man sue the Los Angeles Police Dept.? Ninth Circuit (unpublished): No.
18. Shortly before the 2022 election, the Libertarian Party of Georgia—which has run candidates for governor and lieutenant governor in every election since 1990—challenges a Georgia campaign finance law that favors Republican and Democratic nominees over those of minor parties. The district court denies its motion for preliminary injunction and the party appeals. Eleventh Circuit: Too bad the complaint didn't include any allegations in their complaint about what the party wants to do after the 2022 election. The case is moot.
19. Man is mistakenly released on bond from Orange County, Fla. jail. When officers seek to apprehend him, he shoots at them, wounding an officer in the shoulder. He flees, leaves his gun behind, and is then shot himself. While officers are holding him down, and before he can be cuffed, he jerks his arm. An officer shoots him in the back of the head, killing him. Excessive force? Eleventh Circuit: Qualified immunity. He may have been unarmed, but no reasonable jury could find that the officer knew he was unarmed.
20. And in amicus brief news, IJ is urging the Supreme Court to take up a pair of cases about outrageously short deadlines for filing Section 1983 cases, deadlines that are set by … state legislatures? As Judge Ho recently noted, that does seem passing strange: "you would think the last thing Congress would want is fifty different limitations rules." And, as we note in the brief, too short limitations periods (of, say, one year)—combined with judge-created procedural barriers like qualified & municipal immunity that require intense, time-consuming research prior to filing suit—undermine Congress' intent to allow individuals to vindicate their rights under the federal Constitution.

Victory! Friends, back in April we sued Nazareth, Penn. over an ordinance that made it a criminal act to put a "for sale" sign on a legally parked car. (Curiously, the ordinance only banned "for sale" signs, while allowing all sorts of other commercial speech on legally parked cars.) This week, borough officials repealed the ban. "I'm glad the borough has done the right thing and repealed the law, so nobody else will have to worry about facing criminal charges for simply putting a 'for sale' sign in their car window," said IJ client Will Cramer. "This case was always about making sure what happened to me doesn't happen to anyone else in Nazareth." Click here to learn more.

Comments

[John F. Carr]

The First Circuit enters the centuries-old debate about justification: can one get into City Hall by good works alone, or must one have faith?

[Dr. Ed 2]

James Michael Curley....

[John F. Carr]

The essence of the eviction moratorium takings decision:

To summarize: even if an action by a government agent is unlawful, it will likely be deemed authorized for takings- claim purposes if it was done within the normal scope of the agent’s duties—for example, if it was done “pursuant to the good faith implementation of a congressional act.” Del-Rio, 146 F.3d at 1362 (cleaned up). If instead the action was outside the normal scope of the government agent’s duties—or, despite being within that scope, it contravened an explicit prohibition or other positively expressed congressional intent—it will likely be deemed unauthorized. See id. at 1363; Ramirez, 724 F.2d at 151. The ultimate inquiry is whether the government agent’s action is “chargeable to the government.” Del-Rio, 146 F.3d at 1362.

[John F. Carr]

D.C.: "And the five circuits that have gone the other way on this employed unpersuasive reasoning."

One of the unpersuasive cases was featured on Short Circuit. Denault v. Ahern, 857 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2017). A police officer was holding initially legally seized property hostage to force a woman to testify against her ex. He was found liable for conversion but not for constitutional violations.

[loki13]

In fairness, I briefly looked at one of the cases.

Case argues that the retention of his seized property violated the Fourth Amendment, but we disagree because Officer Davis had probable cause to seize Case's property. Case relies on Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2007), in which we explained that, if an initial seizure of property by officers constituted an illegal seizure then "[c]ertainly, the continued retention of . . . [that] property . . . would be a constitutional violation as well." Id. at 1248. We did not say that the retention of legally seized property violates the Fourth Amendment. In Byrd v. Stewart, we distinguished a complaint under the Fourth Amendment "that the search and seizure itself was unlawful," from a complaint "that the officers have failed to return the items seized without due process of law," which is a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 811 F.2d 554, 554-55 (11th Cir. 1987).

A complaint of continued retention of legally seized property raises an issue of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but Case did not raise that issue in the district court.

So they aren't saying there is no redress, just not under the 4th. They say it's under the 14th. But this isn't my thing, so ... shrug.

[Noscitur a sociis]

It still seems pretty unpersuasive. How long the government holds onto the property seems like it will often have a pretty significant bearing on whether or not a seizure was reasonable.

[loki13]

Again, not my bag, but I can actually completely understand the reasoning.

You don't measure the reasonableness of the seizure based on whether the property was timely returned to you; it has to be measured at the time of the seizure.

