The Volokh Conspiracy
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The Flipped Dynamics on Federal Criminal Law
A generation ago, the liberals would have written the majority in Snyder and the conservatives would have dissented.
One of the more remarkable changes at the Supreme Court in recent years has been the flipped dynamics on federal criminal law. Synder v. United States turns on the line between a bribe and a gratuity. A generation ago, if Snyder v. United States came to the Supreme Court, it would have been a 7-2 ruling in favor of the federal government. The Court's conservatives and moderates would have gladly agreed with the Solicitor General's reading of the Section 666 (if ever there was an aptly numbered statute), with Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent.
But today, the vote is just the other way. Justice Jackson wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, upholding the SG's broad reading of federal criminal law. Jackson wrote:
We took this case to resolve "[w]hether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions." Pet. for Cert. I. The majority today answers no, when the answer to that question should be an unequivocal yes.
And Justice Kavanaugh, for the Court's other conservatives, ruled in favor of the criminal defendant:
The Government asks this Court to adopt an interpretation of §666 that would radically upend gratuities rules and turn §666 into a vague and unfair trap for 19 million state and local officials. We decline to do so. Section 666 is a vital statute, but its focus is targeted: Section 666 proscribes bribes to state and local officials, while allowing state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials
Justice Jackson's dissent gestures to this flip, pointing out how only "today's" Court could reach this holding:
Snyder's absurd and atextual reading of the statute is one only today's Court could love.
Who is the conservative and who is the liberal here?
Jackson charges the majority with outright judicial activism--a common theme in her opinions:
Both the majority and Snyder suggest that interpreting §666 to cover gratuities is problematic because it gives "federal prosecutors unwarranted power to allege crimes that should be handled at the State level." App. 14–15 (emphasis added); see also ante, at 10–11. But woulds, coulds, and shoulds of this nature must be addressed across the street with Congress, not in the pages of the U. S. Reports. We have previously and wisely declined "to express [a] view as to [§666's] soundness as a policy matter." Sabri, 541 U. S., at 608, n. But, today, the Court can stay silent no longer. Its decision overrides the intent of Congress—and the policy preferences of the constituents that body represents—as unequivocally expressed by the plain text of the statute.Respectfully, I dissent.
I haven't done a deep dive, but my tentative observation is that the SG is filing fewer petitions on federal criminal issues. Perhaps better to maintain some favorable circuit precedents than risk setting adverse nationwide precedents.
A subtext of this opinion, though not stated, are gifts given to the Justices. The majority opinion lists a wide range of policies that limit gifts to government officials. But the dog that did not bark is the Supreme Court's own ethics code.
Justice Kavanaugh also gave Caitlin Clark a shout-out. See if you can find it.
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"(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more;"
Facially, while a bribe up front is an effort to influence, a gratuity after the fact is, by definition, a reward. So, I'd have to say the liberals have the better argument here.
That's a distinction only lawyers could make, just as theft is slavery after the fact, and slavery is theft before the fact: both steal your self-ownership.
About the only practical distinction is which party has to trust the other to follow through after the first part of the exchange has been executed.
But what does "corruptly" mean in the context of an after-the-fact reward that was not agreed to beforehand?
And how does one prove a negative?
The prosecution has the burden of proof.
In this case, that would mean proving that Snyder
"corruptly . . . accept[ed] or agree[d]s to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."
A $13k rewards for a $1.1m contract? Sounds more like a sales commission.
ACtually, that's the wrong section. The one Snyder was convicted under relates to accepting, not giving, a bribe:
a)Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section exists—
(1)being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof—
. . . or
(B)corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more; or
. . .
(b)The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.
Gorsuch has a very nice concurrence.
We have seen in the last decades that prosecutors have been able to stretch vague statutes to cover activities that may or not be criminalized. This opinion is a good limit on that. If Congress wants to outlaw gratuities, it knows how to do so clearly.
