The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Federal Court Rules Laws Restricting Interstate Travel for Abortion Violate the Right to Travel
The decision addresses an important issue left open by the Supreme Court's decision reversing Roe v. Wade.

As Eugene Volokh notes, yesterday, in Yellowhammer Fund v. Attorney General, a federal district court ruled against an Alabama law criminalizing assisting or facilitating the procurement of an out-of-state abortion by an Alabama resident. Eugene's post focuses mostly on the First Amendment part of the ruling. I will focus on the right to travel.
In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization the Supreme Court's decision overturning Roe v. Wade, the Court left open the issue of whether states could punish residents who seek abortions in other states. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote that this is question is "not especially difficult," and that the answer is "no" because such laws violate "the constitutional right to interstate travel."
Federal District Judge Myron Thompson, author of yesterday's ruling clearly agrees. Here's an excerpt from his reasoning:
Considering the right to travel in the context of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause confirms that the right includes both the right to move physically between the States and to do what is legal in the destination State. The Clause was meant to create a "general citizenship," 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3:674-75, § 1800 (1833), and "place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868)…. When individuals do travel into another State, the Clause ensures that they lose both "the peculiar privileges conferred by their [home State's] laws" as well as "the disabilities of alienage." Id. The Clause "insures to [citizens] in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness." Id. at 180-81. These goals are incompatible with a right to travel that would allow one's home State to inhibit a traveler's liberty to enjoy the opportunities lawfully available in another State….
Similarly, the Supreme Court has explained that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation." Ward v. State, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870)…
The Attorney General's characterization of the right to travel as merely a right to move physically between the States contravenes history, precedent, and common sense. Travel is valuable precisely because it allows us to pursue opportunities available elsewhere. "If our bodies can move among states, but our freedom of action is tied to our place of origin, then the 'right to travel' becomes a hollow shell." Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973, 1007 (2002). Indeed, the Attorney General's theory of the right to travel, which would allow each State to force its residents to carry its laws on their backs as they travel, "amount[s] to nothing more than the right to have the physical environment of the states of one's choosing pass before one's eyes." Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future—or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 152 (1999). Such a constrained conception of the right to travel would erode the privileges of national citizenship and is inconsistent with the Constitution….
I agree and would add that the contrary view has drastic implications that go far beyond abortion. It would allow states to criminalize travel for virtually any purpose that is forbidden or restricted within their jurisdiction, but legal in another state. For example, some states ban marijuana, while others do not. But that doesn't give a state the power to punish citizens who travel to another state to use weed. The same goes for sports gambling, legal in 38 states, but still forbidden in 12. If a Californian (resident of one of the states that still ban the practice) decides to cross into Arizona to place a bet on his favorite team, California doesn't have the right to punish him for it.
Judge Thompson also effectively refutes the argument that the Alabama law is constitutional because it doesn't directly punish women who travel to get abortions, but only targets those who assist them in doing so (in this case a charity that helps poor women get abortions):
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that, when a State creates barriers to travel itself, "the constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified," Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), and even the slightest burdens on travel are generally not tolerated. For this reason, travel restrictions directed toward those who facilitate travel for others can offend the Constitution. Exemplifying both points is Crandall v. Nevada, which produced the Supreme Court's first majority opinion on the right to travel. 73 U.S. 35 (1867). At issue was a Nevada statute that imposed a one-dollar tax per passenger on common carriers leaving the State. The Court held that the tax was an unconstitutional burden on the passengers' right to travel, even though the tax was merely one dollar and even though it applied only when someone relied on a common carrier for transportation….
Likewise, in Edwards v. California, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that made it a crime to bring or assist in bringing into the State any indigent person who was not a California resident. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Thus, the California law subjected only those who assisted others in travel to criminal liability. The Court nonetheless determined that the law violated indigent people's right to travel….
Denying—through criminal prosecution--assistance to the plaintiffs' clients, many of whom are financially vulnerable, is a greater burden on travel than the one-dollar tax per passenger in Crandall, and it is precisely what was held unconstitutional in Edwards. The Attorney General argues that Crandall and Edwards are distinguishable because the travel restrictions at issue in those cases operated categorically, regardless of the reasons for which people were traveling. Again, however, the right to travel includes the right to do what is lawful in another State while traveling, so restrictions that prohibit travel for specific out-of-state conduct are unconstitutional just as those that impede travel generally are. There is no end-run around the right to travel that would allow States to burden travel selectively and in a patchwork fashion based on whether they approve or disapprove of lawful conduct that their residents wish to engage in outside their borders.
I think Judge Thompson is right on this point, as well. And I would add this issue unique to the right to travel. In other contexts too, the Constitution bars laws punishing people who assist in or facilitate the exercise of a constitutional right, as well as the immediate rights-holders themselves. For example, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment surely bars laws that punish people who publish and distribute speech, as well as the actual speakers. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law that barred the sale and distribution of contraceptives, not merely their use.
In the aftermath of Dobbs, interstate travel to get abortions has been a major factor limiting the impact of laws severely restricting abortion enacted by many red states. It's a major reason why the number of abortions has actually risen slightly since Dobbs, instead of declining. It also helps explain why few people have "voted with their feet" to move to pro-choice states since Dobbs. Interstate travel to get an abortion is a less costly alternative form of foot voting for many women. "Mail order" abortions using drugs such as mifepristone are also a factor here.
That does not mean that severe abortion restrictions have no effect. Having to travel out of state is costlier and more time-consuming for many women than in-state options would be. And there are certainly some who simply cannot or will not undertake the necessary travel. But the interstate option has nonetheless greatly reduced the effects of Dobbs.
This ruling will almost certainly be appealed. But, ultimately, I expect Alabama will continue to lose. Judge Thompson's reasoning is strong. And Justice Kavanaugh's concurring opinion is a strong signal there is no majority on the Supreme Court for upholding these kinds of laws.
In a 2022 post, I outlined how state laws banning interstate travel to get an abortion might also be unconstitutional on two other grounds: the Dormant Commerce Clause and lack of state authority to regulate activity outside its borders. Judge Thompson does not address these issues, presumably because he didn't need to do so, given that he already decided to rule against Alabama on other grounds.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
I'd be more sympathetic if leftists were more consistent in their beliefs on this.
....aaaaaaaand predictably stupid comment in one!
I don't think any sane person (which obviously and predictably excludes the individual I am replying to) is particularly in favor of having their state attempt to prohibit and criminalize their ability to go to another state to partake in lawful activity. Whether it's weed or buying booze on a different day or buying and lawfully using fireworks. Because to do otherwise would be kind of crazy, right?
A good rule of thumb is that you should probably think about the issue first, as a general thing, before immediately trying to contort it into some partisan issue.
"I don’t think any sane person (which obviously and predictably excludes the individual I am replying to) is particularly in favor of having their state attempt to prohibit and criminalize their ability to go to another state to partake in lawful activity."
So what you are saying is that all of the gun control idiots who claim that they need some way to prohibit guns from Indiana in order to make gun control work properly in Chicago need to be institutionalized ?
Maybe you do have something there ...
In fairness to that argument (which I disagree with) it is not, say, California trying to outlaw CA residents from traveling to Vegas to go to one of the machine-gun-shoot places. The argument is that easy gun sales in, say, Indiana result in the Indiana purchased guns ending up in Illinois.
It's an argument that ignores existing federal law (law that gun dealers are very strongly motivated to follow), of course.
Correct. While federal law outright prohibits the sale of a handgun outside of one's state of residence, which is blatantly unconstitutional, it also prohibits the purchase of a long gun in another state if the purchaser's state of residence prohibits it.
So it allows the exact same thing this article refers to.
