The Volokh Conspiracy
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Chief Justice Roberts, The Judicial Supremacist in Jarkesy
The Chief Justice wavers on many issues, but never in returning power to the federal judiciary.
Jarksey continues a trend by the Chief Justice: the transfer of power from the executive and legislative branches to the judiciary. From Stern v. Marshall to Loper Bright, Chief Justice Roberts rejects effort to deprive the federal courts of its powers to decide cases. Justice Sotomayor makes this point in her dissent:
Beyond the majority's legal errors, its ruling reveals a far more fundamental problem: This Court's repeated failure to appreciate that its decisions can threaten the separation of powers. Here, that threat comes from the Court's mistaken conclusion that Congress cannot assign a certain public-rights matter for initial adjudication to the Executive because it must come only to the Judiciary.
Indeed, Sotomayor pokes Roberts's much-vaunted "umpire" analogy:
The majority today upends longstanding precedent and the established practice of its coequal partners in our tripartite system of Government. Because the Court fails to act as a neutral umpire when it rewrites established rules in the manner it does today, I respectfully dissent.
On many issues, Chief Justice Roberts's jurisprudence is situational, and depends on a a confluence of many factors. But with regard to judicial independence, Roberts is dogmatic. In Jarkesy, Roberts extended this philosophy to the context of the Seventh Amendment.
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The greatest justice who has ever lived or will live concurred with Roberts and so must be deemed to agree with everything Roberts wrote in Jarkesy (as indeed should the rest of the majority). Why not criticise them as well?
"Adjudication" is THE core judicial power, and the Constitution does say,
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
Note that it doesn't say anything about letting Congress vest any part of the judicial power in the Executive.
Taking the summary from SCOTUSBLOG
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for a 6-3 majority in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy that the SEC cannot continue to handle this cases in house without a jury.
Why is this ruling controversial? Why isn't in unanimous?
I get that "public rights" and sovereignty could limit claims against the government from jury trials, but SEC enforcement actions are indistinguishable from a criminal trial with fines.
Because think of the poor administrative agencies that will now have to invest more resources in bringing cases in real courts!
It's not as controversial as some might make it appear. The concept of "public rights" that don't require jury trials isn't very intuitive, at least to me, and complaining about the result that some people will get jury trials isn't a winning message
I do fully agree with Justice Thonas's concurrence in Ortiz v. United States.
It was not a "criminal" jury case. It was a civil jury. That's why it relies on the Seventh Amendment. So, it is "distinguishable."
Except, of course, in the single biggest case of this term, Trump v. United States, where he stripped the federal courts of their power to decide a class of cases. (To be fair, he also stripped the executive branch of its power to prosecute those cases, and the legislative branch of its power to make the laws to be enforced.)
You do know that, any time the Supreme court rules a law unconstitutional, in the same sense it 'strips' both lower courts and the executive of the power to enforce that law, and even the legislature of the power to (meaningfully...) enact substantially similar laws.
Because you can't enforce unconstitutional laws.
That's all that happened here. The Court ruled that it's unconstitutional to sanction a President for core exercises of his constitutional authority. Just as it can't be illegal for the legislature to vote on a law, or the judiciary to decide a case.
Your comment is both wrong — ruling a law unconstitutional is different than creating an immunity — and irrelevant. Blackman's claim was that Roberts empowers the judiciary in every case, but in this case he did exactly the opposite.
Whether the decision was correct (spoiler alert: no) is irrelevant to that point.
Immunity was not invented July 1st.
Presidential criminal immunity was.
Nothing needs to be 'invented' until people finally, after over 200 years, decide to proceed as though it didn't exist.
I suppose next somebody will try to criminalize a member of Congress deciding not to vote for a treaty, and you'll be pissed off when the Court 'invents' the idea that it can never be criminal for a member of Congress to refuse to vote for something.
Did I not see you comment here that there was no constitutional basis for Presidential immunity of any kind?
Yes, you did.
On the one hand, there's no basis at all for the notion that Presidents have immunity from normal laws, of the sort members of Congress have in VERY limited fashion.
On the OTHER hand, exercise of an actual constitutional power of the office cannot, itself, be a crime, because the action is affirmatively authorized by the Constitution.
So, for instance, if a President is bribed to grant a pardon, taking the bribe can be a crime, but the actual granting of the pardon cannot be.
It's not that the President has immunity from a law regulating granting pardons, so much that to the extent any law presumes to regulate that action, the law is unconstitutional.
One note . . . .
It doesn't appear the federal law about bribery covers the president.
18 U.S. Code § 201 - Bribery of public officials and witnesses
(a)For the purpose of this section—
(1)the term “public official” means Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror;
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/201
Or we get back to the debate whether the president is an officer of the US.
Seems that these judicial boundaries need further work, but who would be able to do it ?
Amendment ?
Article III is sparse ... does mention "... Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Funny that Sotomayor writes, "The majority today upends longstanding precedent and the established practice of its coequal partners in our tripartite system of Government. Because the Court fails to act as a neutral umpire when it rewrites established rules in the manner it does today, I respectfully dissent."
Today's practice is from constructing over the years from virtually nothing. Flux is normal, as it reflects common practice. Like climates, change happens. Originalism, likewise, is fraught with being a slightly absurd proposition when from the start SCOTUS opinions talk about constructing. Law like life is not static. However, our Constitution has the means for change via amendments, so use it or shut up. Compromise for mutual benefit.
Establishment of "clauses" used is one reason why the federal government has grown as it has - "Whatever we want to do is contained in some clause, so find one that fits, and if it doesn't fit completely, use glue, bubble gum, or a bigger hammer."
I'm not sure how Blackman can complain about the chief's judicial supremacy when he cheers on decisions like overturning Chevron, an exemplar case where it is the federal judiciary, and not the executive branch, that gets the final say in interpreting the law.
As it should be. I agree that Chevron needed to be overturned, because as the ramifications of the decision played out in real life, agency interpretations flip-flopping with change of party administrations is contrary to the rule of law.
Laws change with the flip-flop of Congress.
And laws change with the flip-flop of the Supreme Court.
So why can't laws change with the flip-flop of the President?