Thus, going out of his way to call out the dissent as not being "fair readers."
He repeatedly had separate opinions this month complimenting the reasonableness of his colleagues, even when he disagrees with them, but for whatever reason went another way with two opinions written by Justice Ketanji Jackson.
Which is the point. Brown does what many judges do, which is to go from "what the defendant did is bad" to "we have to interpret the statute to include the defendant's bad."
One of the cases which used to annoy me to no end was a SCOTUS decision concerning the "misappropriation theory" of securities fraud. The issue deeply divided the federal courts, SCOTUS itself was at one point split 4-4, but then in the later case they said, "yes, that's securities fraud. To the penitentiary with you, defendant. "
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)
To me, a statute so unclear that the top jurists in the land can't agree on whether it covers certain activities does not give fair notice.
“we have to interpret the statute to include the defendant’s bad"
The three justices did so -- as judges do so in many cases -- because they think there is a clear case that the statute says so.
The Supreme Court also settles conflicts between the circuits. A major reason they take cases is to settle disputes. Sometimes, they split 5-4. Yes, sometimes in criminal cases.
"To me, a statute so unclear that the top jurists in the land can’t agree on whether it covers certain activities does not give fair notice."
What is the test here? Unless the Supreme Court unanimously agrees, the statute was wrongly applied?
For criminal statutes, which is what we are talking about, it has to be very clear that this activity is covered. If the Court splits 4-4, then that standard has not been met, IMO.
" If the Court splits 4-4, then that standard has not been met, IMO."
Also, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, since an evenly divided Court does not settle the question. It just upholds the lower court.
A 7-2 opinion has a dissent. The top judges did not all agree with it.
re: What is the test here? My answer:
Unless the Supreme Court and the lower courts can all (pretty much) unanimously agree on what the law is, the law is too vague for us mere mortals to be on notice about what behavior is and is not prohibited. Therefore, the rule of lenity applies. Once the opinion is released, future miscreants are now on notice and can be held accountable for their misbehavior but no ex post facto application.
That's the standard that government agents insist they should be held to in their qualified immunity claims. We peons deserve the same protection.
It's important to remember that this is an as-applied test. No one doubts that simple bribery is covered by this statute, and is properly punishable if proven.
That's the pattern. There are criminal statutes whose core clearly punishes some improper behavior. But then prosecutors try to stretch it to cover grey areas.
“Supreme Court and the lower courts can all (pretty much) unanimously agree”
I appreciate the vague “pretty much” here. Is it ironic?
Vagueness never requires this amount of impractical unanimity.
"Perfect unanimity" is generally impossible - there's always some loon out there willing to make trouble for its own sake. "Near unanimity" is a fairly common standard easily understood and regularly enforced. "Near unanimity" is not considered especially vague or unworkable.
I'm sorry you didn't like my casual phrasing of near unanimity as "all (pretty much) unanimously" but that doesn't make it vague or impractical.
No apologies are necessary.
The case here involves vagueness. So, it appeared a bit ironic it shows up here.
I am not sure what “(pretty much) unanimously agree” translates as. The rule here is not that the Supreme Court along with the lower courts have to pretty much all unanimously agree. So, yes, it does seem a bit tricky.
A 7-2 result is not enough? Are two dissenting circuits (perhaps by close votes) a problem?
Why is vagueness as compared to a variety of legal rules required to meet this super strict test? One where even 6-3 or maybe 7-2 is not enough?
SCOTUS smacks a bribery statute again. Its a favorite pinata.
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the conclusion but criticizing the Mayor for not getting any luxury vacations thrown in.
So funny I forgot to laugh, it's like when Rehnquist criticized Ted Kennedy for not having Life preservers in his Oldsmobile.
Well I congratulate you for proving it's simultaneously possible to have bad taste and no taste.