So if Maine has a 3 day waiting period, it prohibits buying a rifle in NH?
From a dealer, Yes. Your mileage may vary
IL has FOID laws (firearm owner identification) whereupon owning a firearm without a FOID is against the law. IL is one of a very few number of states that require this.
So nearby states do not have FOID. Iowa is constitutional carry to use an example. So an IL resident can go to Iowa and purchase a firearm which could be perfectly legal in Iowa. Once they bring it back to IL it can be illegal to possess (if they don't have FOID).
It's a tricky situation. IL is surrounded by more lenient gun law states. IL is awash in guns. IL also has comparatively speaking strict gun laws. Something's gotta give. IL has a mandatory prison offense for transporting a loaded immediately accessible gun in a motor vehicle w/out FOID or concealed carry. Which out of state residents normally can't get because they aren't IL residents. (there are provisions for out of state hunters to bring their firearms in).
Long story short: don't bring your guns into IL and get pulled over. You could be in for a very bad time.
While federal law outright prohibits the sale of a handgun outside of one’s state of residence, which is blatantly unconstitutional
How does not being able to buy a handgun in another state impede your ability to fully participate in your state's militia?
Of course, by this same reasoning existing federal law is unconstitutional: Since your rights as a citizen of the country are not dependent on which state you happen to be in at the time, the federal government can't constitutionally condition exercise of a civil liberty on which state you happen to be in at a given moment.
But the Court is hardly going to follow that reasoning; Compliance with the Constitution is reserved for states, not the federal government, which largely gets a pass on enforcement of it.
Leaving aside the merits of the specific issue, there is no doubt that the 17th Amendment eliminated one of the Framers’ original checks against federal encroachment on state powers.
Since your rights as a citizen of the country are not dependent on which state you happen to be in at the time, the federal government can’t constitutionally condition exercise of a civil liberty on which state you happen to be in at a given moment.
Oh Brett, it’s always funny when your brain tries to do logic.
Your rights as a citizen absolutely do depend on which state you happen to be in.
a) The Constitution delegates some powers to states which may exercise them differently, such as marriage.
b) The interpretation and application of federal rights is often mediated by state law principles, even in federal courts.
c) As relevant here, your state of residence is special, and your federal rights may be different in that state compared to others. Voting rights are the obvious example, but also Second Amendment rights, considering the 2A’s reliance on state militias.
California has threatened Nevada and Arizona stores that were selling ammo to California residents. It would be equivalent to Alabama threatening pharmacies in other states for selling mifepristone to their residents, on the grounds that they MIGHT bring it back in to Alabama and have the abortion there.
You have a right to travel to Denver to buy and smoke weed. You do not have a right to carry your weed back to Texas or any other state for use there.
Similarly, a Californian has the right to buy ammo in Nevada or Arizona and use it in those states, but does not have the right to take it back to California in contravention of state law.
This is addressed below somewhat in the discussion about alcohol in Pennsylvania.
The issue with guns is that they can be brought back into the state that is trying to keep them out. I haven't seen any state trying to say its residents can't go to another state to light off fireworks or smoke weed, etc. even if those things are illegal within the home state. It gets complicated (and definitely illegal) when you try to bring those things back home. So we're talking about conduct out of state vs. obtaining something illegal that could be brought back home.
The Mann Act is probably the better analogy, but I actually think the issues are sufficiently different at the federal level that it's not that helpful to look to federal laws (or examples of, e.g. prohibiting international travel). Are there examples of states themselves criminalizing their citizens from hiring a prostitute in another state (where it would be legal)?
"Are there examples of states themselves criminalizing their citizens from hiring a prostitute in another state (where it would be legal)?"
Maybe not States, but, I do believe that people have been prosecuted for acts that they have committed in other Countries, where they were legal, but are illegal in the US.
I agree that the federal government does that, but I think the legal/constitutional posture is sufficiently different that it's not a super helpful analogy. Just as examples of the difference: the federal government can regulate immigration from other countries, whereas states cannot regulate immigration from other states (or the federal government can wage war against other countries but states cannot wage war against each others).
Similarly, the federal government can probably regulate things that happen with citizens moving between states (e.g., through the regulation of interstate commerce) that the individual states wouldn't be allowed to do themselves.
That doesn't mean the federal government gets a free pass on regulating movement between the states, but it does imply that this seems pretty unprecedented.
"The issue with guns is that they can be brought back into the state that is trying to keep them out."
The problem here is that most gun related crime is committed with handguns and federal law prohibits direct transfer of handguns on interstate sales. The gun must be shipped to an FFL licensed in the buyer's home state and that FFL is supposed to verify that the sale is legal per state law and complete the federal background check before transferring the firearm to the buyer.
"The argument is that easy gun sales in, say, Indiana result in the Indiana purchased guns ending up in Illinois."
This is always the argument isn't it ? It is true of other arguments to regulate as well. Do you really think if you become a drug addict in California, you are suddenly a perfectly functioning member of society when you cross the border back into Utah ? So why shouldn't Utah attempt to prohibit drug use in California ? The same is true of abortion. Coming back over the state line after an abortion doesn't suddenly make the fetus viable again does it ? There is definitely an effect that crosses state lines.
My point was not whether or not that regulation is good or bad. What I was being amused by is Loki's vapid comment about being insane if you can't let those people on the other side of the border partake in legal activities. Most of the growth of federal power is pushed by exactly that set of people who can't stand it if someone in a different state is doing things differently. For being insane, it is pretty common place and is in fact the very basis for progressivism.
"The same is true of abortion. Coming back over the state line after an abortion doesn’t suddenly make the fetus viable again does it ? There is definitely an effect that crosses state lines."
How is that an effect that crosses state lines? Even giving full credit to the pro-life argument that abortion is murder, one state can't prosecute a murder that occurs in another state just because one of its citizens is involved. If they can't do that for a full-grown person, why would they be able to for an unborn one?
Can a state prosecute people who conspire in that state to commit a murder in a different state?
Only to the extent that the proposed "murder" is a crime.
So for example, if three of my vampire hunter friends decide in Maine to travel to Plains GA and put a wooden stake through Jimmy Carter's heart, they would not be guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, even if they sincerely believe that they are killing Vampire Jimmy. They may well be guilty of conspiracy to commit grave desecration or some such crime, but again, that would depend (I think) on GA law as well as ME law. I'd need to check with Dr Ed for a more definitive answer.
You know Jimmy Carter isn't in a grave yet, right?
Ruh-roh!
So your position is that State A can criminalize conspiring in State A to what would be a State A crime in State B, if (but only if?) that act is also illegal in State B?
Based on absolutely no research, I'd say yes. Otherwise, as I mention downthread, innumerable group vacations have actually been criminal conspiracies.
Yes.
As an inchoate crime, conspiracy cannot be charged unless there is an attempt to consummate a crime. If there is no crime that can be consummated, then there is no conspiracy. See, e.g, Hyde.
A fundamental element of conspiracy is ... an illegal act. If it's not illegal, you can't charge it.
@Loki -- If it were otherwise, I think you'd start to get into First Amdt issues as well. It is well established that Conspiracy, Fraud etc. are not protected by the First Amdt, but that doesn't mean that the govt can define any false criticism of the President as "Fraud." The exceptions have to be grounded in the common meanings of the terms.
Bingo, Ridgeway.
Here, for example, is NY Penal Law sec. 105.25-
1. A person may be prosecuted for conspiracy in the county in which he entered into such conspiracy or in any county in which an overt act in furtherance thereof was committed.
2. An agreement made within this state to engage in or cause the performance of conduct in another jurisdiction is punishable herein as a conspiracy only when such conduct would constitute a crime both under the laws of this state if performed herein and under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.