That doesn't mean I'm down to clown with the gummint keeping property for days, weeks, or months, just that I can understand why some courts place this as a due process issue, and not a 4th Am. issue.

[Noscitur a sociis]

I think a seizure continues from the point the government takes control of a piece of property all the way until that control is relinquished. And I don't see how there's any question that seizing something briefly might be reasonable, while seizing for a long enough time might not be. Yes, that does mean that law enforcement might not know ex ante whether their seizure is reasonable—but that's how a lot of fourth amendment issues are resolved, so I don't think that's fatal.

In addition to matching my intuition, I think this is also how the Supreme Court has analyzed things: that is, that they view a seizure as ongoing, not just the moment that it's made, and they consider the length of the seizure in evaluating reasonableness. At least, I don't know how else to read a case like Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-333 (2001):

We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful, in light of the following circumstances, which we consider in combination....

Fourth, the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 28 (manner in which police act is "vital ... part of ... inquiry"). As far as the record reveals, this time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U. S., at 709-710 (holding 90-minute detention of luggage unreasonable based on nature of interference with person's travels and lack of diligence of police), with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 253 (1970) (holding 29-hour detention of mailed package reasonable given unavoidable delay in obtaining warrant and minimal nature of intrusion). Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, this brief seizure of the premises was permissible.

(There also could be due process concerns, of course, although it's hard to see how there were here, since D.C. provides a process to request the return of property and it seems like it's adequate, at least for these plaintiffs, since it worked.)

[loki13]

Right ... but those cases aren't about retaining the property.

You see the difference, right?

[loki13]

I realized that came off as weird.

I meant that those cases are about whether the restraint was reasonable, and therefore lawful. This is about what happens after there is no dispute that it was a lawful seizure.

Again, not my area, but I understand why a court would make the distinction.

[John F. Carr]

In the First Circuit case the plaintiff also alleged an unlawful taking because the seized property was not returned. She lost because she did not exhaust administrative remedies. I think that precedent no longer stands in light of Knick v. Township of Scott.

[John F. Carr]

It seems to have taken about 20 months for the Third Circuit to decide that time was of the essence in the habeas case.

[Noscitur a sociis]

More like 8 months, I believe.

[John F. Carr]

The first parent to sincerely object to a book being pulled off the shelves because it is icky should be awarded the school's copy of the book to read to his child or otherwise use to corrupt youth. And that should be the limit of the school's liability other than at the ballot box.

[Purple Martin]

...and if multiple parents sign onto the same lawsuit at the same time? They get t loan it to each other, so no problem?

[Bored Lawyer]

Can the wrongfully jailed woman sue the City of Los Angeles? Ninth Circuit (unpublished): No.

How about suing the Gainesville police who "indicted the wrong woman?"

[BillyG]

Agreed. That would seem to be the reasonable thing to do.

[not guilty]

If the woman had sued the Texas officers, she may have had an uphill fight to overcome qualified immunity. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Nerio v. Evans, 974 F.3d 571, 575-576 (5th Cir. 2020); Bosarge v. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2015).

[Michael P]

Yes, that seems to me like the right defendant. But could #16 woman sue the LAPD, or #17 man sue the City of Los Angeles?

[not guilty]

A local government does not qualify as a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy or was undertaken pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government's official decision-making channels. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978).

[not guilty]

Re: the Pittsburgh felon-in-possession defendant. I wonder why this man pleaded guilty. It seems to me that would have been a very triable case based on defense of third parties, justification and/or necessity. The accused need not even have testified -- defense counsel could have elicited the relevant facts and circumstances from the girlfriend. That way the jury need not have learned of his prior convictions. (The defense could have stipulated the existence of a prior felony conviction without identifying the underlying offense, per Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).)

I also question the discretion of the prosecutor in bringing this case.

[Brett Bellmore]

"Girlfriend gets out her handgun she keeps in a safe, hands it to the man, and takes her three kids out of the house and to safety. Man then confronts the figures, "

No defense of a third party when the third party has already left at the time of the confrontation.

[jb156]

I don't know the full circumstances, but it's certainly possible that the third party in danger was only out of immediate harm due to the interposal of the felon with a gun, and that without their presence, their proximity would be too close to be considered "safe".

[not guilty]

"No defense of a third party when the third party has already left at the time of the confrontation."

The gravamen of the offense was not confronting the car burglars and shooting one of them; it was possession of the firearm itself. When the defendant took possession, the girlfriend and her children were still in the house.

Perhaps there was an agreement with state prosecutors not to charge the shooting.