I agree with Prof. Blackman here:
A subtext of this opinion, though not stated, are gifts given to the Justices. The majority opinion lists a wide range of policies that limit gifts to government officials. But the dog that did not bark is the Supreme Court's own ethics code.
But what about Blackman's point -- that the liberal justices are more likely to favor prosecutors over criminal defendants and the conservatives are more likely to favor criminal defendants --- which would be a very distinct switch in tendencies. I'm not sure that this is actually correct -- outside of this case, of course. Although Sotomayor wrote the awful opinion on the career criminal reform law.
Substantively, this decision does not seem to bode well for the government's use of the obstruction statute in the Jan. 6 prosecutions.
"Justice Kavanaugh also gave Caitlin Clark a shout-out. See if you can find it."
There was a reference to Fever tickets as a gratuity.
Judge Kavanaugh likes Beer Tits
The whole bribe/gratuity distinction looks a little silly here. Thirteen thousand dollars is not a gratuity. Kavanaugh himself gives examples of gratuities at the start of his opinion:
The question in this case is whether §666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos,or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The answer is no.
or:
A family gives a holiday tip to the mail carrier. Parents send an end-of-year gift basket to their child’s public school teacher. A college dean gives a college sweatshirt to a city council member who comes to speak at an event. A state legislator’s neighbor drops off a bottle of wine to congratulate her for her work on a new law.
To conflate a plaque or a sweatshirt with $13,000 is silly. (AFAICT the decision also ignores the fact that Snyder initially claimed the money was for consulting work. Apparently he didn't think it was an innocent gratuity, and made up a cover story.)
Kavanaugh tells us that, Gratuities are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.
The before/after distinction is weak. There are such things as repeated games, and awarding municipal contracts can easily become one. The financial "gratuity" awarded on completion of the 2023 contract might well influence the award of the 2024 contract.
"To conflate a plaque or a sweatshirt with $13,000 is silly."
The issue at hand however is that the law as it was being argued does not differentiate these. We have the prosecutor's "promise" that they won't prosecute these crimes of lesser value. But that's all.
If a cop pulls you over and you slip him a $100 bill before he tickets you...that's a bribe. If the cop tickets you (or doesn't ticket you), and you then donate $100 to the policeman's retirement/donut fund later that day...that's a gratuity. The second is generally looked at as fine. The first, not so much. But under the law, these are as KJ would interpret this, they are exactly the same, and both deserving of a 10 year jail sentence.
Can you get repeated games and other such nonsense? Sure. But other criminal laws can cover that. But as KJ and the state was arguing, they would potentially make something as simple as giving a teacher an apple potentially a crime worth a 10 year sentence in jail.
The issue at hand however is that the law as it was being argued does not differentiate these. We have the prosecutor’s “promise” that they won’t prosecute these crimes of lesser value. But that’s all.
The supplier takes the purchasing manager out for dinner after the big order, that's a gratuity.
The supplier gives the purchasing manager $13k that's a kickback and the purchasing manager is updating their resume.
There's always a grey area, but no company would tolerate a $13k "gratuity" coming back to the decision maker on a $1m order. SCOTUS is supposed figure out the tough cases, not say the obvious difference is too hard to distinguish.
Clarence Thomas should start every opinion with
"Well, I'm not a Biologist....."
Frank
here's a thought. Let's agree that money, property, or position should never pass between public officials and private entities without a written, publicly available contract with all the specifications thereof. After all, anyone issued a speeding ticket or paying property taxes has written documentation of the why's and wherefore's, including the names of who paid what to whom and how much. Some arcane distinction between a gratuity and a bribe would almost never be needed. Everyone could be (more) confident that no one is taking unfair advantage of their wealth or position to get something under the table.
Would it? The obvious example is McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Scalia and Rehnquist voted for a narrow reading of the fraud statute (as, to be fair, did Brennan and Marshall), while Stevens and O'Connor voted for the prosecution.
Great,
I congratulate on you for this criminal Law.