3. An agreement made in another jurisdiction to engage in or cause the performance of conduct within this state, which would constitute a crime herein, is punishable herein only when an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is committed within this state. Under such circumstances, it is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that the conduct which is the objective of the conspiracy would not constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.
Notice the distinction between (2) and (3), which is a pretty good idea of how jurisdiction and conspiracy should apply.
I should note that generally, conspiracy (civil and criminal) does raise very interesting jurisdictional questions. But do you know what isn't one of them?
The Alabama one.
I'm by no means an expert on the law in this area, but my opinion would be that yes a state could do that and similarly it would be valid for Alabama to criminalize someone conspiring in California to murder someone in Alabama. I don't think that Alabama can criminalize a conspiracy or a murder that occurs entirely within California just because an Alabama citizen is the victim or the perpetrator though.
Responding to Artifex while I'm here: there's a pretty obvious difference between an event that happens entirely within another state and then can't be repeated elsewhere (like an abortion or a murder) and the sale of a physical good that can easily be transported across state lines. I don't think that's an arbitrary dividing line, and in principle it applies just as much to things like guns that blue states want there to be limits on as to things like weed that red states want there to be limits on, so I don't think it's a partisan principle either.
Then what’s the problem with what Alabama is doing here?
I never really thought about this. How does it work in practice?
Jimmy Ray, Billy Bob, and Cletus are in AL and plotting to go to Atlanta and kill the new boyfriend of Jimmy Ray's ex by blowing up his car. They buy the dynamite, mark their map with the route and book a room in Atlanta. The AL police know this because they have Billy Bob's trailer bugged.
Do the AL police just call up GA and say 'you might want to pick up the '78 El Camino that's headed your way and ask about the dynamite in the trunk'?
How would your hypo work in practice?
Well, the Alabama police would do one of the following-
1. Get the feds involved.
2. Contact Georgia authorities, and follow the individuals until they crossed the border. Once they cross the border, that's an "overt act" in Georgia, and Georgia can get 'em. Less paperwork.
3. Nab them and charge them in Alabama, since there has already been an overt act in Alabama and it is a crime in both jurisdictions.
Good?
Thanks!
Then what’s the problem with what Alabama is doing here?
Because, however much you want it to be, abortion isn’t murder in much of the country and specifically in the states where people would be helping pregnant women go to get abortions.
The conspiracy to murder example involves a crime (murder) which is a crime in both State A and State B. In other words, it’s a conspiracy in Alabama to commit murder in, say, New York with murder being a crime in both Alabama and New York. As loki describes above, the conspiracy can be prosecuted in either Alabama or New York (or by the feds) if the conspiracy was started in Alabama and the murder completed in New York.
What Alabama is doing here is (per the AG) attempting to criminalize a conspiracy in State A to do something (obtain an abortion) in State B that is not illegal in State B. Alabama cannot effectively dictate the abortion policy of New York (even for its own residents). New York law still applies to people in New York, even Alabamians visiting New York. And New York law does not prohibit abortions. Hence, a conspiracy to obtain an abortion in New York does not involve any predicate crime, so the conspiracy cannot itself be a crime.
This is different from international law where all jurisdictions aren’t subject to the Constitution, so the U.S. government has decided that some things U.S. citizens do abroad can be crimes prosecuted in the U.S. even if they aren’t crimes in the country where the act takes place.
To be clear, by this:
I did not mean the Constitution does not apply to U.S. citizens abroad, just that the states in the U.S. are coequal under the Constitution and, so, must respect each other's laws and cannot impose their will on other states (except to the extent that is possible through the federal government). In contrast, the U.S. does not consider itself coequal with Iran or North Korea or Thailand and nothing in the Constitution requires that, so the U.S. isn't required to respect those countries' laws or lack of laws in the same way that states must respect each others' laws.
Suppose State A is a pioneer in abolishing the marital exception to rape, and State B has not. If a State A resident forms a plan to rape his estranged wife in State B, is State A powerless to stop him?
Noscitur,
You know better than that (I hope). But the short answer is … define “powerless.”
First, you need more facts. For example, is the estranged spouse in state B? Because if so … well, that’s their criminal law, right? She is residing there, and expects their law to apply. If the husband travels there and commits a non-crime, well, that’s state B’s problem.
And if not, then there would be other predicate crimes (assumedly) in taking her to another state.
But again, you know better. Not everything “bad” is a crime.
Just like this- imagine someone (assuming the law is still in effect) is “conspiring” to use heroin. And they travel to Oregon, in violation of their own state’s law, to consume it. And they die. What can their original state do?
NOTHING. Well, they are dead, so there's that. But tweak the fact pattern. Ahem.
Just like if they traveled and used fireworks and managed to incinerate themselves in another state.
Again, you (of all people) should know better. Or at least I expect you to.
Criminal law has jurisdictional rules. And people have a right to travel. Law. Law matters.
And to expand on this ... these sorts of "bad fact" hypotheticals happen, and have happened, all the time without this layer of BS.\
If you travel to another state, you are subject to their criminal law.
Just imagine, if you are in Kentucky (IIRC), and someone dies during the commission of a felony, they can't get you for felony murder. Whereas if you did the same thing across the border in Tennessee, you would get it! Because different states have different laws.
Seriously, I worry.
Noscitur,
You asked:
Suppose State A is a pioneer in abolishing the marital exception to rape, and State B has not. If a State A resident forms a plan to rape his estranged wife in State B, is State A powerless to stop him?
And loki, as he often does, provided a detailed and absolutely correct answer.
I'll just add, your hypo seems to assume State A learns of the plan before it is executed. First, they can obviously tell the wife of the plan. Second, a plan to rape an estranged wife likely includes elements such as kidnapping, assault, battery, false imprisonment, fraud, etc., many of which would likely violate State B's law. Third, as loki says, sometimes states have bad laws that allow people to do bad things. Advocate for change.
The remaining point is: Alabama's AG is attempting to do something unconstitutional, the problem with what Alabama is doing is it is unconstitutional, and the fact that you're having a really hard time developing a parade of horribles (while imaging many abuses if the Alabama AG's position prevails is trivially easy in the areas of guns, drugs, alcohol, transgender issues, minimum wage, animal welfare, etc.) indicates the Constitution and courts are getting this one right.
Of course it is an effect that crosses state lines, just as murder is an effect that crosses state lines. A person dead in one state remains dead in another state. Yes, maybe legally they cannot prosecute this and maybe there are good reasons for this. Abortion follows the same pattern.
Absaroka's original argument was that the gun control argument is different because Indiana guns effect things in Chicago. My point was that this is not so different from boatloads of other things. If you want to argue that these people are insane, feel free, but this is not a special case.
"Of course it is an effect that crosses state lines, just as murder is an effect that crosses state lines. A person dead in one state remains dead in another state. Yes, maybe legally they cannot prosecute this and maybe there are good reasons for this."
You seem to be confusing different things. SHOCKER!
When you're talking about effects that cross state lines, you are talking about commerce. There are rules (and suits, and other things) about that. So, for example, let's take "gun laws."
State A restricts X.
State B doesn't.
Resident of A can travel to B. Can purchase X in B. Can shoot X in B. And that's fine! But if they bring X back to A, then A has the ability to go after them. This is all how it works, whether it's guns, or fireworks, or weed. And, of course, the federal government operates with different rules.
And why are there good reasons for this? Because of criminal law and because we have the right to travel. If I kill someone in Reno, just to watch him die, then California can't charge me with murder- only Nevada can. Which, of course, gets to other interesting issues, if you're into that. You know, what happens if you shoot a person in state A, and they crawl to state B and die? (The answer has to do with the gravamen of the crime, and not that you get away with it, btw).