[Brett Bellmore]

Sure, and if he’d thrown the gun back in the safe when they left, that might work as a defense. But he didn’t. He continued his possession after there wasn’t any third party to defend.

So defense of a third party will not help him.

I’ve been pretty clear about my belief that, as a policy matter, felons should be restored ALL their rights at the completion of their sentence. But even if he had been under no legal disability, defense of a third party leaves the room with the third party.

And, frankly, even with no criminal record, that was a wrongful shooting.

[Jerry B.]

No girlfriend (or wife) of mine would be unable to defend herself with a firearm.

[Dr. Ed 2]

What about in states where deadly force is allowed for defense of property? Would 3rd party apply to that right?

[Noscitur a sociis]

It seems to me that would have been a very triable case based on defense of third parties, justification and/or necessity.

I would have to disagree. In the Third Circuit, a justification defense to felon in possession requires the defendant to show:

(1) he was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury;
(2) he did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct;
(3) he had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm); and
(4) there is a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.

U.S. v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1991). I don't see how there's much of an argument for any of the first three elements, much less all of them.

[bernard11]

I also question the discretion of the prosecutor in bringing this case.

Me too. And 84 months?

Something else going on here?

[Corve5]

My guess is the fact that he had already been convicted of felon in possession played a huge role.

Also, if he pleaded guilty and got 6 years for 3 grams of cocaine, there clearly was something else he did that was dropped.

[Drewski]

Pennsylvania statutorily prohibits a claim of self-defense or defense of others with an illegal firearm. Necessity doesn't work because if she could flee then so could he.

I'm surprised he wasn't charged for the shooting as well.

[Brett Bellmore]

Perhaps there were details that didn't come out on account of only charging him with the possession, that the prosecutor thought would make a conviction unlikely, and might even have hurt the possession case before a jury. Maybe the bullet wound in the thigh entered in the front of the thigh? Just random speculation, though, I have no reason to suppose that.

But defense of a third party? Absolutely not applicable here, and obviously so.

[Noscitur a sociis]

Pennsylvania statutorily prohibits a claim of self-defense or defense of others with an illegal firearm.

So what? This was a federal prosecution.

I’m surprised he wasn’t charged for the shooting as well.

What federal law do you think could have been charged?

[tkamenick]

Or just getting a reasonable jury. I'm reminded of a PBS documentary that was permitted to videorecord jury deliberations in a Milwaukee case. It was a simple felon in possession case. The defendant was a simple man who discovered that his girlfriend had brought a gun into his home. He knew he wasn't supposed to have it, so he took it to a police station to turn it in. The asshole prosecutor charged him with felon in possession, and he had no defense, but the jury acquitted him anyway, they were so incensed by the charges. Jury nullification at its best.

[TextFirst]

In re 12, hard to escape the impression that the aviation expert who the spy supposedly tricked is just playing dumb. So he didn't inform his employer about the trip, he downloaded export-controlled proprietary documents to take with him to China, he did his presentation, and he received cash? Uh huh. Sure is nice that the feds entered into a non-prosecution agreement with him. If I found the right linkedin profile, looks like he's no longer with GE and is working at Johnson & Johnson. Hopefully they don't have anything China wants.

[Dr. Ed 2]

Hopefully he lost his security clearance.

But if the real goal is to deal with the ChiCom spy, you have to use the CI you have and not the one you would like to have.

That said, some people do stupid things, and the cash may have to avoid an ex wife.

[Noscitur a sociis]

Re: 20—is the argument that there just isn't a statute of limitations for § 1983 actions? Because if we're arguing based on plausibility about what Congress intended, that seems a lot less likely than turning to state law (even ignoring any argument about liquidation by legislative inaction).

[not guilty]

I haven't read the cert petitions in question, but SCOTUS has long opined that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, such that the limitation period is borrowed from the state's personal injury statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).

[Noscitur a sociis]

Yes, that is the case that they're trying to have overruled. I'm curious what they think the correct rule should be instead.

[Michael P]

#14 is a case we have seen several times before here at the VC:
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/10/04/does-auto-insurance-policy-cover-spreading-std-when-having-sex-in-a-car/
https://reason.com/volokh/2023/03/10/if-you-get-an-std-from-sex-in-your-lovers-car-is-that-covered-by-the-auto-insurance-policy/

[mulched]

Once you've caught a case like that it's hard to get rid of.

[Purple Martin]

OK, that's the single funniest two-beat deadpan punchline I've read since Steven Wright stopped doing stand-up.

[Corve5]

If the two people were homosexual men, there would be no lawsuit, as they get infected with diseases on purpose.

