Today in Supreme Court History: March 28, 1955

3/28/1955: Williamson v. Lee Optical decided.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (decided March 28, 1949): Krulewitch and a woman brought another woman across state lines for prostitution. They were arrested for conspiracy under the White Slave Traffic Act and Krulewitch’s partner told the prostitute that “it would be better for us girls to take the blame” rather than Krulewitch. At Krulewitch’s trial the prostitute’s testimony as to this statement (hearsay) is not admissible as a declaration of guilt because not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (decided March 28, 1966): Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman, civil rights activists, were lynched in 1964 near Philadelphia, Mississippi (which since then has been a symbolic place for politicians to give speeches). The Court here holds that the nonofficial men who assisted the Deputy Sheriff in the abduction and murder were “acting under color of state law” and could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §242 (the criminal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. §1983).

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (decided March 28, 1955): not a denial of Equal Protection for Oklahoma to regulate opticians but not drug stores selling ready-to-wear glasses

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (decided March 28, 1898): Fourteenth Amendment bestows citizenship on nonwhite children born here to foreign-born parents domiciled here

United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (decided March 28, 1921): prior Mexican grant, not California claim to submerged land, determined ownership of North Island and surroundings (eminent domain by the United States to become a naval air station, still in existence, though island was later joined to the mainland)

Sester v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (decided March 28, 2012): dual sovereignty not violated by federal sentence (for meth possession) to run concurrently with anticipated state sentence (for probation violation)

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (decided March 28, 2000): anonymous tip (that 16-year-old black man on corner in plaid shirt was carrying a gun) was too vague to support Terry stop where no other evidence of illegal conduct (vacating conviction for carrying concealed weapon without license)

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (decided March 28, 1995): color of press pads (used in dry cleaning) could be trademarked (such that competitor using same color might confuse dry cleaners)

Clemmons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (decided March 28, 1990): Due Process and Eighth Amendment not violated by state appellate court salvaging death sentence arrived at by invalid aggravating factor by reweighing proper factors or conducting harmless error review, but it has to say which one of these it is doing

United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (decided March 28, 1978): Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951, covers all extortion, not just “racketeering” (which is mentioned in legislative history but not the statute); affirming conviction of solitary man who got money from bank president by threat of force (I wonder if it would cover Dick York’s actions against Philip Coolidge in the Alfred Hitchcock Presents episode, “The Dusty Drawer”?)

[SMP0328]

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (decided March 28, 1955): not a denial of Equal Protection for Oklahoma to regulate opticians but not drug stores selling ready-to-wear glasses

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (decided March 28, 1898): Fourteenth Amendment bestows citizenship on nonwhite children born here to foreign-born parents domiciled here

I wonder why Josh highlights Williamson, rather than Wong Kim Ark. Today, Wong Kim Ark is clearly the more important decision.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Josh wears glasses. He’s not a nonwhite child of immigrants.

(that’s my guess)

[F.D. Wolf]

How do you measure the "importance" of a decision? Per FastCase, Wong Kim Ark has been cited by courts 324 times. Williamson, though decided nearly 60 years later, has been cited more than 2100 times.

[I woke up when Hillary talked about Reconstruction]

Yes, one should be able to express one’s self without a further inquiry into motive. but government? What that does is point out to evil folk that if they want something done that couldn’t be directly done (because its evil intent would be obvious) can be done by government.

I wait to see whether Gov Newsom really enacted a law about minimum wage to help out a donor, but that would be exactly what I think this ruling gets wrong.

===============
California Gov. Gavin Newsom Signs Bill To Carve Out Exemptions for New Minimum Wage Law Following ‘PaneraGate’ Scandal
Apparently if you work fast food at the airport, a hotels or casino, you don’t need a ‘living wage’

One more thing: Maybe those Pizza delivery guys will now legally deliver at their normal wage but from airports .

[apedad]

Re: Sester v. United States

Facts of the case

On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court.

Question

Did the district court err by directing that petitioner's federal sentence be served consecutively to a state sentence that had not yet been imposed?

Conclusion (6 - 3)

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the lower court's decision. The Court determined that the federal judge had discretion to order a federal sentence to run consecutively or concurrently with an anticipated state sentence. The Court found nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act which foreclosed the federal judge's authority to make such a decision and noted that judges have traditionally had broad authority to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Breyer argued that a federal judge does not have the power to order that a federal sentence run consecutively or concurrently with a state sentence that has yet to be imposed. Breyer noted that nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act explicitly granted federal judges that power. Furthermore, after discussing the history and purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, Breyer concluded that the Court's decision was contrary to the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act. (oyez)

IANAL but I agree with the dissent here.

How can a federal judge impose a requirement on a state court?

[Dan Schiavetta]

I don’t see how this is imposing anything on the state court. If anything it is subjugating the federal court to what the state court does; if the state court decides not to impose any kind of sentence (and instead, say, imposes a fine) the federal court’s order arguably becomes moot.