So, I will repeat what I often say- if you actually want to learn something, try listening. Or reading and learning, instead of reflexively arguing and making bad points.
"Absaroka’s original argument was that the gun control argument is different because Indiana guns effect things in Chicago. My point was that this is not so different from boatloads of other things."
Actually, in the law, different things are different. If you can't (or won't) understand that, then you do you. But don't expect people to keep spoonfeeding you the answers.
(As an aside to Nscitur, the issue of conspiracy is, IIRC, very complicated since, well, telephones. So we have the federal laws, and, again IIRC states use the overt act within the jurisdiction of the state as the gravaemen and that is imputed to the other members. But conspiracy requires that the end act itself be a crime, which runs into the whole problem that it wouldn't be. So if, for example, you have a bunch of people conspiring to run a bookie operation in a state, that would be a crime (because the bets are placed and paid out there, even if one member of the syndicate places them in Vegas). On the other hand, if the people just talked about a trip to Vegas, and then went out there to legally gamble, it wouldn't be.
"What I was being amused by is Loki’s vapid comment about being insane if you can’t let those people on the other side of the border partake in legal activities. Most of the growth of federal power is pushed by exactly that set of people who can’t stand it if someone in a different state is doing things differently."
Let's unpack this in two parts!
1. It is insane for one state to try and criminalize what is going on in another state. And if you thought about this for even a second, you'd understand. Even the DERP comments would realize that. If you love guns, and you go to another state to engage in legal activity in that state, you'd probably think it was crazy if, when you came back, your own state arrested you for what you did there ... legally. RIGHT? This isn't a partisan issue, this is a matter of common sense. Or, for that matter, if you fly to Vegas, and gamble in a way that your state hasn't legalize (yet?), should your state arrest you? Seriously, think about this for even a second.
2. As for the second part- yeah, there is a difference between what the federal government (managing things between states) does, and what the individual states do. Regardless of your opinions on various doctrines or Supreme Court decisions, everyone agrees that there is a difference between a state and the federal government.
I hope. But given the level of intelligence and legal acumen I see displayed here, maybe I overestimate people.
I agree with you on #1, but there is not a giant difference between (a) imposing penalties for out of state behaviors (like getting an abortion, firing a gun -- whatever politically-charged activity you want to choose) and (b) banning the importation of pork into a state if that pork was raised in a manner disapproved by that state, as was the case w CA Prop 12 recently.
(b) has nothing to do with the safety or quality of the pork -- just the nature of the out-of-state activities.
Massive difference, actually. Legally speaking. And this is whether you agree of disagree with the prop 12 case (which was a 5-4 decision).
In the first example, we are talking about one state criminalizing behavior that is legal in another state.
In the second example, we are talking about a state enforcing standard for in-state sale. The argument was that compliance with this requirement was unfair on out-of-state producers, which is a fine argument to make. But again, there was no requirement that producers sell their pork in California.
Again, these issues are as (legally) different as you can possibly posit.
As long as the rule we derive from the Prop 12 case is that a State can maintain enforce a level playing field for its producers, I agree with you.
It’s not just that, though.
Look, not to get too didactic on this, but-
One involves the (1) the rights of people to travel, (2) rights to free speech, and (3) criminal law. And, again, it is about criminalizing conduct that occurs in another state that is perfectly legal in that state.
The other does not involve the right of people to travel, or the right to free speech, and is about a regulation that is occurring within the state. This is all very normal. I will be the first to say that this does impact the dormant commerce clause (which is why, inter alia, Thomas was in the majority in the opinion). But legally speaking, this is about as far away from the Alabama case as you can get.
I see what you are saying, but the bigger picture question is whether and to what extent a state can impose its policy preferences on other states.
Can a state prohibit the sale of goods manufactured by workers making less than that state's minimum wage? A powerful state like California could thus impose a nationwide minimum wage (like they did with auto emissions standards a while back). Conversely, could Texas prohibit the import of goods produced by workers making more than the average TX manufacturing wage? What if they both tried laws like these? My gut reaction is that it would not be allowed, but I have a hard time seeing a principled reason why.
But ... you can't just say that it's the same. Because it's not about states imposing their policy preferences on other states.
There are all sorts of ways that states can "impose" their policy preferences. They can poach industries by offering selected tax breaks. They can regulate certain products. They can try to attract workers by hiking minimum wages (or, conversely, attract businesses by keeping minimum wages low). They could buy airtime in another state telling residents they should move. They could have longer hunting seasons, or make it easier to set up shell corporations. They could have a more lax (or vigorous) regulatory or criminal enforcement of certain laws.
But different ways of doing things have different legal implications. Some are completely permissible. Some are completely not permissible. Some are ... well, maybe permissible depending on exactly what the fact pattern is.
I see what you are saying, but the bigger picture question is whether and to what extent a state can impose its policy preferences on other states.
Oh my god.
I see what you are saying, but the bigger picture question is whether and to what extent life is affected by politics.
"It is insane for one state to try and criminalize what is going on in another state."
Oh, I don't completely disagree, but I cynically note that this conviction lasts exactly as long as it is politically convenient. It's accepted as insane until one's own ox is gored. Examples are easy to come by:
Is it insane for Chicago resident to attempt to regulate Indiana guns ?
Is it insane for California to force collection of sales tax if I am not in California ?
Is it insane for the Pine Ridge Lakota to attempt to stop the sales of alcohol in Whiteclay across the Nebraska border to prevent drunkenness on the Res ? They even go as far as calling the sale there "liquid genocide".
I am not disagreeing that it is probably not a great thing for states to criminalize activities in other states. I do think those things are insane. Do you ?
I will repeat what I have said numerous times- you can't simply lump everything together and say it's the same. If you don't get that, you never will.
So I will simply reiterate my non-partisan position, which has been consistent. A state cannot criminalize going to another state and doing something that is legal. Period.
Whether it's abortions or fireworks, or taking advantage of Oregon's (repealed?) legalized drugs, or whatever.
There's a reason that every attorney looking at this decision has been, "Yup," and that even Kavanaugh expressly noted it at SCOTUS. It's how things work.
Now, that doesn't mean that someone isn't going to try and gin up something that might pass muster that doesn't make a mockery of the law, but the Alabama attempt ain't it.
No you wouldn't.
Thread hijack:
NG's favorite jurist Loose Cannons has postponed the Florida documents case INDEFINITELY.
Film at 11.
1. Winner of the "Least Surprising Ruling" ever prize.
2. Question: Is this the type of order that can be immediately appealed? (I'm assuming not; but this is not my area of practice.) I think the prosecution has been begging for any chance to get the case as quickly as possible to the appellate level again, in hopes of getting Loose Cannon off the case. But I'm guessing that the judge has been anticipating this, and is careful to now make only rulings that cannot yet be appealed. [I'd LOVE to be wrong about this, obviously.]
No, this kind of order cannot be immediately appealed.
It also strikes me as inherently rational -- there are issues that haven't been resolved yet. That isn't true?
"Question: Is this the type of order that can be immediately appealed"
On what grounds?
Delays in cases like this are extremely common, given the complexities involved. Given the DoJ's recent revelations about the document "miscues" and its accidental "misleading" of the court, it's unsurprising.
But let's cut to the real chase here. The issue is, people want the case to take place before the election. But from a judicial perspective, that magical "election date" should play no role in when the case's trial date should occur. Judge Cannon's decision here wouldn't raise the slightest issue...if it wasn't for that election date bit...