Google Bugchasing.

[Corve5]

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/211255.P.pdf

Basically, this “opinion” can be read as “Yeah, we were slapped down by SCOTUS in Bruen, and now we hereby twist our same poor anti-Constitution logic to supposedly fit within Bruen’s framework.”

Except for Wilkinson who is a geriatric piece of shit appointed by Reagan, all judges in the majority were appointed by Clinton, Obama or Biden. They don’t care about the rules. They care about outcomes.

They belong in concentration camps.

The dissent was great, and a blueprint for SCOTUS. He calls out his colleagues for doing exactly what SCOTUS said not to do.

[mulched]

I saw cites to at least two Conspirators in the dissent.

[Corve5]

I didn't notice, but good for them. It means that people are reading.

[MatthewSlyfield]

On case #6.
"and all that court has done is since is hold a single status conference"

Ancient philosopher Confuseus says: What???

[Noscitur a sociis]

I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe that you had any trouble understanding what they were trying to convey.

[Squirrelloid]

Expressing no opinion about LGBT-related or gender-related reading materials, but... what in the world is 3-pages of gender identity doing in a book titled Cats vs. Robots? I came to read cats fight robots, and what I got was 3 pages of gender identity exposition? I don't know how, but somehow that author managed to screw up a concept as simple as cats fighting robots.

[Brett Bellmore]

Maybe the author wrote a book of gender identity exposition, and wrapped some stuff about cats fighting robots around it as a way of sneaking it into the children's section of the library.

[Dr. Ed 2]

How do robots have a gender to express?

[Absaroka]

If you follow the link in the OP, the Wengrod children are humans caught up in a war between the Robot Federation and the Feline Empire. Apparently both want the Singularity Chip which is hidden in the Wengrod house.

Of the Wengrod kids, the posted excerpt doesn't talk about the gender preferences of Max and Min, but goes into the three page exposition of Javi's non-binaryness, and apple pancakes.

[Sarcastr0]

Did either of you people even try to Google before going straight for the outrage?

"With examples of why coding is fun and other STEM applications cleverly woven into this fun and thoughtful story about looking beyond binary terms, this is the perfect novel for fans of House of Robots and The Tapper Twins. This middle grade novel is an excellent choice for tween readers in grades 5 to 6, especially during homeschooling. It’s a fun way to keep your child entertained and engaged while not in the classroom."

[Absaroka]

I'm not sure what is added by searching for a favorable review[1]. Some reviewers like it, and some don't, as evidenced by the complaint. The OP links to images of the three pages in question, which some parents probably think are great, while others don't think sexuality discussions are appropriate at the elementary level.

[1]In fact, I've picked up some pretty dreadful books at airports, and the back covers are full of reviews saying how great they are!

[Squirrelloid]

“Outrage” would be the wrong word. I was expressing confusion. It felt like a title describing exactly what it contained, like Cowboys vs. Aliens, or Kong vs. Godzilla. And the description of that content doesn't feel like it belongs in that sort of story at all.

You’re reading things into my comment that weren’t there.

(I feel like the text itself is inartful and fails to show, choosing instead to tell. But poor writing isn't sufficient cause for outrage.

Bridge to Terabithia manages to convey more about the artificiality of gender roles while 'telling' less, and is targeted at the same age group. Literature the excerpted Cats vs. Robots passage is not.)

[Dr. Ed 2]

Look, robots do not reproduce sexually, they therefore do not have a sex and hence can not have a gender let alone one to express that is different from the one that they don’t have in the first place.

It’s one thing to think you are a sex other than the one you actually are IF YOU **HAVE** A SEX — but robot’s don’t…

[Absaroka]

What makes you think the book has robots (or cats) with gender preferences?

[John F. Carr]

Plain old stories are out of style. Publishers of children's books like to have quotas of politically sound content. Maybe it's a token dark-skinned character, and by convention the dark-skinned character has to be good. Librarians love gay stuff, judging by the emails I get from the Boston Public Library as well as all the culture wars news.

[Dr. Ed 2]

While I DO have problems with the GEICO claim, how could GEICO’s lawyers not anticipated this? I would have, and IANAA...

Not THIS this, but maybe a fistfight or something.

[tkamenick]

"Though an errant semicolon may suggest that the policy covers all "bodily injury" for which the insured becomes liable, context and common sense suggest the injury must be associated with the use of the car as something other than a mattress."

I hate shit like this. Judges deciding what an insurance policy is SUPPOSED to do literally ignoring what the policy ACTUALLY does. The insurance company wrote it that way. Enforce it the way it's written.