“Judge Cannon’s decision here wouldn’t raise the slightest issue…if it wasn’t for that election date bit…”
Let me fix that for you: It wouldn’t raise the slightest issue if she hadn’t previously made her bias for Trump clear beyond any shadow of a doubt, and if she hadn’t also made it clear that she is unqualified to handle the job.
She’s had months to deal with these issues. There's no other explanation.
She just seems biased for Trump because the other judges are so sharply biased against Trump.
Keep telling yourself that, but it was a conservative appeals court who unanimously smacked Cannon down for an amateurishly flawed ruling that benefited Trump.
The order seems somewhat routine, though possibly dragged out over 12 or so weeks when the motions / issues it should be resolved over a period of 2-4 weeks. I will defer to criminal attorney with experience in those matters.
Here is a link to the order from legal insurrection (note - I am not a fan of legal insurrection since it is generally populated with very right wing nuts). However its a source doc , so forgive the source of the link
https://legalinsurrection.com/2024/05/trump-classified-records-trial-in-florida-postponed-indefinitely/
...as opposed to very left wing nuts in the MSM?
good point
And if "the other side" weren't pushing for this to be resolved before the election, to hurt a political opponent's election chances.
But...
Liars
Krayt, actually, hurting an opponent's election chances is at least half of what politics is supposed to be about. And politics are the means prescribed in the Constitution to enable the jointly sovereign People to empower and constrain government, and to vindicate the rights of individuals.
So yeah, a judge who is trying to delay presentation of evidence in court, with an eye to improving the election chances of the defendant, is abusing the Constitution. Judge Cannon deserves impeachment.
Krayt, actually, hurting an opponent’s election chances is at least half of what politics is supposed to be about. And politics are the means prescribed in the Constitution to enable the jointly sovereign People to empower and constrain government, and to vindicate the rights of individuals.
So yeah, a judge who is trying to delay presentation of evidence in court, with an eye to improving the election chances of the defendant, is abusing the Constitution. Judge Cannon deserves impeachment.
So using the courts to hurt a political opponent is just perfectly acceptable politics, while a court not playing along with that is "abusing the Constitution".
Your insanity knows no bounds.
I sense Judge Cannon's problem here may be more green than red (as in, she is mostly inexperienced, overmatched, and flailing, rather than being mostly motivated by her partisan sympathy for the guy who nominated her).
I’m not sure whether that is right, but it is eminently reasonable. Are you okay?
I am not exactly sure that "too inexperienced and stupid" as opposed to "too partisan" is exactly the compliment you think it is for a federal judge.
That said, given the totality of her decisions to date (both large and small) in this case, I have trouble believing the "inexperienced and stupid" angle solely for the reason that if that was, in fact, what was happening, you'd expect that the bad decisions would break down evenly (or somewhat evenly) as opposed to consistently favoring one party.
In addition, since the serious benchslap, her poor decisions seem to be calculated to both delay and to insulate the case from review until after the election. Which means that it keeps her options open- if Trump wins, she can look forward to an appointment at a higher court, and if Trump loses, she can start acting like a real judge again and limit the damage.
Replying to Loki13:
"...since the serious benchslap,..."
You seem to think she is the only judge to be benchslapped by an appellate court.
Several factors could support an "inexperienced and flailing" argument.
First, she was an unusually inexperienced and unaccomplished federal judicial nominee -- and has reportedly developed scant relevant experience in her time as a federal judge.
Second, she is part of a backwater bench, likely with relatively limited opportunities to seek help (informally) from more experienced and able judges. She was sent to Fort Pierce, I believe, instead of one of the major Florida judicial postings.
Third, after she botched a couple of early rulings, some judges might be inclined to avoid getting involved with her.
Fourth, didn't a couple (or few) of her clerks quit? Able, somewhat experienced clerks might not be the most important resource a federal judge should be relying on, but in this case it might be close to all she has going for her. And she doesn't even have that.
That doesn't explain all of her one-sided and substandard performance, but it could be responsible for much of the substandard part.
“Inexperienced, Overmatched, Flailing”? Sort of like Penn States Defenses the last 20 years
I’d LOVE to be wrong about this, obviously.]
Ya think?
I am pro-life, but the idea that a state can prohibit a woman from leaving a state and getting a legal abortion in another state is daft.
Agreed.
Yup. Same here. The reach of a state ends at its border.
The federal government already facilitates too much of this sort of thing, unconstitutionally, as Balisane notes above.
But must they let her come back?
Only if she re-impregnates.
Ah, I dig that Handmaid's Tale vibe! You guys must love that show, your future utopia!
The headline and lede here are wild overstatements of the case. Based on the prior article (and other coverage), the judge merely said that the case can go forward. In other words, it has survived the Motion to Dismiss stage. This case still has a long way to go.
How do you figure? There's no factual dispute here, and the court just held that the law can't be enforced: all that remains is for the plaintiffs to file a summary judgment motion.
Rossami, just a little tip, if you want to consider it. Among journalistic professionals the term has for decades been, “lead,” not, “lede.” The latter is more a field mark to identify amateurs trying to look in the know. It has a plausible-sounding explanation, which commends it to those who gravitate to plausibility as a substitute for finding out. As far back as, All the President’s Men, and even earlier, it was always, “lead.” You can look it up. Even in shops still using lintotype, which were commonplace as late as the early 1960s, I never saw anyone use, “lede.”
How do y’all feel about this at the national level? Can the US criminalize helping someone go overseas to do something that is legal there but illegal here?
Examples:
1. Helping someone to go to Iran to join the Al-Quds Force. That would include providing them contacts, introduction, tickets, etc.
2. Helping someone to travel to a country where the age of consent is 12, with specfic intent to take advantage of that, again providing contacts, introductions, etc.
3. Helping someone to go work on the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the preparatory work here to include (US legal non-classified) advanced training in physics, specifically coordinated with the HR director in NK.
My vague recollection was the the US did criminalize traveling to another country for the purpose of engaging in sex with people under some specified age...even when such a sexual act would have been legal in that other country. That was several decades ago, I believe.
I assume that, if that law passed judicial muster; it also would be possible to prosecute those (e.g., travel agents) who facilitated these types of trips, although of course you'd have to also show the bad intent for those 3rd parties. My arranging your illicit trip to Cambodia would be fine, if I'm just acting as a typical travel agent. Me knowing about the trip's purpose and helping you carry it out? I think I'd be legally exposed.
Thanks, San.
I guess my point is the court’s ruling has a lot of high-flown rhetoric about the right to travel, seek opportunity, etc. The difference when the national government does it (see also comment on Mann Act below) tells me that the rhetoric is maybe a bit phony. It’s really about, (1) keeping states from getting too big for their britches, and (2) being kind of soft on the activity in question, in this case abortion.
Both of which are fine, but I’m not seeing some grand vindication of the human right to travel, much as Somin and some of us would like to see it.
It seems hard to justify a right to travel that the United States can abrogate for essentially any reason – anything that can be criminalized, the United States can prohibit travel for purposes of doing that thing, whether or not legal in the destination state and whether or not the United States can prohibit it directly. Yet a state can’t do the same thing. At least not based on the Due Process Clause.
I can see some sort of Equal Protection argument (applicable only partially to the federal government, so there are some things the federal governemt can do but states can’t in that department). I can see some sort of structure-of-government argument.
But an individual rights argument based on Due Process? If there is a right to travel to jurisdictions where something is legal for the purpose of doing it, the Mann Act among many others ought to be unconstitutional.
Answer.
Yes, the US can criminalize such actions. And has in the past. And has prosecuted them.
18 U.S. Code § 1119 - Foreign murder of United States nationals - is a nice example.
But for something clearer cut...think about taxes on income earned by US nationals overseas. Uncle Sam still wants his cut.
Isn't the right to travel a right to inter*state* travel?
Two issues:
1) State jurisdiction is limited to the states' own territory, because you're only a resident of a state, but federal jurisdiction covers you no matter where you are, because you're a citizen of the country.
2) Don't expect federal courts to take seriously limits on the reach of federal power, when refusing to do so is one of the primary unofficial qualifications for the bench.
Not so. See Amendment 14 Sec. 1:
“All persons born in the umUnited States abd subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside.”
States are sovereigns, not just administrative provinces. As sovereigns, states have citizens, not just residents.
And states’ undelegated general police power means that their sovereign interest in their citizens’ health, safety, welfare, and morals is at least as strong as the federal government’s.
Now define "jurisdiction thereof".
Obviously, if Putin and Kim Jongs kids have a Lovechild, born one inch over the border in US territory that baby can grow up to be (probably a better) POTUS just like Sleepy Joe and Barry Hussein
That’s quite a big penumbra created around the P&I clause.
“As Eugene Volokh notes, yesterday, in Yellowhammer Fund v. Attorney General, a federal district court invalidated an Alabama law criminalizing assisting or facilitating the procurement of an out-of-state abortion by an Alabama resident.”
This gets the procedural posture of the case wrong, the judge’s decision wrong, and the applicable law wrong.
First, the federal district court in this case did not “invalidate” an Alabama law. This can be quickly seen by reading the first couple of pages of the opinion, or simply skipping to the end of the opinion.
From the opinion:
Second, there is no Alabama law “criminalizing assisting or facilitating the procurement of an out-of-state abortion by an Alabama resident.” The case involves Ala. Code § 26-23H-4, which makes it unlawful for any person to intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion except in the case of a medical emergency. At issue in this case is the Alabama Attorney General’s statement that “he would prosecute anyone who helped someone else obtain an out-of-state abortion under Alabama’s conspiracy laws” (p. 11-12).
But what does any of that stuff matter when your just trying to plug foot voting.
While it may be true that the District Court did not imvalidate a law or issue an injunction, I don’t think the opinion can be interpreted as anything other than a clear win for the plaintiffs on the legal merits of their claim. The District Court said the right to travel includes a right to travel for purposes of abortion and this right overrides any state law.
So it’s merely a matter of docket management that the court is deciding the legal questions related to the motion to dismiss before deciding other questions and issuing orders. The plaintiffs unequivocally won in federal District Court. Everything else is simply a matter of clean-up.
My gut reaction to that is that the Alabama AG is an idiot. And probably posturing stupidAF positions in the hopes of more name recognition and votes (also possibly a Trump judicial appointment). One can't just yell "conspiracy!" and have that be a crime. "Conspiracy" ... to do what act that is itself illegal?
What's next, Alabama? Am I going to be prosecuted for conspiring to have a good night out on the town with my friends, because "Conspiracy!"?
Well, the relevant statute (which isn’t specific to abortion) says that a> “conspiracy formed in [Alabama] to do an act beyond the state, which, if done in this state, would be a criminal offense, is indictable and punishable in this state in all respects as if such conspiracy had been to do such act in this state.” That does seem like it would cover this situation, doesn’t it?
So, the most likely outcome is that whole stupidity gets struck down.
I am betting that in order for that law to be constitutional, there would have to be a requirement that the conduct be illegal both in AL and the other state. Otherwise every bachelor party trip to Vegas organized in AL has been an illegal conspiracy.
For one, the procedural posture of this case is odd. There is no law in Alabama (or anywhere) forbidding interstate travel to get an abortion. The attorney general of Alabama, however, has made some comments that he might use the state's general ban on abortion to prosecute individuals who took women across state lines to procure abortions. No specific individual has been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution. Nevertheless, several abortion advocacy groups applied for an injunction. This ruling did not grant an injunction, but merely denied the AG's motion to dismiss on issues of standing, among other grounds.
But to the main point, one may observe that most "right to travel" restrictions struck down by courts are from the state one is entering, not the state one is exiting. (In fact, I can't think of a single case, though I imagine a few exist.) When a court strikes down, for example, a durational residency requirement for voting or an abortion or whatever, it does so because it discriminates between in-state and out-of-state residents. No such discrimination would exist here.
The proposed California "exit tax" on millionaires could be seen as impeding movement to a different state.
Nah. It's pro-travel. Encourages it. And lightens the load the traveler has to carry.
At least according to the opinion, the attorney general "stated that he would prosecute anyone who helped someone else obtain an out-of-state abortion under Alabama’s conspiracy laws."
So, does the same reasoning invalidate using the Mann Act in prostitution cases, when the destination state has decriminalized it?
Somehow I doubt it, which makes me wonder whether this was really about freedom of travel, or more about preserving federal supremacy.
I agree that "freedom of travel" is a shaky ground for this decision. It seems much more sensibly rooted in the logic that a) a state can't criminalize out-of-state conduct and b) a criminal conspiracy must contemplate a crime.
Question. The Supreme Court struck down direct federal criminalization of domestic violence on grounds directly policing non-economic interpersonal violence falls outside Congress’ enumerated powers. However, it left the law against traveling for purposes of engaging in domestic violence intact.
Suppose a state did not have laws against domestic violence. If it’s legal in the state, and since the federal government can’t prohibit it directly, does that mean the right to travel makes the law against traveling for purposes of domestic violence unconstitutional? Could enterprising tourism outfits start offering the Give Your Wife The Surprise of a Lifetime package?
They could, but they would go broke in about 30 minutes.
Imagine such a state exists, and tourism companies started offering these kinds of tours.
How long would it take for:
A. the legislature to pass DV laws? Do you think local hotels, restaurants, sports teams, museums, etc. would sit quietly by?
B. The word to spread that it is not safe for women to travel to those states with their husbands/partners.
C. Companies offering such tours to face boycotts of all their offerings?
D. Banks to refuse to finance these companies?
IOW, you are taking an (absurd) law school hypothetical and trying to make it a real life issue. This is one time when markets will work just fine, and quickly, to halt unacceptable practices.
I agree that the premises of ReaderY’s hypo aren’t very realistic, but why do think there would be a constitutional problem with this law anyway?
I'm far from certain either way
Would a federal law against traveling for the purpose of gambling be constitutional? (I realize federal gambling laws are a complex and not easily comprehensible mess, but let's just simplify and assume they don't exist at all.)
I think not. People have been going to Las Vegas for a long time without arousing lot of interest in prohibiting that. Not dispositive, as you guys say, but suggests that even the zealots see little hope for such legislation.
Is there a difference. Well, DV requires a victim. (So do many types of gambling, of course, but there the victim usually is the traveler himself, voluntarily presenting himself to be victimized.)
Maybe such a law would pass muster on the grounds that traveling for the purpose of committing DV sounds a lot like kidnapping. A bit complicated, maybe, but that makes sense to me.
Aren't child pornography laws constitutional on the presumption that there is an implied victim. How is this different?
No. Why would it?
Do you think the District Court was wrong? If not, how would you distinguish the two cases?
Because the U.S. government can criminalize conduct that occurs anywhere in the U.S., as long as it’s pursuant to a congressional grant of power and doesn’t violate constitutional rights. Alabama can’t necessarily criminalize conduct that doesn’t occur in Alabama.
"Because the U.S. government can criminalize conduct that occurs anywhere in the U.S., as long as it’s pursuant to a congressional grant of power and doesn’t violate constitutional rights."
By "congressional grant of power", do you mean a federal statute, or enumerated power granted Congress?
I meant an eneumearted grant of power.
I realize you don’t think congress has been granted the power at issue here, but I’m talking about about current doctrine.
Thanks for the answer. Then I agree, with the proviso that I severely disagree with a lot of current doctrine.
Could the United States require Oklahomans to pay a tax if they want to move to California?
That is, the right to travel doesn’t apply to the United States in its entirety? The United Stated can bar or restrict people from entering or exiting states or changing their state of residence?
If seems to me if the United states can’t do that, it would be only because the right to travel DOES apply to the united states. All of these hypotheticals are clearly interstate commerce and would fit in Congressional jurisdiction in the absence of a constitutional right or principle limiting them.
And if the right to travel permits Congress to make it illegal to travel to another state to do something legal in the state and outside Congress’ power to prohibit, why shouldn’t the same outcome apply to a state as well?
"Could the United States require Oklahomans to pay a tax if they want to move to California?"
The trouble with dreaming of hypotheticals that aren't applicable is that you cause additional issues.
The problem with this is that before you get into other issues, you get into the very issue of the tax itself. It is not an income tax (duh) and it certainly isn't an indirect tax subject to the rule of uniformity.
But yeah, the additional issue is that the right to travel is premised on the "privileges and immunities" clause, which is about the rights of citizens of a state being the same the the rights and citizens of other states, and is discussed in terms of states attempting to abridge it. Etc.
Your hypo is answered in your question, ReaderY.
The federal government can (and does) criminalize traveling interstate for purposes of engaging in domestic violence. So even if one state somehow did the unthinkable, that could still be handled by the Federal Government.
But let's assume we live in a world where both the Federal Government dropped the law, and a state did. Then to answer your question, no, another state could not criminalize the domestic violence that happened in ALABAMA (because of course the hypothetical state would be Alabama). Nor could they try and gin up a "conspiracy" charge since while there might be overt acts done in that state (planning to go to Alabama, etc.), there would be nothing unlawful about the act, so there is no predicate illegality.
However, a state CAN criminalize a conspiracy if (1) an overt act occurs in the state, and (2) the act is illegal in the state, even if the planning occurred in a state where it was legal.
So to get brass tacks, if someone was in New York (were abortion was legal) and was conspiring to help someone have an illegal in Alabama, and there was an overt act that occurred to further the conspiracy in Alabama, Alabama could go after the people who were conspiring, even if it was legal in the jurisdiction where they were conspiring.
Long story short- it's better to actually, you know, understand the issues than try to conjure fantastical hypotheticals.
If Alabama wishes to cure the defect in the law they should amend it to prohibit traveling out of state to have an abortion in a vehicle with an internal combustion engine.
EV's, or diesel-powered vehicles, would be OK?
Or suppose you take an ICE vehicle to the state line, and then walk across (or ride a bicycle a few feet)?
Diesel is internal combustion.
Steam locomotives are external combustion, and EV's are no combustion, at least not until they spontaneously combust.
Man is a Diesel Internal Combustion! What’s the compression ratio on one? 22:1? Had a 1978 Ford LTD Police package with a 460 Diesel, Ford didn’t offer a Diesel in the LTD? Mine would run for 2-3 minutes after shutting her off, that horrible 80’s gas
EVs are remote combustion, most of the time.
Except when they spontaneously combust?
https://futurism.com/the-byte/electric-cars-lighting-houses-on-fire
Its been pointed out IC cars are more likely to burn than EV's but EV fires are much harder to put out, and are much more toxic.
From your link:
"There's still no evidence that EVs catch fire at higher rates than gas-powered vehicles, the Post points out — though it didn't track down comprehensive data on the phenomenon."
Yes but not necessarily, I get my power from Nuclear, the Northwest and west has quite a bit of baseload hydro.
It depends on where you live.
Doesn't it always "depend"?
I like the ruling and its principle, but it implies other rulings and I wonder if they will follow.
For instance: Reason published decades ago a story on how Pennsylvania police would attempt to surveil the cars of Pennsylvanians visiting border towns in neighboring states, attempting to catch people who buy cheaper liquor and bring it home into Pennsylvania, which is a crime in PA. Can that law or that practice stand?
Well, Constiutional Amendment 21, Section 2, says
“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein, of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”
That would seem rather directly on point, wouldn’t it?
Exactly: Alcohol is, explicitly, subject to a kind of inverse dormant commerce clause.
Or, rather, "intoxicating liquors", doesn't actually specify alcohol. A state could probably get away with prohibiting the importation of a lot of things, so long as it could shoehorn them into "intoxicating liquors". Cough syrup, or liquid allergy medications, for instance.
Might have a bit of a legal fight on their hands if they tried defining "intoxicating liquor" to include Mifepristone, but they'd at least have an argument.
Oh come the frack on. Be remotely honest - possibly even textualist - for a hot minute.
Your hypo would require courts to accept that a solid pill is a "liquid", and that an FDA-approved medication with zero (or at least no remotely significant) brain activity is "intoxicating". You might as well add defining "up means down" and "the value of pi is integer 3" to your fantasy list.
So no, anyone clowninsh enough to file that would not "have an argument". They'd be fighting a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 ... and probably losing it.
Not a fan of PA police doing this. However, they are trying to catch people who possess something which (if I understand correctly) is illegal to possess in PA. In that case, it's not the travel or inducing to travel, etc., but the possession of something that is outlawed.
That's different than prohibiting people from going to NY, say, to drink and then coming back to PA without the illicit product.
I grant that the functional difference may be slight where PA cops are using travel to nearby NY towns as reasonable suspicion to stop cars (or as the actual reason for stops based on other pretexts). It's pretty crappy behavior by the police, I think, but doesn't involve the right to travel or First Amendment or other issues that were raised and dealt with in the Alabama case.
The alcohol isn't illegal. Having it without paying the local mafia protection money is.
You pass a constitutional amendment that gives states special powers over alcohol, you have to put up with states using those powers in ways you’d prefer they didn’t.
If they want a state monopoly to make sure liquor purchases are documented and taxes paid, rules enforced, workers paid fair wages amd competently selected, etc., etc., and incidentally prices are higher and income greater, well, the 21st Amendment gives them the right to do that. If you don’t like it, vote for legislators who will change it.
Don’t like the 21st Amendment giving states that much power? Try to get it amended. I don’t think you’d want it repealed.
Yes, of course. Pennsylvania was neither criminalizing travel nor criminalizing the purchase of the liquor. It was criminalizing bringing said liquor back into Pennsylvania.
There was a variation on that game back in the 80's when there were different drinking ages. I grew up and still live in PA very near the Ohio line. The age was 21 here and 18 there. A lot of teens would drive over to Ohio to a very popular and promoted nightclub. A lot of PA police would go over and make note of the cars in the parking lot with PA plates. The scam was to stop those cars coming back, not necessarily for DUI. What they were looking for was underage consumption which at the time was a basic $52.50 fine. It was a cash cow for local departments.
That actually seems like an example that is much more on-point: PA was issuing fines for conduct (the "underage consumption") that occurred in another state.
And I think that practice was bool and sheet for the exact same reason that Alabama's position is bool and sheet.
PA can prohibit "importing PA-untaxed booze into PA", but cannot prohibit "drinking PA-untaxed booze while in Ohio".
I admit I didn't see the point Rossami was trying to make there.
Apologies to Rossami, after further reading.
Yet:
While it may be true that the District Court did not imvalidate a law or issue an injunction, I don’t think the opinion can be interpreted as anything other than a clear win for the plaintiffs on the legal merits of their claim
Couldn't the red bible states just charge for the conduct up to the state line? Charges like maybe kidnapping, or transporting a child across state lines with intent to kill? There must be something that could be charged that is separate and apart from the actual abortion that happens in the legal state.
It is not a child (and a vial full of IVF material is not a nursery school or a group of hundreds of children), regardless of what you or other clingers think you read in a book of silly fairy tales or believe an illusory man in the sky whispered to you because you are special.
Were you educated in Alabama? Backwater religious schooling, maybe, in one of the most ignorant, bigoted states in America?
The Revolting Reverend obviously never learned about the birds and the bees
Are you one of those "personhood" freaks who wants to protect the zygote from the moment of conception (except when they don't, because superstition, dogma, and partisan polemics prevail against reason and logic in their minds)?
Humans a Human whether it 2 cells or Bullions and Bullions (ht C Sahel)
Peak dumbass.
That is the proposal under discussion, yes. According to this opinion, the answer is no.
So the "Man Act"'s possibly Unconstitutional????
Hey Now!!!!!!
Nobody tell Hunter
Frank
It's not surprising that wingnuts want to talk about Hunter Biden -- despite no apparent precipitate -- after the performances of Trump and Noem this week.
Carry on, bigoted clingers.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/new-york-proposes-crackdown-on-major-gun-company/ar-BB1lZgVW?ocid=msedgntp&pc=U531&cvid=816ec3409fb746f5a87bbf554a0785f3&ei=8
Okay, great, so they won't sell them in New York. These assholes will never stop.
Funny how nobody recognizes the comparison to the “Underground Railroad” of the 19th century. Except instead of taking peoples to freedom it's more like the trains to Treblinka.
Frank
For example, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment surely bars laws that punish people who publish and distribute speech, as well as the actual speakers.
That from Somin suggests he may have no clue about the traditional law of libel, which has always held publishers jointly liable with their contributors for damages resulting from defamation. And rightly so. Almost all the damage from a typical defamatory publication is inflicted by the activities of the publisher, not the contributor. A defamatory utterance left unrecorded and undistributed to a broad audience would typically prove no more damaging than a random remark made on a barstool.
Perhaps Somin can clarify. Is he distinguishing, "punish," from civil damages? What's going on? Is he trying to suggest Section 230 is Constitutionally mandatory?
Don't over-think it. He's just saying that it isn't just the original author of a book who's protected, it's also the printer, the binder, the people who truck the book around, the book stores, the buyers.
Freedom of the press, and freedom of speech, protect the whole ecosystem necessary for the right to be effective, not just the original writer or speaker. You can't just ban spending money on ink, and circumvent the right.
This is where Citizens United came in, after all: They tried to ban political speech they didn't want, by banning spending money to have it heard. The Court didn't buy that idea for a second.
This from Lathrop suggests he's both an arrogant twit who still mistakenly thinks that having run some obscure newspaper gives him an insight into the law, as well as a terrible reader. Prof. Somin's point was literally exactly the opposite of what Lathrop thinks. Prof. Somin's point was that publishers get the same protections that speakers do, that the government can't get around the 1A rights of speakers by targeting the people who distribute their speech.
No. He was making no point about libel.
Yeah, Nieporent, I get that context around the Somin quote somewhat supports the point you argue. But it is at least peculiar that Somin chose to put right in the middle of that context words which contradict his intended meaning as you see it. And then, you go on to do the same, with:
Prof. Somin’s point was that publishers get the same protections that speakers do, that the government can’t get around the 1A rights of speakers by targeting the people who distribute their speech.
Make no mistake. Publishers distribute the speech of contributors. The traditional law of libel, pre-Section 230, targeted publishers. They got liability for damaging consequences of false and defamatory utterances created by the publishers' contributors. That remained true even when the contributors couldn’t pay a dime.
And of course, libertarians like you assert that everyone ought to be free to lie with impunity, and publish the lies. We both agree that government should not be empowered with prior restraint. You assert, at least as a practical matter, that every person on earth should be at liberty to publish anything, with no constraint by anyone. That shows thinking ungoverned by experience, and misguided by axiomatic rationalism.
What you want is not just a question of law or policy, to be decided by a whim, by a guess, or worst of all by an axiomatic premise. It is in fact a practical impossibility which if attempted would drastically reduce the scope of expressive freedom by undermining real-world means to deliver it. I have explained that to you. But you insist again and again you are a legal expert about a subject you know only as a matter of law. That is another practical impossibility. The law must understand the activities it purports to govern, and on this subject you do not.
With both you and Somin presenting as doctrinaire libertarians, and you at least taking it to the extreme of pro-libel advocacy, I must take that comment by you as a deliberate misreading of the traditional law of libel. It wouldn't be the first time I have seen you try out a tendentious point, while posturing to proclaim it as binding legal authority. I think you are in bad faith when you do that here, because I doubt you would dare try it in court.
Yes, the same liability as the original speakers. Liability which is itself subject to limits by the First Amendment.
Prof. Somin was simply making the rather banal point that the government can't circumvent First Amendment protections by imposing limits or sanctions on people distributing speech that it couldn't impose directly on the people who created it. That's it. I recognize your monomaniacal obsession with abolishing § 230, the internet, and free speech so that we have more small town newspapers, but Prof. Somin doesn't share it and isn't leaving hidden codes for you. (He's monomaniacally obsessed about different things, and isn't subtle about it!)
This comment has my vote for winning the internet today. Well played.
Noscitur's comment was excellently precise and accurate.
Nova Layer, not accurate at all.
I advocate to use the internet instead of newspapers. Given economies from foregoing paper, printing, and physical distribution, it would be foolish to do otherwise. The point always should be maximally to expand expressive freedom.
Much lower entry costs and operating expenses create unprecedented opportunities. Bad policies have squandered those opportunities, and imposed unexpected damage on the public life of the nation. News gathering has dwindled. Defamation and frauds proliferate. Political discourse has become a cesspool. No means exists, or is even contemplated, to control bad faith attempts to use AI technology to poison and discourage public discourse on the internet. Unaccountable quasi-oligopolists sit astride choke points in the flow of public information, to nearly everyone's dismay.
No one doubts any of that. You ought to ditch anti-constructive complacency, and try instead to learn enough to help get better results out of the internet—better results for both expressive freedom, and public life.
Stephen,
You're missing the point that you completely misinterpreted Somin and, apparently based on his use of the word publisher, have gone off on a tangent wholly unrelated to the OP and not responsive to anything anyone has said to you.
You're having a conversation with yourself. And it's been based on a complete misinterpretation of Somin's original statement and the surrounding context (which was entirely consistent with the publishing example, though you tried to save face by claiming otherwise).
But sure, Stephen, we get you love the internet. My bad. The larger point remains that you are monomaniacally obsessed with the intersection of the Section 230, the internet, and the news. And Somin wasn't agreeing with you. Or disagreeing with you. You destroyed your credibility in this comment thread by interpreting Somin exactly the opposite of the clear meaning of both his words and their context. As well as by bloviating about unrelated subjects while making the worst possible assumptions about others' views.
It's not a good look, Stephen.
No; you advocate to use the Internet instead of newsprint. Your point is purely a technological one. You still detest individual speech and want to severely cabin it because of your hysterical fear of defamation, while empowering professional members of the news media to decide what speech will be distributed.
…of newspaper publishers. Not anyone else.
If a bright young law type person wanted to make his/her bones, perhaps devoting their career to cementing the constitutional right to travel and stop this pernicious idea that car registration is a cow to be milked and a driver's license is a stick to be wielded to beat compliance into people who've engaged in disfavored conduct that has nothing to with the ability to safely pilot a vehicle on the public roadways.
Don Kates was the 2nd Amendment guy. Who will take up his mantle with this basic right?
What if the state says you just can't use plane, train, or automobile?
The USSC has already said - regarding no fly lists - that you have a r right to travel, just not a right to access specific forms of travel.
Also, isn't it federally illegal to travel to Amsterdam to do drugs?